Indian Philosophy Beyond India:
A Reconsideration of Vaiśeṣika 勝論
and Its Sources in East Asia

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Indian Philosophy Beyond India:
A Reconsideration of Vaiśeṣika 勝論 and Its Sources in East Asia

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ABSTRACT

This paper deals with non-Buddhist Indian philosophy in East Asia, a subject that has received comparatively little attention from scholars, though there is a vast amount of East Asian material that contains information on Indian thought. The discussion focuses on the interpretations and sources pertinent to one particular school, Vaiśeṣika. Vaiśeṣika, in Indian philosophy, is famous for its theory of primordial principles (padārthas), aiming to explain the universe on a naturalistic basis. The primary source associated with this school in East Asia is Daśapadārthī 勝宗十句義論, a Vaiśeṣika text translated from Sanskrit by Xuánzàng 玄奘 in 648. However, there are numerous other relevant passages and references to Vaiśeṣika scattered over hundreds of East Asian Buddhist texts. On top of that, during the Japanese Edo period (eighteenth–nineteenth centuries), dozens of direct commentaries were written on Daśapadārthī. Thus, concerning the plurality of sources on Vaiśeṣika in East Asia, this paper puts forward two arguments. First, although there are other unique East Asian sources on Vaiśeṣika, scholars have overwhelmingly based their analysis on Daśapadārthī treated solely as an Indian text, to the neglect of the intellectual framework of East Asia. This argument is put forward via a bibliographical analysis of previous scholarship on the topic. Second, Daśapadārthī, together with other East Asian textual materials discussing or referring to Vaiśeṣika, constitute a unique East Asian interpretative tradition for Vaiśeṣika. In making this argument, I distinguish three consecutive stages for the reception of Vaiśeṣika in East Asia and describe peculiar features of Vaiśeṣika within each.

Keywords: Vaiśeṣika 勝論, Daśapadārthī 勝宗十句義論, East Asia 東亞, Maticandra-Candramati 慧月, Tīrthika 外道, Xuánzàng 玄奘, Consciousness-Only school 唯識宗, Edo period 江戸時代
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1 The Subject, Aim, and Argument of the Paper

The term “Indian philosophy” is understood as covering all the doctrines and teachings that originated within the boundaries of historical India and informed by intellectual prowess congenerous with philosophy in the West. But apart from historical India, some forms of Indian thought, like Buddhism, spread and became indigenized teachings in the entirety of East and Southeast Asia. However, as concerns non-Buddhist Indian philosophy (for example, the six darśanas), it is usually only discussed and implicitly regarded as belonging to the Indian context because its teachings never visibly spread outside India. Non-Buddhist Indian philosophy is represented in India through various schools known as darśanas (literally “views”). The six enumerated darśanas, which include Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mimāṃsa, and Vedānta (including its various subschools, such as Advaita). Vaiśeṣika, the darśana highlighted in this paper, founded by the mythical sage Kaṇāda, is known mainly for its theory of primordial principles (padārthas) that explains the universe in a naturalistic manner. Vaiśeṣika or any other darśana these days is investigated almost exclusively based on Indian texts.

The situation regarding two of the darśanas, Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika, is rather complicated.

1 The doctrines and teachings usually enumerated as belonging to Indian philosophy include the Brahmanic darśanas and Buddhist and Jain thought, as well as the doctrines of Islamic philosophy. The last-named rose to prominence from the twelfth century onwards.

2 I take this expression from Jonardon Ganeri (2017, 10–11).

3 By East Asia, I primarily mean historical China, Korea, and Japan.

4 The majority of books written in Western languages about non-Buddhist Indian philosophy tend to use only Indian sources, however, books about the same topic written in Chinese or Japanese almost never fail to highlight the pertinent information that is preserved in East Asian sources. Compare, e.g., specific descriptions of Vaiśeṣika by Hé (2018, 1–28) or Kanakura (1962, 140–141) with Kumāra (2013, 1–7; 2019, passim).

5 The darśana of Yoga seems to have had a greater impact outside historical India as well. This can be attested by at least two known texts: Kitāb Bātanğal, an Arabic version of Pātañjalayogaśāstra, authored by Perso-Muslim polymath Al-Birūni at the beginning of the eleventh century (Maas and Verdon 2018), as well as Dharma Pātañjala, an Old Javanese text, known from the fifteenth-century codex that adopted a variety of Pātañjala Yoga (Acri 2011). However, the latter texts of Yoga are only known from a few manuscripts. In contrast, the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika texts of Suvarṇasaptati and
East Asian Buddhist text catalogs (as early as the seventh century⁶) and text collections (大藏經; as early as the tenth century⁷) routinely include Chinese translations of two texts that are non-Buddhist. These are an early Sāṃkhya text, Suvarṇasaptati (金七十論 T.2137), as well as a doctrinally and structurally uncommon Vaiśeṣika text, Vaiśeṣika Daśapadārthī 勝宗十句義論 (T.2138, hereafter abbreviated as Daśapadārthī). The original Sanskrit versions of both texts are lost⁸ as are the circumstances of and motivation for the translations.

This situation calls for scholarly attention and implies various questions: how did these non-Buddhist texts and other related materials function in a new civilizational context? Did they have any impact on the development of Chinese Buddhism or other East Asian systems of thought? How were they received and interpreted? Why were these texts chosen for translation into Chinese by Buddhist masters? To summarize, the paper's subject is East Asian Buddhist textual materials containing information on non-Buddhist Indian philosophy that usually receives less attention from scholars than the Sanskrit materials from India. The article specifically focuses on the interpretation and analysis of materials that are pertinent to Vaiśeṣika.

The aim and argument of the article are twofold:

1. To review the previous scholarship on the topic, delineating the key contributors and contributions to the field. This review culminates in the first of my arguments: the dominant research approach towards Vaiśeṣika in East Asia has been based primarily on Daśapadārthī, treating it solely as an Indian text and largely neglecting the context of the intellectual framework of East Asia and its unique sources on Vaiśeṣika.

2. To put forth an alternative approach toward Vaiśeṣika that integrates its multiplicity of East Asian sources. This approach conveys my second argument: Daśapadārthī, together with


⁸ The tentative reconstructions of Suvarṇasaptati and Daśapadārthī from Chinese to Sanskrit were respectively made by Aiyaswami Sastri (Sastri 1944) and most recently by Miyamoto Keiichi (Miyamoto 1996, 2007).
other East Asian textual materials discussing or referring to Vaiśeṣika, constitutes a unique East Asian interpretative heritage for Vaiśeṣika. I develop this argument with (a) a discussion of the intellectual tradition of Vaiśeṣika; (b) a presentation of three consecutive stages for the historical reception of Vaiśeṣika in East Asia, which culminated in the evolution of a unique East Asian Vaiśeṣika tradition; (c) a description of the most peculiar features (in terms of content) of Vaiśeṣika within these three stages.

2 REVIEW OF THE PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP

2.1 Vaiśeṣika as “The Outside Path” 外道

The first step in examining the history of scholarly inquiry into Vaiśeṣika in East Asia should be a review from the perspective of wàidào 外道, which is translated as “the heterodox teaching” or literally “the outside path.” This is the broad category that was historically applied by East Asian Buddhists to non-Buddhist Indian thinkers. The term, which displays an obvious bias, was used consistently by East Asian Buddhists until the very end of the nineteenth century when the phrase “Indian philosophy” replaced it. The teachings included under the wàidào label were primarily the views of six non-Buddhist masters (Pūrṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gośāla, Ajita Kesakambali, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Niganṭha Nātaputta, Sañjaya Belatthiputta) and the followers of Sāṃkhya 數論, Vaiśeṣika 勝論, Jains 尼乾子, Ājīvikas 邪命外道, Lokāyatika 順世外道, and Maheśvara 大自在天. Other well-known darśanas of non-Buddhist Indian philosophy like Yoga, Nyāya, Mimāṃsā, and Vedānta are less distinguished in East Asian Buddhist texts.

The pioneer systematizers of East Asian materials on non-Buddhist Indian philosophy, by Western standards of scholarship, were the first generation of Meiji (1868–1912) scholars.9 The most prominent among them, Inoue Enryō 井上 円了 (1858–1919), published an entire book dedicated to the subject, The Philosophy of the Outside Path 外道哲學 (Inoue 1897). Inoue discussed non-Buddhist Indian ideas in a new fashion. His methodology included not only detailed classifications of the

9 For a more detailed treatment of the topic as well as the enumeration of the Meiji scholars and their works on non-Buddhist Indian philosophy, refer to Ideno 2013, especially pp. 99–109.
doctrines from Indian science and philosophy but also employed novel Western terms to present the work within the context of the global history of ideas. The work introduced non-Buddhist Indian philosophy as found in East Asian sources (regarding Vaiśeṣika, refer to: Inoue 1897, 491–518) as a subject worthy of study in its own right.

However, the Meiji scholars' investigation of non-Buddhist Indian philosophy based on East Asian materials was not necessarily premised on the intrinsic value of these materials. Instead, it emerged as a result of a combination of a lack of Sanskrit knowledge and limited access to original Sanskrit sources. This situation changed with the gradual Sanskritization of Japanese Buddhist studies, which was initiated by Nanjō Bunyū 南条文雄 (1849–1927). As a result of this new trend, scholars adopted the ad fontes approach, giving preference to Sanskrit sources of Indian Philosophy and leaving East Asian materials on non-Buddhist Indian philosophy aside (Hayashi 2014, 20–22; Stortini 2020, 1–10).

The next scholar crucial in the history of the scholarship on this subject is Tāng Yòngtóng 汤用彤 (1893–1964), one of the most notable Chinese scholars of Indian philosophy and Buddhism of the twentieth century. In the epilogue of the second edition of his book A Brief History of Indian Philosophy 印度哲学史略 (1960), Tāng informed readers about his intention to collect and edit materials about Indian philosophy preserved in Chinese Buddhist translations and original Chinese Buddhist works (Tāng 1988 [1960], 169–170; Gōng 1985, 52). However, he did not complete his project before his death. A book based on Tāng's manuscripts was published in 1994 with the name Historical Materials of Indian Philosophy in the Chinese Buddhist Scriptures 汉文佛经中的印度哲学史料 (Tāng 1994). The latter is the most recent and comprehensive book to classify non-Buddhist Indian philosophy sources from East Asia. Unlike Inoue's book, it does not provide interpretations. Rather, it separately lays out relevant passages (including many on Vaiśeṣika) in the original Chinese under various headings, making the book a handy tool for searching through the materials in question.10

10 For further discussion, refer to articles by Gōng and Yáo (Gōng 1985; Yáo 2005) and especially to the book by Yán (2019, 163–235).
Several publications dealing with the topic are known (Ideno 2013: 101), including some from such well-known scholars as Murakami Senshō (Murakami 1888), Nanjō Bunyū (Nanjō 1892), and Watanabe Matajirō (Watanabe 1894–1895). In general, apart from a few exceptions (e.g., Frauwallner 1955), the research on Vaiśeṣika in East Asia has principally been conducted by Japanese scholars. But, since the middle of the twentieth century, more Chinese scholars have entered the field and made significant contributions.

2.2 Scholarship on Daśapadārthī 勝宗十句義論

The most prominent research trend regarding Vaiśeṣika in East Asia from the earliest publications until now has remained within the realm of delineating the Daśapadārthī text. The single most notable contribution, which opened the field to the English-speaking world, is the doctoral thesis by Ui Hakuju 宇井伯寿 (1882–1963), published in the form of a book named The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy According to the Daśapadārthaśāstra (Ui 1917). The book offered the first translation of the Daśapadārthī Chinese text (Ui 1917, 93–119; seemingly based on the two editions: Ui 1917, 254) into English and provided a lengthy introduction (1–91) with comprehensive notes (121–224). It also featured information on Vaiśeṣika from both Chinese Buddhist and Sanskrit materials. The book was enormously influential for Vaiśeṣika studies because Ui undertook the task of reconstructing the historical development of the Vaiśeṣika school, which he based on the relatively fixed chronology of Chinese sources that referred to Vaiśeṣika ideas. As is well known, most Chinese Buddhist texts, translators, and thinkers can be assigned comfortably precise dates that function as the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem, thus helping determine a timeline for Sanskrit texts and their authors.

Following this chronological method, Ui ascertained the period for the supposed author of the Daśapadārthī text, Maticandra 慧月 (alternatively spelled as 惠月), in addition to another thinker of crucial importance for the Vaiśeṣika school, Praśastapāda. Determining which thinker came before the other has become the most debated problem in the field. Ui argued that Praśastapāda lived before Maticandra, in the period of 501–550 or 450–500 (18) and Maticandra in 550–640 (10).\(^n\)

\(^n\) After the publication of the book, Ui changed his scholarly focus, and his later Japanese works provide little new information on East Asian Vaiśeṣika (see: Ui 1990a (1926), 419–594; Ui 1990b (1932), 176–191).
Another prominent scholar in the area is Erich Frauwallner (1898–1974). In 1955, he published an article entitled “Candramati und sein Dasapadarthasastram” (Frauwallner 1955). He also introduced his position on the topic in the second volume of his Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie (Frauwallner 2003 [1956], 122–123). Frauwallner's main idea revolves around a critique of Ui's argument that dated Praśastapāda earlier than Maticandra (Frauwallner prefers the name Candramati to Maticandra). Frauwallner reversed the order, dating Maticandra to 450–550 and Praśastapāda to 550–600 (Frauwallner 1955, 221). Frauwallner also claimed that Maticandra was a pioneer thinker who managed to reform the older philosophy of Vaiśeṣika by emphasizing and reworking the theory of padārthas, at the expense of other doctrines. Still, according to Frauwallner, the reformulation of Vaiśeṣika by Maticandra was not generally accepted, which is why Praśastapāda's work returned Vaiśeṣika to a more orthodox form (Frauwallner 1955, 220–222).

However, Frauwallner's position was never unanimously recognized, leaving the problem unresolved. In a move to clarify this debate, Kanakura Enshō 金倉圓照 (1896–1987) scrutinized both sides. After reviewing the internal and external arguments concerning the contents of both Daśapadārthī and Praśastapāda's Padārthadharmasamgraha (Kanakura 1971, 273–294), Kanakura concluded that it is hard to tell the relationship between the two authors and their works and that their relationship was more likely contemporaneous than sequential (296–297). Kanakura directly rebuked the linguistic arguments made by Frauwallner. For example, Frauwallner claimed that the relative paucity of information provided by Daśapadārthī in comparison to Padārthadharmasamgraha explains the early date of the former (Frauwallner 1955, 205–206). Kanakura responded that the contrary could also be true since it may indicate that Maticandra used abbreviations to exclude excessive information and provide a more precise definition (Kanakura 1971, 285–286). Kanakura's evaluation has created a stalemate in this debate, at least temporarily.

Daśapadārthī was translated for the first time into Japanese by Nakamura Hajime 中村元 (1982 [1960], 529–570). Although Nakamura did not devote much attention to Daśapadārthī or East Asian Vaiśeṣika in his extensive body of works, his Japanese translation of Daśapadārthī and particularly the rich supplementary notes to the text are enough to include Nakamura among the influential contributors to the scholarship. Furthermore, the section of his introductory article that
deals with the extant Daśapadārthī commentaries in Japan is one of the most detailed overviews of the topic (524–528).

Several Chinese scholars made significant contributions to the investigation of Daśapadārthī. The already referenced Tāng Yòngtóng published the Daśapadārthī text, compiled with notes from contemporaneous Chinese Buddhist masters, which situated this particular reading of the Daśapadārthī within an East Asian context (Tāng 1994, 189–208). In his master’s thesis, Yáo Wèiqún defended his analysis of the philosophical questions within Daśapadārthī by relying on both Indian and East Asian sources on Vaiśeṣika (Yáo 2001 [1981], 377–423).

To the best of my knowledge, there have been three attempts to render the Chinese translation of Daśapadārthī back into Sanskrit (or restore the original Sanskrit). The first one was made by Karunesh Shukla in 1962–1965 and published in The Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute (Shukla 1962–1965). The second translation came from Uma Ramana Jhā (Jhā 1977, 1–24), complete with an elucidating introduction (1–16; note the separate numbering for the opening) and annotations (25–43). However, there is some overlap with Ui’s study. The third Sanskrit translation-reconstruction is part of the most recent and widely acclaimed study on this subject, written by Miyamoto Keiichi 宮元啓一 (Miyamoto 1996). The book presented three novelties: (1) a Sanskrit reconstruction; (2) a new English translation (167–251); (3) a Chinese edition based on five earlier versions (255–278). Additionally, it contained ten articles on the various problems of early Vaiśeṣika. However, altogether, the book did not propose any novel arguments concerning Daśapadārthī.

Miyamoto modified his approach in his later publications, such as an article about a new Japanese Daśapadārthī translation (Miyamoto 1997), a book with detailed commentary (Miyamoto 1999), as well as a revised English translation with eight articles (2007). In his last two books, Miyamoto adopted the logic of Frauwallner by placing Maticandra before Praśastapāda, and even earlier than Frauwallner’s estimate, that is, in the period of 350–450 (Miyamoto 1999, 22, 26) or at the beginning of the fifth century (Miyamoto 2007, 3). The arguments adduced by Miyamoto mostly follow the analysis of various aspects of the contents of Daśapadārthī, Padārthadharmasamgraha, and other non-Vaiśeṣika texts (Miyamoto 1999, 25–26; Miyamoto 2007, 57–125). Yet many arguments remain susceptible to the same critique given by Kanakura.

Miyamoto pointed out three crucial characteristics of the extant Chinese text of Daśapadārthī...
(translated by Xuánzàng 玄奘) that had yet to be clearly articulated by earlier scholars: 1) translation errors made by Xuánzàng; 2) Xuánzàng's decision to do a literal translation because of the obscurity of the text; and (3) noting and correcting other typos and omissions introduced by scribes throughout the years (Miyamoto 1997, 1; Miyamoto 1999, 27, 34). All of these observations from Miyamoto are of great value to scholars interested in this subject.

Lastly, the most recent scholar in the field is Hé Huānhuān 何欢欢. In her book, which contains a Chinese translation of Candrānanda's Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti, the author thoughtfully summarizes Daśapadārthī studies (Hé 2018, 34–37, 65–67). She has also recently authored an updated critical edition of a Daśapadārthī Chinese text with explanatory comments (Hé, “Shèngzōng Shǐyùyìlùn” Jiàoshì [unpublished manuscript]).

2.3 Other Research on East Asian Vaiśeṣika

In addition to Daśapadārthī, numerous other East Asian Buddhist texts contain passages with references to Vaiśeṣika. Tāng (1994, 4–5, 183–237) and Huáng Xīnchuān 黄心川 (1983, 245; 1989, 361–362) provide enumerated lists of the most salient components of these texts. Few of these passages have been studied with a specific focus on Vaiśeṣika. A prominent example from the group of publications that meaningfully employed these materials in their study of Vaiśeṣika is the study by Ui (1917, 2–9, 38–64, 66–80, etc.). There is also an article by Adachi Tōshihide 安達俊英 that examines the development of the Vaiśeṣika theory of ātman relying on these materials (Adachi 1994). Other studies that refer to passages on Vaiśeṣika, as a rule, do not aim at specifically investigating Vaiśeṣika in East Asia but mainly synthesize books that deal with Indian philosophy in general and make casual use of the information. These books were either written in Japanese during the Meiji (1868–1912) and Taishō (1912–1926) periods or in Chinese, and remain in publication today (e.g., Kimura 1917, 297–381; Sūn 2015, 288–289, 298, 308–310). However, there are various articles or theses that in one way or another touch upon Vaiśeṣika as described in East Asian Buddhist texts (e.g., Yáo 2000, 2005, 2006; Qín 2011; Cài 2017; Brewster 2018). Although they provide little critical analysis, the Mochizuki 望月 (Mochizuki 1958–1960, 245a–b, 2234a–2235c, 2639c–2640a, 28i8b–28i9c, etc.) and Fó Guāng 佛光 (1988, 409, 486i, 4869, 6412, etc.) dictionaries contain the most informative entries on the topic among East Asian encyclopedias.
Scholars have rarely investigated the increased popularity of Vaiśeṣika during the Japanese Edo period (1603–1868). This period witnessed the emergence of dozens of direct commentaries on *Suvarṇasaptati* and, most importantly, *Daśapadārthī*. Ui, in his 1917 book, mentioned eleven such commentaries on *Daśapadārthī*, although he consulted only two later ones (Ui 1917, 11). *Explanatory Dictionary of the Buddhist Books 仏書解説大辞典* (Ono 1933–1936, 5:157, 356–357) lists fifteen different commentaries. Nakamura provided perhaps the most detailed overview of these commentaries (Nakamura 1982 [1960], 524–528). Nakamura also recorded fifteen commentaries (although the list does not altogether match with the *Dictionary*) and succinctly described some of their particularities.

Furthermore, Nakamura pointed out two important things regarding these commentaries. First, they reveal a new attitude from Edo-period scholars that could be likened to the ethos of the humanist movement in the Western World (fifteenth–sixteenth centuries) that deviated from medieval theology. According to Nakamura, these fifteen commentaries demonstrated a new way of thinking among Buddhists that was more characteristic of modern times. Second, he called for more research explicitly investigating whether the commentaries reflect a diffusion between Buddhist idealism (which, according to Nakamura, was the dominant position among schools at that time) and Vaiśeṣika realism. Did Edo Japanese Buddhists raise these questions while commentating on *Daśapadārthī* (Nakamura 1982 [1960], 526–527)?

One could say that the question raised by Nakamura has yet to receive any scholarly reception. To my knowledge, only one scholar explicitly published on the topic, Hōjō Kenzō 北條賢三. Hōjō wrote a concise summary on the Edo commentaries about Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya (Hōjō 1983, 255–256), and two articles about (perhaps) the earliest extant *Daśapadārthī* commentary, authored in 1752 by Hōjū Chidō 法住智幢 (Hōjō 1978a; 1978b). Even though there are no other scholars who published on the *Daśapadārthī* commentaries, Okitsu Kaori 興津香織 has been investigating and writing about the Edo commentaries on *Suvarṇasaptati* for more than ten years now. Based on the premise that what holds for Sāṃkhya, to a great extent, holds for Vaiśeṣika, one can gain plenty of insights by consulting her articles (e.g., Okitsu 2005; 2016; 2018).

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12 One of them is noted on the page of errata and addenda of that book.
2.4 Conclusion and Evaluation of the Literature

In reviewing the existing studies about Vaiśeṣika based on East Asian texts, it becomes clear that the efforts of researchers have mainly been devoted to Daśapadārthī, without paying much attention to other existing East Asian Vaiśeṣika materials. There are obvious reasons for this situation. First, Daśapadārthī provides a lucid and complete exposition of Vaiśeṣika ideas, while other Buddhist texts give scattered, partial, and more obscure presentations. Second, the Daśapadārthī commentaries from Edo Japan (most of them in the form of manuscripts) remain inaccessible to many scholars. Nevertheless, the researcher might overcome both of these obstacles by shifting from the paradigm of studying Indian philosophy solely from the Sanskrit sources to a more favorable approach to all East Asian Vaiśeṣika material. In the latter case, one would be motivated to explore the East Asian materials as valuable testimonies of specific ways of thinking about Vaiśeṣika by East Asian Buddhists.

To illustrate this approach in the context of Daśapadārthī, I argue that there have been two ways of approaching the text:

First, to approach Daśapadārthī separately from other contemporaneous Chinese Buddhist texts and to treat it only within the Indian context of Vaiśeṣika (e.g., comparing it with Padārthadharmasamgraha). Miyamoto Keiichi and most other scholars have pursued this strategy. The second way is to interpret Daśapadārthī within the East Asian Buddhist context, treating the book not only as belonging to historical India but also to East Asia. This approach was partly initiated by Ui Hakuju and upheld by Tāng.

I presume that the ad fontes paradigm has justified the first approach. It presupposes that the only “authentic” Vaiśeṣika can be traced back to the known sources (i.e., in Sanskrit), disregarding East Asian interpreters whenever they deviated from the “orthodox” interpretations. Ui thought that Edo commentaries have many examples of misreading and misunderstanding that come as a result of transmission and culturally biased interpretations, mostly introduced by the third Consciousness-Only School 唯識宗 of master Zhīzhōu 智周 (668–723) (Ui 1917, 11, the first footnote). Miyamoto generally followed the same approach, arguing that the Edo commentaries are preposterous and of no educational value (Miyamoto 1999, 34). This approach ultimately discouraged further research focused on the many other East Asian Vaiśeṣika sources.
The second approach to Daśapadār̥thi, I would argue, has yet to be explored in sufficient depth. It entails the investigation of other Chinese materials that referred to Vaiśeṣika before and after the translation of Daśapadār̥thi. This approach would demand the scholar pay attention to East Asian interpreters, not judging whether they were right or wrong but, rather, accepting their interpretations and understanding the reasoning behind them, which might reveal the peculiar reception of Vaiśeṣika ideas in East Asia.

In this paper, I follow the latter approach, which aims at recovering the historical link between various Vaiśeṣika ideas. It is important to situate these ideas in both their earliest appearance in the East Asian Buddhist scriptures (i.e., the translation of Daśapadār̥thi into Chinese) and the Edo commentaries. Altogether, these constitute the East Asian Vaiśeṣika tradition.

3 THE EAST ASIAN VAIŚEṢIKA TRADITION AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS

3.1 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF VAIŚEṢIKA AS REFERRED TO IN EAST ASIAN SOURCES

In this paragraph, I sketch the problematization of Vaiśeṣika in East Asia up to the middle of the nineteenth century. From a linguistic point of view, all the information about Vaiśeṣika in East Asia is unique because, unlike in India, where the language of Vaiśeṣika texts was Sanskrit, the ideas about Vaiśeṣika in East Asia were conveyed primarily in Classical or Buddhist Chinese. However, apart from this apparent difference, concerning the originality of the contents of such information, I would distinguish two main variants of thought on the matter:

1. There is unique information about Vaiśeṣika in East Asia that is not included in the existing Indian sources.

2. The information about Vaiśeṣika in East Asia is equivalent to the information known from the existing Indian sources.

By the phrases “as known from India” and “Indian sources,” I primarily mean that most of the sources we have on Vaiśeṣika originate in historical India, written in Sanskrit. But it is also essential to
mention the abundance of Buddhist sources produced in ancient Tibet and written in Tibetan. They also record some pertinent information on Vaiśeṣika, mostly translated as *bye brag pa*.

Yet no separate treatise of Vaiśeṣika was translated into Tibetan, mirroring the situation of *Dāsapadārthī* in East Asia. Moreover, the translations in Tibetan started much later than in Chinese; thus, one might assume that Tibetan sources provide less original information about Vaiśeṣika than East Asian sources and, therefore, separate them into different studies. In addition to Sanskrit and Tibetan, there were also materials on Vaiśeṣika written in other Indo-Aryan languages, like Apabhraṃśa. As far as the scholarship of Vaiśeṣika is concerned, these materials either do not provide much original information or have not been studied adequately.

I propose a further differentiation of the East Asian sources that should give some clue as to the uniqueness of the information about Vaiśeṣika in East Asia. Herein, I distinguish three classes of East Asian texts that refer to Vaiśeṣika, either explicitly or implicitly:

1. Sources referring to Vaiśeṣika that have extant Sanskrit (or Tibetan) text equivalents (e.g., *Pudgalaviniścaya*阿毘達磨俱舍論, T.1558).
2. Sources referring to Vaiśeṣika that presumably had Sanskrit (or Tibetan) equivalents that are not extant (e.g., *Śataśāstra*百論, T.1569; *Dāsapadārthī*勝宗十句義論, T.2138).
3. Unique sources referring to Vaiśeṣika that have no direct Sanskrit (or Tibetan) equivalents (e.g., *Commentary on Śataśāstra* 本論疏; *Commentary on Chéng Wēishí Lùn* 成唯識論述記, T.1839; *Biography of the Tripiṭaka Master of Dacien Temple* 大慈恩寺三藏法師傳, T.2053).

By “explicitly or implicitly,” I mean either direct references to Vaiśeṣika by various names in Chinese like Wèishìshī 衛世師, Féishīshījiā 吹世史迦, and Shèngzōng 勝宗 (more about them later), or indirect references to Vaiśeṣika by noting in passing its ideas and doctrines. The three classes of sources provide different degrees of the uniqueness of Vaiśeṣika information, that is to say, the second and third class of sources are the most likely to contain exclusive details. Therefore, in my discussion, the focus is on that group of sources.

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13 However, there is no consensus on the issue of which school is being refuted in the chapter. Cf. Duerlinger 2003: 118, n. 62.
3.2 The Notion of “Vaiśeṣika Traditions”

It is a well-known fact among Vaiśeṣika scholars that the textual history of Vaiśeṣika is rather complicated. The earliest known Vaiśeṣika text, Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra of Kaṇāda, is the first hurdle for many researchers. The barrier is that there is no one original version of the text that has been preserved. Rather, several different variants contain many sūtras suspected to be later interpolations, some of which are very obscure and reflect different chronological layers of Vaiśeṣika ideas (Wezler 1982, 665, 671–672, 674; Isaacson 1994; Thakur 2003, 9–13).

The second problem is the so-called “dark period” between the writing of the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra (around the first century) and the life of Vaiśeṣika thinker Praśastapāda (sixth century), who is known as the author of the Vaiśeṣika treatise Padārthadharmasamgraha. The problem is based on the hints of non-Vaiśeṣika sources: we know that there were once many elaborate commentaries on Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra that are lost. The names of some lost commentaries are Ātreya-Bhāsya, Rāvaṇa-Bhāsya, Vākya-Bhāsya, Vaiśeṣika-Kaṭandī, Praśastamati-Ṭīkā (Thakur 2003, 165–167). The loss of these makes understanding the explications and debates around specific sūtras mostly unknowable. However, thanks to the only extant commentary from that period (that of Candrānanda), one can recover a few earlier interpretations.

The third challenge is the fact that Padārthadharmasamgraha is an independent treatise, which does not directly rely on the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra but is instead an attempt to organize Vaiśeṣika ideas uniquely. The work proved to be a success, and in later generations, Padārthadharmasamgraha overshadowed direct interpretations of the sūtras (Matilal 1977, 62–63). However, the question of the more precise doctrinal relationship between Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra and Padārthadharmasamgraha with its separate commentaries has remained unclear. In other words, it remains unknown to what extent Praśastapāda was faithful to the ideas of Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra and in what way he put forward his interpretations as novelties.

Besides Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra and Padārthadharmasamgraha, there are at least three other works that do not fit neatly with either of the texts: Lakṣaṇāvalī of Udayana, Saptapadārthi of Śivāditya, and most of all, Daśapadārthi of Maticandra.

The picture of multilayered Vaiśeṣika history prompted some scholars to advocate the notion
that there existed several traditions of Vaiśeṣika, based on the preference of one particular text (or exposition style) over another and somehow different doctrinal theories associated with each. This conceptualization of Vaiśeṣika traditions is endorsed by Anantalal Thakur, Karunesha Shukla, and recently by Ionut Moise (Shukla 1970; Moise 2020, 39–40).

In the proposed scheme by Anantalal Thakur (Moise 2020, 39), one is to distinguish at least three textual traditions (transmissions) of Vaiśeṣika: (1) Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra and its commentaries; (2) Padārthadharmasamgraha and its commentaries; (3) Works that do not fit either, e.g., Lakṣaṇāvalī, Saptapadārthī, and Daśapadārthī. Besides these, there is a lot of information about Vaiśeṣika provided by non-Vaiśeṣikas, mostly Jains and Buddhists. These are unreliable as individual sources because they survey the Vaiśeṣika doctrines mainly to denounce them.

Up until now, Vaiśeṣika in East Asia has either found its place under the Indian Daśapadārthī rubric or in the vague category of scattered references preserved in Buddhist scriptures. I would like to reconsider the hitherto prevailing image of Vaiśeṣika by remarking that neither of these classifications sufficiently captures the dynamics of thinking about Vaiśeṣika in East Asia unless we take into account the unique characteristics of Vaiśeṣika transmission in East Asia. These characteristics revealed themselves in their most developed form during the Edo period. They included: (a) the interpretive-commentary tradition of Daśapadārthī by the Buddhists who do not directly connect it with the Indian traditions of Vaiśeṣika; (b) the exclusive reliance on East Asian Buddhist masters' opinions regarding the doctrinal points of Vaiśeṣika, including mutual cross-referencing among the masters; (c) the conscious historical admittance of Vaiśeṣika as one of the East Asian systems of thought by Japanese Edo Buddhists; (d) the unique stories about the beginning of the school and its originator, Kaṇāda-Ulūka, as well as his disciple Pañcaśikhī, that are unknown in India; (e) the evaluations and comparison of Vaiśeṣika with Buddhist theories (mostly to Consciousness-Only Buddhism 唯識/法相宗).

Therefore, I propose that East Asia evolved a unique tradition of Vaiśeṣika that merits separate treatment and cannot be encompassed in the framework of Daśapadārthī as solely an Indian text.
3.3 The Three Stages of Reception of Vaiśeṣika in East Asia and Their Characteristics

The above-referenced characteristics of Vaiśeṣika transmission, which are recognizable from the Edo commentaries, developed gradually. The extended transmission was shaped by generations of Buddhist thinkers from as early as the beginning of the fifth century via the efforts of Kumārajīva 鸠摩羅什, through the seventh century via Xuánzàng and Kuījī 窺基, and up until the Edo period in Japan (mainly the eighteenth century) vis-a-vis the Edo Buddhists. In this section, I propose a division of the encounter of East Asians with Vaiśeṣika ideas into three stages of reception, the last of which resulted in the unique tradition of Vaiśeṣika having many parallels to the ones pointed out by Thakur.

In describing each stage, I enumerate the most important sources regarding the initial emergence of Vaiśeṣika and briefly discuss their context. I then describe each period's distinguishing characteristics as well as the most significant peculiarities of the contents of Vaiśeṣika information from each of these periods.

3.3.1 Vaiśeṣika in China before Xuánzàng (Beginning of the Fifth Century–648)

3.3.1.1 Sources

The earliest Chinese texts (including translations from Sanskrit) that contain Vaiśeṣika ideas are hard to pinpoint since they do not necessarily mention the names of Vaiśeṣika or its founder Kaṇāda-Ulūka. Therefore, I discuss only those text passages that unambiguously touch upon the subject matter of Vaiśeṣika by invoking these names.

The first explicit mention that we know of occurs in the translations of Kumārajīva 鸠摩羅什 (344–413) between 401 and 413, namely, in Śataśāstra百論 (T.1569), Satyasiddhi-Śāstra成實論

14 Some of the thoughts presented in this third section resemble the second section of another article of mine (Snuviškis 2020). Here, however, they are given in greater detail.

15 E.g., T.1569.168b08–10: 優樓迦弟子誦衛世師經, 言於六諦, 求那諦中, 日三洗再供養, 火等和合生, 神分善法.

16 E.g., T.1646.262a13–14: 又我等說現見堅等是四大, 不如衛世師人說四大亦有非現見.
Sūtrālaṃkāra-Śāstra7 大莊厳論經 (T.201) as well as in a roughly contemporaneous translation, Mahāyānāvatāra8 入大乘論 (T.1634) by Đàotài 道泰.

Direct references also occur in the dozens of later translations or originally authored treatises from the defined period: the Northern and Southern versions of Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra9 大般涅槃經 (T.374, 375) and their respective commentaries, e.g., the one on the Northern text by Jingyīng 慧遠 (T.1764), Lankāvatāra-Sūtra10 入楞伽經 (T.671) translated by Bodhiruci 菩提流支, Ratnagotravibhāga11 究竟一乘寶性論 (T.1611), and Fāngbiàn Xīnlùn12 方便心論 (T.1632), “The Commentary on the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra of the Benevolent Kings Protecting Their Country”24 仁王護國般若經疏 (T.1705) by Zhìyǐ 智顗 and his disciple Guàndǐng 灌頂, among other texts.

The most informative sources are the already mentioned Satyasiddhi-Śāstra, Śataśāstra with its commentary5 百論疏 (T.1827) authored by Jízàng 吉藏 (549–623), Suíxiàng Lùn26 随相論 (T.1641),

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17 T.201.258c15–17: 我昔曾聞，有婆羅門名憍尸迦，善知僧佉論、衛世師論、若提碎摩論。
18 E.g., T.1634.40c07–08: 比舍師計異，有何過耶？答曰：若作與作者異，亦有大過。
20 T.1764.784a07–09: 第四論師名優樓伽，是青目仙，造衛世師經。此名最勝。明六諦義。主諦依諦總諦別諦作諦無障諦是其六也。
21 T.201.542a20–21: 非但言先實有貪瞋癡，後時言無，同衛世師等，是故不如。
22 T.1611.828c19–20: 一者多種外道種種邪計，謂僧佉、衛世師、尼揵陀若提子等。
23 T.1632.23c02–05: 如衛世師有六諦，所謂陀羅駁、求那、總諦、別諦、作諦、不障諦，如斯等比皆名論法。雖善通達，猶不了別諸餘經論。
24 T.1705.271c29–272a03: 衛世師外道說有六諦，大有經是其一諦，彼經說云，此三界外別有世界，若言三界外別有眾生，同彼外道說也。
25 E.g., T.1827.264c26–27: 衛世師稱為勝異，異於僧佉勝於僧佉故名勝異。
26 E.g., T.1641.168b15–18: 僧佉、衛世師作此執，一是內作器、二是外作器。我是知者作者受者，知是我法，即是九法中之覺法也.
and “The Refutation of the Heterodox Teachings and Hinayānists in Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra by Deva Bodhisattva”\textsuperscript{27} 提婆菩薩破楞伽經中外道小乘四宗論 (T.1639).

3.3.1.2 Distinguishing characteristics of the period

The most distinguishing characteristic of this period is the beginning of the circulation of Vaiśeṣika ideas in the Chinese cultural sphere. Although there was not yet a systematic treatment of Vaiśeṣika, which only started in the subsequent period, the fundamental doctrines of the school were introduced to the Chinese audience. What is evident from the contents of these sources is that the information about Vaiśeṣika is deeply concerned with Indian actualities, most likely stemming directly from the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra tradition. If not for the subsequent developments of the interpretation of Vaiśeṣika in East Asia, perhaps scholars would not need to distinguish East Asian Vaiśeṣika.

The three main avenues for the appearance of Vaiśeṣika ideas in the period are as follows: (1) texts associated with the Madhyamaka 三論宗 and Satyasiddhi\textsuperscript{28} 成實宗 traditions brought eastwards by Kumārajiva; (2) texts associated with Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha\textsuperscript{29}; (3) and any remaining texts\textsuperscript{30} that refer to Vaiśeṣika nominally.\textsuperscript{31}

The texts from the Madhyamaka lineage present Vaiśeṣika as one of several refutable doctrines that are not in accord with the core teaching of emptiness. These are put forward and then systematically dismissed by exposing several inner contradictions. Yet, there remained no establishment of a rival theory.\textsuperscript{32} Although Satyasiddhi-Śāstra did not engage in the same kind of

\textsuperscript{27} E.g., T.1639.155b07–10: 云何毘世師外道說一切法異？答曰：所言異者，我與覺異，何以故？以說異法．

\textsuperscript{28} E.g., T.1569, 1646, 1824, 1825, 1827.

\textsuperscript{29} E.g., T.761, 1588, 1610, 1616, 1632, 1634, 1639, 1640, 1641.

\textsuperscript{30} E.g., T.374, 375, 1611.

\textsuperscript{31} The exception is T.201, which is an early scripture referring to Vaiśeṣika in a larger passage; however, it does not fall under my suggested classifications.

\textsuperscript{32} Refer to chapters 2, 4, 6, 8, and 9 of T.1569 and 1827.
polemics with Vaiśeṣika as was described in Madhyamaka treatises, they contained a juxtaposition between a few of the Vaiśeṣika ideas and acceptable Buddhist teachings.\(^{33}\)

In the second class of texts, T.1634 is the oldest translation that provides a scheme of the four attachments\(^{34}\) 四執 of heterodox teachings, one of them being Vaiśeṣika. T.1639 and 1640 are the brief commentaries on the passages of Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra. T.1639 is a commentary on the excerpt of Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra\(^{35}\) where the four attachments concerning dharmanas are enumerated: (1) the same 一; (2) different 異; (3) the same and different 俱; (4) neither the same nor different 不俱. Vaiśeṣika falls within the school adhering to the idea of all dharmanas being different 一切法異. T.1640 is a commentary based on another passage of Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra,\(^{37}\) where the concept of Nirvāṇa is under investigation. Thus T.1640 defines the notions of Nirvāṇa of many Indian schools, including the definition of the Vaiśeṣika notion of Nirvāṇa. T.1632 and T.1641 provide not so much critique of Vaiśeṣika as expositions of its theories. The third class of sources offers little unique material. All its contents are traceable either to the first or second class.

3.3.1.3 Peculiarities of the contents

I base my categorization scheme on previous ones, namely those from two Chinese scholars, Huáng Xīnchuān 黃心川 (Huáng 1983, 245) and Gōng Jìng 宮靜 (Gōng 1985, 52–53). The peculiarities of each period's contents can be broken down into three main categories, listed here and discussed in the paragraphs following the list:

1. The Chinese transcription/translation of Vaiśeṣika names and terminology;
2. The origins of Vaiśeṣika, its founder, the teaching transmission, and other details;

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33 Refer to chapters 23, 38, 41, 54, 57–59 of T.1646.

34 T.1634.43b14–19: 是諸外道不解因緣而起四執，何者為過? 答曰：僧伽所說，有計一過。作與作者一、相與作者一、相與相者一、相與有分一，如是等皆名為一。優樓佉計異，尼犍陀計一異，若提子計非一非異，一切外道及摩他羅等異計，皆悉不離如是四種.

35 T.671.537c23: 謂一、異、俱、不俱，是名四法.

36 T.1639.156a10: 達那陀外道論師言一切法異者.

37 T.671.549a10–12: 阇時聖者大慧菩薩白佛言：世尊！如佛所言涅槃涅，槃者以何等法名為涅槃. 而諸外道各各虛妄分別涅槃.
3. Exposition of the major doctrines of the school and records of controversy between Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhists.

1. Regarding early transcription, we know that Kumārajīva was the first identifiable scholar to render the Sanskrit names of Vaiśeṣika and Kaṇāda-Ulūka into Chinese characters and translate the basic concepts of Vaiśeṣika thought. Kumārajīva transcribed Vaiśeṣika in Chinese as Wèishìshī 衛世師 (T.1569, 1646) or Píshìshī 毘世師 (T.201), and Kaṇāda-Ulūka as Yōulóuqū 優樓伎 or Yōulóujiā 優樓迦. Dàotài, one of Kumārajīva's contemporaries, also used the transcription of Yōulóuqū 優樓佉 as well as a unique one for Vaiśeṣika: Bǐshěshī 比舍師 (T.1634).

Many later scholars followed the transcriptions of Kumārajīva. Paramārtha provided an alternative for Vaiśeṣika, calling it Bǐngshìshī 川勝師 (see especially: T.1641). Bodhiruci provides other transcriptions of the names of Kaṇāda-Ulūka as Jiānàtuó 迦那陀 (T.1639) and Zhiyí as Ōulóu 湳樓 (T.1911) and Yōulíuqū 優留佉 (T.1718). One of the great commentators on Kumārajīva translations, Jīzàng was the first Chinese thinker to explain the meanings of Wèishìshī and Yōulóujiā: “Yōulóujiā is called the owl sage. Also called the horned owl sage or the smelly barbarian sage. […] Wèishìshī is called different and excellent 異勝論. Differing from Sāṃkhya, therefore, considered different. Explaining principles easily and refuting others causes them to be defeated, therefore named as excellent.”38 Zhiyí and Jingyǐng Huìyuǎn, perhaps following the latter interpretation by Jízàng, both add that Wèishìshī is translatable as “the most excellent”39 最勝.

As regards the translation of Vaiśeṣika terminology, the first translation task, most likely, was to render the names of the fundamental entities of Vaiśeṣika, i.e., the padārthas and their separate members. Kumārajīva translated the six padārthas as “six principles/truths” 六諦 (T.1569). This translation remained the most accepted one until the new translation by Xuánzàng (T.1632, 1718, 1763, 1764, 1827, etc.). Interestingly, Kumārajīva also recorded two other variant translations of six padārthas: “six stores/wombs of dharma” 六法藏 (T.1509) or “six phenomena” 六事 (T.1646), but these were not popular among later translators. It might be of significance that, by the time of the

38 T.1827. 244b10–11; 246c14–15: 優樓迦 此云鵂鶹仙, 亦云鵂角仙, 亦云臭胡仙 […] 衛世師此云異勝論. 異於僧法故 称為異. 明義自在破他令懷故稱為勝.
translation of Kumārajīva, the same character 迪 諦 had already been used in a translation of the Four Noble Truths 四諦. The linguistics here gives the impression that the Chinese masters of this period understood padārthas as relatively equivalent to the fundamental truths that both Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas sought to articulate.₄⁰

The last point I want to make in this subsection concerns the transcription/translation variants of the separate padārthas: both of these are found in Jízàng's commentary on Śataśāstra₄¹ and are the most representative of the period in question. Therein, the transliterations of six padārthas are as follows: (1) tuóluóbiāo 陀羅驃 (dravya/substance), (2) qiúnà 求那 (guna/quality), (3) jiémo 羯摩 (karma/action), (4) sānmóruò 三摩若 (sāmānya/commonness), (5) píshīshā 毘尸沙 (viśeṣa/particularity), and (6) sānmópóyè 三摩婆夜 (samavāya/inherence). While transliterations of the names of each padārtha convey only approximate Sanskrit phonetics, the translation variants of these transcriptions provide additional explanatory value of each padārtha that reflects how Chinese thinkers understood them: (1) “the main/support principle” 主諦/所依諦; (2) “the depending principle” 依諦; (3) “the action principle” 作諦; (4) “the general characteristic principle” 總相諦; (5) “the separate characteristic principle” 別相諦; (6) the non-obstruction principle 無障礙諦.

₂. Information on the origin of Vaiśeṣika is not extensive in this period. Despite a lack of comprehensive information on the origins of Vaiśeṣika, these sources are on par with the existing Sanskrit sources in terms of academic salience. Again, the authoritative source on this is Jízàng. According to him, Ulūka “Came to the world 800 years before Buddha flourished. In the day time, he was composing treatise, at night—wandering. Wishing for offerings, at midnight, he was busy handling the food and drink, depending upon followers to receive the offerings.”₄²

₄₀ It is noticeable from at least two places where the six padārthas and the Four Noble Truths are contrasted – T.1827.298b27–c02: 外曰，實有方，常相有故，次時破方者 [...] 智度論云，汝四法藏中無方，我六法藏中有。四法藏無，則四諦不攝彼六諦。九法中，方為其一，故云六法藏有。Also T.1763.488b05–09: 文殊師利菩薩摩訶薩(至)所言實諦其義云何。案。道生曰，就前說不了。如似實諦。全異四諦。故更問也。僧亮曰，問一諦總上六諦。名為實諦也。因上二乘有苦集諦而不真實。似如二乘實諦不攝。是以明也。

₄₁ T.1827.246c16–29.

₄₂ T.1827.244b11–14: 此人釋迦未興八百年前已出世，而白日造論夜半遊行。欲供養之當於夜半營辦飲食。仍與
Sūtrālaṃkāra-Śāstra (T.201) corroborates the idea of the earliness of Vaiśeṣika when compared with Buddhism. However, the story given in this source is not precisely identical. Instead, it might be considered the source for the narrative described by Jīzàng:

Formerly, when the ten powers of Buddha had not appeared, all the sentient beings were obstructed by ignorance. Because of the blindness and absence of the eyes, in the treatise of Vaiśeṣika, they deemed the illuminating ideas arising. But when the sun of Buddha appeared, the illuminating wisdom flashed, and the treatise of Vaiśeṣika was not any more brilliantly intelligible; it had to be given up. It is like the owl in the night, which moves powerfully, but in the daytime hides, having no power. The treatise of Vaiśeṣika is exactly like that. When the sun of Buddha appeared, the treatise had no more use.43

Both of these accounts leave scholars with the indubitable message: Vaiśeṣika is more ancient than the Buddha, but can it be trusted? Most contemporary scholars agree that Vaiśeṣika only solidified around the first century BCE–first century CE (Hirano 2000, 11; Miura 2008, 9–10; Hé 2018, 51–52). The early Buddhist Agamas attested to the posteriority of Vaiśeṣika concerning Buddhism, evidenced by there being no clear-cut Vaiśeṣika ideas detectable in their works.

My interpretation of both stories is that the Vaiśeṣikas themselves claimed to be ancient, and Buddhists did not dispute this. The purpose most likely would have been the subsequent popularity of Vaiśeṣika, which presented a challenge to the ubiquitous acceptance of Buddhism. Thus, in some Buddhist circles, the simile of prior darkness and posterior illumination was adopted that likened Buddha to the sunlight-wisdom44佛日 dispelling the previous darkness-ignorance (the state before Buddha came). In the story, Buddhists compare Vaiśeṣika to an owl that proceeds well in the dark-

43 T.201.259c15–21: 昔佛十力未出世時, 一切眾生皆為無明之所覆蔽, 盲無目故, 於毘世師論生於明想。佛日既出, 慧明照了, 毘世師論無所知曉, 都應棄捨。譬如鵃鵖夜則遊行能有力用, 晝則藏竄無有力用。毘世師論亦復如是, 佛日既出, 彼論無用。

44 E.g., T.384: 佛日照世間, 除去諸闇冥; T.539: 佛日久已出, 能救濟世間, 解脫諸過惡; T.614: 久久佛日出, 破大無明暝.
ignorance but is impotent in light-wisdom. Chinese Buddhists (e.g., Jízàng, and others who came later) continued to build upon the general motifs of the story by identifying the founder of Vaiśeṣika as an owl.

There are other clues from the sources of this period that have allowed scholars to glimpse how Vaiśeṣika developed and how Buddhists in India and China understood it. According to the preface of a biography of Harivarman, a talented disciple of Ulūka appeared in India and disputed the authority of a Buddhist king, and only Harivarman dared to take up the challenge and ultimately defeat the hardy opponent. According to a biography of Āryadeva (T.2048), he also won many debates against the Brahmans and later created Šataśāstra and Catuḥśataka as a means of recording the arguments he made against his opponents, among which Vaiśeṣika figures most prominently. It is curious that in Jízàng's commentary on Šataśāstra, Vaiśeṣika is proselytized to the people with the three jewels: “Ulūka is the Buddha jewel, disciples the saṃgha jewel and Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra the dharma jewel.” The latter episodes testify to the shared imagining of Vaiśeṣika by Buddhists in both India and China.

3. The main theories of Vaiśeṣika identified by the Buddhists in the period are: (a) the six padārthas六諦, (b) “all dharmas are different” 一切法異論, (c) an offshoot of the latter theory: “the self is different from cognition” 神覺異, 神知異, and (d) “no effect in the cause” 因中無果. The Buddhists focused on disproving the latter three theories and did not aim at refuting all six padārthas separately. Presumably, if the claim of the fundamental difference of dharmas constituting the separate padārthas were to be invalidated, then the system of six types of entities would collapse. The same would apply to “no effect in the cause theory,” as there was no new entity emerging from a substance, quality, or action, the differences among token objects would not hold as well. In the next

45 T.2145.79a22–b11.
46 T.1827.0246c12–14: 優樓迦弟子下第二師亦三寶化世. 優樓迦佛寶. 弟子僧寶. 衛世師經為法寶. This image may have been evoked by the Āryadeva who proposed the thesis that Buddha, the Dharma of Buddha, and the Saṃgha of Buddha are the greatest – T.2048.187b14–16: 高座立三論. 言一切諸聖中佛聖最第一. 一切諸法中佛法正第一一切救世中佛僧為第一.
few paragraphs, I provide concise illustrations of specific attempts to refute the Vaiśeṣika theories by
the Buddhists of this period.

The refutation of the theory “all dharmas are different” is one of the primary focal points of the
treatise T.1639. An assertion of Vaiśeṣika introduces the problem, “the self and cognition are different
because of the theory of the difference of dharmas. Here is the self, here is cognition, as with the
whiteness and cloth—here is the whiteness, here is the cloth.” The Buddhists’ reply: “This cannot be
so, because there is no such simile. As if a man spoke—this is a hand, these are fingers and palm.
Although that person speaks so, it cannot be said that the dharmas are different.” After that, in the
text, the Buddhists are said to differentiate the notions of perceptual form 相 and locus 處.

It is pointed out that the perceptual forms of color, smell, taste, and touch do not possess
other perceptual forms. The same is true with the locus, like wheat or beans, etc. There is no
difference in perceptual forms that would distinguish the locus of the whiteness and cloth. For
example, from the viewpoint of perceptual form, cloth and whiteness are not different from each
other and thus do not exhibit different perceptual forms. While from the perspective of locus,
precisely the fact that cloth and whiteness are not of different perceptual forms inhibits one’s ability
to distinguish a difference of locus among them. Thus, Vaiśeṣika imputes a locus to cloth and denies it
to whiteness without giving the reason beforehand. That is the Buddhist critique of the Vaiśeṣika
distinction of the substance and quality.

A similar critique is found in the preface to a biography of Harivarman. However, this time,
the evaluation is directly applied to the theory that “the self is different from cognition.” The Vaiśeṣika
opponent of a Harivarman puts forward his thesis as follows: “In the fanciful speech, it is mainly about
six padārthas; in simple speech, it is about the difference of cognition and the self. The self is the
support for cognition, only that I judge to be the thesis.”

Next, Harivaman attempts to expose contradictions within his opponent's statement: “Given
that self is not cognition, the self is aware of cognition, isn’t it the cognizing self? If the self is aware of

47 T.1639.156a13–12: 我與覺異以說異法故, 此是我, 此是覺, 如白疊, 此是白, 此是疊故.
48 T.1639.156a12–17.
49 T.2145.79b02–03: 繁文則六諦同貫, 簡旨則知異于神, 神為知主唯斷為宗.
cognition, who is aware of the self? If cognition is the awareness of self, isn't it thus that cognition and the self are the same? Harivarman's argument is based on the understanding that the self cannot merely be the unconscious locus. If one assumes that the self is the locus only of the unconscious, it would not have any reason to be the locus of cognition. However, if one supposes that the self is conscious, then there is no simple way to prove that the self is different from cognition.

The last representative theory of the period is “no effect in the cause.” A Buddhist monk, Jizang, provides five reasons why the position of Vaiśeṣika is not proved. The first is “because of the non-existence of non-makeability.” Here, the author argues that if there were no oil in the seeds, there would be no need to press them to make oil. But that is precisely the successive practice for extracting oil. The second argument is “the necessity of assuming the cause.” The example would be that if one wants cheese, the milk is used and not the water. The third reason is “the non-production of all.” Namely, if there is no effect on the cause, one thing can produce all the things. The fourth reason is “the potentiality to make the made.” It applies to the example of the potter who is skillful in making pots and takes the earth, not the grass, to make the pot. The last reason is “according to each cause there is an effect.”

The simple attestation illustrates that when one sows wheat corn, new wheat springs up from the sown.

3.3.2 Vaiśeṣika as the Subject of the Consciousness-Only Tradition (648–Middle of the Eighteenth Century)

3.3.2.1 Sources

The classes of sources for Vaiśeṣika in this period are six: (1) Daśapadārthī; (2) Chéng Wéishi Lùn T.1585 and its commentary tradition; (3) Nyāyapraveśa T.1630 and its commentary tradition; (4) the

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50 T.2145.79b07–09: 神既非知，為神知知，知神乎。若神知知，知神者誰，知若知神知亦神乎。

51 The tradition of commenting on Chéng Wéishi Lùn in East Asia is extensive. The primary commentators are three: T.1830 by Kuījī窺基 (632–682) and its subcommentaries – T.1832 by Huìzhǎo 慧沼, and T.1833 by Zhìzhōu 智周. In China, the tradition of commenting on Chéng Wéishi Lùn diminished in the middle of the eighth century but revived in the seventeenth century, although at that time the commentators did not have at their disposition the three commentaries just referred to. There were equally as many commentaries made by Korean monks, the most important of them authored by Woncheuk 圓測 (613–696). However, his commentary is extant only in scattered quotations. The most complete
tradition of commentary on *Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya* T.1588; the texts that are associated with the same classes of sources from the previous period but are affected by the new information about Vaiśeṣika stemming from the above-referenced group of sources, e.g., T.1567, 1570, 1571, 1912, 2255; (6) other sources, e.g., T.1830, 2128, 2183, 2425, X.733.

The introduction of *Daśapadārthī* in the period was the turning point in the study of Vaiśeṣika in China, Korea, and to the greatest extent in Japan. As was discussed in the second section, most of the previous scholarship focused exclusively on the contents of the text without measuring its significance in the East Asian context.

*Chéng Wéishí Lùn* refers to Vaiśeṣika in the first volume, which deals with the interpretation of the first stanza of *Triṃśaka* T.1586. Vaiśeṣika is refuted based on four different concepts: the self, *padārthas*, atoms (*paramāṇu* 極微), and the theory of “all dharmas are different.” The primary commentary T.1830 of Kuījì expands significantly on the Vaiśeṣika theory of *padārthas* and their differentiation into similar and dissimilar types. This presentation by Kuījì is even more coherent than the original *Daśapadārthī*. Two catalogs from the tenth–eleventh centuries also list *Shènglùn Shíjiùyì Zhāng* 胜論十句義章, which is a commentary on *Daśapadārthī* that most scholars tentatively attribute to Kuījì. However, the text is either nonexistent or was an extracted passage of Kuījì’s commentary on the *padārthas* from T.1830 circulated as a separate text.

*Nyāyapraveśa* implies the theories of Vaiśeṣika on several occasions when enumerating the surviving Korean commentary is that made by Daehyeon 大賢 (eighth century), X.818. Japan preserved the most commentaries—an excellent example is the vast compendium of commentaries T.2263, which record many of the Japanese *Chéng Wéishí Lùn* interpreters; another example is T.2266, by Tanne 湛慧 (1675–1747).

52 *Nyāyapraveśa* and its commentaries are the basis for the tradition of Buddhist logic in East Asia. The essential commentary is T.1840 by Kuījì and Huìzhǎo. Other important commentaries are X853, 854 by Zhīzhōu and the Japanese compendia T.2270 by Zenju 善珠 and T.2271 by Zōshun 藏俊.

53 *Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya*, as translated by Xuánzàng, also saw a lot of commentaries and subcommentaries such as T.1821–23 and later T.2250–2251.

54 T.1585.1b20–1c02, 2c22–3b07, 3b19–3c13, 3c18–3c23.

55 T.1830.253b09–257c22.

56 T.2180.1140a14, 2183.1162c09.
fallacies of argumentation. Again, the commentary of Kuijī T.1840 extends the explanations to include a presentation of Vaiśeṣika history and theory. Vaiśeṣika in Nyāyapraveśa is primarily discussed within the context of the following fallacies: “non-acceptance of both the subject and predicate by the opponent” 俱不極成 (ubhayāprasiddha), “valid reason contradictory to another valid reason reaching the opposite conclusions” 相違決定不定過 (anaikāntika-viruddhāvyabhicārin), “reason contradicting the expressed subject” 有法自相相違因 (dharmi-svarūpa-viparīta-sādhana), and “reason proving the opposite of the specific property of the subject” 有法差別相違因 (dharmi-viśeṣa-viparīta-sādhana).

Pǔguāng 普光 T.1821 and later generations of sub-commentators commented on Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya. This source discusses the doctrines of Vaiśeṣika many times. The most prominent passages are in the fifth, twelfth, and thirtieth volumes of T.1821. The fifth and sixth classes of sources mentioned provide little new material about Vaiśeṣika in comparison to the others. Most of them derive from the already mentioned sources.

3.3.2.2 Distinguishing characteristics of the period

The distinguishing characteristic of the period is the new wave of information about Vaiśeṣika that emerges from a single source: Xuánzàng and his established textual legacy-transmission of the Consciousness-Only school 唯識宗. A Buddhist monk, Xuánzàng, traveled and studied in India around 631–641 and returned to China in 645 with a caravan bearing 657 texts and other Buddhist treasures (Yáng 2011, 16–18). In the second half of his life, from 645 until his passing away in 664, he led

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57 1843.117c18–118c14, 126a20–126c16, 129c24–131a29, 131b01–133b15.

58 There is a debate over to what extent the Consciousness-Only school was established by Xuánzàng or by the efforts of his foremost disciple Kuijī. My interpretation is that Xuánzàng effectually paved the way for the Consciousness-Only school through selected translations and oral explanations to his disciples. Xuánzàng’s authority and fame did not rest solely on the fact of establishing this school, and the person who most represented the school was Kuijī. However, another branch of the school emerged from the very beginning, exemplified by Woncheuk. The respective lineages of Kuijī and Woncheuk had apparent disagreements, but gradually Kuijī’s position became dominant in East Asia.

59 I prefer the name “Consciousness-Only school” 唯識宗 instead of the more common name, “Dharma characteristic school” 法相宗. The latter name was coined by a Huáyán school 華嚴宗, while the name “Consciousness-Only” 唯識 was used in the original treatises of the school (Hamar 2010, 183–184).
the imperially sponsored translation team, which collectively translated seventy-five texts. The result was that, on May 15, 648, the translation of Daśapadārthī was completed. My proposed start date for the period (648) is significant in two respects. First, the translations of Vaiśeṣika terminology found in the Chinese version of Daśapadārthī set the standard for all future discussions of Vaiśeṣika. Second, the theory of the four additional padārthas introduced in Daśapadārthī was considered to be a new stage in the history of the development of Vaiśeṣika by the first disciple of Xuánzàng, Kuiji himself.

Furthermore, throughout this whole period, one finds the discussions of Vaiśeṣika, besides Daśapadārthī itself, primarily in the areas of Buddhist study exclusively promoted by the Consciousness-Only school lineage of Xuánzàng (e.g., Wei 2011, 34–38). These are the detailed commentaries on (1) “the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only” or Chéng Wéishí Lùn; (2) the principles of Buddhist logic 因明, based on the transmission of Nyāyapraveśa; and (3) Abhidharma.

For these reasons, I name the period: “Vaiśeṣika as the subject of Consciousness-Only.” Further, the purpose of the translation of Daśapadārthī by Xuánzàng has either been undiscussed or thought to be a somehow haphazard decision. However, some hints may allude to the possibility that the Yogācāra Buddhists could have compiled the text. Although there is no space to expand upon the idea in this discussion, I offer some arguments below. My suggested line of reflection may provide a new angle of thinking about the Daśapadārthī and its relationship to Consciousness-Only Buddhists.

Xuánzàng must have needed the concise version of the Vaiśeṣika text to present the doctrines in Chéng Wéishí Lùn. While the text of Śāmkhya existed as translated by Paramārtha, no handy book was available of Vaiśeṣika. Thus, while he was staying in India—likely at the time he was studying in

60 In the twenty-second year of the Zhēnguàn 貞觀 period: T.2154, 557b39.  
61 T.1830.255c17–18: 後其苗裔名為惠月，立十句義；T.1840.118a06–08: 十八部中上首名戰達羅。此云慧月。造十句論。此六加四。謂異，有能，無能，無說，廣如勝論宗十句論。  
62 The principal scholars of Daśapadārthī, Ui and Miyamoto, did not express a clear opinion. Tāng thought that the translation of Daśapadārthī was more a personal wish of Xuánzàng to train his translation skills and did not come from a systematic need (Tāng 1988: 108).  
63 Cf. the paragraph of the “Notion of Vaiśeṣika Traditions” and the problem of the complicated Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra transmission.
Nālandā (in 631–636, 640) with Śīlabhadra—Xuánzàng obtained some Vaiśeṣika manuscripts. The result of his thorough editing was a concise manual on Vaiśeṣika doctrines: Daśapadārthī.

Kuījī’s commentaries record the dubious assertion that Vasubandhu authored the prose commentary on the verses of Suvarṇasaptati. If this were true, then Xuánzàng or his Indian teachers may have attempted to do the same with Vaiśeṣika, following this precedent. Although the author of Daśapadārthī is referred to as Maticandra-Candramati, no additional information is known about him to add certainty. Furthermore, it is conspicuous that Daśapadārthī is considered an unorthodox text in both structure and content. Lastly, Daśapadārthī features indirect responses to the refutation of Vaiśeṣika doctrines by Madhyamaka, which in China were mostly presented by Jízàng. There had existed doctrinal tension between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra (Lusthaus 2015; Shi 2006), and this text neutralized some of the previous arguments by Madhyamakas against Vaiśeṣika.

Whether the text was an incidental translation or was meant to be studied by the followers of Consciousness-Only, Daśapadārthī secured its place in subsequent lists and canons of Buddhist books. Nevertheless, no one that we know of from the period, besides Kuījī, attempted to make a commentary on it. To summarize, the history of East Asian Vaiśeṣika in this period is inseparable from the history of Consciousness-Only tradition. Thus, it is necessary to sketch the history of Consciousness-Only in China, Korea, and Japan in order to provide a more precise geographical and chronological framework for the reception of Vaiśeṣika in East Asia.

Despite its promising beginning, Consciousness-Only, led by Xuánzàng and Kuījī, did not succeed in establishing itself in China. Kuījī’s disciple, Huizhāo 慧沼 (648–714), and the latter’s disciple, Zhìzhōu 智周 (668–723), were the only prominent proponents of the school in China. There are many reasons for the quick decline of the school; among them, the scholastic doctrines, the unpopular doctrine of the five natures 五性各別, and the lack of connections to the later emperors. However, the ideas of Consciousness-Only, and the references to Vaiśeṣika, did not disappear entirely in China during the following centuries. There was a revival of Consciousness-Only studies in the late

64 T.1830.252b11.

65 E.g., the introduction of potentiality padārtha rebuts the critique of no effect in the cause by Jízàng.

66 A good summary of the reasons for decline is given in: Chén 1992, 108–118. Also a recent article on the topic: Yáng 2017.
Ming dynasty and at the beginning of the Qing dynasty (seventeenth century). This resulted in more commentaries being written on *Chéng Wéishí Lùn*, six of which are publicly available and at least seven others are preserved in library collections (Jiǎn 2017, 231–232). However, the primary Chinese materials on Consciousness-Only and Vaiśeṣika come from the Tang dynasty of the seventh–eighth centuries.

Consciousness-Only also failed to establish itself successfully as a school in Korea.\(^6^7\) In the first stage, the Consciousness-Only teaching there came primarily from the lineage of Woncheuk 圓測 (613–696), who was learning and residing in China. One of his disciples, Dojeung 道證 (seventh–eighth centuries), brought the teaching to Silla. In turn, his disciple Daehyeon 大賢, alongside his contemporary Gyeongheung 憶興, are the most important scholars of Consciousness-Only from the Silla kingdom. In the eleventh century, there was a revival of Consciousness-Only, primarily associated with two teachers who promoted the Kuījī line: Sohyeon 韶显 (1038–1096) and Uicheon 義天 (1055–1101).\(^6^8\) However, because Buddhism was suppressed in favor of Confucianism in later Korean history, few of the writings of Consciousness-Only masters remain. The best extant work that includes passages on Vaiśeṣika is the commentary on *Chéng Wéishí Lùn* X.818 by Taehyŏn (Bang 1993).

In contrast to China and Korea, Japan witnessed Consciousness-Only establishing itself on a firm institutional basis that permitted the teachings to take root in society. The four periods of transmission\(^6^9\) from China and Korea resulted in the establishment of Consciousness-Only teaching with two temples in Nara. They are the Southern temple of Gangōji 元興寺 and the Northern temple of Kōfukuji 興福寺. The two temples were at odds regarding Buddhist logic and doctrinal theories for several centuries, until around the twelfth century when Kōfukuji became indisputably the only center of Consciousness-Only (Chén 2005, 115–122; Fù 2013, 55–56).

What is vital is that in this period, the Japanese scholars of both temples addressed questions

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\(^{67}\) By Korea, I primarily mean Later Silla (668–935) and its successor, Goryeo (918–1398).


\(^{69}\) The transmission, preliminarily, may be dated as around 660 and ending about 735. The first date is the return of Dōshō 道昭 to Japan in the first transmission, and the second date belongs to the return of Genbō 玄昉, in the fourth transmission.
about Vaiśeṣika. In perhaps the most significant Consciousness-Only Japanese scholarly achievement of the period, Yuishiki Dōgakushō 唯識論同學鈔 T.2263, compiled by Jōkei 貞慶 (1155–1213) and his disciple Ryōsan 良算, one can find such examples. The enduring academic vigor of the school paved the way for further commentaries on Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika in the eighteenth century.

Another vital point about Vaiśeṣika in Japan is that Kūkai 空海 (774–835), arguably the most influential figure in Japanese Buddhism, in his “Treatise on the Mind in Ten Stages” 十住心論 T.2425, listed Vaiśeṣika with other non-Buddhist Indian teachings as “the mind in the third stage,” which is ranked as above Confucianism. As this treatise was influential in Japan and did not aim at refutation, in the long run, it might have contributed to raising Japanese interest in Indian non-Buddhist philosophies (Miyasaka 1995, 87, n. 6).

3.3.2.3 Peculiarities of the contents

In this section, I review the peculiarities of the period’s contents using the same three-point scheme as used for the elaboration of the previous period.

1. The Vaiśeṣika terminological translations by Xuánzàng and disciples like Kuījī made the previous versions of Vaiśeṣika translations-transcriptions less salient. The approach adopted towards previous versions of Vaiśeṣika translations by Xuánzàng can be characterized as a means of “clearing the decks” from the confusion of the earlier translations to be able to introduce exact and unified Chinese equivalents that make more sense with the Sanskrit meanings (Fù 2006, 63–74).

The terms that Xuánzàng used for the name Vaiśeṣika are, “victorious-excelling-superior tradition” Shèngzōng 勝宗 or “victorious-excelling-superior theory” Shènglùn 勝論. His translation followed the interpretation that had already been concocted by Jízàng and his contemporaries. The reason for the name, as given by Kuījī, is that “either all the theories could hardly compare with [it], therefore named [it] as excelling; or the superior person created it, hence named as superior.” Altogether, other previously prevalent transcriptions like Wèishì 延世 or Bǐngshìshī 良師世師 were deemed false by Xuánzàng.70 Thus, the name Shènglùn 勝論 came to be the standard translation for Vaiśeṣika in all East Asia up to today.

70 T.1830.255b27–29: 諸論罕匹故云勝也。或勝人所造故名勝論。舊云衛世師、或云鞏世師、皆訛略也.
A similar situation happened with the name for the founder of Vaiśeṣika. Kuījī recorded a handful of variants, clearly distinguishing two traditions of naming the founder. The first tradition followed the name Ulūka, transcribing it as Wàlùjiā 雉露迦 and translating it as “an owl” 鵂鶹, 犀猴. The second applied the name, Kaṇāda, transcribing it as Jiénápú 羯拏僕 or Jiǎnnápú 蹇拏僕 and translating it as “Eater of grain diet” 食米齋 or “Grain-diet-eating sage” 食米濟仙人.7

As to the translation of terminology, one notices an apparent effort to make the translations as close as possible to the original meaning in Sanskrit. Thus, the term “padārtha” was translated as jùyi 句義. This managed to capture the two components of the word “padārtha”: pada—“foot, sentence, etc.” and artha—“target, object, meaning, etc.” more precisely than the previous and more opaque translation of “padārtha” as dì 諦. The same is true concerning the earlier renditions of the names of separate members of the padārthas. For example, the old translations of “commonness” (sāmānya) as “the general characteristic principle” 總相諦 and “particularity” (viśeṣa) as “the separate characteristic principle” 別相諦 were useful for explaining the function of both padārthas; however, they did not match with the direct meaning in Sanskrit. The new translations of commonness as tóng 同 and particularity as yì 異 accomplished this.

2. Regarding the founder of the school and his teaching transmission, in this period one finds plenty of new information not attested in Indian sources. All these facts are reported by Xuánzàng’s successors, mostly Kuījī. As there are no other sources for many of their assertions, they should be taken with a grain of salt. I think this is the result of hearsay from the previous period coupled with the imagination inherent in constructing a more coherent narrative of Vaiśeṣika for the Chinese audience.

In a biography of the founder from this period, the motif of night and owl is maintained and developed. “In the day time, avoiding being visible and audible, [he] hid in the mountains and marshes. Only at night, perfectly seeing and hearing, did he move around to beg for food. Therefore contemporary people nicknamed him ‘owl’ [Ulūka].” Moreover, the two traditions of naming the founder as Ulūka and Kaṇāda are ingeniously incorporated together in a later segment: “Previously he had wandered in the night, frightening some young women. But finally [he] switched to finding some

7 T.1830.255b20–26; T.1840.117c23–24.
grain cereal among the withered grain chaff, grinding it, and eating it. Thus his name [Kaṇāda]. Contemporary people named him the grain-diet-eating sage.” The narrative of frightening the young women and grinding grains is fully explicated in later sources, e.g., in Xo232, where the text elaborates by stating that, because he was frightened, Ulūka did not beg for food any longer and decided to live by grinding grains.\(^72\) Thus it is clearly explained that his first nickname was “the owl” (Ulūka), and later, he was dubbed “the grain eater” (Kaṇāda).

Although this narrative is already quite elaborate, one finds some further embellishment in a later source. The scholar, Xuányīng 玄應, worked on the translation team of Xuánzàng and later compiled a dictionary of corresponding Buddhist terms, named The Sounds and Meanings of the Scriptures\(^73\) 一切經音義, which includes an entry called: “the tradition of the grain-diet-eater” 食米齋宗. The entry:

Previously known as the ‘eater of crumbs,’ this was an unorthodox teaching undertaken by followers who practiced austerity by binding the thumbs and index fingers of both hands. Then they went into people’s barns and picked up bits of grains by placing them into their palms and eating some of them. If the grains were full kernels of corn, they would not take them, fearing to consume too much. They bonded the two fingers like that; it was also called the pigeon practice and was an unorthodox teaching. The picking of grains is like the practice of pigeons.\(^74\)

A Vaiśeṣika scholar cannot help but see the further enhancement of the story based on some knowledge of Indian austerities.

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Besides details about the life story and practices of Kaṇāda-Ulūka, Kuījī recorded another fascinating tale about the transmission of Vaiśeṣika up until the time of his master, Xuánzàng. Here, I report some details:

For many years [Kaṇāda] cultivated the Dao and acquired five superpowers. He is said to have attained awakening and happily entered nirvāṇa. But then he sighed, realizing that there was no one to pass on the teaching to. Sympathizing with the ignorant, and beings of the world who lacked the eyes of wisdom, [he] contemplated seven qualities [required] to receive the dharma and pass on the teaching […]. Many years passed without his finding the person possessing these qualities. After many eons, in the state of Vārāṇasī appeared a Brahmin, with the name Māṇavaka, translated as “a youth.” The son of this Māṇavaka was named Pañcasikhi, which means “having five peaks,” as his hair was arranged in five locks, like a head with five horns. Although this man possessed seven qualities, his spiritual maturation was slow, since he was attached to his wife and children, which led to misery. After the passage of many years, he matured. After three thousand years, he had a dispute with his wife over his attendance at a play, and thus they developed a mutual resentment. Ulūka exerted his powers to try to guide him, but Pañcaśikhi did not follow, and the sage gave up. Again three thousand years passed without trouble. After another three thousand years more, they fought again and became disillusioned with each other. [Pañcaśikhi] looked up at the sky, longing for the sage. At that time, the sage applied his divine power to transform and guide. Soaring in the air to welcome the arriving [of Pañcaśikhi] at his abode in the mountains, he then slowly explained the conceived dharmas of the six padārthas.75

In this story we come to know that Kaṇāda-Ulūka was a practicing yogi who managed to reach the state of Nirvāṇa. However, being overcome by compassion as if he were a Bodhisattva, he waited

75 T.I.830.255c01–015.
for a suitable person to whom he could pass down the teaching of the six padārthas. That person ended up being a Brahman, Pañcaśikhī. We find out that, later on, Vaiśeṣika branched off into eighteen schools 十八部, among which the school of Maticandra-Candramati 慧月 was of top importance 上首. This is the same Maticandra-Candramati who wrote Daśapadārthī. The narrative culminates in the era of Kuījī, who, if we believe the story, had at his disposal the latest and most superior texts from all the Vaiśeṣika schools.

It is clear that Kuījī is not a reliable narrator. From other Indian sources, we know that Pañcaśikhi was considered a teacher of Sāṃkhya and not of Vaiśeṣika (Larson; Bhattacharya 1987, 113–123). Eighteen is likely not the actual number of schools, as this is a sacred Buddhist number and it is a common practice to use it in narratives. Also, to name the school of Maticandra-Candramati as the most important is an unfounded claim; if it were undoubtedly true, it likely would have been preserved in the Indian sources. My conclusion is that Xuánzàng and Kuījī were creating a Vaiśeṣika narrative to present themselves to other Buddhists as the most knowledgeable about Vaiśeṣika. This supports my argument that there is a unique and distinct East Asian Vaiśeṣika tradition.

3. This period saw numerous expositions, interpretations, and staunch rejections of various Vaiśeṣika doctrines. Due to the space limitations of the paper, in this section, I skim through some representative samples. The essential theories of Vaiśeṣika commentated on were: (1) the ten padārthas 十句義; (2) the differentiation and explanation 諸門辨釋 of all aspects of padārthas; (3) atomism and the creation of the phenomenal world; (4) being not identical with the objects; (5) the real existence of three times 去來實有 (the reality of past, future, and present); (6) the impermanence of the sound 聲無常. The first part of the original Daśapadārthī meticulously expounds the theory of the ten padārthas. It gives the enumeration of all the members of the different padārthas with their definitions. Similar and more succinct transcripts are found in other texts from the period. The second part of Daśapadārthī differentiates and explains 諸門辨釋 all aspects of the padārthas. Chéng Wéishí

76 T.1830.255c17–18: 後其苗裔, 名為惠月, 立十句義; T.1840.118a06–08: 十八部中上首名戰達羅, 此云慧月, 造十句論, 此六加四, 謂異, 有能, 無能, 無說, 廣如勝論宗十句論. 77 I attempt to use exact translations of specific phrases/terms.
Lùn Shùjì also devotes a chapter to this. However, it seems that these examples only serve to refute the Vaiśeṣika padārthas. The whole passage in Chéng Wéishí Lùn is dedicated to exactly this and is based on inferential logic. According to Kuījī, Chéng Wéishí Lùn Shùjì narrated the tale of Vaiśeṣika only for the sake of the Consciousness-Only school.

Kuījī explained the atomic theory of Vaiśeṣika in his commentary on Viṃśatikā T.1834 in the following way:

Earth, water, fire, and wind are of atomic nature. If it is the time of destruction, they do not perish, they are dispersed in all the places and are said to be permanent, there are a multitude of dharmas, their bodies are many. At the time of creation, the couples of atoms join together to produce the child atoms; the measure of the child atoms is equal to the parent atoms; its body is single. Because these are born from others, their nature is impermanent [...] the child atom makes the root, containing three atoms. In this way, it combines with the other three atoms, together producing the child atom, the seventh child. Its measure is equal to the six root atoms. In this way, the seven atoms join with the remaining, to produce the fifteenth child atom. The measure of the fifteenth child atom is equal to the producing root of fourteen atoms. In this way, the world develops into three thousand realms. These three thousand realms are born from the two dharmas of father and mother, its measure equal to the measure of father and mother.

Kuījī's explanation of atomic theory differs from Indian Vaiśeṣika sources. In other words, according to his explanation, the couples of atoms produce the child atom (1+1=3). And later, three such atoms combine with another three atoms to create the seventh atom (3+3=7). In turn, seven

78 T.1830.257a01–c08.
79 T.1830.257c06–c08.
80 T.1834.992b17–27.
atoms with the other seven atoms produce the fifteenth child atom \((7 + 7 = 15)\). In this way, the phenomenal world is created.

In the existing Sanskrit sources, the orthodox scheme suggested by Praśastapāda and explained by his commentators is that the two atoms (\(aṇu\)) make up a compound, \(dvāṇuka\) \((1 + 1 = 2)\), and the three \(dvāṇukas\) \((2 + 2 + 2 = 6)\) make up \(tryāṇuka\), which consists of six atoms (Bronkhorst 2004, 27–31). Here I would like to note the distinctive Chinese interpretation of atomic aggregation that invoked the biological family model by naming two atoms as father and mother and the result of the pairing as the child. The subsequent aggregates are functioning as families, and the newly-born individual is not more than his family, e.g., the seventh atom is nothing but equal to the two families of \(3 + 3\).

However, the theory of atoms was subjected to refutation by Consciousness-Only scholars. In \(Chéng Wéishí Lùn\), Xuánzàng rebuked it by remarking that the object formed by various atoms being in different places could not be perceptible because the particles are not perceptible. Furthermore, if the cause and effect are material, they both should occupy a different location, as the two atoms do. If that is not the case, they should be merging, and would not be eternal or unitary.81

Turning to the theory of being not identical with the objects, which is most conspicuously explained in the commentary on \(Nyāyapraveśa\) by Kuījī in the context of illustrating the logical fallacy of, “the reason contradicting the expressed subject” 有法自相相違因. Moreover, the text narrates a fascinating story directly related to the transmission of Vaiśeṣika teaching from Kaṇāda-Ulūka to Pañcaśikhī.

It states that after Pañcaśikhī went to follow Kaṇāda, the founder taught him the fine points of the theory of the six \(padārthas\):

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\text{[The sage] slowly explained previously conceived dharmas of six \textit{padārthas}, explaining substance, quality, and action. Pañcaśikhī believed each of them up to the \textit{padārtha} of absolute being. Then to him, the doubt arose. The sage said: \textit{As to the being, it is the potentiality of substance and so on \[quality, action\]. Besides the three—}
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81 T.1585.3c02–09.
substance, quality, and action—there is a separate being, whose nature is permanent and unitary. The disciple [Paṇcaśikhī] didn’t follow, saying: the nature of substance, quality, and action is not absent; it is namely the potentiality. Leaving the three aside, how can there be separate being as a potentiality? Then the sage explained the padārtha of commonness and particularity. [...] Moreover, there is a single and permanent potentiality of the nature of inherence [...]. Although Paṇcaśikhī believed in commonness-particularity and inherence, [he] still didn’t believe in separately existing absolute being.82

The dilemma that Paṇcaśikhī encountered is that the separately existing being apart from substance, quality, and action is not an obvious thing; it has to be proven.

To prove the existence of separate being, Kaṇāda put forward a syllogism which Nyāyapraveśa quotes as an example of fallacious proof. Here is the argument: “Beingness is neither substance, nor quality, nor action because it possesses each substance, quality, and action, like the nature of commonness and particularity.”83 Fortunately for Kaṇāda, it is said that the inference convinced Paṇcaśikhi. Thus he accepted the system of padārthas, and as a result, Kaṇāda entered Nirvāṇa, and the teaching of Vaiśeṣika was propagated.84

However, later on, the syllogism was examined by Dignāga, and he found it to be faulty. The underlying reason for faultiness depends on the notion of “being.” If one simply assumes that “being” is the potentiality of no absence, then it would be equal to the substance, quality, and action, about which Paṇcaśikhi already agrees. But the notion that “being” would be inclusive of substance, quality, action, and standing is denied by Paṇcaśikhi.

The idea of Dignāga, as explained by Kuījī, is that the line of reasoning, “because it possesses

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82 T.1840.130a10–19: 徐説先悟六句義法，說實德業，彼皆信之，至大有句，彼便生惑，仙言，有者能有實等，離實德業三外別有，體常是一。弟子不從云，實德業性不無，即是能有豈離三外別有能有，仙人便說同異句義 [...]復有一常能和合性，五頂雖信同異和合，然猶不信別有大有。

83 T.1840.129c24–25: 有法自相相違因者，如說，有性非實，非德，非業，有一實故，有德業故，如同異性。

84 T.1840.130c09–11: 仙人既陳三比量已，五頂便信，法既有傳，仙便入滅，勝論宗義由此悉行.
each substance, quality and action,” contradicts the supposed subject in the inference, “the absolute being,” and proves the opposite, or “the being” as the potentiality of no absence. Namely, the following inference proves the opposite: “Beingness [potentiality of no absence] must not be beingness [absolute being] because it has the single substance, quality and action, as commonness and particularity.” That is to say, the potentiality of no absence can function within substance, quality, and action as the commonness (like substanteness) and particularity (particular substance).

The last two theories to consider are the theory of the real existence of three times and the theory of the impermanence of the sound. While they are usually not renowned for propagating these two theories, Kuījī mentions both of these as characteristic of Vaiśeṣikas. The former is the theory most often associated with the Buddhist Sarvāstivāda position, which claims that dharmas exist in the past, present, and future. However, in his introductory chapter of the Essay of the Forest of Meanings in the Dharma Garden of Mahāyāna T.1861, Kuījī claims that Vaiśeṣika adheres to this teaching. This may be related to the Buddhist reception of Vaiśeṣika, wherein it was easier to understand the teaching of padārthas by comparing it to the dharmas of Sarvāstivādins.

As to the impermanence of the sound, Kuījī elevated this theory to “the essence of the teaching” 教體 of Vaiśeṣika. This teaching must likely have been relevant among the Brahmanic schools but not so much for Buddhist ones. As the sound was claimed to be the source of the Vedas, the theory of the impermanence of sound would have been challenging to other Brahmanic schools. However, from the Consciousness-Only standpoint, the procedure of inferring the impermanence/permanence of sound is itself the point most worthy of pondering. According to the Buddhists of the period, neither Vaiśeṣikas nor the proponents of the permanence of sound could prove their theory coherently; thus it yielded to “the fallacy of valid reason contradictory to another valid reason reaching the opposite conclusion” 相違決定不定過.

Lastly, there are the East Asian interpretations of specific questions about Vaiśeṣika. The thirteenth century Japanese magnum opus of Consciousness-Only, Yuishiki Dōgakushō 唯識論同學

86 T.1861.249c22–24: 謂勝論外道, 及計時外道等, 亦作此計, 有去來世, 猶如現在實有非假.
87 T.1861.251a25–26: 其勝論師, 以諸德中聲為教體, 無常無礙.
鈔 T.2263，offers an exceptional glimpse into these discussions. One passage on Vaiśeṣika presents eight problems of interpretation: (1) do Vaiśeṣika masters posit five sense organs and five consciousnesses? 勝論師立五根五識歟; (2) is the smell quality both eternal and non-eternal? 德句中香通常無常歟; (3) the problem regarding directly cognized objects 唯現境; (4) the issue of the realness of six padārthas 六句皆實; (5) questions on the validity of alternative reason while refuting the being, commonness-particularity, and inherence 破同異和合量; (6) the fallacies of proving being as existing separately from substance, quality, and action 有性離實量; (7) the problem of the mistranscription in the refutation beginning with “as the nature of the substance and so on” 如實性等; and (8) the problem of whether the syllogism refuting inherence is correct 破和合句義實有量.

In the following, I convey the general atmosphere of the discussion by outlining the first and fourth of these problems. Regarding the first question of the existence and non-existence of the five senses and consciousnesses was deliberated: hypothetically, if there were no sense organs and consciousnesses, by what means could one perceive objects? The response supported by Daśapadārthī is that the sense organs exist and are based on the elements (earth, water, fire, wind, and ether). While regarding consciousnesses, it is namely about cognition, pleasure, and so on, which form the plurality of mental qualities that are equivalent to consciousness. It is unreasonable that the plurality of mental qualities would be dependent on the five senses, resulting in the five consciousnesses of eyes and so on.89

The fourth problem is whether the six padārthas imply different degrees in reality. In other words, the problem can be reduced to the question of whether substances such as forests or armies are less real as objects than trees and people. According to Kuījī’s disciple, Huìzhāo, small imperceptible objects like atoms and forests are false objects, while plural objects like trees, etc., are more real. In contrast, Huìzhāo ‘s successor, Zhìzhōu, claimed that all such objects are equally false since apart from trees and people, there are no forests and armies.90

88 T.2263.112b14–22.
89 T.2263.114c07–22.
90 T.2263.115b26–c24.
3.3.3 Vaiśeṣika in the Buddhist Curriculum: The Edo Commentaries on Daśapadārthī (Eighteenth–Mid-Nineteenth Centuries)

3.3.3.1 Sources

This period is the pinnacle of original and independent scholarship on Vaiśeṣika in East Asia. Although from the second half of the nineteenth century onward Japan was to adopt rapid modernization that opened and revolutionized the country in many spheres, Japan in the eighteenth century was still the continuation of the old social-governmental system with no active relations to other countries (Gordon 2003, 13–19). Thus, the new stage of Vaiśeṣika scholarship appeared on the eve of ground-breaking geopolitical changes rather than as a direct result of Western or global influence.

The new sources from this period are mostly direct commentaries on Daśapadārthī. The first identifiable commentary on Daśapadārthī, Shōshū Jikkugi Ron Ki 勝宗十句義論記, was written by a Shingon monk from the Buzan branch 豐山, Hōjū Chidō 法住智幢 (1723–1800) in 1752. Although the circumstances are opaque, the possible reasons that could have led to this new trend of authoring direct commentaries are discussed in the next paragraph. Hōjū Chidō also wrote the first commentary on Suvarṇasaptati, Kin Shichijū Ron Shō 金七十論疏, which demonstrates his trailblazing interest in non-Buddhist Indian philosophies (Hōjō 1983, 191; Okitsu 2018, 15–16).

According to the entries of the Union Catalog of Early Japanese Books,91 up to forty commentaries on Daśapadārthi from this period still exist, counting from the first commentary of Hōjū Chidō down to the very end of the nineteenth century. The majority of these commentaries are preserved in libraries or temple archives in Japan as manuscripts. However, some were printed immediately after they were written, thus have been circulated on a larger scale. Nevertheless, despite a large number of commentaries, the contents of many overlap to a great extent. Therefore the effort of writing and recompiling may have also been a way of paying homage to the lineage of one's masters, which ultimately went back to Hōjū Chidō.

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In analyzing this period, I consult a few of the printed commentaries considered to be the most important of the time. These were republished in recent times and include the already-mentioned commentary by Hōjū;92 Kachū Shōshū Jikkugi Ron 科註勝宗十句義論, published in 1760 and written by Ikkan Kokatsu93 一觀虎喝 (unknown dates); Shōshū Jikkugi Ron Shaku94 勝宗十句義論釈, by Kiben Daidōbō 基辨大同房 (1718–1791) in 1773; Shōshū Jikkugi Ron Kecchaku95 勝宗十句義論訣択, composed in 1778 by Rinjō Kaidō 林常快道 (1751–1810), the most extensive commentary of all; and a concise commentary, Jikkugi Ron Monki96 十句義論聞記, published in 1844 and written by Hōun Usui 宝雲烏水.

3.3.3.2 Distinguishing characteristics of the period

The main distinguishing characteristic of the period is, of course, the appearance of direct commentaries on Daśapadārthī that aimed at synthesizing all East Asian information about Vaiśeṣika from the time of Kumārajīva to the Edo period. The beginning of the period is Hōjū's commentary on Daśapadārthī. The end is the second half of the nineteenth century, which witnessed the modernization and globalization of Japan. As a result of the latter, Vaiśeṣika study began to include newly coined Westernized terminology and methodology, which tended to focus more on Sanskrit sources and dismissed East Asian texts as less authoritative. Consequently, the unique East Asian tradition of Vaiśeṣika gradually disappeared. As some Japanese scholar-monks became professors of Indian and Buddhist philosophies, the knowledge and training required to read Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika texts remained, and they facilitated the development and flourishing of modern scholarship on Indian philosophy in Japan.

By the designation “Vaiśeṣika in the Buddhist Curriculum,” I mean the phenomenon that Daśapadārthī became a text studied by Buddhist monks of all schools along with other standard

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92 Hōjū 1978.
93 Kokatsu 1760.
94 Kiben 1975.
95 Kaidō 1975.
96 Hōun 1975.
Buddhist texts via the plurality of extant commentaries and different school affiliations of the authors in the period. Accordingly, here I offer some explanations for the increase in popularity of commenting on Daśapadārthī and Suvarnasaptati.

The first reason is the emergence of universal Consciousness-Only studies in the Edo period, sometimes known as the “study of essence and characteristics” 性相學. The article, written by famous Buddhist scholar Yūki Reimon 結城令聞, highlights the critical fact that, in the Edo period, the Consciousness-Only temple of Kōfukuji became the center of studies for many monks despite their school affiliations. Therefore, the monks would study as if abroad 游學, leaving their home temples for Kōfukuji and later returning with the texts promoted by the Consciousness-Only school (Yūki 1940, 434–450). In this way, all three main branches of Consciousness-Only study became widespread as never before. They are (1) Chéng Wéishí Lùn, (2) Buddhist logic based on Nyāyapraveśa, and (3) Abhidharma grounded on Abhidharmakośakārikā. Together with the study of the later texts, the ideas of Vaiśeṣika attracted the attention of Japanese Edo scholars.

For example, one can note the history of the Shingishingon 新義真言宗 school during the Edo period. Many Shingon patriarchs of both the Chisan 智山 and Buzan 豐山 branches studied at Kōfukuji and wrote commentaries on Consciousness-Only texts (Yūki 1940, 450–460). Hōjū, having learned from both lineages, could have come across Vaiśeṣika ideas from a variety of his teachers.

The second reason is the accomplishments of Japanese scholars in perfecting neat outlines and compendia of doctrinal information. One can already find useful summaries of Vaiśeṣika that aided the compilation of direct commentaries on Daśapadārthī in texts like Yuishiki Dōgakushō97 and Inmyō Ronsho Myōtō Shō98 因明論疏明燈抄 T.2270 by Zenju 藏俊.

Third, the emergence and introduction of movable type significantly enhanced the technology of printing. Although printing was present in Japan at least since the eighth century, it was only in the Edo period that it became a commercially viable means of business for individual printers. Not only were books of all sorts printed, but also texts with Japanese reading aids, kunten 訓点. These were published on a much larger scale than ever before, which increased the number of potential readers.

97 T.2263.114b01–c06.
It was during this time that the first separate printings of *Daśapadārthī* and *Suvarṇasaptati* appeared in Kyōto. Previously, both texts were only printed within the projects of Buddhist canons 大藏經 containing thousands of other writings. As *Daśapadārthī* and *Suvarṇasaptati* occupied only a minuscule part of the Canons and also only appeared in a limited number of copies, these texts did not attract much attention. The situation changed completely with the separate printings, which enabled multiple copies to spread within the society.

As I was not able to consult the earliest separate publications of *Daśapadārthī* in 1708 and 1748, I looked at the first individual print of *Suvarṇasaptati* in 1697. This contained a unique postscript referring to Sāṃkhya as inferior to Buddhism but superior to the teachings of Confucius and Laozi. From the Buddhist viewpoint, the relatively favorable evaluation, and circulation of the non-Buddhist text without proper commentaries, may have caused misunderstandings in society (Okitsu 2018, 18–19). Thus the monks could have assumed responsibility for preparing the commentaries on these publications based on all existing Buddhist sources and explanations.

The final reason I find plausible is what Nakamura explains as the signs of the modern way of thinking in the Edo period. These would express themselves most conspicuously in three specific touches applied by Buddhist authors of the period. The first is the employment of an abundance of available East Asian Buddhist reference sources. The suitability of the sources tended to be judged not by their authority but by their informativeness and cogency. E.g., Okitsu has noted that Kaidō in his commentaries on *Abhidharmakośa* not only relied on the translations of Xuánzàng but also on the ones done by Paramārtha (Okitsu 2018, 3–15). That would be impossible if one were to follow authority, since Xuánzàng was in many ways opposed to Paramārtha.

Second, there was a concern unique to themselves with the study of Sanskrit terminology and its grammatical principles. Buddhist scholars wrote commentaries on the topics of the eight cases 八囀聲 and six different interpretations of compounds 六合釋 derivable from Sanskrit grammar, and they occasionally tried to apply these principles to Chinese (Zamorski 2019). The focus on the study of Sanskrit words is detectable from the commentaries on *Daśapadārthī* by Hōjū and Kaidō when they attempt to discuss not only the phenomena of *padārthas* but also the original Sanskrit terms and their

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99 竺乾外道之智勝支那孔老之道也遠矣況乎吾 (Okitsu 2018, 19).
meaning. The specific focus of the Sanskritization of the language demonstrates the keenness of Edo Buddhists in textual criticism and the key role that language plays in explaining reality.

Finally, the Edo scholars were quite exacting in their scrutiny of previous scholars, thus tended to judge their work critically (Lin 2018, 383–386). All these points may have contributed together to the Zeitgeist of authoring separate commentaries on Daśapadārthī.

3.3.3.3 The East Asian Vaiśeṣika as revealed through the Edo commentaries

In this section of the paper, I explain in greater detail the essential characteristics of the East Asian Vaiśeṣika tradition, which appear in the Edo commentaries on Daśapadārthī. But before that, I provide a synopsis of these commentaries. Such commentaries have largely been neglected by modern scholarship.

Three of the five consulted commentaries begin by presenting an outline of Daśapadārthī. The commentary of Kiben begins with two prefaces, one by a monk, Seihan 盛範, and another by Kiben himself, and only then goes into outlining the contents. The commentary by Hōun skips the outline and only deals with the contents of Daśapadārthī. It expounds Daśapadārthī by quoting statements on Vaiśeṣika and concurrently providing explanations from various Buddhist scriptural materials.

Hōjū divides the contents of his commentary into five parts (Hōjū 1978, 323): (1) discernment of the cause of the teaching 辨敎起因; (2) clarification about the essentials 明論體性; (3) establishment of the main doctrine 建論宗旨; (4) commentary on the title 釋論題額; (5) commentary on the main body of the text 入文解釋.

Kokatsu divides the contents into four parts (Kokatsu 1760, 1): (1) discernment of the origins 辨緣起; (2) clarification about the essentials and establishment of the main doctrine 明宗體; (3) explanation of the title 解題名; (4) [commentary] on the main body of the text 入本文.

Kiben divides the contents of Daśapadārthī into five chapters (Kiben 1975, 2): 1) discernment of the cause of the teaching 辨敎起因; 2) expression of the essence of the treatise 彰論體性; 3) clarification of the primary doctrine of the treatise 頌論宗旨; 4) interpretation of the title 四釋題目; 5) line by line commentary on the main body of the text 五隨文判.

Kaidō divides the contents into six parts (Kaidō 1975, 63): (1) name and date of the founder 本祖名時; (2) transmission in India and China 流傳竺漢; (3) essence and primary doctrine of Vaiśeṣika
Despite a varying number of chapters, all the consulted commentaries, except Hōun’s, display the same logic in their treatment of *Daśapadārthī*. They begin by presenting the history of Vaiśeṣika, including the biography of Kaṇāda/Ulūka, the narrative of his teaching transmission to Paṇcaśikhī, and the authoring of *Daśapadārthī* by Maṭicandra/Candramati, including how it was translated by Xuánzàng. Subsequently, the Vaiśeṣika doctrines of the three times and the permanence of the sound mentioned by Kuījī in T.1861 are introduced as essential teachings. Then there is the treatment of the meaning of the title of *Daśapadārthī* in Chinese, *Shèngzōng Shíjùyì Lùn* 勝宗十句義論.

The majority of the space in each commentary is devoted to the line-by-line quotation of *Daśapadārthī*, and the commentator’s explanations follow the main body of the text. The commentaries proceed with the explanation of the meaning of ambiguous characters or character combinations. In some places, where there are multiple opinions on the meaning of characters, each of these opinions is examined. Finally, the most convincing opinion is judged as expressing the correct understanding according to the commentator.

A large number of explanations in the commentaries are based on the quotations from various East Asian texts of previous centuries that, in one way or another, touch upon Vaiśeṣika. The especially distinct segments of the commentaries are sections in which the authors make judgments on specific passages and at which the authors reflect on Vaiśeṣika in a more general fashion. Such musings are mostly found in the beginning chapters of the commentaries. I consider the commentary of Kiben to be the most representative and expressive of the period in question; he demonstrates his interest in Vaiśeṣika and provides clear arguments about its relationship with Buddhism.

Now, I turn to the main characteristics of East Asian Vaiśeṣika brought up earlier in the article. The first is the interpretive-commentary tradition of *Daśapadārthī* that does not directly connect with the Indian traditions of Vaiśeṣika. Calls for the interpretation of the ideas of *Daśapadārthī* were happening since at least Kuījī. Most of these interpretations were given in the commentaries on

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100 The characters *Líhé* 离合 refer to the six interpretations of compound terms 六离合释.
Chéng Wéishí Lùn and Nyāyapraveśa. Nevertheless, only in the Edo commentaries were all opinions concerning the particular passages of Daśapadārthī in question gathered together.

What is particularly notable here is that the Buddhist interpreters from East Asia during this period were repudiating the works of their Buddhist opponents in India. However, as these interpreters were Buddhists not from historical India, their encounter with Vaiśeṣikas was limited to the textual sources from previous Chinese Buddhist transmissions. Only a minimal number of Chinese monks had a chance to meet living Vaiśeṣika scholars or practitioners, including Xuánzàng, who traveled to India.

To illustrate the “interpretive-commentary” aspect of the first characteristic, I present two discussions that demonstrate how the contents of Daśapadārthī were addressed in the Edo commentaries: (a) the ambiguity in the definition of the self (ātman), (b) the uncertainty in the definition of color. Although both topics appear in other commentaries, the commentary of Kiben clearly and precisely distinguishes various opinions.

(a) The self is defined in Daśapadārthī thus: “That which is the inherent cause of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, internal effort, mental tendencies (saṃskāra), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma) and so on, giving rise to cognition as a characteristic, is called the self.” This definition of the self posed two problems for East Asian Buddhists. First, regarding the meaning of the character děng 等, translated as “and so on” above. Second, regarding the meaning of the characters héhé yīnyuán 和合因緣, translated as “inherent cause” above. In the next paragraphs, I discuss the first problem in more detail.

As Kiben reports, there were six different opinions about the problem (Kiben 1975, 7–8). The first was offered by Dàoyì 道邑, who was a Consciousness-Only master in the Tang dynasty. He suggested that using děng distinguishes the nine “interior” 向內 qualities that are capable of pervading the self and giving rise to knowledge from the five exterior qualities that are non-pervading: number, measure, separateness, conjunction, and disjunction.

An unknown interpreter recommended a second, different solution, i.e., that děng only refers
to the five “exterior” qualities of the self not mentioned in the definition but described later in *Daśapadārthī*.

The third anonymous opinion attacked the idea of Dàoyì by pointing out the inconsistency in talking about the nine dharmas as pervading ones since later in *Daśapadārthī* they are not enumerated as such. This suggests that if dharmas such as cognition, pleasure, etc. were pervading, the self would then have to be copresent, which, for example, would make it hard to explain the coexistence of pleasure and pain at the same time.

The fourth opinion came out in support of the first one and against the attack of the third. It offered a defense by arguing that although the locus of pleasure is devoid of pain, in this sense, there is no pervasion. Still, since pleasure is a single characteristic of a single self, which is the largest measure, then there is the potentiality to speak about pain and pleasure as pervading dharmas. That is to say, pleasure can be located everywhere because the self is omnipresent.

The fifth opinion is more in the nature of textual criticism and suggests that the character *děng* is inappropriate and probably a mistaken insertion.

Finally, according to the sixth opinion, *děng* means not “and so on” but “equally.” In this case, the self is equally the inherent cause for all nine qualities like cognition, pleasure, etc. Kiben’s judgment of the accuracy suggests that both Dàoyì and the fifth opinion are correct. Kokatsu and Kaido upheld the ideas of Dàoyì. Miyamoto Keiichi, in his latest edition of *Daśapadārthī*, judges *děng* to be a false insertion, following the fifth position (Miyamoto 1996, 255, 269).

(b) The second problem came up with the definition of color. “What is color? That which is perceived only by the eyes and has one support is called the color.” The controversy appeared concerning the phrase “one locus” or “one support” *yīyī*. Three opinions are recorded (Kiben 1975, 16–17). The first was put forward by Huìzhǎo who interpreted *yīyī* as the color of a single atom. The second opinion was of Zhìzhōu who explained *yīyī* as the perceptible substance which is the locus for the existence of color. The third opinion of Dàoyì emphasized that *yīyī* primarily refers solely to support of color, which excludes other possible referents like sound, taste, etc. Kiben chose the third version as correct; in contrast, Miyamoto’s choice follows the logic of the second (Miyamoto 1996, 169).

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The second characteristic of the Vaiśeṣika intellectual tradition in East Asia is: the exclusive reliance on East Asian Buddhist masters' opinions regarding the doctrinal points of Vaiśeṣika, including mutual cross-referencing among the masters. Based on the previous discussion, it is clear that the debates on Vaiśeṣika were conducted by East Asian Buddhist masters solely relying on East Asian sources. The referenced sources ranged from translations of Kumārajīva 鸠摩羅什 to unknown contemporaries during the Edo period. Kibēn's discussions (mentioned above) provide an excellent example of the latter, but other exemplars include the commentaries of both Hoju and Kaidō. Hōjū made references to dozens of sources from various periods (Hōjō 1978a, 20). Buddhists of the Edo period were entering an already distinguished field of Vaiśeṣika scholarship, which they traced back to Chinese sources and opinions on Vaiśeṣika from a thousand years earlier.

The third characteristic is: the conscious historical admittance of Vaiśeṣika as one of the East Asian systems of thought by Edo Japanese Buddhists. All Edo commentaries begin by describing the history of Vaiśeṣika. The historical narrative is formed by joining bits of information from various sources. Noteworthy is how this history explains the reason for the spread of Vaiśeṣika to China and further east, which clues us in to how the Edo Buddhists thought about the genesis of Vaiśeṣika in East Asia. I found the commentary of Kaidō to be the most explicit on this question. I paraphrase his main ideas in the bellow paragraph.

Kaidō informed the readers (by quoting Woncheuk) that, in India, only three teachings had been studied: the inner (i.e., Buddhism) and the two outside teachings. The two external teachings referred to are the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya schools. As for the Chinese transmission of Vaiśeṣika, according to Kaidō, in the past there were no scriptures so everything was orally transmitted. It was thanks to the efforts of Xuánzàng when he translated Daśapadārthā that Vaiśeṣika came to be recognized in China as a school 勝宗. It seems that the point of introducing Vaisesika in this way was to assist the inner teaching (the Buddhist doctrines) by excluding any heretical interpretations (so that no oppositions would exist). As the Daśapadārthā text was very obscure in its purpose, according to Kaidō, Kuījī made a commentary to facilitate its understanding; unfortunately, the surviving copy was eaten by moths (Kaidō 1975, 67).

The above-paraphrased ideas from Kaidō informed scholars of a supposed raison d'être for Vaiśeṣika transmission in East Asia. It was imagined that, in India, three central teachings were
predominant, and Xuánzàng brought Daśapadārthī to China because, with it, one could better study Buddhist doctrine. Essentially it was an attempt to prevent the opposition’s ideology from creeping into Buddhist teaching.

The fourth characteristic of East Asian Vaiśeṣika is the distinctive group of stories about the beginning of the school and its originator, Kaṇāda-Ulūka, as well as his disciple Pañcaśikhī, which in fact are unknown in India. This characteristic, which encompasses the development of the biographies of the founder of Vaiśeṣika and his teaching transmission to Pañcaśikhī, has already been discussed in the previous sections.

The fifth and last characteristic I explicate here is the evaluation and comparison of Vaiśeṣika with Buddhist theories (mostly to Consciousness-Only Buddhism). To expand on this, I follow the commentary of Kiben, where many pertinent reflections are given, and I assume that these reflections might reveal the predominant attitude of Edo period Buddhists towards Vaiśeṣika.

First, I quote from the preface to Kiben’s commentary, authored by a monk named Seihan who laments the state of Consciousness-Only Buddhists by comparing them to Vaiśeṣikas:

“The scholarship of our Hossō (Consciousness-Only school) Mahāyāna does not differentiate between the real and conventional, and is corrupted by pursuing merely the characteristics and terminology. It seems that it lapses into Vaiśeṣika. One can be not but very cautious.”

After this, Seihan wrote about how he came to know Daśapadārthī and explained his understanding of Kiben’s motivation for writing a commentary:

Master Kiben Daidōbō was afraid of letting Mahāyāna Buddhism tumble into the heterodox [wàidào] track. With sympathy, he did not distinguish bad or good of it; in authoring this commentary, the intention was only for inner and not for outer [use]. On the day when the master was lecturing about Consciousness-Only and logic in the temple, I managed to consult the unpublished manuscript and on asking obtained it. While reading, I had doubts, but from discussions, I was firmly convinced of the profound meaning of Vaiśeṣika, as clearly as watching the sun. The master, no matter

103 Kiben 1975, 1: 讲學我法相大乘著, 有不與真俗卽離, 而但逐相數名之弊, 可謂墮勝論也. 不可不慎焉.
of my ignorance, trusted his decision, assigning me the task of reviewing and publishing [this commentary].

In the main body of Kiben’s commentary, Kiben dedicated a subchapter within the first to “the ascertaining of the intention in creating the commentary” 辨造释意, where he explained his reasons for writing it. This long passage is a rare example of the work of a monk who consciously recorded his rationale for writing the commentary:

Having entered Buddhism, in the time of reading many of our sūtras, śāstras, and commentaries, I was overwhelmed by doubt and encountered immense obstacles concerning the passages that explain Vaiśeṣika. Discussing and reflecting on them over a long time, gradually I managed to grasp and distinguish the names and characteristics of the six and ten padārthas. However, I still did not understand the essential doctrine of the school; and consequently, how did the padārthas establish the mundane and transmundane? Therefore, I discarded the text, saying, “this is heterodox teaching, so even if I do not understand, why lament?” Again, I considered this to be a superficial theory, but my understanding was shallow. The reason is that the insight and our knowledge of contemplating various phenomena are inferior to them [the Vaiśeṣikas]. Furthermore, I think that [our] naturally practiced intellectual activity is inferior to them [the Vaiśeṣikas]. Therefore, [we] cannot understand and cannot refute them [the Vaiśeṣikas], is it not a shame? Moreover, I think that contemporary scholars do not come close to the wisdom of wàidào teaching. They [contemporary scholars] are only skimming through extensive and profound Buddhist teachings according to the texts, stubbornly clinging to the name and form and calling themselves as understanding Buddhism. Is it not a pity? The Mahāyāna scholars of

104 Kiben 1975, 1: 大同房基辨法師，懼令佛之大乗，亦行墜外焉，愍不辨珉玉者焉，以作斯釋，意但在為內非為外已矣。師掛錫于本寺，講唯識因明之日，予屈資見此論釋，未脫艸稿。遂請得焉，閱猶有惑，從以問答決擇，勝論玄旨，昭昭乎如看日。師不以我庸愚，命校刊施行意.
today do not debate the wàidào doctrines. They are unaware that they are themselves stubbornly clinging onto the teachings of Mahāyāna. The words of Mahāyāna aspiration do not come close to the view of the person of wàidào. Isn’t it to be feared? Therefore, I had been investigating this treatise for years, attentively examining the six padārthas, drilling, and contemplating the ten padārthas. I slowly awakened to grasp the fundamental meaning of this school. Therefore, I created this commentary while lecturing, to admonish the superficial learners of Mahāyāna.\textsuperscript{105}

From this passage, one should note the way Kiben evaluated Vaiśeṣika and its relation to the Buddhism of his time. The judgment is much more appreciative of Vaiśeṣika than the one given by Xuánzàng a thousand years before Kiben, who described the Vaiśeṣika theory of padārthas as “being postulated based on falsity and delusions.”\textsuperscript{106} In the above-quoted passage from Kiben, Buddhists are referred to several times as “not coming close to” 不及 and “inferior to” 劣於彼 Vaiśeṣikas. That is a surprising assessment by one of the most famous Buddhist scholars of his day.

In the next passage, Kiben emphasizes the necessity of studying Vaiśeṣika for Consciousness-Only Buddhists, which is the crowning jewel of East Asian Vaisesika evolution as an intellectual tradition:

The person who studies Hossō Mahāyāna must examine the doctrines of Vaiśeṣika in order to remove the clingings and to abide by the middle way. If it is not so, the characteristics of Hossō teaching are completely like Vaiśeṣika and not Mahāyāna. Why is it so? The theory of Hossō Mahāyāna teaching postulates the innate seeds that

\textsuperscript{105} Kiben 1975, 3: 基辨入釋門闕我諸經論疏中至敘勝論所執文鴻疑閲塞義意難通. 商礭日久漸得辨六句十句名相. 然未解彼宗由此句義如何建立世出世間. 遂捨卷言, 此是外道. 雖不解得何痛之有. 復竊以為此是外道膚淺之論. 而解了不容易. 因識我觀諸法之智猶劣於彼. 又以爲生來所修慧業劣於彼. 故不能知彼伏彼何其不羞焉. 又以爲今世學者以不及外道智. 概覽廣大深遠佛教隨文固執名相自稱為解得佛教. 何其不慎焉. 故間推窮斯論既有年矣. 周審六句練觀十句徐悟得彼建立本旨. 遂造斯釋説演教授以誡大乘受膚學者.

\textsuperscript{106} T.1585.3b07: 隨情妄所施設.
manifest all the dharmas as the alterations of consciousness. Consciousness is called the awareness of the subjectively cognizing mind. If speaking [in the position of being] not separated from substantial clingings, according to the doctrine of Vaiśeṣika, the conjunction of the self and mind produces cognition that comes from the substantial cause of expression and cognition, which produces the result of a cognizable object. Even though the explanations are different, the meaning is entirely the same. Furthermore, the theory of devoid discrimination of the no-self conditions the substantial self to separate from the six padārthas and obtain Nirvāṇa. If speaking [in the position of being] not separated from clingings, the rejection of linguistic expressions, the wondrous truth, or the essence of Consciousness-Only is entirely equal to the former [Vaiśeṣika], saying it is getting rid of the six padārthas to obtain the self of no-self. Moreover, the so-called dharmas of our school are discussed as the innate seeds that are the alternation of consciousness dependently arising from the other. It is explained that the seeds are untrue and nominal dharmas. Therefore the alterations of consciousness are illusory but discussed as a perfectly accomplished reality [parinispanna-svabhāva] as well. Since the theory of perfectly accomplished reality depends on the former [illusory theory], if this principle is not attained, the teaching of Hossō is identical to the doctrines of the former [Vaiśeṣika]. Therefore now, I make an effort to comment on this wàidào treatise.107

The main reason provided by Kiben for studying Vaiśeṣika is that both the theory of metaphysical reality and the theory of liberation are practically the same in Vaiśeṣika and the Consciousness-Only school. The only difference is that Vaiśeṣikas subscribe to the intrinsic existence of objects while Hossō speaks about objects as only nominally-conditionally existing. The main

problem about which Kiben cautions the students of Consciousness-Only is the threat of slipping into the clinging of objects and forgetting that they are dependent upon consciousness. If this central principle of difference is not conscientiously established, according to Kiben, the theory of Consciousness-Only and Vaiśeṣika are identical. That fundamental similarity is why Kiben wrote the commentary.

4 CONCLUSIONS

This paper has addressed a rarely discussed realm within the study of Indian non-Buddhist philosophy in East Asia, focusing on Vaiśeṣika, which is one particular school of Indian philosophy. In the second section, after listing and reviewing the essential sources concerning Vaiśeṣika to come from East Asia, I argue that previous scholarship on Vaiśeṣika in East Asia has been limited to analyzing Daśapadārthī, which is interpreted as (only) belonging to the context of Indian civilization.

In the third section, I propose a model of speaking about Vaiśeṣika in East Asia as not only limited to Daśapadārthī but functioning as an intellectual tradition, which is different from Indian Vaiśeṣika traditions. To prove the existence and specificities of East Asia Vaiśeṣika tradition, I describe the development of Vaiśeṣika in East Asia. In this way, I distinguish three stages (time-periods) of Vaiśeṣika development in East Asia, which culminate in a visible intellectual tradition with its peculiarities, which distinguish it from the Indian traditions. In describing the first two stages of Vaiśeṣika development, I discuss three subtopics: (a) sources; (b) distinguishing characteristics of the period; (c) peculiarities of the contents. Concerning the final stage of Vaiśeṣika development, after discussing the sources and distinguishing characteristics of the period, I also touch upon the topic of “The East Asian Vaiśeṣika as Revealed through the Edo Commentaries,” which summarized the essential characteristics of East Asian Vaiśeṣika. The key information on all the three periods and East Asian Vaiśeṣika more generally can be summarized as such:

The first period, Vaiśeṣika in China before Xuánzàng (Beginning of the Fifth Century–648), includes the time span in which the first datable information on Vaiśeṣika appeared on Chinese soil. The primary sources about Vaiśeṣika from this period are the texts associated with the Madhyamaka
and Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha traditions. The most important personality and text about Vaiśeṣika are Jízàng and his commentary on Śataśāstra T.1827.

The second, Vaiśeṣika as the Subject of Consciousness-Only Tradition (648–Middle of the Eighteenth Century), encompasses a vast period of texts and events concerning Vaiśeṣika. The critical event is the translation of Daśapadārthī into Chinese by Xuánzàng in 648. This translation begot the systematic treatise on Vaiśeṣika in East Asia. Also, it is vitally important to emphasize that Consciousness-Only thinkers of this period viewed themselves as keepers and interpreters of Vaiśeṣika doctrines that were in Daśapadārthī but also other key texts like Chéng Wéishí Lùn, Nyāyapraveśa, and Abhidharmakośa. Though the Consciousness-Only tradition did not last long as an independent tradition in China, the ideas were transmitted to the neighboring countries of Korea and Japan. Only in Japan did Consciousness-Only Buddhists manage to establish themselves as an independent school with the center at Kōfukuji temple in Nara. With the transference of the Consciousness-Only school to Japan, Vaiśeṣika scholarship thrived.

The third period, Vaiśeṣika in the Buddhist Curriculum: The Edo Commentaries on Daśapadārthī (Eighteenth–Mid-Nineteenth Centuries), includes the blossoming of the East Asian Vaiśeṣika tradition that resulted in dozens of direct commentaries on Daśapadārthī. The novel commentaries on Daśapadārthī consulted practically any existing and available East Asian material on Vaiśeṣika in order to make a groundbreaking synthesis of the Vaiśeṣika ideas. The trailblazing figure in this commentarial movement was Hōjū, who wrote the first commentary on Daśapadārthī in 1752. The most informative and expressive is that of Kiben, written in 1773.

The essential characteristics of East Asian Vaiśeṣika tradition that expressed themselves in the Edo commentaries on Daśapadārthī are as follows: (a) the interpretive-commentary tradition of Daśapadārthī that does not directly connect with the Indian traditions of Vaiśeṣika; (b) the exclusive reliance on East Asian Buddhist masters’ opinions regarding the doctrinal points of Vaiśeṣika, including mutual cross-referencing among the masters; (c) the conscious historical admittance of Vaiśeṣika as one of the East Asian systems of thought by Japanese Edo Buddhists; (d) The unique stories about the beginning of the school and its originator, Kaṇāda-Ulūka, as well as his disciple Pañcaśikhī, that are unknown in India; (e) The evaluations and comparison of Vaiśeṣika with Buddhist theories.
In conclusion, East Asian Vaiśeṣika developed from seemingly insignificant references in the earliest period (beginning of the fifth century–648) into a system revolving around Daśapadārthī that was viewed as antagonistic to Buddhism (648–middle of the eighteenth century). And finally, this system found its place in the movement of writing and studying synthetical commentaries about it as a necessary curriculum of study for Edo Buddhists.
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NOTES ON ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSCRIPTIONS

- T. Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經.
- X. Manji Zokuzyō 卍字續藏經.

In transcribing Chinese, I use Pīnyīn; when Japanese, Hepburn Romanization; when Korean, Revised Romanization of Korean.

When writing the names of the treatises of Indian provenance, I give their names in Sanskrit. If the treatise happens to be of Chinese or Japanese origin, I either transcribe or translate its name into English.
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