China and the New Cosmopolitanism

by

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SINO-PLATONIC PAPERS
FOUNDED 1986

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ISSN
2157-9679 (print)   2157-9687 (online)

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China and the New Cosmopolitanism

by Johan Elverskog
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Last year I was invited to participate in the conference “Chinese Cosmopolitanism 1600–1950,”² and I readily accepted, since I had been working for several years on the question of what I was calling Qing cosmopolitanism.³ Indeed, I was very much looking forward to this gathering of scholars and the potential discussions it could generate about the theoretical possibilities and the implications of applying the “new cosmopolitanism” towards the study of China. Yet, even though the conference involved many fascinating papers and lively discussions, the end result

¹ In an article on the indifference of Han Chinese to the current situation in Tibet, especially the more than 100 self-immolations, the Tibet activist Woeser provided a Chinese saying as an explanation for this lack of concern. The phrase was slightly mistranslated — or perhaps modernized — as “If you are not of my ethnicity, you cannot share my heart” (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/world/asia/educated-chinese-are-silent-amid-tibetan-self-immolations.html?_r=0. Accessed November 11, 2012).

² The conference was organized by Hu Minghui as part of the project “Constructing Modern Knowledge in China, 1600–1949,” headed by So-an Chang of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica. It was held at the University of California, Santa Cruz, on September 7 and 8, 2012. For more information see http://humweb.ucsc.edu/huminghui/. Accessed January 11, 2013.

³ “Mongol Cosmopolitans and Qing Culture,” was presented at the conference “Tibetan Religion and State in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries” (University of California, Berkeley, May 7, 2006). This was followed by “Wutai Shan in the Mongol Literary Imaginaire,” (presented at the “Wutai Shan and Qing Culture” conference held at the Rubin Museum of Art, May 12, 2007), which was eventually published as “Wutai Shan, Qing Cosmopolitanism, and the Mongols,” Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies 6 (2011): 243–274. Available at http://www.thlib.org/collections/texts/jiats/#!jiats=/06/elverskog/b1/
was not quite what I had expected. Rather, on the first day of the conference the shorthand phrase “c-word” already had become ubiquitous. Moreover, there was a growing consensus among the participants that cosmopolitanism may not actually be useful or applicable to the study of China.

Much of this reticence seemed to hinge on two factors. The first was the endless debate about how to define cosmopolitanism: what, indeed, are we actually talking about? The second critique was more trenchant, and it revolved around the question of what intellectual work we wanted to achieve by employing this notoriously amorphous and diffuse intellectual concept to the study of China. Did it really achieve anything worthwhile? Or did bringing this idea and its long genealogy into the Chinese context just muddy the waters? Moreover, did using this term actually offer us anything of value? Did it offer us any new insights?

While such concerns are certainly valid, my own view is that they are incorrect. I believe cosmopolitanism is an important theoretical approach that can open up new perspectives on China’s past. Others may disagree. Yet, in order to broaden the discussion I would simply like to present here a slightly revised version of my pre-circulated conference paper, the ten-minute summation that I gave at the conference, and something like a conclusion about the value of Chinese cosmopolitanism.

**Injannashi and the End of Qing Cosmopolitanism**

Awhile back a colleague, a Qing historian, told me about how he had vicariously experienced the fall of the Soviet Union. In particular, he told me about a friend of his, a Kirghiz woman, who at the time was a fellow researcher at an institute in Chengdu. She was working on questions of Kirghiz history in terms of the frontier/borderland and thus, as can well be imagined, she reveled in the collapse of the communist state since it brought not only an end to a brutal and dysfunctional political system, but also heralded the potential liberation of her people and country. These two events inevitably did come to pass, and were cherished by many, including the Kirghiz scholar herself. Yet, for her, they also came with a great personal loss. Namely, her husband, an Uzbek, who had been a member of the Party elite, suddenly became an Uzbek nationalist and wanted to move to Tashkent and have his wife take care of the kids as a “good Uzbek wife.” They got divorced. Similarly, the Kirghiz woman also lost all the perks and status...
of having been a member of the Soviet intelligentsia: the apartment in Moscow, the international travel, the well-endowed research projects, etc. Or, in other words, all the positive things — such as education, internationalism, a global perspective — that shaped the realities of what we may want to call “Soviet cosmopolitanism.” Or should we? Of course, tied into this question is the fundamental problem of what we mean by “cosmopolitanism,” and what kind of intellectual, moral and/or political work we aim to foster by employing it.

Of course, over recent years this bundle of issues has exercised a great many scholars working in the movement known as the “new cosmopolitanism.” Indeed, ever since this scholarship started to gain traction across academia the deluge of works on the topic has been nothing short of monumental. The on-line retailer Amazon.com, for example, lists almost a thousand books with “cosmopolitanism” in the title. Which in itself is rather remarkable, but so too is the fact that these works range across the disciplines. Thus cosmopolitanism as a new theoretical lens is being used by scholars in everything from anthropology to communication to education, as well as gender studies, legal theory, and literature, in addition to the fields of political science, philosophy, sociology and religious studies, in addition to all the area studies. Of course, while the range of issues and themes engaged within all these works invariably run the gamut, one is probably safe in saying that all of them are unified in the basic assumption of cosmopolitanism as being something positive — if not even the pinnacle of human progress. At the same time, however, there is also a general divide between those scholars, such as Nussbaum and Derrida, who continue the Enlightenment ideal of cosmopolitanism as a universalist mode of practice, and those who focus on what may be termed the particularities of multiple


cosmopolitanisms in both time and space. Yet, regardless of these differences, it is also clear that much of this work — especially that done by those with an historical inclination — aims to utilize this new theoretical paradigm in order to approach old material in new ways and thereby potentially open up new intellectual vistas. Indeed, is that not the aim of this conference? To employ the framework of cosmopolitanism in order to explore and hopefully reveal new perspectives and insights on China’s recent past.

Such was at least my own concern when I first started to think about cosmopolitanism in relation to Qing history. In particular, what interested me were the possibilities of using cosmopolitanism as a theoretical paradigm through which to conceptualize the possibilities and/or realities of a distinctive Qing culture. A culture that was not simply being deployed by the metropole in order to dominate the periphery, but one that had organically developed within the structures of the Manchu state and that actually cut across and knit together the diverse cultural mosaic of Qing space. Or, in other words, a Qing cosmopolitanism.

At the time — this was seven years ago — the impetus for such a project was not simply to dabble with the latest buzzword du jour, but rather, to engage specific historiographical concerns. And the main one in this regard was the desire to overcome the pervasive ethno-national frameworks — some arising out of the New Qing History, but also the larger academic organization of knowledge: the Sinologist, the Tibetanist, the Mongolist, the Islamicist, etc. — that hindered the conceptualization of a unified cross-cultural Qing. And to a certain extent this concern was also tied into the broader issue of how to bring China — and in this case the Qing — into dialogue with the burgeoning historiographical trend towards the global. Since in many cases it seemed precisely as if all the issues of current historiography — diaspora, flows, mobilities, networks, routes, and travels, as well as the new area studies based on natural regions, world regions or trans-boundary economic zones — were not being taken up by Qing historians. Rather, in many cases it seemed as if scholars all too often went in the other direction and

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7 See, for example, the essays in Pheng Cheah and Bruce W. Robbins’s *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); and Kwame Anthony Appiah’s *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (New York: Norton & Company, 2007).
partitioned a modern territorial unit, the People’s Republic of China, into its components, selected the respective portions in which they specialized, and then generally ignored the rest. Thus instead of recognizing or bringing to the fore the interaction between Qing peoples and culture(s) — much less their interactions with the broader world — much scholarship seemed to be doing exactly the opposite.

Of course, other scholars had also recognized this problem. And thus several works appeared that highlighted the fact that Qing rule was not all about division — or different hats and costumes for various ethnic “constituencies”\(^8\) — but rather, there were certain polyvalent practices, rhetoric and institutions that cut across these boundaries and were thereby forging a new, distinctive and unified Qing culture.\(^9\) And clearly there were various ways by which to conceptualize this dynamic, or draw parallels with other similar historical processes, such as Bose’s historical model of an “interregional arena,” where the aim was to overcome conventional boundaries and look instead at the “important connections of material life, politico-military organization, economic institutions, and social-religious ideology” that bound together larger units of space.\(^10\) Thus while thinking about the Qing as an interregional arena may have been a

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valuable exercise, I chose instead to approach the same issues through the discourse of cosmopolitanism.

In doing so the aim was not simply to provide another historical example of cosmopolitanism, such as Akbar’s Mughal India, but more importantly to re-conceptualize the nature of the Qing. And in this regard, as with most of the “new cosmopolitanism,” there was not only an historical and intellectual dimension to the question, but also a moral one. The first of these invariably revolved around the long running question of the continuities and discontinuities between the Qing and modern China, which was obviously an issue that had been central to the initial work of the New Qing Historians. Yet, at the same time, this critical edge of New Qing History had been completely dismantled and appropriated by the PRC in their minzu-rhetoric of China simply being the successor state of the multi-ethnic Qing. And thus the reality of a Qing cosmopolitanism — and not ethnic ghettoization — pointed to a very different scenario, one wherein there were very real disjunctures between the Manchu state and the various iterations of China that came after. It also provided a framework to grapple with the reality of all the ethno-national and religious movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century — be they Mongol or Chinese communists and nationalists, or Tibetan monastic conservatives — that all seemed to be unified in at least one thing: a radical repudiation of the Qing and its cosmopolitan culture.

And this issue points to the fact that Qing cosmopolitanism requires not only a re-imagining of Chinese history, but also that of Mongolia, Tibet and other places and peoples as well. In the case of Mongolia, for example, it requires a wholesale re-evaluation of more than a century of communist and nationalist historiography that has presented the Qing as nothing but a


12 In regards to re-thinking Tibetan and Sino-Tibetan history, see, for example, Gray Tuttle, Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), and the essays in Matthew T. Kapstein, ed., Buddhism Between Tibet & China (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2009).
complete abomination. A detour and blight in the glorious independent history of the Mongols during which they suffered not only under the jackboots of the Manchus, but were also economically exploited by the wily Chinese. Moreover, and even more problematically, the Mongols also believed their “Mongolness” had been weakened by Sino-Tibetan cultural infiltration. All of which may be true, yet if one really believes in the dynamic cultural mixing that defines cosmopolitanism, which I do, then clearly it should be pointed out as a positive thing in the case of Qing Mongolia. And this I have done repeatedly: stated in print that the Qing — which by definition does not mean “the Han” \(^{13}\) or the PRC — was good for the Mongols. \(^{14}\) At least in the sense that Mongol culture was profoundly enriched by its engagement with both the global thought-world of the Tibetan tradition, \(^{15}\) as well as the art, literature, and culture of the Han Chinese. This is a point of view that invariably raises the hackles of many, especially among those in the burgeoning far-right/fascist movement in contemporary Mongolia. \(^{16}\) Yet it is


\(^{14}\) In doing so I am not promoting a romantic utopian vision of pre-modern empires, as seen in the recent embrace of “neo-Ottomanism” by a range of thinkers including Slavoj Žižek (“Zizek: Europe is Turkey’s Greatest Problem,” The Balkan Chronicle, January 30, 2012. Available at http://www.balkanchronicle.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2065:zizek-europe-turkeys-greatest-problem&catid=82:Europe&Itemid=458. Accessed September 18, 2013). As I have made clear in earlier work, the Qing was also enormously destructive in other ways.

\(^{15}\) On the global nature of the Tibetan intellectual tradition at this time see the three essays on the topic in Sheldon Pollock’s edited volume *Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).

\(^{16}\) Unfortunately the rise of the far right in Mongolia has not received the scholarly attention it deserves; however, the lyrics of the song “Don’t Overstep the limit you Chinks” by the popular Mongolian rap band Dörwön Züg gives a hint of its sensibilities.

We are Chinese, you are paupers sitting on gold
We have the money to buy everything you’ve got
Your women, land, dignity, down to everything you own.
You just wait and see!

Crushing rice in their hand, they took hold of our state for themselves
If the state entrusted by us was entrusted to the Chinks
(We would) shoot and slaughter them all (until) none (is left)
Mongolian girls who become 5 penny whores below them

Snub-nosed Mongolian stray dogs as their food menu
The poison goes straight down to our empty stomach
Right away, (they) suck out the Mongol blood
We will make trouble for you, we’ll make you pay dear

You’ll give up, saying “Come here, come here,” you’ll click the tongue ha ha
You Chink who stabs from behind you’ll be dead by tomorrow
While we think it’s easy to click click the word “Chinese,” they really overstep the limits
On the land of our country Chinese slippers’ prints do not lack, they are in excess

Us Mongols who became men following men’s principles
Are we going to let ourselves be humiliated by these shitty Chinks?
Call the Chinese, call call call; and shoot them all all all
Call the Chinese, call call call; and shoot them all all all …

They rape young girls and abandon them, dirty shits
You weak candy wraps with your fetid breath and your small body
Time has come for you to go back bastards
Slide out and die motherfuckers

(http://www.gregorydelaplace.com/images/docs/zugdavaren.pdf). For more on this movement and its connection with Chinese mining companies, corruption, and a whole host of other factors see the following articles:
precisely for such reasons that the reality of Qing cosmopolitanism needs to be brought to the fore.

Qing Cosmopolitanism

To do so, however, two questions first need to be investigated. First, what precisely is meant by Qing cosmopolitanism, and second, did such a thing actually exist? In addressing the first question we can note at the outset that defining the term has always been an intractable problem. Bhabha, Breckenridge, Chakrabarty, and Pollock, for example, summarized it as the ability to see “the larger [picture of the world] stereoscopically with the smaller.” Yet there are many other definitions, and since it is such a slippery term, and one that, as we have seen, has acquired cache in the academy, one inevitably finds it being used in many ways. In one of the more common of these, scholars claim there is cosmopolitanism whenever there is a mixed group of people in a particular place, as seen in the following description of Qing authorities dealing with illegal mining in nineteenth-century Mongolia:

The number and diversity of such “escapees” testify to the limitations of the imperial project. While Chinese migrants were arrested most often, the archives record the arrests of a striking range of fugitives: Russians, Bukharans, Tibetans, and even Ottoman Turks — a reflection of a certain cosmopolitanism to Qing Mongolia.19

While this is a remarkable testament to Eurasian mobility it does not seem to merit the label cosmopolitanism. Namely, the presence of various people in one place does not by definition


mean that they are cosmopolitans. Indeed, to really talk about cosmopolitanism one has to find evidence of a serious cultural engagement and exchange, since by definition cosmopolitanism means a serious ethical, intellectual and moral commitment to the other. And thus a valid question is whether such a commitment actually did take place during the Qing. Indeed, was there a Qing cosmopolitanism?

If we take cosmopolitanism as described above, or more prosaically as the ability to think and act beyond the local, and thus by means of bricolage create something new that transcends the old, then the answer is yes. There certainly was a distinctive Qing culture that cut across many modern ethno-national boundaries. And one of the better-known aspects of this culture was the intermixing of artistic styles at Qianlong’s court, which has received much scholarly attention. Yet such developments were not an isolated phenomenon, but rather one part of a larger cultural zeitgeist. Thus, for example, in addition to the well-known pentaglot *Wuti Qingwen jian* (五體清文鑑), we also need to take into account the large number of tri- and quadralingual dictionaries produced by the court at this time. Similarly, one should note the project of Zhuang Qinwang Yinlu (莊親王胤祿), the Qianlong emperor’s uncle, who compiled a compendium of the proper pronunciation of dharani and mantra in Manchu, Chinese, Mongolian and Tibetan. Such projects reflect precisely the cosmopolitan culture that took hold during reign of the Qianlong emperor.

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21 His four-part compendium, the *Imperially Commissioned Complete Concordance of Dhāranī in Manchu, Chinese, Mongolian and Tibetan* (御製滿漢蒙古西番合壁大藏全咒), was compiled between the years 1748 and 1758 and was “printed and distributed to monasteries throughout the empire in 1773.” (Patricia Berger, “The Jiaqing Emperor’s Magnificent Record,” *Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies* 6 [2011]: 369).
This is not to suggest, however, that cosmopolitanism was simply a court affair, much less a court-ordered directive, if such a thing could in fact ever be accomplished. Rather, the role of the court was to provide a context wherein cosmopolitan practices could flourish, as seen in Tükwan’s ecumenical *Crystal Mirror of Tenet Systems* (*Grub mtha’ shel gyi me long*) composed in Beijing.\(^22\) Indeed, the point is precisely that such ideas were not found only in the capital. Rather, such ecumenical ideas were also being explored in far-off Inner Mongolia, as seen in the work of the Mongolian lama Mergen Gegen, who called for all Tibetan Buddhists to recognize the value of the Chinese Buddhist canon. In fact, he went so far as to accuse the Tibetan ruler Trisong Detsen of wrongfully rejecting the Chinese canon during the Tang dynasty, and criticized contemporary Mongol nobles for despising all sacred texts except the Tibetan.\(^23\) Making such an argument was clearly revolutionary, but not if seen within the broader context of Qing cosmopolitanism.\(^24\)

At the same time, however, it is important to recognize that within this dynamic, as with any cosmopolitanism, it did not entirely obviate pre-existing conceptualizations. Thus, notions such as being Mongol or Tibetan did not dissipate in a fog of Manchu cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless, while we do need to recognize that each of these entities retained its own continuities, it is also vital to realize that each one of them was also indelibly transformed on account of the cultural exchange made possible by the *pax manjurica*. In fact, it was precisely this multiplicity and mixing, this cosmopolitanism, that not only made the Qing distinctive, but also made it successful. The Mongols, for example, did not fight and die for the Manchu state because they were Mongol, or because the court supported Tantric Buddhism. Rather, in their


\(^24\) On the issue of language among the Mongols, especially the process of Tibetanization, see Johan Elverskog, *Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 120–126.
view, it was for “Our Great Qing” — manu yeke cing — and in the nineteenth century this entailed a particular cosmopolitan culture that needed defending from both Islamic uprisings in the west and Euroamerican imperialists in the east.25

Of course, it was such actions — as well as the cosmopolitanism advocated by Mergen Gegen — that later Mongol nationalists wanted to forget. In fact, for the Mongols of the twentieth century the standard claim has always been that the Mongols have eternally resisted Chinese culture. This idea is so deeply engrained in Mongol historiography it is important to recall that such resistance was more a twentieth-century imagining than anything else. In the sixteenth century, for example, the Mongols were heavily indebted to the Chinese, and by most measures this was to their advantage.26 Similarly, in the late Qing we find abundant evidence of Mongol engagement with things Chinese, such as Chinese historiography,27 Chinese visual culture,28 and Chinese literature,29 all of which were part of the cultural production that defined Qing cosmopolitanism.

25 For an example of such paens to the Mongol defense of the “motherland” see Khesigbatu’s description of Senggerinchen, the Mongol general who defeated the British at Dagu Fort (Kesigbatu, [ed. C. Altansümbür and L. Qurcabayat] Erten ba edüge-yin erdeni-yin tobei [Kökeqota: Öbör Mongul-un soyul-un keblel-ün qoriy-a, 1997], 167–169).


27 As an example of this development one can note the author of the 1835 Pearl Rosary, who included passages from sources as diverse as the Iledkil Šastir, the Lifan Yuan Zeli (理藩院則例), the Shengyü guangxun (聖諭廣訓), the Manchu translation of the Yuan Shi, direct quotations from imperial edicts of both the Kangxi and Daoguang emperors, as well as the geographical knowledge found in the work of the Sumba Khambo (Johan Elverskog, The Pearl Rosary: Mongol Historiography in Nineteenth Century Ordos [Bloomington: The Mongolia Society, 2007], 1–18).

28 As evidenced in Martha Boyer’s extensive catalogue of Mongol jewelry, it is clear there was abundant use of “Chinese” motifs, like the butterfly, the bat, and the eight auspicious signs of the Daoist immortals in Mongol jewelry, thus clearly reflecting some sort of cultural exchange taking place between Mongols and Chinese during this period (Mongol Jewellery [København: Nordisk Forlag, 1952], 181–184). More important, however, is the fact that the majority of this most distinctive aspect of Mongol visual culture was largely produced by Chinese artisans.
Yet Qing cosmopolitanism was not only manifested and transmitted through such ephemeral cultural products, it was also made real through material goods, especially commodities. Thus in thinking about the creation of Qing cosmopolitanism we need to take into account the large corpus of scholarship that reveals how consumer goods are not only a vehicle to legitimate social claims, but also a means to constitute personhood. Yet among the Mongols, at least, this new cosmopolitan culture was not only an issue of consumption and its attendant status markings. The reality of Qing cosmopolitanism was that it was an arena in which new cultural products were created out of the fusion of these various cultural streams. One remarkable case of this phenomenon is seen in the Mongol reworkings of *The Dream of the Red Chamber* (*Honglou meng* 紅樓夢). While the rewriting of this novel was clearly a part of Chinese literati culture during the Qing, it is important to note that it was not solely the domain of the Han. The Mongols also partook in this literary activity. Of course, whether or not the Han

And as Christopher P. Atwood has rightly noted, this close Mongol-Chinese artistic and cultural relationship throws into relief our common perception of these two groups as continually antagonistic (“Review Article of Boyer’s *Mongol Jewellery*.” *Mongolian Studies* 19 [1996], 105–106).

The Mongol fascination with Chinese literature is found not only in the enormous corpus of translated Chinese works extant in collections around the world, but also in the oral tradition; see Nasanurtin Hasbatar, *Mongolische „Heftgeschichten” und chinesisiche Ritterromane: Eine Untersuchung über die chinesichen Einflüsse auf die mongolische Literatur* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1999).


literati cared is another issue entirely.\textsuperscript{33} But again, the fact that such endeavors were possible, and indeed took place, is a reflection of the Qing culture in which it manifested.

This same cultural mixing is also reflected in the work of the famous nineteenth-century scholar Danzin Rabjai, who introduced Cham dancing to Mongolia, most famously with his play “The Tale of the Moon Cuckoo” (\textit{Saran kökögen-ü namtar}).\textsuperscript{34} Yet this play and its performance across the Gobi desert reveal not only the ongoing infusion of Tibetan cultural products into Mongolia, but shows that Danzin Rabjai incorporated Chinese elements into his work as well. After having traveled extensively across North China, Danzin Rabjai was well situated to draw upon a vast repertoire of traditions in order to create his own distinctive theatrical productions. Thus, rather than have monks perform his plays with the well-known Cham masks used in Tibet, Danzin Rabjai had them paint their faces and wear the beflagged clothing in the style of Chinese opera.\textsuperscript{35} Yet perhaps even more remarkable than the appearance of this cosmopolitan aesthetic in the Gobi was that Danzin Rabjai also actively fought to defend this new cultural world. In Mongolian popular lore, for example, it is claimed that during the Opium War Danzin Rabjai volunteered for the Qing army and not only conjured up thunderstorms against the British fleet, but also made a hundred Manchu soldiers look like a thousand. In addition, during the Taiping rebellion Danzin Rabjai performed tantric rituals in order to secure Mongolia from the rebels at the request of the Mongol and Manchu nobility.\textsuperscript{36} While the historicity of these events can be

\textsuperscript{33} On this issue see Zvi Ben-Dor Benite’s study of Chinese Muslims and the creation of the \textit{Han Kitab} and its minimal influence in the larger Sinophone world (\textit{The Dao of Muhammad: A Cultural History of Muslims in Late Imperial China} [Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005]).


questioned they do nevertheless reveal how the Mongols at the time valued the Qing state and its broader cultural world.

On one level, of course, Danzin Rabjai’s cultural innovations may seem like minor or even irrelevant developments, but at the same time we should recognize that they are also symptomatic of a Qing culture that actually enabled and fostered such newly fused cultural forms. Indeed, could any of these things happen today in either Inner Mongolia, or Mongolia, without raising the hackles of cultural imperialism and complaints of the death of “Mongolness”? Probably not, and thus the fact that it was possible during the Qing dynasty needs to be better understood.

Another arena that sheds further light on this phenomenon is found in the realm of astrology, especially the Mongols’ interest and adoption of a wide range of traditions into their own. For example, the *Xuanze guangyu xia ji* (選擇廣玉匣記), a Chinese astrological treatise, had already been translated into Mongolian in 1686 and was then retranslated twice more, once from a Tibetan translation of the Chinese. This Tang dynasty text includes a vast array of Chinese divinatory practices including coin divination, physiognomy, weather divination, and various of the Chinese star spirits and omens that became vastly popular among the Mongols. Yet, as Walther Heissig already had pointed out in the 1970s, the extant Mongol versions are not simply translations but rather reworkings into distinct composite texts. Indeed, the greatest example of Mongol syncretic, or cosmopolitan, inclinations is found in the so-called “almanacs,” the compendia of astrological lore that are found in abundance in all collections of Mongolian manuscripts.

The best-known such almanac is the *Manual of Astrology and Divination*, published by Mostaert in the Harvard Yenching series. While this is a fascinating text for numerous reasons, what we need to note here is its cosmopolitan nature. Namely, what is most remarkable about the *Manual of Astrology and Divination* is that it is not a composite text, nor simply a cutting and


pasting of Tibetan, Chinese and Indian texts in order to create a new pastiche. Rather, it is a coherent reworking of these disparate elements into a coherent whole. Moreover, we find throughout the text continuous references to its own conceptual framework, which it calls “Mongol,” in contradistinction to the other four traditions with which it engages, namely the Indian, Tibetan, and the Chinese peasant and scholarly traditions. Thus, as Baumann has shown in his recent work on the almanac, although the text is clearly aware of the late seventeenth-century *White Beryl* (*Vaidurya Karpo*) — the main astrological text of the Gelukpa school — the Mongol almanac is strikingly different, not least since the Tibetan work focuses on elemental divination and the Mongolian text focuses on omens, but also because the Mongolian text does not have the natal horoscopes or pebble divination that are central to the *Vaidurya Karpo*. Nor does the Mongolian text follow the Tibetan eight-day week or even the *nakshatra* system of the Tibetan tradition. Rather its twenty-eight-lunar-mansion system is influenced by Chinese traditions, and the Chinese influence is also seen in the Mongol use of the hundred-unit reckoning system, the twelve-double-hour system, the twenty-four joints and breaths, as well as the Chinese method for fixing the intercalary month. Yet at the same time the Mongolian almanacs are not wholly Chinese: instead they are a fusion of these diverse elements. The fusion, or reformulation, of these previously disparate traditions into a holistically coherent new one is found not only in Mongolian astrological texts, but also in medical texts as evidenced in the *Handbook of Medicines* (*Bükün-e tusalaqu eldeb jüil em-yin nayirul ça kemekü orosiba*). This 1872 work was compiled by the Alashan nobleman Guusiya “who, having studied translations in four languages, put together to the best of his ability a list of the drugs easily available in Mongolia.” To my mind, it is precisely this range of cultural products that is indicative of Qing cosmopolitanism.


41 Baumann, “Divine Knowledge,” 54.

42 Walther Heissig, *Catalogue of Mongol Books, Manuscripts and Xylographs* (Copenhagen: The Royal Library,
One further example of this reality is well captured in the famous Inner Mongolian joke about the Khalkha nobleman who went to the opera during his visit to Beijing. In the performance the emperor was murdered, and upon seeing this the Khalkha nobleman jumped on stage and shot the actor who had “killed” the emperor. This joke is obviously told at the expense of the Khalkhas, the country-bumpkins in relation to the more urbane Inner Mongolians. Yet above and beyond this internal Mongol class struggle, it also not only confirms the Mongols’ loyalty to the Qing state, but it also reveals the nature of imperial Beijing’s cosmopolitan culture. Namely, going to the opera is not the joke, rather, the issue is whether one is cultured enough to appreciate its value and meaning. This, however, is not to erroneously suggest that Qing Mongolia was therefore somehow akin to fin de siècle Vienna, but instead to bring to the fore the cosmopolitan nature of Qing culture that enabled such cross-cultural products and experiences to flourish.

**Injannashi**

Of course, it was precisely this cosmopolitan world that was challenged, and eventually came crashing down, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And, as is to be expected, it was precisely the activists and thinkers who brought about these radical transformations, and their interpretation of the ancien régime, that subsequently came to define most historical narratives. The defenders of the preceding order, on the other hand, were to be forgotten. Yet, invariably, not all were. Which is fortunate since it is precisely such people and their lives and thoughts that afford us a unique window into a world that no longer exists. And this is very much the case with Injannashi (1837–1892), the last Mongol Qing cosmopolitan.

Unfortunately, however, we know very little about Injannashi’s life. What we do know is

1971), 192. For details on this work see Walther Heissig, *Die Pekinger lamaistischen Blockdrucke in mongolischer Sprache* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1954), 171–172. On the state’s involvement in the medical field see also the trilingual medical manuals housed in Copenhagen (Mong. 68, Mong. 443).

43 On the tension between these two groups of Mongols see Uradyn E. Bulag, *Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
that he was a nobleman from a prominent Tümed family, a descendant in the twenty-eighth generation from Chinggis Khan, and that his father, Wangchinbala (1795–1847), was the administrator of Tümed Right Banner in the Josotu League. However, during the course of Injannashi’s life both the political power of his family and its fortunes were beginning to wane. For example, while the family had started a coal mining business in Zhalan, this business had for some reason failed, and they therefore had to sell their family lands in order to pay the mine workers. Moreover, a group of their Chinese sharecropping farmers had rebelled and destroyed Injannashi’s family’s entire crop. As Injannash tells us, it was these economic disasters that caused him to reevaluate his life. In particular, rather than entering the hurly-burly world of the market economy, or following his father and brothers into political careers, Injannashi decided to retreat into the world of literature. He therefore set about revising and ultimately finishing the work purportedly begun by his father, what was to become *The Blue Sutra* (*Köke Sudur*), a massive three-volume fictionalized history of Chinggis Khan and the early Mongols. It was also at this time, or perhaps later, that he presumably began writing his two novels, *One Story Pavilion* (*Nigen dabqur asar*) and *Pavilion of Scarlet Tears* (*Ulaγan-a ukilaqu tingkim*), which draw upon the *Dream of the Red Chamber* tradition and poignantly capture the trials and tribulations of a Chinese gentry family, with Mongol embellishments, such identifying the hero as son of the “Marquis of the North.”

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Indeed, it was towards the idealized life of the Chinese literati that Injannashi aspired. A sentiment that is well-captured in one of the many first-person prefaces that he included in the Köke Sudur: in response to his list of society’s ills (gambling, cricket fighting, homosexuality, and opium smoking), Injannashi offers us his own list of pleasures:

Among these ten earthly pleasures I did covet and enjoy, was to be able to sit in a lovely garden with flowers during warm spring days or moonlit autumn nights with an intimate friend, to drink lightly while we search deep into our souls, to have a sip of scented tea while we discuss a profound subject. A stick of incense, a bouquet of flowers for hors d’oeuvres, to relax our minds and to amuse our hearts. To laugh and amuse, this I consider my supreme pleasure.47

While a more romanticized view of the Chinese literati life may be hard to find, it is symptomatic of Injannashi’s worldview and writing style. Thus although he wrote only in Mongolian — as far as we know — all the “references and literary puns are based on Chinese.”48 Yet above and beyond Injannashi’s creation of a unique Sino-Mongolic literature, what is even more remarkable is that his entire moral universe is based on an elite vision of Three-in-One thought (San jiao heyi), whereby all action is dictated by the cosmic forces of karma and the Dao.49 In many cases, at the same time that he rails against the ignorance and superstitions of the Tibeto-Mongol Buddhist clergy,50 he juxtaposes it with the Confucian ideal of humaneness (仁), which in many ways was in his mind the pinnacle of moral action.51 And in fact he uses this

47 KS, 88.


50 On one level this critique can be seen as part of the broader anti-clericalism of the late Qing. On this phenomenon see the essays on the topic in the special issue of Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident 24 (2002).

51 Although Injannashi greatly admired Chinese thought he was also critical of Han chauvinism. As he writes,
amalgamated form of thought not only to defend Islam against the pervasive Mongol Buddhist hatred of Muslims, but also clearly to uphold the value of both Chinese culture and the Qing state. In this regard he even advocated that Mongols seek to pass the civil service exam. The remarkable thing about all this — Injannashi’s sophisticated marshaling of Buddhist, Daoist and Confucian thought within a Sino-Mongolophone idiom — is that it was all done to advance the future of the Mongols.

In many ways, it is clear, Injannashi was a paragon of Qing cosmopolitanism: someone who was able to think and act beyond the local and by bricolage create something new that

“Some learned ones believe that only the Middle Kingdom is the kingdom of heaven, and that it alone possesses humanity. They believe this land alone receives the major benefits of sun and moon, and this land alone gives birth to intellects and wise ones, great minds and scholars. They not only explain all the rest to be strange, alien, perverse and evil, peculiar and queer, they even believe this to be true in their hearts” (KS, 96) He then goes on to puncture this image by humorously pointing out the absurdity of Chinese scholars, who for three thousand years claimed to be at the center of civilization, and yet for all that time continued to miscalculate solar and lunar eclipses — a mistake that Injannashi points out with relish was rectified only with the arrival of the Belgian Jesuit Ferdinand Verbiest at the Kangxi emperor’s court in the seventeenth century (KS, 99).


53 “But then, in this Great Qing Empire, regarding those Muslims who submitted to the empire later than the Mongols did, and who did not contribute to the founding of the dynasty as the Mongols did, care is being taken so as not to let the learned among them be neglected by selecting from among them, according to their schooling, persons to employ in ministerial positions. Why are Mongols alone singled out and excluded from this examination system? Therefore, I tried to reason to myself as follows: Is it because the Mongols are so uncouth and stupid that they will never be able to pass the examination, so that no examination system is necessary for them?” (KS, 63)

54 “Ultimately, Injannashi dedicated his Khökhe Sudur to the Monggol togatan [those who are considered Mongol] — exhorting them to, “Know, the Mongol togatan, altogether our lineage-nationality [ug ündisü(un] and gene/race/stock [izagur udam]” (ibid.: 13) wishing “the Monggol togatan to last for a thousand and ten thousand years inexhaustibly, unbreakably, and inextinguishably, without decay” (Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene, “The Mongolian Nationality Lexicon: From the Chinggisid Lineage to Mongolian Nationality (From the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Century),” Inner Asia 8,1 (2006), 78.
transcended the old. Of course, this world — the cosmopolitan Qing of the mid-nineteenth-century in which he lived — was itself coming to an end. Indeed, during the course of Injannashi’s lifetime everything would change. Thus, by the turn of the century, instead of glorifying the myth found in nineteenth-century ritual texts that proclaimed that the Mongols, Chinese and Tibetans were all born from one mother, the Mongols would be wiping Chinese blood from the points of their spears. To some extent it is this fact that gives Injannashi’s cosmopolitan fusion and vision — especially its Chinese orientation — such poignancy.

Indeed, to fully appreciate his particular vision it is important to recognize its historical context, in particular the marked social, political and economic transformations that were occurring in nineteenth-century Inner Mongolia due to Han immigration, which was expanding rapidly as a result of the eighteenth-century population explosion. This is not to say that Chinese had not moved into Mongol areas in earlier times — they had, but many of these earlier settlers actually “became Mongol” and therefore did not greatly destabilize the prevailing social order. But during the course of the nineteenth century the Chinese population in Mongol areas increased exponentially, and thus the situation quickly became tense.

The reason for this dramatic increase in the number of Chinese settlers was not only the


outcome of population pressures, but also the direct result of policies carried out by the Mongol elite, namely the renting and selling of land resources to increase their revenues.

The financial thinking of the yamen, and indeed all the Mongols under the banner system, was dominated by a rentier mentality, which sought to solve emergent fiscal problems, such as debts or military modernization or new schools, through the renting out of specific plots of land, to the ever-willing Chinese land developers, and assigning rent to the specific tasks at hand. Salt and soda lakes, and medicinal roots, were also rentable resources; Chinese traders would supply all the capital and assume all the risk.58

While the commodification of land resources may have worked in theory and generated income initially, the reality was that it was both a social and economic disaster. Not only did these policies disenfranchise the commoners who traditionally had free access to these resources, but, since the best land was sold to Chinese farmers, the arrangement pushed these same herders onto marginal lands that could barely sustain their herds. To make up for their diminished tax revenues the banner elite then sold still more land to Chinese settlers. This vicious circle was not even the only or primary problem — the whole system was corrupt.

The process of renting out the banners’ natural resources was, moreover, pervaded by corruption of all sorts, and this corruption, once done led to the permanent loss of the money sources…. The problem with renting out farm land in particular was, of course, that the payment of rent could only be enforced as long as the banner kept administrative control over the land, yet the extension of Chinese settlement naturally led to the extension of neighboring Chinese county jurisdictions, and so eventually the end of banner revenues.59


59 Atwood, Young Mongols and Vigilantes, 206.
As a result, the situation quickly grew untenable.

As Chinese migrants demanded their rights, which they often won against the Mongols as evidenced in the proverb “Old Tartar goes to law, and gets a big loss” (Lao dazi da guansi changchang yu), “Mongolian nobles and landowners, fearful of the destruction of the social order, and in an effort to maintain their culture, instituted strict rules for the Chinese to follow and they heavily taxed their farmers.”60 The Chinese in turn saw these policies as discrimination and tensions between these two groups culminated in the devastating uprising of 1891, during which an offshoot Chinese White Lotus Buddhist group, the Jindandao, slaughtered and expelled tens of thousands of Mongols from the Josotu League. Injannashi may have been one of them. We simply do not know. What we do know is that the cosmopolitan Qing world captured in the work of Injannashi had definitely come to an end.

Conclusion

Shortly after beginning my work on Qing cosmopolitanism, I was in Cairo with my wife, a sociolinguist of Arabic. One evening we visited an old friend from Indiana and her Egyptian husband at their apartment in the heart of the bustling downtown. Their balcony overlooked Tahrir Square and, as the sun was setting over the Nile, we went out to enjoy the view. While there I spied on a side table a book with the intriguing title Cairo Cosmopolitan.61 The book of course piqued my interest, and I quickly glanced through it. The next day, when we were on the campus of the American University visiting an old Egyptian friend from Harvard, who now teaches in London, I brought up this book and asked his opinion. He had not read it, and he seemed dubious of its implied premise, since in his estimation the cultural structures necessary for cosmopolitanism were lacking in contemporary Egypt. In his view, the generation of Edward Said was the last of Cairene cosmopolitanism. Another AUC faculty member, from Belgrade, was even more adamant. In her view, the whole idea was “science fiction.” We then shared a


laugh about the need for a companion volume, *Cairo Provincialism*, which, considering recent headlines, may have been prescient.

Either way, however, the observation that particular cultural structures are necessary for the development of cosmopolitanism bears directly on the case of the Qing. Indeed, what factors beyond the enormous economic growth and attendant social and geographical mobility of the *pax manjurica* — which made the crossing of boundaries and such cultural exchange possible — played a role in forging the Qing cosmopolitanism typified by the work of Injannashi? In trying to answer this question a key question that clearly needs to be taken into consideration is why the Han/Sinophone world was seemingly completely outside this process. Is it possible that the answer to this question is as simple as that they did not care (tinged, of course, with hints of xenophobia, condescension, etc.62)? Or was it that, in the “Chinese” view, the Inner Asian world simply had nothing to offer, while “the West” did? Whatever the case may have been, however, the intellectual embrace of Euro-American thought (social Darwinism, Marxism, nationalism, Christianity, “science,” etc.) — in tandem with the common turn to the local at times of globalization — forever shattered the world that had produced someone like Injannashi.

With the cultural structures gone that had fostered Qing cosmopolitanism, whatever they may have been, the possibilities of cosmopolitanism in China apparently came to an end. Indeed, in today’s world the notion of Chinese cosmopolitanism seems rather remote, or perhaps even a cruel joke. Or does it? Perhaps Richard Madsen is correct when he suggests that in today’s world it is only at the margins — in places like Tibet and Taiwan — that we find progressive traditions

62 In this regard it may be relevant to note the profound historical impact that Inner Asian peoples had on Chinese thought. In the earliest traditions, for example, it was assumed that all of humanity was fundamentally the same and peoples only differed in habits. However, with the rise of the powerful Xiongnu confederacy, Chinese thinkers began to espouse the notion that people were actually radically different in their “Heaven-endowed nature;” a debate that invariably continued up through the Qing period. (Yuri Pines, “Beasts or Humans: Pre-Imperial Origins of Sino-Barbarian Dichotomy,” in *Mongols, Turks, and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World*, ed. Reuven Amitai and Michal Biran, 59–102 [Leiden: Brill, 2005]).

promoting “cosmopolitan individualism” and “universal unity without uniformity.” Thus perhaps Qing cosmopolitanism does live on in some manner in the places it had always thrived, on the periphery.

**Summary**

Five themes animate the present paper: (1) there was a culture of cosmopolitanism during the Qing period; (2) the Mongol nobleman Injannashi was a representative of it; in fact, he was something like the last gasp of this particular Qing cosmopolitanism before the onslaught of modernity and the radical turn to Western modes of thought across the imperial domains of the Qing empire. Tied into this simple presentation are three further points that are more open-ended and potential fodder for discussion; namely, (3) the moral mandates of the “new cosmopolitan” scholarship; (4) the possible cultural institutions — be they political, intellectual, religious, or whatever — that fostered Qing cosmopolitanism, and, finally, (5) the suggestion, echoing the work of sociologist Richard Madsen, that this cosmopolitanism was not really found in the center of Chinese culture, which we may recognize as the elite Han literati, but rather on the periphery, especially in Inner Asia and the among those on the margins of the political center. It is these last three issues that I want to focus on here.

In terms of the first, what we can call the moral mandate, much can and needs to be said; however, where to begin is an open question. Two recent events, however, have crystallized, in a certain sense, my argument on this point. The first of these occurred in Israel: the widely-reported incident of a group of Israeli teenagers, aged between thirteen and seventeen, who beat almost to death a seventeen-year-old Palestinian boy in Zion Square in Jerusalem. One of them, a

fifteen-year-old Jewish boy, gave the kick that stopped the Palestinian’s heart; he declared outside the courthouse, “For my part, he can die: he’s an Arab.”65

The second event occurred a few days earlier in China: protests erupted across the country in response to Japanese actions related to a disputed island in the East China Sea, during which protestors in Chengdu held up banners saying things like “Even if China is covered with graves, we must kill all Japanese.” At a conference on the dispute, the editor of the nationalist newspaper The Global Times — which is owned by the Party’s own People’s Daily — told the assembled attendees that the Japanese are “monkeys.”66

Of course, whether one can even begin to compare these events, one a teenage rampage triggered by a perceived sexual slight; the other a highly manipulated protest manufactured within a one-party Leninist state, is certainly a valid question. But what interested me was the subsequent response to these events. In Israel, for example, there was an immediate soul-searching response across the political spectrum. Editorial pages on both the left and right condemned the attack and reflected on the broader cultural consequences of the occupation of the West Bank and its attendant discourse dehumanizing Palestinians. Nimrod Aloni, the head of the Institute for Educational Thought at a Tel Aviv teacher’s college, for example, said that this event was “directly tied to national fundamentalism that is the same as the rhetoric of neo-Nazis, Taliban and K.K.K…. This comes from an entire culture that has been escalating toward an open and blunt language based on us being the chosen people who are allowed to do whatever we like.”67 And Reuven Rivlin, a member of the rightwing Likud Party and speaker of Israel’s parliament, called it not only “a microcosm of a national problem,” but blamed “this evil” as


67 Kershner, “Young Israelis Held in Attack on Arabs.”
coming from “insufficient education.” And so the education minister launched an initiative whereby during the first week of school all teachers were supposed to address this issue head-on. In China, on the other hand, the response to this latest rash of toxic nationalist and racist discourse has been — let us say — rather more muted.

Of course, what all of this has to do with our topic is perhaps a valid question, but in varying degrees it clearly touches on foundational issues related to questions of cosmopolitanism as argued by scholars working within the field dubbed the “new cosmopolitanism.” All of these clearly have varying arguments about the nature of cosmopolitanism — what it means, how to live it, and/or activate it as a universal morality — yet regardless of the specifics a central concern of all is the fundamental understanding that cosmopolitanism is by definition a critique of nationalism. Or, as Bruce Robbins sums it up in his recent work, it is overcoming the tendencies and narrative structures whereby everything can be summed up with the phrase “We’re great, you stink” — which is in fact how Robbins’s ten-year-old son summarized his take-away from the movie the “Three Kings.” That is, unlike all the other Hollywood movies he had seen about the Muslim world, it did not promote the standard Islamophobic, American neoliberal capitalist exceptionalism of “We’re great, you stink.”

A sentiment that invariably makes one wonder whether such a movie could be produced in China. Indeed, in thinking about such a possibility one wonders whether Zhang Yimou could forsake his recent Leni Reifenstahl-like nationalism and actually make a historical movie about the cosmopolitan world of the Qing. One that wasn’t simply what Geremie Barmé has rightly dubbed “Qianlong porn,” but instead offers a nuanced exploration of the cultural realities of Inner Asia during the Manchu period.

Such a movie is neither here nor there; the notion, however, does point to the cultural and institutional structures that produce the discourses of social reality. This too has, of course, been a topic of focus of the “new cosmopolitans”; namely, what are the political structures,

institutions, practices, etc. that foster cosmopolitanism? And by extension, if such things can be identified, how can they be promoted and put into practice in order to promote cosmopolitanism and its fundamental idea of a better world built on a principle of universal morality. In this regard I confess that I have hedged my bets in my paper. That is, the questions regarding the forces that enabled or fostered Qing cosmopolitanism, I have conveniently left unanswered. In fact, I even went a little bit further and suggested that such cosmopolitanism was in fact only found on the periphery, which is a sentiment that I believe is partially echoed in the work on Islam in the Qing. Indeed, recent scholarship reveals that although the Han literati despised Islam not only did Muslim intellectuals engage with Chinese thought, but also the Manchu court ensured that Muslims were recognized as valuable members of the Qing.69 Yet, as we also know this pluralistic reality was eventually abandoned when the Qianlong emperor eventually listened to his Han officials and thereby implemented laws persecuting Muslims in particular, which helped fuel the Muslim uprisings of the eighteenth century.70

Yet, as is so often the case, the reality was not necessarily so black and white. Rather, as several papers presented at this conference reveal, there were in fact Confucian cosmopolitans. But, at the same time, one can also wonder what made scholars like Dai Zhen and Gong Zizhen possible? Why did the former express such an interest in western knowledge, and why did the later have such an admiring view of Inner Asian culture and even Tibetan Buddhism? Indeed, to the point raised above about Qing cosmopolitanism seemingly existing only the periphery: were these two individuals therefore not symptomatic of a Han cosmopolitanism, but rather, were they both something like oddballs and therefore themselves figures on the margin, or extending the metaphor, people on the periphery? And if so, should we recognize that the late nineteenth

69 James D. Frankel, Rectifying God’s Name: Liu Zhi’s Confucian Translation of Monotheism and Islamic Law (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011).

century cosmopolitan turn of the Han elite – especially its embrace of western traditions – as something new. A development, moreover, that may even have been spurred on by the horrors of the Taiping rebellion. Clearly there is nothing like 20 or 30 million dead to refocus one’s priorities.

But is that really what it took to change China, to make it cosmopolitan during the late Qing? Or is that a mistaken interpretation, and there were in fact other cultural elements that enabled cosmopolitanism? If so, I still want to ask, what were they? If not, the obvious question is why not? In asking this question, the point is not to use it as cudgel of condemnation, but rather the opposite. Indeed, we should all recall the advice of Benedict Anderson from his work *The Spectre of Comparison*, wherein he argues that we should all propagate the slogan “Long live shame,” since it is only by recognizing flaws that opportunities for fixing them can arise. And it is with this point exactly that Bruce Robbins concludes his latest book: “Cosmopolitanism could be represented by worse slogans” than “Long live shame.”

To do so, it seems we need more answers, and as noted above, I simply don’t know the answer to these questions; however, I hope that by bringing them to the fore that it will allow us to explore them in more detail since it would be interesting to know not only what those cultural structures may, or may not, have been, that produced Qing cosmopolitanism, but also how such a discovery can be employed today. In this regard I’m thinking more in terms of the moral mandate that the new cosmopolitanism carries, especially the argument most forcefully articulated by Martha Nussbaum who has noted that, in order to build a pluralistic and democratic society of universal equality, one needs to begin with an education grounded in critical thinking as found in the arts and humanities.\(^\text{71}\) Which, of course, is a concept that the Israeli government followed when they mandated a nation-wide discussion on the beating that occurred in Zion Square. It is also something that I believe we, as scholars of China, need to take seriously as our own mandate.

In that regard it is no doubt important to simply make clear the fact that there did exist a tradition of Qing cosmopolitanism, and that the Chinese tradition has the cultural, intellectual, and religious resources needed to foster cosmopolitanism. It does not need to import these things from the West. On one level, this may seem an elementary observation; however, it is also one that seems to a certain extent to have been obscured in the long-running Great East–West Debate where blame and failure have invariably been a recurrent theme. Blame the Manchus, blame Confucianism, blame imperialism, blame capitalism, blame historiography. Of course, it would be wholly disingenuous to dismiss all of these things as being unimportant in shaping both Chinese history and its contemporary realities; however, at the same time, the reality of Chinese cosmopolitanism seems to point in an entirely different direction, one that we may dare say is positive, but also unburdened by the inevitable reflexive narrative frame of “We’re great, you stink.” This is a reality that seems to be a step in the right direction in thinking about not only “China as method,” but also quite simply in terms of China in the world.

Hayden White was the first person to ask a question after the above synopsis: “How do you define cosmopolitanism?” My immediate joking response was, “C’mon, that’s the one question that you can’t ask.” It brought a laugh. Then as I tried to come up with a pithy coherent answer I began rambling off various definitions of the term — beginning with the ancient Greeks and then highlighting the recent debate between universal and local cosmopolitanisms — and then finally ended up with something like “a serious moral commitment to the other.” Whether that is the correct answer I still honestly do not know. However, one can certainly wonder whether we should accept the possibility that such a vision is not applicable to China.
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