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*Soldierly Methods: Vade Mecum*  
for an Iconoclastic Translation of *Sun Zi bingfa*

by  
Victor H. Mair

with a complete transcription and word-for-word glosses  
of the Manchu translation  
by H. T. Toh

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Academia Sinica

&

Cambridge University

Victor H. Mair, “*Soldierly Methods: Vade Mecum for an Iconoclastic Translation of Sun Zi bingfa*”  
*Sino-Platonic Papers*, 178 (February, 2008)

For Arthur Waldron and June Teufel Dreyer  
from whom I have learned so much about China’s potential to make war

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A good warrior is not bellicose,  
A good fighter does not anger.  
— *Tao Te Ching / Dao de jing*, 68

The Way of heaven  
does not war  
yet is good at conquering.  
— *Tao Te Ching / Dao de jing*, 73

Now,  
Weapons are instruments of evil omen;  
Creation abhors them.  
Therefore,  
One who aspires to the Way  
does not abide in them.

The superior man  
at home honors the left,  
on the battlefield honors the right.

Therefore,  
Weapons are not instruments of the superior man;  
Weapons are instruments of evil omen,  
to be used only when there is no other choice.

He places placidity above all  
And refuses to prettify weapons;  
If one prettifies weapons,  
This is to delight in the killing of others.

Now,

One who delights in the killing of others  
Cannot exercise his will over all under heaven.

For this reason,

On occasions for celebration,  
the left is given priority;  
On occasions for mourning,  
the right is given priority.

Therefore,

A deputy general stands on the left,  
The general-in-chief stands on the right.

In other words,

They stand in accordance with mourning ritual.

The killing of masses of human beings,  
we bewail with sorrow and grief;  
Victory in battle,  
we commemorate with mourning ritual.

— *Tao Te Ching / Dao de jing*, 31

Sun Wu... was a wise general of a former age. He is remote and  
recondite, and it is difficult to know anything about him.

—Falsely attributed to Liu Xiang (79–8 BC),  
*Xin xu* (Newly Compiled Stories) and quoted in *Taiping yulan*  
(Imperial Survey of the Great Peace [Reign Period];  
completed 984 AD), s. 276.

## Preface

This is a companion to Victor H. Mair, tr., annot., and intro., *The Art of War: Sun Zi's Military Methods* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). Although it repeats much of the material in the published translation, the present monograph differs significantly in the following respects: it expands significantly on various aspects of the discussion on the text and its author, particularly in the philological and linguistic analysis of key terms; it is somewhat bolder in the positions taken with regard to controversial matters; it includes a transcription and word-for-word gloss of the Manchu translation of the text; and it omits the translation and annotations of the original text, for which the reader is invited to consult the volume published by Columbia University Press (2007), where the following chapters will be found in their entirety:

- Chapter 1: (Initial) Assessments
- Chapter 2: Doing Battle
- Chapter 3: Planning for the Attack
- Chapter 4: Positioning
- Chapter 5: Configuration
- Chapter 6: Emptiness and Solidity
- Chapter 7: The Struggle of Armies
- Chapter 8: Nine Varieties
- Chapter 9: Marching the Army
- Chapter 10: Ground Forms
- Chapter 11: Nine Types of Ground
- Chapter 12: Incendiary Attack
- Chapter 13: Using Spies

It is hoped that the present monograph will be of assistance both to serious researchers on the *Sun Zi* and to the interested layman.

Swarthmore, Pennsylvania

February 15, 2008



## Principles of Translation

The *Sun Zi* (SZ) is written in a style that is often highly abbreviated and elliptical. Both the subject and the object, as well as other parts of the sentence, may be omitted, and even whole clauses may be dispensed with. One may think of this style as telegraphic (or, in current terms, written as though for purposes of short text messaging [STM]), at times carried to an extreme, making the text extraordinarily terse and maddeningly obscure. Since all of these missing elements are essential in normal English both for grammatical reasons and for the reader to gain a full understanding of the purport of the Chinese text, I have silently added a word or two here and there. Occasionally, however, when I have provided intratextual amplification or clarification that exceeds more than two or three words, I generally signal these longer or more substantial additions in a note.

### I. *Being overly literal does not necessarily ensure accuracy.*

A frequently recurring expression in the SZ is *yong bing*. Literally, in the narrowest, most primitive sense, it signifies “use weapon(s).” However, it never means that in the SZ. Instead, it conveys the idea of “employ soldiers,” “conduct military operations,” “engage in warfare,” or “wage war” (I consistently render *yong bing* with the last English equivalent).

### II. *Do not be too free.*

This is the opposite of the previous principle. One of the most important terms for nearly all schools of early Chinese thought is *dao* (“way”; Mair 1990: 132–133). For obviously ulterior purposes, some modern interpreters render *dao* as “God,” distorting the term so horrendously as to make it impossible to understand the ideas presented in the original texts where it occurs.

III. *Be consistent, but not mechanically so.*

The same word in a given text may mean two or more very different things. For example, in the *SZ*, *xing* can signify both “form(ation)” and “terrain.” If one fails to distinguish the distinction between these two vital concepts, it would be impossible to make sense of the arguments that are put forward in the text. On the other hand, when the same term always conveys an identical meaning, there is no reason not to be consistent in the way one renders it, and many advantages to doing so. For instance, a characteristic structural feature of the *SZ* is that its maxims are frequently loosely linked by the conjunction *gu* (“therefore”). Many translators, fearing that the monotony of this usage might lead to boredom, vary their renderings of *gu* as “hence,” “thus,” and so forth. In my estimation, by so doing they fail to convey to their readers both the rhetorical flavor and stylistic quality of the original text.

IV. *Strive to convey a sense of the form and essence of the original.*

When one is reading a translation, one should be at least subliminally aware that one is encountering a text that was originally written in another language and belongs to another culture, both of which have distinctive, quintessential features. To reduce them to something that is identical with an original text written in English is tantamount to having failed to convey the essential quality of the work being translated. This is not, however, to advocate exoticization, chinoiserie, or other such clumsy crudities. Rather, I believe that the translator should simply respect the text that he has undertaken to present in another language, and that he should do his utmost to honor its inmost nature.

§§§

The base text for the Columbia translation is *Song ben shiyi jia zhu Sun Zi* (Song Edition of the *Sun Zi* with Annotations by Eleven Commentators) (Zhonghua shuju Shanghai editorial office, 1961) as presented in *Sun Zi bingfa xinzhu* (*Master Sun's Soldierly Methods, Newly Annotated*) (for complete publication information see under Zhongguo Renmin Jiefang Jun in the Bibliography). The *Sun Zi bingfa xinzhu* has been reprinted numerous times since the first edition of 1977, with well over half a million copies having been issued. This is an extremely handy edition of the *SZ*, since it provides a reliable base text, significant variants (including from recently discovered manuscripts), a judicious combination of ancient and modern annotations, together with general discussions of the contents of each chapter. Two appendices are the so-called biography of Master Sun from *Shi ji* (The Grand Scribe's Records) and the carefully edited bamboo strip manuscript of the *SZ* in thirteen fragmentary chapters (only the title of the tenth chapter survives), plus five other fragmentary chapters that are thought to be closely associated with the *SZ* (three of the texts do mention a Master Sun [the first, the third, and the fifth], and two of them [the first and the last] also mention the king of Wu [specifically Helu in the latter case], and it is possible that they are meant to be from the hand of the legendary Sun Wu). I have also consulted dozens of other commentaries, some of which are mentioned in the discussion of the text and the notes or are listed in the Bibliography

## Guide to Pronunciation

The standard system of transcription for Chinese characters employed in this study is Modern Standard Mandarin (MSM), as represented in *pinyin* (the official romanization of the People’s Republic of China). This is purely a convention of modern scholarship and does not at all reflect the pronunciation of Sinitic during the late Warring States period when this text was compiled. Transcribing Chinese characters into Cantonese or Taiwanese would actually be preferable, in the sense of sounding more like ancient Sinitic, since — of all modern Chinese languages and topolects — MSM has diverged the furthest from ancient and medieval pronunciations. Unfortunately, the field has not yet reached that stage.

### VOWELS

In MSM vowels are generally long, as in many continental (European) languages; thus

*a* is pronounced as in “father,” not as in “matter”

*i* is pronounced as the “ee” of “beet” or “peek,” but after *z*, *c*, *s*, *zh*, *ch*, *sh*, and *r* (for which see below) it is pronounced like the “i” of “bit”

*u* is pronounced as the “oo” of “boo!” except after *q* and *x*, when it is pronounced like *ü* (see below)

*e* and *o* are a bit more difficult to grasp, with *e* sounding somewhat like the “u” of “lucky” and *o* sounding roughly like the “o” or “more”

*ü* sounds like the same umlauted letter in German, comparable to “you”

### DIPHTHONGS

*ao* sounds like “ow!”

*iu* sounds like “yo!”

*ai* sounds like “eye”

*ei* sounds like the letter “a”

*ou* sounds like the letter “o”

*uo* or *wo* sounds like the combination of *pinyin* *w* and *o*

## CONSONANTS

Most of the consonants in pinyinized MSM sound more or less like their counterparts in English, with the following exceptions:

*c* sounds like the "ts" of "tsetse fly"; thus "Cao Cao" is pronounced not as "cow cow,"

but as "Ts'ao Ts'ao," with noticeable aspiration

*j* sounds like the "g" of "gee"

*x* sounds like the "sh" of "she"

*q* sounds like the "ch" of "cheese"

*z* sounds like the "dz" of "adze"

*ch* sounds like the "ch" of "chintz" or "change"

*sh* sounds like the "sh" or "shin" or "shame"

*zh* sounds like the "g" of "gip/gyp" or the "j" of "jam"

*r* has a slight buzzing aspect to it, as though one were trying to pronounce "r" and "zz" (lightly) at the same time

## TONES

Sinitic languages are tonal, and MSM is no different, having four tones plus a neutral tone (i.e., absence of the other four tones). It is too much to ask noninitiates to cope with the tones when they already have so much to do in dealing with the vowels and consonants, some of which are quite counterintuitive for speakers of English. However, without the tones, homonyms sometimes occur. In order to differentiate them, I have marked the vowels of the relevant syllables with tonal diacriticals or numerals, or occasionally with superscript letters ( $x^a$ ,  $x^b$ ) when the tones are also identical.

## EXAMPLE

Following these pronunciation rules, Sun Zi sounds like "Soon Dz," *bing* sounds like a kind of luscious dark cherry, and *fa* sounds like a note to follow do, re, mi: *Soon Dz bingfa* (Master Sun's Soldierly Methods).

## Key Terms

Here are highlighted only several of the more important words and subtle concepts used in the book. Other technical terms and proper nouns are defined in the notes or in the Introduction. A few of the more difficult-to-grasp ideas in the *Sun Zi* (marked with an asterisk [\*]) are discussed more extensively in Appendix II: “Further Notes on Selected Key Terms.”

*BIAN*. variation, variety, transformation.

\**BING*. The earliest form of the character used to write this word depicts two arms holding up an adze. The basic idea conveyed by this graph subsequently developed from the concrete and limited to the more general and abstract: weapon → soldier → troops → war.

\**FA*. law, method, model.

*BINGFA*. The combination of the previous two terms, it is usually rendered as “art of war” in English, but may more literally be rendered as “soldierly methods,” “military methods,” etc. For further discussion of the term *bingfa*, see the section below on “The Book and Its Title,” n. 2.

*GUI*. deceit, deception; contrary to the norm.

\**Jī*. Pivot, moment of change (functions somewhat like a tipping point); the instant just before a new development or shift occurs; the nodal point of a situation in flux. *Jī* also refers to the first, imperceptible beginning of movement in an unstable situation. In organic metaphors, it means “seed, germ”. The sage or superior man can recognize the immanence of these crucial moments before they become manifest to others. It cannot be stressed too heavily that *jī* by itself does not mean “opportunity” nor does it mean “crisis,” although it is closer to the latter than to the former because

of the extreme instability of a given situation and the unforeseen consequences that may follow.

\**Jì*. Count, calculate; plan; intention. Another word in the *SZ* sometimes rendered as “plan” is *mou* (as in the title of ch. 3), though it tends more in the direction of “scheme” or “counsel.” Depending upon the context, *jì* and *mou* may also convey the idea of “strategy” or “stratagem.”

*Lǐ*. A traditional measure of length equivalent to 300 paces (hence “trident” in English). It is easy to think of how long a trident is (about a third of a mile) by recalling that the English word “mile” is derived from Latin *milia*, *millia* (“a thousand [paces]”). For those who are not familiar with miles, a trident is equal to approximately half a kilometer.

*Lì*. Advantage, benefit; profit, interest (the basic meaning is “sharp,” which is why the character used to write it has a “knife” radical).

*MOU*. See *jì*.

*Qì*. Unformed, energetic substrate of matter; material energy; the primal “stuff” of the universe; configurational energy. In the *SZ*, it usually refers to the vital force, energy, or morale of the men in the army. For more information on *qì* and its metaphysical implications, see Mair (1990: 137–138).

\**Qí*. See *zheng*

*QUAN*. Power, expedient (assessment) — exerted by the commander in the field. The literal meaning of the morpheme is “horizontal balance,” hence “weigh, judge, (exert) power/authority.” *Quan* is often associated with *bian* or *qí* (q.v.).

\**SHI*. configuration, circumstances, efficacy, inertia.

*TIANXIA*. all under heaven, i.e., the empire (writ large).

*WEN*. civil, culture (contrasts with *wu*) The evolution of the primary meanings of the graph used to write this word, in simplest terms, is as follows: tattoo → pattern → culture/civilization/writing. The earliest meaning of *wen* as “tattoo” still survives in the expression *wen shen* (“tattoo the body”). By the time of the Warring States period, however, when the *SZ* was written, tattooing had become a form of punishment, and different words were used to refer to it, *wen* itself having transmuted into one of the most exalted terms in the language. See ch. 9, n. 12 and the biography of Sun Bin in the section on “Authorship.”

*WU*. martial, military (contrasts with *wen*) The character used to write this word shows a shafted weapon and a foot, i.e., a man going off to fight in a war. It should be noted that this *wu* meaning “martial, military,” pronounced in the third tone in MSM, is the supposed given name of the alleged author of *Soldierly Methods* (the *Sun Zi*), Sun Wu. Another, completely different, word that figures prominently in our discussion is also Romanized as Wu, but this is pronounced in the second tone in MSM and refers to a state in the southeast as well as designates the surname of a different strategist, Wu Qi or Wu Zi (Master Wu). Usually it is possible to differentiate between the Wu meaning “military, martial” and the Wu signifying a particular kingdom or a surname. Occasionally, however, when the two words are used in close proximity and there is danger of confusion, I shall distinguish them by writing Wǔ for “martial, military” and Wú for the kingdom and the surname.

The confusion surrounding the syllable “Wu” is further exacerbated by the fact that it also stands for yet another character pronounced in the third tone in MSM. This character is the surname of an individual named Wu Zixu or Wu Yun who figures prominently in our discussions of the authorship of the *Sun Zi*. Fortunately, we shall restrict our usage of this surname only to instances when it occurs together with the name Zixu, making it impossible to mistake for the Wu of Sun Wu and the Wu of Wu Qi (“Master Wu”).



*XING*. form, shape, disposition One of the most important tactical concepts in the *SZ*, it occurs with particularly high frequency in ch. 6, where it means mainly the arrangement of forces, and in ch. 10, where it signifies different types of terrain. There is another word meaning "punishment" that is pronounced exactly alike (*xing*) and is written with a very similar character that one might well expect to find in a work of strategy such as the *SZ*, but it does not occur even once. The *xing* meaning "form, shape, disposition" occurs a total of 31 times in the *SZ*. In stark contrast, the *xing* meaning "punishment" occurs a total of 24 times in the *Wei Liao Zi*, another early work of strategy which has very little to say about the *xing* meaning "form, shape, disposition." Thus the *SZ* and the *Wei Liao Zi* may be said to be in mutual complementarity with regard to the advocacy of these two key concepts of strategy. Clearly the *SZ* is concerned with tactics but not punishment, and vice versa for the *Wei Liao Zi*. Similar analyses could be carried out for other principal concepts in all of the extant military treatises from the Warring States and Han period.

*ZHAN*. battle; specific military actions and engagements.

\**ZHENG*. used in combination with *qí* to signify contrasting types of warfare; variously translated as "direct/indirect," "regular/irregular," "conventional/unconventional," "orthodox/unorthodox," "ordinary/extraordinary," and so forth. Of these two terms, the more difficult to grasp is *qí*, which may be thought of as signifying "odd, strange, singular, unique," or whatever is not *zheng* ("straight, upright, correct, right, orthodox, normative," etc). In purely military applications, *qí* may be thought of as "special operations" or "unconventional warfare," whereas *zheng* are main force deployments and maneuvers.

## Abbreviations

- AH*    *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000)
- b.      born
- c.      century
- ca.     circa
- ch.     chapter
- d.      died
- DDJ*   *Dao de jing* (also well known as *Tao te ching* [Classic of the Way and *Virtus*])
- EA      East Asia
- EAH    East Asian Heartland
- fl.      flourished
- HDC*   *Hanyu da cidian* (see under Luo Zhufeng in the Bibliography)
- HFZ*   *Han Fei Zi*
- MSM   Modern Standard Mandarin
- n.      note
- no.     number
- r.      reigned
- RH*    *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language*, 2nd ed., unabridged (New York: Random House, 1983)
- s.      scroll ([*juan*] of ancient Chinese books)
- SA      Spring and Autumn (period)
- SB*     *Sun Bin bingfa* (Sun Bin’s Soldierly Methods)
- SJ*     *Shi ji* (The Grand Scribe’s Records)
- SSZ    Shang Sunjia Zhai ([wooden strip manuscripts from] Upper Sun Family Fortress)
- s.v.    *sub verbo* (under the word [in question])
- SZ*     *Sun Zi*, i.e., *Sun Zi bingfa* (Master Sun’s Soldierly Methods)
- TTC*   see *DDJ*
- WS     Warring States (period)
- YS     Yinqu Shan ([bamboo strip manuscripts from] Silver Sparrow Mountain)
- YSH    Yinqu Shan Hanmu zhujian zhengli xiaozu (see entries in the bibliography)

## Discussion

### THE BOOK AND ITS TITLE

The Chinese title of the book discussed here is *Sun Zi bingfa* or just *Sun Zi*.<sup>1</sup> The latter means simply *Master Sun*, while the former may be rendered as *Master Sun’s Soldierly / Military Methods / Tactics / Strategy*.<sup>2</sup> It is commonly referred to in English as *Master Sun’s Art of War* or the *Sun Zi*.

The *Sun Zi* is China’s earliest extant work dealing with military affairs.<sup>3</sup> It is held by modern critical scholarship to be the late Warring States (475–221 BC) crystallization and summation of the military experiences leading up to that period. It is not, as traditionally believed, the original product of a single author who supposedly lived during the late sixth and early fifth century BC.

Despite its shadowy origins, the *Sun Zi* has had an enormous influence on the development of Chinese military strategy during the last two millennia, and occupies an important place in East Asian intellectual history. The *Sun Zi* is concerned with the theory and tactics of war, not such mundane matters as training and practice. Although it mentions “arrow” once in passing, it does not have anything to say about bows, swords, knives, halberds (*ge*), and spears (*mao*), nor does it utter a word about the drilling of soldiers.

The *Sun Zi bingfa* was by no means the only *bingfa* that appeared during late Warring States times. We shall encounter the *Wu Zi bingfa* (Master Wu’s Military Methods) and the *Sun Bin bingfa* (Sun Bin’s Military Methods) in our investigations, and there were many others, some associated with a specific individual, and some referred to simply and generically as *Bingfa*. In certain cases, we know of a given *bingfa* that initially circulated independently, but was later absorbed into a larger text. A good example of the latter situation is *Guan Zi* (Master Guan) VI.17, a military treatise that is even more closely associated with Taoist views than the *Sun Zi bingfa*, which I consider to be “Taoistic” in nature (see below), though the *bingfa* in the *Guan Zi* is also informed with Legalist ideas. (Rickett 1985: 267–278) What is more, *bingfa* was not the only category of military manuals that circulated during the Warring States period. For instance, in the *Zuo zhuan* (Chronicle of Zuo; completed near the end of the fourth

century BC), under the twenty-eighth year (632 BC) of Duke Xi, there are three successive quotations from a *Jun zhi* (Treatise on the Army): "When things are suitably arranged, then return." "When you realize that you are in difficulty, then retreat." "He who is possessed of *virtus* cannot be opposed." The fact that the *Zuo zhuan* also quotes from the *Jun zhi* under the twelfth year of Duke Xuan (see *Sun Zi* 7 n. 5) means that this must have been a fairly well established text, since it is quoted in the same authoritative fashion as the *Shi jing* (Classic of Poetry) and the *Yi jing* (Classic of Change). And *Sun Zi* 7 itself quotes from an obviously earlier text called the *Jun zheng* (Army Administration) about the need for efficient signaling in the heat of battle.

Elements of the military thought of the *Sun Zi* are to be found in other noted late Warring States works dealing with strategy, such as the *Wu Zi*, *Sun Bin bingfa*, and *Wei Liao Zi* (alternate pronunciation: *Yu Liao Zi*; Master Wei Liao [or Yu Liao]). There is no doubt that the reputation of the *Sun Zi* was firmly established by the beginning of the first century BC.<sup>4</sup>

It seems ironic that, of all the military treatises that proliferated during the latter part of the Warring States period and the Han,<sup>5</sup> the *Sun Zi* is the least likely to be connected to an actual person. On the other hand, it may simply be the case that, once the *Sun Zi* congealed into stable written form, it provided a model for the composition of other military texts that were more closely linked to known individuals.

An important aspect of the history of the *Sun Zi* is the commentarial tradition that grew up around it and sustained it during the first and second millennia AD. Over the centuries, there have been at least two hundred different commentaries written on the *Sun Zi*. Few of those composed after the Han period have any significant philological or historical value for understanding the *Sun Zi* itself, though they are of interest for comprehending the ongoing importance of the *Sun Zi* during medieval and later imperial history. Of these, there are about a dozen that stand out and are most frequently cited. Conveniently, these have been brought together in *Shiyi jia zhu Sun Zi* (The *Sun Zi* with Annotations by Eleven Commentators) compiled by Ji Tianbao (eleventh to twelfth century). The eleven commentators<sup>6</sup> are Cao Cao (155–220), Meng shi (Mr. Meng, Liang Dynasty [502–557]), Li Quan (fl. 750), Jia Lin (around the last quarter of the eighth century), Du You (735–812),<sup>7</sup> Du Mu (803–852), Chen Hao (late Tang), Mei Yaochen

(1002–1060), Wang Xi (fl. 1082), He Yanxi (after the mid-eleventh century), and Zhang Yu (Southern Song [1127–1279]). All of these individuals clearly had a strong interest in military matters, but we know almost nothing else concerning over half of them.

Cao Cao was a famous military leader during the latter part of the Eastern Han (25–220) who was responsible for the initiation of the Three Kingdoms period (220–280 AD). It was Cao Cao who wrote the first (and by far the most valuable) commentary on the *Sun Zi*, and I shall have occasion to cite it more than any other in my own notes. In his preface to the *Sun Zi* preserved in his collected writings, Cao Cao praised it lavishly: “I have read many soldierly books and military stratagems. The one written by Sun Wu is the most profound.” The great Tang (618–907) emperor, Taizong (r. 627–649, Li Shimin (599–649), when discussing soldierly methods with his outstanding general, Li Jing (571–649), extolled the *Sun Zi* in similar terms: “Of the soldierly books that I have read, none is superior to the *Sun Zi*.”

Although little information is available about Li Quan, he is noteworthy because he was a Taoist and because he had an interest in martial arts. After a moderately successful official career, reaching to the level of provincial governor, he was demoted and thereafter became a wandering Taoist recluse. The place of his seclusion was the same mountain (Song Shan), north of present-day Dengfeng County, Henan Province, that earlier was supposed to have been the abode of Bodhidharma, the first Zen (Chan) patriarch in East Asia. It is here too that Shaolin Monastery, with its celebrated tradition of fighting monks, is located. (Rand 1979; Shahar 2001, 2008)

Du You was a highly distinguished scholar and statesman, thrice a chancellor at the Tang court. He is best known, however, for his compilation of the encyclopedic *Tongdian* (Comprehensive Institutions; completed in 801), a rich collection of information pertaining to political and administrative affairs. One of the nine main sections of the *Tongdian* is devoted to border defenses, and includes a wealth of authoritative material concerning Central Asian military matters. This is in large measure due to his nephew Du Huan’s having been taken captive at the Battle of the Talas River in July 751 at the town of Atlakh (near Talas) in what is now northwestern Kirghizstan. Located approximately two-thirds of the way from Frunze (capital of Kirghizstan, formerly known as Pishpek or Bishbek) to Dzambul (in Kazakhstan), this is the site of

one of the most important battles in the history of the world. Here an Arab army of the Abbasid Caliphate defeated a Chinese army under the Korean general Go Seonji (or Ko Sôn-ji; MSM Gao Xianzhi; d. 756), thereby halting the expansion of the Tang toward the west and establishing the foundations for the dominance of Islam in Central Asia for the coming centuries. An incidental, but far from inconsequential repercussion of the battle of Talas River is that, among the Chinese captives, aside from Du Huan, there were also paper-makers who subsequently transmitted their craft to West Asia. Portions of Du Huan's lost memoir, *Jingxing ji* (Notes on Places Passed through), were incorporated in Du You's *Tongdian*. After visiting Arabia, Du Huan returned by sea in 762, having been away for a total of nearly a dozen years. An interesting tie-in with Li Quan is that Du You also draws on a military treatise completed by him in 768 and Taoistically entitled *Taibo yin jing* (Scripture of Venusian *yin*). (Wakeman 1990: 6–7) Despite the mystical title, the *Taibo yin jing* is actually tough-minded and pragmatic, declaring that success in war is dependent upon human abilities and intelligence, not yin and yang.

Another member of the distinguished Du family who was so absorbed in military matters that he wrote a commentary on the *Sun Zi* is Du Mu, one of the finest late Tang poets. But Du Mu was not the only outstanding poet to write a commentary on the *Sun Zi*, for he was followed in that calling by Mei Yaochen, one of the best known early Song poets.

It is evident that the *Sun Zi*, though slight of scope and of obscure origins, attracted some of the best minds — military, scholarly, religious, poetic, and even royal — throughout history and until the present day.<sup>8</sup> Wherein lies the mystique of this diminutive text? For one thing, the *Sun Zi* is to war as the *Tao Te Ching* / *Dao De Jing* is to mysticism — in more ways than one, as we shall see momentarily. But the sheer prismatic nature of the *Sun Zi* accounts for a large measure of its popularity, since the text is viewed in a variety of lights depending upon which facet one focuses upon.

The first woodblock printed editions of the *Sun Zi* date to the Song period (960–1279).<sup>9</sup> The earliest extant is preserved in the *Wu jing qi shu* [Seven Military Classics] from sometime during the reign of Emperor Ningzong (r. 1195–1224).<sup>10</sup> Together with the *Shiyi jia zhu Sun Zi* mentioned above, this is the edition that we shall refer to as the

“received text.”<sup>11</sup> It is contrasted with archeologically recovered manuscript finds, which take us back much nearer to the time when the text was composed.

In 1972, at Yinque Shan (Silver Sparrow Mountain) in Linyi County (about 120 miles southwest of Qingdao), Shandong Province, a small cluster of closely related Western Han tombs dating to between about 140 and 118 BC was discovered. From these tombs were unearthed more than five thousand bamboo strips, including a large quantity of fragmentary texts dealing with military matters. Among them was the earliest known copy of the *Sun Zi*. In addition to the thirteen chapters of the received text (so far only the title of the 10th chapter has been identified among the manuscript finds), five other fragmentary texts closely associated with the *Sun Zi* were recovered from the same tombs.<sup>12</sup>

Even more significantly, the hitherto lost work known as *Sun Bin bingfa* (hereafter *Sun Bin* for short) was also found among the Yinque Shan manuscripts. As we shall see below in the next section discussing authorship, the chances that there existed an actual historical personage called Sun Bin (ca. 380–320 BC) are far greater than that there was a real individual behind the “Master Sun” of the *Sun Zi*. Sun Bin’s major defeat of the forces of the state of Wei under Pang Juan in a famous battle of 341 BC at Maling<sup>13</sup> is mentioned at least three different times in the *Shi ji* (The Grand Scribe’s Records, s. 65, 68, and 75), and each time it is convincingly linked with historically verifiable persons and/or dates. (Nienhauser 1994: xviii, 41, 91, 190) The intricate interdependence between the *Sun Zi* and the *Sun Bin*, together with the other fragmentary texts associated with them, is a topic that I shall touch upon at various points in our investigation. Since all of these texts were recovered from the Western Han tombs at Yinque Shan and were written on bamboo strips, I shall henceforth refer to them as the Yinque Shan (bamboo strip) manuscripts.

The Yinque Shan site may lie within the southern reaches of Qi, the northern state that Sun Bin served, and is close to the territory of the much smaller state of Lu, from which Confucius hailed.<sup>14</sup> Although the tombs contained a considerable quantity of military works, no weapons have been found, giving the impression that this was a family deeply interested (and probably highly expert) in military matters, but not professional soldiers.

The bamboo strips from Yinque Shan are not the only early manuscripts related to the *Sun Zi* that have recently been archeologically recovered. A late Western Han tomb (first century BC) at Shang Sunjia Zhai (Upper Sun Family Fortress) in Datong County, Qinghai Province<sup>15</sup> (in the remote northwestern part of China) has also yielded important military documents. Although the expression *Sun Zi yue* ("Master Sun said") occurs five times in these documents, they do not constitute an early edition of the *Sun Zi*. Rather, they are a collection of old military orders, some of which invoke the storied "Master Sun" to enhance their authority. None of the quotations attributed to "Master Sun" in the Shang Sunjia Zhai manuscripts can be found in the received text or among the supplemental passages in later literature that are associated with it. (Li 1995: 261) Another noteworthy aspect of the Shang Sunjia Zhai manuscripts is that they three times mention cavalry, a subject that is entirely absent from the *Sun Zi*. All of this indicates that, in addition to the *Sun Zi* and the *Sun Bin*, there must have been a large body of military lore attributed to "Master Sun" that circulated broadly during the Western Han and probably already during the late Warring States period as well. It was from this amorphous corpus of "Master Sun" materials that the various editions of the *Sun Zi* and the *Sun Bin* recorded in early bibliographies must have been compiled. The fact that the available body of materials was much bigger than any of the individual collections would account for the discrepancies in length and contents among the various editions of the *Sun Zi*. Indeed, this same indeterminate reservoir of military wisdom would also have been drawn upon by the other strategists who emerged during the late Warring States and Han period. Nonetheless, it is essential to observe that one of the fragmentary Shang Sunjia Zhai wooden strips (no. 061) reads as follows: "Master Sun said, 'Now, the thirteen chapters....'" Here "Master Sun" is referring to the work that has been linked with the illusory Sun Wu since at least the Western Han period.

Like the even more influential ancient Chinese classic, the *Tao te ching* (*Dao de jing*), which has a total of only about 5,000 characters, the *Sun Zi* is a short work, with a total of just 6,075 characters. Yet it manages to cover a variety of vital topics in its thirteen chapters. In terms of general principles, the *Sun Zi* identifies and advocates the following: awareness of the political and psychological aspects of war, the importance of careful calculation and planning before embarking on a campaign, mastery of different



types of terrain and the appropriate disposition of forces in relation to them, and the ability to capitalize upon favorable circumstances and to avoid unfavorable circumstances. Two chapters on incendiary warfare and espionage are not integral to the main concerns of the *Sun Zi*, but are late additions, probably by persons holding a special brief for these limited aspects of warfare. Since the text has nothing to say about chariots, cavalry, and bowmen, it is obvious that the *Sun Zi* was assembled with mass infantry in mind.

#### AUTHORSHIP

Every chapter of the *Sun Zi* begins with the incipit, “Master Sun said.” This mechanical invocation of “Master Sun” implies nothing more or less than a vague persona who supposedly uttered all of the wise sayings in the book that goes by his name. In this study, when reference is made to “Master Sun,” it signifies the collective personality of all military sages whose pronouncements were assembled in the *Sun Zi*. By no means should use of the name “Sun Zi” or “Master Sun” here be construed as indicating acceptance of a particular individual as the author of the entire text. In short, the author of the *Sun Zi* is a fictional entity, and any mention of him in this study should be thought of as having quote marks around it, indicating that he is “the so-called Master Sun” or “the so-called Sun Wu.”

The Danish Sinologist, Jens Østergard Petersen has persuasively demonstrated (1992a) that the stories told about Sun Wu are generic in nature. They are illustrative tales that are repeated in various sources (often with only minor variations) about different individuals, some real, some not. Petersen has also subjected to intense scrutiny the diverse names applied to Master Sun (Sun Zi, Sun Wǔ, Sun Wú, and Wǔ Zi) and has determined (1992b) that they are all problematic as references to a specific person who is alleged to have been active in the latter part of the Spring and Autumn period. Indeed, two of the names — Sun Wú and Sun Zi — more often than not refer to Sun Bin, who lived in the Warring States period, while Wǔ Zi is an implausible title and Sun Wǔ itself lacks historical grounding. It is also noteworthy that the names Sun Wǔ and Sun Bin do

not occur among the Yinque Shan manuscripts, only Sun Zi, which could refer to either or both.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, the first occurrence of the name Sun Wǔ is in the *Shi ji*, which was completed shortly after 87 BC. Thus, “Sun Zi” in Han and earlier texts — if it signifies any specific person — generally refers to Sun Bin who was a known entity in pre-Han times, whereas Sun Wǔ was not. (Petersen 1992b)

Sun Wǔ’s name itself has all the marks of being a made-up cognomen that is descriptive of his role in the extensively studied Wu Zixu story. (Rudolph 1942, 1962; Johnson 1980, 1981; Mair 1983) That is to say, like the Spring and Autumn period hero Wu Zixu, he *flees* to Wú, and like Wu Zixu, he is a *warrior*, where Sun (literally “grandson”) signifies *xun* (“flee, abdicate”)<sup>17</sup> and Wǔ directly means “military, martial, valiant,” hence Sun (i.e., Xun) Wǔ may be translated as “the fugitive warrior.” The difference, however, is that Wu Zixu had a reason for fleeing from Chu (the murder of his father and brother by the king), whereas Sun Wǔ’s reason for fleeing from Qi (his alleged home state) is completely unknown. Overall, the function of the Sun Wǔ persona in the initial stage of its development as part of the Wu Zixu story is to serve as a reinforcing *Doppelgänger* for the central hero. The inspiration for the creation of the Sun Wǔ character may have come from Sun Bin, who was actually a military specialist from Qi, but who flourished approximately a century and a half after the time that Sun Wǔ was alleged to have lived. Once launched as a supporting member of the cast of the Wu Zixu drama, the Sun Wǔ character was free to develop as an independent figure in military lore.

There is a great deal of evidence that Sun Bin was a genuine authority on military affairs, but that — through a curious process akin to euhemerization — a legendary figure called Sun Wu emerged as the Sun Zi (“Master Sun”) who was acknowledged as the fountain of military wisdom, and not Sun Bin. Some of the evidence for the spinning off of Sun Wu from Sun Bin is presented elsewhere in this study and in the notes to the translation it is meant to accompany. Here, however, we may examine one particularly telling item. Namely, in *Lü shi chunqiu* (Spring and Autumn Annals of Mr. Lü; an eclectic text of about 240 BC) 17.7, it states explicitly that “Sun Bin valued *shi* (‘configuration’).” It is obvious that *shi* is also extremely important for the *Sun Zi*, since it occurs a total of fifteen times in the text, eight times in ch. 5 (one of the shortest

chapters in the book) alone. *Shi* occurs only a total of three times in the other three major works on military strategy from Han and earlier times that were part of the received tradition (*Wei Liao Zi*, *Wu Zi*, and *Sima fa*), thus there are five times as many instances of *shi* in the *Sun Zi* as in the other three main military treatises put together. *Shi* also occurs often in the *Sun Bin*, and ch. 9, entitled "Shi bei" (Preparation of Configuration), is devoted to it. Hence, it would appear that Sun Bin was specialist in *shi* and was recognized for his expertise in this crucial aspect of tactics. However, in the formation of the *Sun Zi*, some of that expertise was siphoned off, with the result that the fictitious Sun Wu also became an expert on *shi*.

The proliferation of Sun Zi lore did not stop with establishment of the thirteen chapter edition as *the Sun Zi*. Sun Zi dialogs and Sun Zi narratives continued to coalesce in an amorphous repository. This accounts for the *Sun Zi* editions with as many as nearly a hundred chapters (counting scrolls of illustrations) listed in Han period and other bibliographies, and it also explains the unruly collection of Sun Zi texts among the Yinque Shan and SSZ manuscripts which are, more often than not, impossible to assign with confidence either to the *Sun Zi* or to the *Sun Bin*.<sup>18</sup>

Nor did the flourishing industry of writing tactics and strategies stop with Sun Wu and Sun Bin. It was inevitable that texts would come to be associated with other military authorities as well, whether they were real, imagined, or somewhere in between. Once the writing of military treatises was legitimized by the creation of the *Sun Zi*, it spawned a bevy of competing texts. After the Sun dyad (Sun Bin and his more famous alter ego, Sun Wǔ), probably the first out of the chute was Wú Qi, whose *Wú Zi* swiftly came to be paired with the *Sun Zi* as the dual fount of military sagesse (hence the expression Sun Wú). After that came the *Wei Liao Zi* and the *Sima fa*, with the authors of the *Sun Zi* and the *Sima fa* tending more to the side of legend and the authors of the *Sun Bin* and the *Wú Zi* being somewhat more securely grounded in history.

To summarize the sequence of Warring States military treatises as they appeared beginning from the middle of the fourth century BC, the first to be compiled was the *Sun Zi*. The *Sun Bin* most likely did not coagulate until the early Han period, after the *Sun Zi* was securely established, and was loosely formed from the residue of Sun Zi materials left over after the compilation of the *Sun Zi*. The *Wú Zi* probably would have come in

between, and has more earmarks of a composed text than the compilatory *Sun Zi* and *Sun Bin* (the latter less so than the former).

Although careful textual and historical research indicates that we should be wary of assigning the composition of the *Sun Zi* to a single individual, the book itself clearly adopts the pretense of embodying the *ipsissima verba* of a certain Master Sun. This formula (“Master Sun said”) by itself, however, gives probable evidence that the text was compiled by other(s) who came after the putative military pundit.

The conventional view, however, is that the author was a man named Sun Wu who was a great military theorist and who allegedly lived around the end of the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BC), making him was a contemporary of Confucius (ca. 551–479 BC). He is said to have been a man of the state of Qi (in the northeast) who — for some unknown reason — fled to the southeastern kingdom of Wu. There he was introduced by the high official Wu Zixu (also called Wu Yun or Wu Xu; late sixth-early fifth century BC), himself a refugee from the south-central state of Chu, to the king of Wu, Helu (or Helü) (r. 514–496 BC). A fanciful tale of Sun Wu training the palace ladies of King Helu constitutes almost the whole of his sole “biography” (see Appendix I). Impressed by Sun Wu’s ability to train even beautiful women to obey military commands implicitly and to face death and danger unflinchingly, the king appoints him as a general in the Wu army. Together with Wu Zixu, Sun Wu helps the king of Wu administer the state and train the army. As a result, the kingdom of Wu grew to be so powerful that it was able to defeat its enemy to the west, the great state of Chu, entering the Chu capital of Ying,<sup>19</sup> and further to intimidate the strong states of Qi and Jin to the north.

Given such a skimpy “life,” it is not surprising that Sun Wu enthusiasts of later times concocted a few more biographical details. More than a millennium and a half after the time when he was supposed to have lived, Sun Wu is first identified as having been from a place called Le’an (it is disputed whether that corresponds to modern Boxing (pronounced Buosheeng) County or Huimin County in Shandong Province);<sup>20</sup> and his grandfather is said to have been granted a fief there. This is casually mentioned, without any proof or documentation, in the “*Zaixiang shixi biao*” (Genealogical Chart of the Grand Councillors) of the *Xin Tang shu* (New History of the Tang Dynasty [73B: 2945]), which was completed in 1060 AD.

Starting with the Song Dynasty scholar, Ye Shi (1150–1223), doubts have sensibly been raised over the historicity of Sun Wu.<sup>21</sup> It has been suggested by some scholars that Sun Wu and Sun Bin (who is supposed by Sima Qian to be a descendant of Sun Wu and whose biography follows immediately after his in the *Shi ji*) may have been the same person. This is virtually impossible, however, since Sun Bin lived more than a century after Sun Wu's supposed death, as asserted at the very beginning of his biography in the *Shi ji*. Sun Bin's placement in the second half of the fourth century, roughly a hundred and fifty years after the alleged time of Sun Wu, is corroborated by the kings (Hui [r. 369–335 BC] of Wei and Wei [r. 356–320 BC] of Qi) and the generals (Pang Juan [fl. mid-fourth century BC] and Tian Ji [fl. second half of the fourth century]) with whom he was associated. It is far more likely that Sun Bin was a historical figure (ca. 380–ca. 325 BC) and that Sun Wu is a backward projection from him.<sup>22</sup>

Suspicion of Sun Wu's historicity goes hand in hand with doubt over his authorship of the *Sun Zi* and its dating to the Spring and Autumn period. Henri Maspero said of the *Sun Zi*, "The work, if not a complete forgery, must date, at the earliest, from the third century BC; and it can therefore have nothing to do either with Sun Pin [i.e., Bin] or with his fabulous ancestor [Sun Wu]." (1978: 441 n. 3; 1955: 328 n. 1) Written long before the discovery of the Yinque Shan and SSZ manuscripts, this is an amazingly prescient, perceptive remark.

The given names of both Sun Wu and Sun Bin are peculiar. The former means "Martial," and the latter means "Kneecapped."<sup>23</sup> Thus, their full names would mean "Sun the Martial" and "Sun the Kneecapped," or, in Western order, "Martial Sun" and "Kneecapped Sun." Whereas the first is simply too pat, too neat for the presumed father of all military theory in China, the latter is most certainly not a sufficiently grand name for a nation's foremost military authority. Since, as I have shown in various ways, the real "Sun Zi" was Sun Bin, it is easy to understand the psychological motivation, indeed necessity, to transform "Kneecapped Sun" into "Martial Sun."

The story of how Sun Bin got his bizarre name is worth retelling in this context, since it has deep implications, both for the development of the Sun Zi legends and for their codification in China's first standard history, the *Shi ji* (The Grand Scribe's Records). Since it is not overly long, but is full of vital information concerning the

establishment of the Sun Zi legends for the rest of Chinese history, it is worth citing the entire biography of Sun Bin from the *Shi ji*:

More than a hundred years after Sun Wu died there was Sun Bin. Bin was born between E and Juan.<sup>24</sup> He was a descendant of Sun Wu. Sun Bin once studied the methods of war (*bingfa*) together with Pang Juan. After Pang Juan took up service in Wei, he obtained a command under King Hui (r. 369–335 BC), but thought his own ability inferior to Sun Bin’s and secretly had a man summon Sun Bin. When Bin arrived, Pang Juan grew fearful that Sun was more worthy than himself. Jealous of him, he had both his feet cut off and his face tattooed as punishment by law,<sup>25</sup> hoping that Sun would retire and refuse to appear.

An envoy from Qi went to Liang.<sup>26</sup> Sun Bin, since he was a convict who had suffered the punishment of mutilation, met with the Qi envoy in secret and advised him. The Qi envoy thought him remarkable and secretly carried Bin to Qi with him in his carriage. Qi’s general Tian Ji thought much of Sun Bin and made him his guest. Ji raced horses and gambled heavily with the Noble Scions of Qi several times. Sun Zi noticed that the horses’ speed was not much different and that the horses fell into high, middle, and low grades. After this, Sun Zi told Tian Ji, “Just bet heavily, My Lord, and I can make you the winner.”

Tian Ji confidently agreed and bet a thousand pieces of gold with King Wei (r. 378–343 BC) and the Noble Scions of Qi on a race. Just before the wager Sun Zi said, “Now match their high-grade horses with your low-grade horses, take your high-grade horses to match their middle-grade horses, and take your middle-grade horses to match their low-grade horses.”

After they raced the three grades of horses, Tian Ji lost once but won twice and eventually gained the king’s thousand pieces of gold. After this, Ji presented Sun Zi to King Wei. King Wei questioned him on the arts of war and made him his counselor.

Some time later, Wei attacked Zhao. Zhao was hard pressed and sought help from Qi. King Wei of Qi wanted to make Sun Bin commander, but Sun declined: “A mutilated criminal will never do.” King Wei then made Tian Ji commander and Sun Zi his counselor.

Sun occupied a wagon where he sat and drew up plans and strategies (*ji mou*).<sup>27</sup> Tian Ji wanted to lead the troops to Zhao. Sun Zi said, “To untangle a snarled mess, one does not raise his fists, and to stop a fight one does not grab or bind. Seize him at his throat and charge him where he is defenseless; his formations attacked, his power constrained, he will retire of his own accord.”<sup>28</sup> Liang and Zhao are attacking each other now; their swift soldiers and picked troops are sure to be exhausted outside on the battlefield, their aged and infirm exhausted inside the cities. It would be better for My Lord to lead the troops in a rush to Da Liang; block its roads and highways, and strike it when still undefended. Liang is sure to release Zhao and save itself. We would thus in one swoop raise the siege of Zhao and exhaust Wei [i.e., Liang].”

Tian Ji followed his advice and Wei did indeed leave Handan,<sup>29</sup> and fought with Qi at Guiling.<sup>30</sup> Qi crushed the Liang army.

Thirteen years later, Wei and Zhao attacked Han. Han informed Qi of its straits. Qi had Tian Ji take command and go to Han’s rescue. He rushed straight to Da Liang. Wei’s commander Pang Juan<sup>31</sup> heard this, left Han, and returned to Wei, but Qi’s army had already passed him and advanced west into Wei.

Sun Zi told Tian Ji, “These troops of Three Jin<sup>32</sup> have always been both fierce and courageous, and have little regard for Qi, since Qi has a name for cowardice. A skilled fighter acts according to the situation and directs the course of events by offering the enemy advantages. According to the arts of war, ‘when one races after advantage for a hundred tricents, the commander falls; when one races after advantage for fifty tricents, only half the army arrives.’ When Qi’s army enters Wei territory, have

them make cooking fires for a hundred thousand; the next day make fires for fifty thousand; and the day after make fires for thirty thousand."

On the third day of Pang Juan's march, Pang rejoiced. "I knew Qi's troops were cowards; three days after entering our territory, over half their officers and men have fled." He abandoned his infantry and covered two days' distance in one day with lightly armed, picked soldiers, pursuing Qi's troops. Sun Zi judged that they would reach Maling<sup>33</sup> at dusk. The road through Maling was narrow and there were numerous barriers on both sides where troops could be hidden. Sun stripped the bark off a great tree and carved on it, "P'ang Juan died at the foot of this tree." After this he ordered the best archers in Qi's army to hide along both sides of the road with ten-thousand crossbows<sup>34</sup> and arranged a signal. "When you see a brand at dusk, fire in concert."

As he expected, Pang Juan reached the foot of the stripped tree at night, saw the inscription, and struck a fire to illuminate it. Before he had finished reading Sun's inscription, the Qi army's ten-thousand crossbows all fired at once and Wei's army was thrown into chaos and confusion. Pang Juan, realizing that he had been outwitted and his troops defeated, cut his throat: "Now this whelp's name is made!"

The Qi army, following up on their victory, crushed Pang's army, captured Wei's Heir, Shen, and returned. Sun Bin's name was renowned throughout the world because of this; his *bingfa* ("methods of war") is transmitted to the present generation.<sup>35</sup>

In terms of its specificity and historical groundedness, this is a far more believable biography than the account of Sun Wu which directly precedes it in *Shi ji* 65. It should be noted that "Sun Zi" (Master Sun) in this biography clearly refers to Sun Bin, not Sun Wu.

Sima Qian, author of the *Shi ji*, must have felt a poignant affinity with Sun Bin, for he had suffered the ultimate mutilation and humiliation of castration. (Goldin 2005b) Furthermore, this was the result of his speaking out in defense of a general who had been defeated by the northern nomads (Xiongnu/Huns) and defected to them. Sima sublimated



his grief by pouring all his remaining energy into writing the *Shi ji*, which remains to this day as a monument to China’s first historian. Ban Gu (32–92 AD), author of the *Han shu* (History of the Han; the second of China’s twenty-five standard histories) and member of a distinguished family that had both military and Xiongnu (Hunnish, north[west]ern) connections, wrote a sympathetic biography of Sima Qian. In it, he draws the obvious parallel that “Sun Zi suffered the mutilation of having his feet amputated, [in consequence of which] he composed his *bingfa* (‘methods of war’).” (*Han shu* 62: 2735) Since the mutilation is specified by the term *bin*, there can be no doubt whatsoever that Ban Gu is referring to Sun Bin and not to Sun Wu when he mentions Sun Zi.

There is an overlap of materials from *Sun Zi* that also appear in *Sun Bin* (Goldin 2005a). *Sun Bin* is a later development presupposing the previous existence of the *Sun Zi*, “and the two may well form a single, continuously developing intellectual tradition united under the Sun name.” (Lewis 2005: 6)

As much as anyone, Sima Qian, author of the *Shi ji*, was responsible for promoting the Sun Zi (= Sun Wǔ) cult,<sup>36</sup> yet even he — at a crucial moment — let slip that he must have been aware of the fact that the real Sun Zi was Sun Bin and not the imaginary Sun Wu. This occurs in his closing comments to the combined biographies of Sun Wǔ, Sun Bin, and Wú Qì (*Shi ji*, s. 65):

When the world talks about armies and brigades, they all mention the thirteen chapters of the *Sun Zi* and Wú Qì’s *Soldierly Methods*. Most people in the world have these books, therefore I have not discussed them here, but instead have discussed the implementation of their actions. A common saying has it that “Those who can act cannot necessarily speak, and those who can speak cannot necessarily act.” Master Sun was brilliant in his calculations against Pang Juan, but could not save himself earlier from the disaster of mutilation. Wu Qi advised Marquis Wu that form and configuration<sup>37</sup> were not as important as *virtūs*,<sup>38</sup> but when he applied this principle in Chu, he destroyed himself through his harsh tyranny and lack of mercy. How sad!<sup>39</sup>

Whether “Sun Zi” in late Warring States times referred to the imaginary Sun Wǔ or the real Sun Bin, there is no doubt that he and his book of strategy had become indelibly linked to Wú Qi and his manual of tactics by that time.<sup>40</sup> From around the mid-third century BC, “Sun Wú” (meaning “Sun Zi” and “Wú Qi,” together with their works) functioned as a nearly ubiquitous expression for military *savoir faire*.

The *Lü shi chunqiu* (The Springs and Autumns of Mr. Lü) has a postface dated 239 BC. It is suggestive that when (in 19.3) it mentions Sun and Wú we might be witnessing the legend of Sun Wǔ at an incipient stage of development when it is still rather inchoate. In this passage, we cannot be sure which Sun [Zi] is being referred to, although Wú most likely specifies Wú Qi. Together, they are loosely linked with King Helu of Wú, which is fine for the emerging Sun Zi (Sun Wǔ), but not for Wú Qi. According to his biography in *Shi ji* 65, Wú Qi was a northerner from the state of Wey who spent the first part of his life in service to monarchs of the northern states of Wei and Lu, and the latter part in the southern state of Chu. There is no indication of his having anything to do with Helu of the southeastern state of Wú. Still, having this vague mid-third century BC reference to a Sun [Zi] and another eminent military expert mentioned in the same breath with King Helu of Wú might well explain how, by the beginning of the second century BC, we have an elaborate legend involving Sun Wǔ and Wu Zixu assisting the king of Wú in successfully defeating its arch-enemy, Chu.

The paradigmatic pair of Sun [Zi] and Wú [Qi] occurs three times in the Legalistic text ascribed to Han Fei Zi (ca. 280–233 BC). A careful analysis of these occurrences offers revealing evidence for the conundrum of how Sun Bin begat his own ancestor. *Han Fei Zi* 26 is entitled “Shou dao” (Guarding the Way). Near the end of this chapter, the author declares that, in a Legalist utopia, “The strategies of Sun [and] Wú would be abandoned, the intentions of Robber Footpad would be cowed.” Robber Footpad (Dao Zhe) was an archetypal brigand featured in *Zhuang Zi* 29. Since “Sun Wú” is parallel to “Dao Zhe” here in *Han Fei Zi* 26, it would appear that Sun and Wú have been conflated into a single entity, and conflation may well have been the prelude to fusion. There is no doubt that the *Sun Zi* (perhaps it would be safer to say “a *Sun Zi*”) was well known during the latter part of the Warring States period and circulated widely. *Han Fei Zi* 49 is entitled “Wu du” (Five Vermin). Here the author states that, where Legalist

ideals do not yet hold sway, “Everybody within the realm talks of soldiery, and every house keeps copies of *Sun* and *Wú*.”<sup>41</sup> He goes on to decry the fact that, whereas everybody is enamored of military theory, the soldiers are weak, and that, while everyone is discussing war, there are few who strap on armor. Here again, this could be a reference to Sun Zi (perhaps an emergent Sun Wǔ) and Wú Qi, but — in the mind of the author — it might also vaguely signify a blurred composite.

The most telling instance of all, however, occurs in *Han Fei Zi* 3, “Nan yan” (Speaking with Difficulty): “Master Sun had his kneecaps chopped off in Wei, Wú Qi daubed tears at Cliffgate.” Of the 55 chapters of the *Han Fei Zi*, ch. 3 is arguably the earliest, the core of the entire text, and probably the only one that dates to the time of the thinker after whom the whole collection is named. (Brooks 1994: 17–19) It is essential to note that, in this relatively early occurrence of the Sun-Wú dyad, there is no question but that we are dealing with two individuals (not a fuzzy fusion) and there can be no mistaking the fact that these two military experts are none other than Sun Bin and Wú Qi. All the later evocations of “Sun [and] Wú” where “Sun” comes to mean the imagined “Sun Zi” of the Spring and Autumn period, i.e., Sun Wǔ, hearken back to this foundational stage where “Sun” still meant “Sun Bin,” *not* “Sun Wǔ.” Thus, within the evolving *Han Fei Zi*, we witness the evolving Sun Zi, who develops from Sun Bin to Sun Wǔ. We may compare this transformation to the exuviation of a cicada. When Sun Wǔ emerged from the old Sun Bin shell, he was shiny and splendid, and the old, discarded husk would have been left by the wayside — were it not for chance archeological discovery of the Yinque Shan bamboo strips, which have restored Sun Bin to his rightful eminence.

The *Xun Zi*, attributed to Xun Qing (fl. mid-third century BC), also has a long chapter on military matters that is entitled “Yi bing” (A Discussion of War). It was almost certainly not written by Master Xun himself, but composed by one or more of his disciples.<sup>42</sup> Also, the form of the surname used for Xun Zi in this chapter (Sun instead of Xun<sup>43</sup>) indicates that it was written during the Han period (to avoid a taboo on use of the phonophore [phonetic component] of the personal name of the Han emperor Xuan Di, viz., Liu Xun [91–49; r. 73–49]). It is probably not accidental that the semi-homophonous graph chosen to replace the Xun surname was none other than Sun, which bids fair to

capitalize on the glamour of this eponym of strategists. Linwu Jun (“Lord Overseer of the Military”; third century BC[?]), about whom nothing substantial is known, functions as an interlocutor in this chapter. The debate begins with Linwu Jun emphasizing the practical, technical aspects of warfare. He stresses the need to capitalize upon strategic advantage, close observation, and swift action. Xun Zi (in this instance called Sun Qingzi) firmly counters that what really matters is to gain the support of the people, which is one of the tenets proposed near the beginning of *Sun Zi* 1. Linwu Jun responds with another aphoristic assertion from the middle of *Sun Zi* 1, namely, that the most crucial aspects of warfare are transformation and deception. “Those who are skilled at waging war” (*shan yong bing zhe*), he opines, are elusive and mysterious in their comings and goings. He then goes on to state that “Sun and Wú used [these principles], and there was no one under heaven who was a match<sup>44</sup> for them.” Now, as in the *Lü shi chunqiu* passage discussed above, we do not know for certain which “Sun” is being referred to here, but given the fact that he is paired with Wú [Qi] and the relatively late date of composition of this part of the *Xun Zi* (late third or early second century BC), most likely it is Sun Wǔ, not Sun Bin, who was already beginning to be eclipsed by his fictive ancestor.

Although the “Master Sun” of the *Sun Zi* (i.e., Sun Wǔ) is a purely legendary figure concerning whom not a shred of reliable biographical data exists, for those who believe in him, he is as real as any deity or mythical hero. It has been so since the second century BC.

To summarize the process whereby texts on tactics and strategy came to be written down and assigned to various authors during the Warring States period, it would appear that the germ of this body of military literature first emerged around the middle of the fourth century BC upon the blossoming of the Iron Revolution in East Asia.<sup>45</sup> The germ then grew into an embryo and the embryo soon developed into a full-blown but ill-defined text. Once the thirteen chapters of the *Sun Zi* assumed canonical form (before the middle of the third century BC), the residue of Sun Zi materials were shunted off into the *Sun Bin*. This is ironic, since it was Sun Bin who was the initial Sun Zi and around whom the Sun Zi lore began to crystallize into a written corpus.<sup>46</sup> But it is also understandable that Sun Bin would be displaced by Sun Wǔ as *the* Sun Zi (Master Sun), because Sun Wǔ

was a purely imaginary figure. Unconstrained by reality, Sun Wǔ evolved as an iconic founding father of East Asian military wisdom. Thus Sun / Xun Wǔ (“the fugitive warrior”) was doubly a *Doppelgänger*, first of Wu Zixu (who truly was a fugitive warrior), and second of Sun Bin (“the mutilated grandson”).

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The *Sun Zi* was compiled during the second half of the Warring States period (ca. 475–221 BC). Moving backward in time, the Warring States period was preceded by the Spring and Autumn period, which began around 770 BC with the weakening of the Zhou king to the point that nearly a dozen major states and many lesser statelets no longer felt themselves beholden to him. The Warring States period experienced an intensification of interstate rivalry and a growing tendency to use military force to achieve domination, rather than relying on diplomacy and relatively small-scale armed conflicts to maintain the alliances and balances that characterized the Spring and Autumn period. The Zhou Dynasty had begun ca. 1045 with the defeat of the Shang, the first historically verifiable dynasty in East Asia. The Shang and the Zhou (up through the Spring and Autumn period) belong to the Bronze Age, which was characterized by bronze weapons and chariot warfare (Shaughnessy 1988, 1989), both of which were monopolized by the elites. The Warring States period, which was distinguished by massive infantry armies and iron weaponry (particularly during the latter part), culminated in the unification of the empire under the Qin, a short-lived (221–206 BC) but extremely important dynasty that brought an end to the incessant wars of the preceding three centuries.

There is actually no unanimity as to precisely when the Warring States period began. Some say that it started in 481, when the chronicles of Lu (Confucius’ home state) conclude, marking the end of the Spring and Autumn period. Others maintain that the Warring States period began in 403, when the Eastern Zhou rump court (King Wei Lie) officially recognized Han, Wei, and Zhao, three states that had resulted from the breakup of Jin half a century earlier (453 BC). Many scholars, however, accept 475 as the

beginning of the Warring States period, because that year witnessed a dramatic readjustment of the feudal order.

In any event, the Warring States period was in full swing by the beginning of the fourth century, with seven major states (Yan, Qi, Chu, Han, Wei, Zhao, and Qin) contesting for power. The rulers of each of these states usurpingly referred to themselves as "king" (*wang*), and each strove to expand his territory at the expense of the other, with the ultimate goal of achieving complete control over *tianxia* ("all under heaven"). A key feature of the politics of the Warring States period was the ambivalent relationship between a ruler and the feudal lords associated with him. Though the feudal lords may have sworn fealty to the ruler, they were often on the verge of revolting and were constantly trying to assume the dominant position that he occupied. The situation was by nature highly unstable and endlessly in flux, so constant wars were inevitable. These shaky alliances are frequently alluded to in the *Sun Zi*, so it is essential for the reader to understand them and bear them in mind.

In contrast to the Spring and Autumn period, during the Warring States no longer was war restricted to brief, chivalrous battles. These had now given way to unrestrained, violent campaigns involving enormous armies. Contributing to the ferocity of warfare during the Warring States were entirely new and ruthlessly efficient military features such as cavalry and the crossbow, both of which appeared in East Asia for the first time during this period (the former from the far north and the latter from the far south), and both of which transformed war into a far more terrifying phenomenon than it had ever been before. But the changes in warfare were not restricted to innovations in weaponry and vastly enhanced mobility. The ways in which human beings were marshaled were also thoroughly transformed, with the deployment of mass infantry, the skillful dispatch of spies, and the rise of competing tacticians, none of which had been seen in East Asia before. It was in this highly charged atmosphere that the *Sun Zi* arose

The hierarchy of organizational levels in the army is alluded to in the *Sun Zi*, but not discussed in detail, nor does the *Sun Zi* present a complete listing of the different units of an army and their sizes. The terms referring to the army's manpower that are most frequently mentioned in the *Sun Zi* are the following: *bing* ("soldiers, armed forces"), *zu* ("troops"), *zhong* ("host, crowd" — referring to the army en masse, but also

sometimes denoting the civilian population upon which the fighting forces of a state depend), and *min* ("the people, populace" — including both the military and the civilian population). It is evident that the authors of the *Sun Zi* were not interested in providing an elaborate organizational scheme for the army, together with normal strengths for each level. Such schemes did exist for the Warring States period (comparable to the corps, brigade, regiment, battalion, company, platoon, squad, and patrol of Western armies), although they varied from state to state and through time. Attention to such specific facets of military administration was not a concern of the authors of the *Sun Zi*, who were preoccupied with more theoretical, political, and psychological aspects of war.

The evolution of the *jiang* or *jiangjun* ("general," i.e., the commander of an army) was another phenomenon of the Warring States period that is reflected prominently in the *Sun Zi*. The first two biographies of generals are both legendary, Sun Wu in *Shi ji* 65 and Marshal Rangju (to whom the *Sima fa* [Methods of the Marshal] is attributed) in *Shi ji* 64. Though written around the beginning of the first century BC, both biographies were projected back to the waning years of the S & A period (late sixth century BC), and both consisted essentially of a single story that emphasized the same principle of military command: absolute adherence to rules, the general as the arbiter of life and death, and not beholden to the ruler when he is in the field.

Chariots dominated in the warfare of the Spring and Autumn period. The chariot essentially functioned as a movable fighting platform of the elite, supported by loosely organized infantry. The main weapons were the convex bow for the noblemen in their chariot, and the lance for foot soldiers. Armies were relatively small, seldom exceeding 30,000 men, and usually much smaller, 10,000 or fewer. The maneuvers that they engaged in, furthermore, were quite simple in nature, and battles seldom lasted more than a day or two, while campaigns were generally limited to at most one season. There was little need for military expertise, with command reserved for members of leading lineages. Nobles led men from their own fiefs, and the armies they constituted functioned essentially as independent units with little overall coordination from a central authority.

As late as the late sixth century BC, large armies normally did not exceed 50,000 men. After that, however, there was a pronounced shift toward reliance on massed infantry during the Warring States period, with armies of one or two hundred thousand

not uncommon. To fill such vast numbers, rulers had to draw on peasants from the hinterland. They greatly expanded their recruitment, which required enhanced centralized control. Professional commanders gradually replaced noble warrior-leaders. Campaigns could go on for a year or more, with no seasonal limits. Multiple armies could be sent to fight simultaneously in different areas. Weapons proliferated, both in types and quantities. The crossbow, the most important weapon of armies during the latter part of the Warring States period, did not become widespread until late fourth century. (Lewis 1999, 2007; Yang 1995: 95–98; 2005: 79–83, 103–104, 158–164; Zhou 2006: 97–104)

Eventually, the state of Qin, whose ruler in 364 BC had already been designated as hegemon (*ba*) or hegemon king (*bawang*, a term that occurs twice in *Sun Zi* 11), one after another subdued all of its rivals. Finally, with the defeat of the great southern state of Chu in 278 and the powerful northern state of Qi in 221, Qin (pronounced like “chin”) reunified the empire. In place of the old feudal system that had obtained since the Shang period, the Qin established a political and institutional system of bureaucrats exercising the emperor’s will that persisted through a succession of dozens of dynasties until the year 1911. It is no wonder that the largest state of East Asia today is called **China**.

Ironically, this two-century period of incessant war was the Golden Age of Chinese thought, when the major philosophical traditions (Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism, and so forth) were founded, the so-called Hundred Schools. It was also the period during which the Chinese writing system was unified and the foundations of Chinese literature were laid. This elicits a conundrum of the highest order: how can it be that a prolonged period of military contestation would result in the most intense intellectual stimulation ever to have occurred in East Asia before modern times? Are there parallels elsewhere? War is a scourge, a blot upon humanity, but for East Asia more than two millennia ago, it induced unforeseen benefits that indelibly shaped one of the world’s greatest cultures.



## DATING

Tradition holds that the *Sun Zi* was a product of the late Spring and Autumn period, but — judging both from internal and external evidence — this is completely impossible. Everything that the *Sun Zi* has to say about the pattern of war, battle tactics, the conduct of armies, strategic planning, and weaponry is irrelevant to the Spring and Autumn period but perfectly compatible with the Warring States period. The entire *modus operandi* of warfare as described in the *Sun Zi* pertains to the Warring States and is completely out of keeping with the Spring and Autumn period, when armies were commanded by rulers, members of the aristocracy, vassals, and ministers. It was not until the Warring States period that military professionals of the sort described in the *Sun Zi* took over the job of prosecuting wars. Furthermore, the armies described in the *Sun Zi* are large, well organized, and extensively trained, whereas the armies of the Spring and Autumn period were much smaller, poorly organized, and lacked training. Likewise, the ascription of books to individuals, real or imagined, was a phenomenon of the Warring States, not of Spring and Autumn times. In addition, there are technological innovations mentioned in the *Sun Zi* that disqualify it as a Spring and Autumn text. For example, the crossbow is referred to in chs. 2, 5, and 11, but it was not common in East Asia until the fourth century BC, and probably not known at all until the fifth century BC. Warfare during the Warring States period was also transformed by sharp metal weapons made of iron that could be produced on a massive scale (see below under “Tactics and Technology”), leading to enormous armies. These are just a few of the immediate, insuperable obstacles to the acceptance of the *Sun Zi* as belonging to the Spring and Autumn period.<sup>47</sup> Many more bars to a Spring and Autumn date will be raised in the following sections of this discussion, but we already have enough counter-evidence to rule out any time before the Warring States for the birth of the *Sun Zi*.

It is clear that the *Sun Zi* belongs to the Warring States, but that does not necessarily imply that it is all of a piece and belongs to a single date within the Warring States period. There are many features of the *Sun Zi* that lead the sensitive, critical reader to the conclusion that, just as it was not all written by the same person, neither was the whole of it written at the same time. Here is a simple chart listing the thirteen chapters of

the *Sun Zi* according to their serial order together with the approximate years in which they were composed.<sup>48</sup>

Chapters of the *Sun Zi* and their rough date of composition

1	309 BC
2	311 BC
3	312 BC
4	313 BC
5	314 BC
6	316 BC
7	317 BC
8	336 BC (?)
9	345 BC
10	342 BC
11	330 BC
12	310 BC
13	272 BC

Let us make another chart arranging the chapters in their apparent chronological sequence.

Chapters of the *Sun Zi* arranged according to their rough date of composition

345 BC	9
342 BC	10
336 BC (?)	8
330 BC	11
317 BC	7
316 BC	6
314 BC	5
313 BC	4
312 BC	3

311 BC	2
310 BC	12
309 BC	1
272 BC	13

What do these dates tell us? First of all, they show that the *Sun Zi* germinated around the middle of the fourth century BC with a sharp focus on the problem of terrain and the proper positioning of troops in different topographical circumstances. From that concrete, infantry-centered core,<sup>49</sup> the text incrementally grew outward over a span of around thirty-five years to encompass increasingly varied and more abstract, theoretical, and political aspects of war. The main development of the *Sun Zi* concluded, however, toward the end of the fourth century BC with a technologically specific chapter on incendiary attacks and a politico-economic tract on planning.<sup>50</sup> Then, after a hiatus of more than a quarter of a century, the *Sun Zi* was brought to a close and coopted by advocates of the intelligence community.<sup>51</sup>

This general view of the evolution of the thirteen chapters of the *Sun Zi* is corroborated by arranging them in groups according to their content. When this is done, the initial breakdown falls into three groups: 1–6 emphasize basic theory and strategy (the second group to be composed), 7–11 concentrate on tactics and topography (the first group composed), and 12–13 deal with specialized topics (the last group composed). The latter two groups, representing the relatively unified core and the periphery furthest removed from it, cannot fruitfully be subdivided. The group in between (time-wise), however, is highly heterogeneous, and can be further broken down into 1–3 which concern overall procedures and principles of warmaking, 4–5 on the intangibles of shape and configuration, and 6 on the most abstract notions of all, emptiness and fullness (or solidity). Finally, 1–3 can, in turn, be subdivided yet again into: 1. pre-war assessments, 2. the actual battle in the field, and 3. attacking cities.

## STYLISTICS AND STATISTICS

Like many other early texts from the Sinitic realm, the *Sun Zi* possesses overt characteristics marking much of its contents as originally having been orally composed. The most obvious mark of orality is the ubiquitous “Master Sun says” at the beginning of each chapter. Of course, this could be a simulacrum of oral transmission, but at least the compilers felt obliged to make an overt gesture in the direction of oral presentation. There are, however, more deeply embedded features of the *Sun Zi* that mark it as being a collection of orally transmitted aphorisms or “bundled maxims.” (Lewis 2005: 6)

A peculiar feature of the *Sun Zi* is the remarkably high frequency of the word *gu* (“therefore”), plus its variant *shi gu* (“for this reason”). The character for *gu* occurs 104 times out of a total of 6,692 characters in the *Sun Zi*.<sup>52</sup> (Lau 1992: 259) This makes it the sixth highest frequent character in the entire text, constituting 1.55% of all characters in the *Sun Zi*. This is in striking contrast with the frequencies for *gu* observed in other early military texts. A comparative chart will help to put this startling disparity in perspective:

Occurrences of *gu* in Four Early Military Texts<sup>53</sup>

	Serial Order of <i>gu</i>	Total Characters	Occurrences of <i>gu</i>	Percentage of <i>gu</i>
<i>Sun Zi</i>	6	6,692	104	1.55
<i>Wei Liao Zi</i>	30	9,484	55	0.58
<i>Wu Zi</i>	53	4,729	18	0.38
<i>Sima fa</i>	49	3,452	14	0.41

This is a phenomenon that may also be observed in the *Dao De Jing*, undoubtedly for similar reasons, namely, the oral background and compilatory nature of the text.<sup>54</sup> (Mair 1990: 119–126, esp. 123–124) Once a particular genre of written literature (such as the military treatise) is established, subsequent exemplars will have fewer characteristics that evince their derivation from orally transmitted lore.

It is not always possible to say with certainty whether a particular illative<sup>55</sup> conjunction in the *Sun Zi* is genuine or false. As a matter of fact, if one were to apply the most stringent grammatical and logical criteria for the use of illative conjunctions, very few of those in the *Sun Zi* would qualify as genuine. I have, however, given the benefit of

the doubt whenever possible (i.e., whenever there is a reasonable connection of any sort between the preceding and succeeding clauses). No matter what degree of rigor is invoked, well over half of the succeeding clauses in the *Sun Zi* manifestly do not follow from the preceding clauses with which they are ostensibly linked by the illative conjunction.

Number of true and false illative conjunctions per chapter

(false / true / total illatives / illatives as a percentage of all characters)

1	1/3/4/1.18%
2	4/2/6/1.74%
3	6/3/9/2.1%
4	7/3/10/3.24%
5	2/3/5/1.5%
6	12/1/13/2.15%
7	8/6/14/2.94%
8	5/0/5/2.02%
9	0/1/1/0.16%
10	2/4/6/1.1%
11	10/3/13/1.21%
12	1/2/3/1.06%
13	2/4/6/1.28%

Chapters with a very high proportion of illative conjunctions, especially those with dense concentrations of false illatives (such as chapters 4, 6, 7, and 8), are poorly constructed. Instead, they tend to read like pastiches of available sayings about war, loosely cobbled together, but given a thin veneer of logic by artificially linking up the sections with illative conjunctions. In contrast, chapter 9, which has far and away the fewest illative conjunctions (by a factor of about 20) was most likely the first to be written, thus providing a kernel around which the military wisdom sayings of the other chapters could crystallize.

Another striking stylistic feature of the *Sun Zi* is that, except for three chapters (numbers 1, 4, and 10), the adverb *fan* ("in general, common[ly], in all cases," etc.) follows immediately after the incipit ("Master Sun said"). What is more, in chapters 2, 3, 7, and 8, right after the *fan* comes *yong bing zhi fa* ("the method of waging war; the method of using military force"), and, at the beginning of chapter 10, this phrase follows on the heels of the incipit, without the interposition of the adverb *fan*. The effect of invoking these universalizing phrases is to claim for Master Sun a type of omniscient military knowledge. Since, however, this is done formulaically, it dilutes the force of the claim, instead becoming a mere mechanical gesture.<sup>56</sup>

The compilatory nature of the *Sun Zi* is also plainly evident in the last section of ch. 7, which begins with a false illative clause, "Therefore, the method of engaging in warfare" (lit., "the method of using *bing*"), strings together an assorted series of eight military maxims, and concludes lamely with the same hollow clause that it began: "This is the method of engaging in warfare." It is clear that the repeated clause serves little purpose other than as a weak justification for assembling the dicta of sagely strategists that were in circulation at the time of the compilation of the text. Furthermore, this final section is not an effective summation of a chapter that is entitled "The Struggle of Armies," a topic which is actually treated only in the first two sections and mentioned again ever so briefly at the close of the third section.

The minimal coherence of the *Sun Zi* may be seen in the title of chapter 7, "Nine Varieties." The title is mystifying enough, with commentators at loggerheads over its meaning, and to the extent that the "nine varieties" are discussed at all in the chapter, it is only in the first section. That is followed by five very short sections, each of which begins with a false illative, and none of which has anything in particular to do with the title or the first section of the chapter.

The loosely cobbled structure of the *Sun Zi* is evident in many places. Again, for the sake of convenience, we may turn to chapter 7 for a good example, namely, the last sentence of the first section: "This is the planning of one who knows how to make the circuitous straight." When this sentence first appears, it makes good sense because it concludes a discussion on the utilization of circuitousness in dealing with another army. When this sentence is arbitrarily reinserted at the end of a subsequent section of the same

chapter, however, it sounds garbled. This sort of slack construction of the *Sun Zi* is also revealed in the next sentence (“This is the method of the struggle of armies”), which likewise harkens back to the opening section of the chapter, but not in any coherent, principled way.

Let us now examine a chart of the lengths of the various chapters in the *Sun Zi* to see whether we can draw some meaningful conclusions from this data.

Length of the individual chapters of the *Sun Zi*

1	339
2	345
3	429
4	309
5	337
6	605
7	477
8	248
9	615
10	548
11	1,072
12	283
13	468

Rearranged by size from shortest to longest, the chapters now line up as in the following chart.

Chapters of the *Sun Zi* arranged according to their length

248	8
283	12
309	4
337	5
339	1

345	2
429	3
468	13
477	7
548	10
605	6
615	9
1,072	11

As is evident from these two charts, the chapters of the *Sun Zi* average just over 467 words in length, ranging from a minimum of 248 to a maximum of 1,072. This wide latitude in the size of the chapters suggests different emphases, constituencies, and even authors (a conclusion already arrived at under our consideration of the dating of the various chapters). One of the chapters (number 11) is disproportionately long and another (number 8) is markedly shorter than the rest. If we remove these two chapters from our calculations, we find that the average length of a chapter is approximately 432 words per chapter, and the variation from this mean lies roughly between 30 percent and 40 percent.

Useful inferences can be drawn from this data, such as that the largest chapter is the fourth (and last) in the series of core chapters dealing with matters of topography. This, the eleventh, chapter is also the most poorly integrated of all the chapters, indicating that it served as a sort of summation and grab bag of whatever miscellaneous information that remained to be subsumed under the topic of varieties of terrain. Conversely, the penultimate chapter on topography is the shortest in the *Sun Zi* and was probably composed as a sort of afterthought, only serving to elicit its opposite extreme a few years later, viz., chapter 11, which is more than four times as long, but goes over much of the same ground. The next shortest chapter, number 12, is also one of the latest and deals with the extraordinary subject of incendiary warfare. The very last chapter, interestingly enough, is almost exactly the length of the average of all the chapters in the book taken together, as though it were consciously designed to strike a balance among all the others, thereby subsuming them under what it proffers as the most important ingredient in the art of war: military intelligence — a topic that was not part of the text as



originally conceived by its founding authors, who were primarily interested in how to deploy mass infantry on different types of terrain.

#### TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGY

Following the waning of the Bronze Age, the appearance of iron during the late second millennium and first millennium had a thoroughgoing, transformative effect on warfare throughout the world. (Keegan 1993: 237–298) The steppe-dwelling Scythians appropriated iron metallurgy from its place of origination in the Black Sea region and, together with other Central Asian and Inner Asian peoples, transmitted it all the way across the continent to East Asia.

Iron appears in the East Asian Heartland (hereafter EAH) from ca. 500 BC. It is very rare at first (during the latter part of the Spring and Autumn period), and restricted almost entirely to the northern fringes of the region. By the early Warring States, there was a vast inventory of iron tools and weapons along the northern borderlands of the EAH. Attempts have been made to demonstrate an autochthonous origin for iron-making in the southeastern states of Wu and Yue, but they are not supported by present evidence, since very few iron objects have been found in the lower Yangtze region, and none preceding the end of the sixth century BC. In contrast, there is abundant evidence of iron tools and weapons all along the north(west)ern fringes of the EAH well before this time, strongly suggesting a western origin for siderurgy (iron technology).

Indeed, ferrous metallurgy spread in the north(west)ern zone before its appearance in the EAH, with iron objects having been recovered from Scytho-Siberian sites in the Altai (Eastern Central Asia) dating to the ninth century BC and in what is now Inner Mongolia no later than the mid-seventh century BC. There is evidence for iron along the Amur River already by the end of the second millennium BC, and iron objects have been found at many sites in Central Asia by the beginning of the first millennium BC. Subsequently, iron artifacts (many of them horse-related, but also weapons, belt ornaments, and tools) became more common in the nearer northwest (the Ordos, Ningxia, Gansu), indicating a vector of introduction by nomads coming down off the steppe. Such

a south(east)ward trajectory through the Gansu Corridor and the Ordos, the omphalos of eastern Eurasia (Mair 2005a: 79–82), is in conformity with the overall chronology and geography of the spread of iron technology from its center near the Black Sea starting around 3,200 years ago.<sup>57</sup> In any event, a large-scale iron industry did not develop in EA itself until the Warring States period, and it is my opinion that the advent of iron was one of the main factors that precipitated the radical political and societal adjustments which characterized the region during this tumultuous period. (Hua 1960; Dubs 1947: 82 n. 121; Needham 1964; Bagley 1999: 177 n. 80; Rawson 1999: 400 n. 68; Lewis 1999: 624–625; Falkenhausen 1999: 475 n. 31, 534–537 n. 157, 542; 2006: 3 n. 4, 9, 224, 227, 229, 282, 409–410, 412; and, most importantly, Di Cosmo 1999: 891–892, 913–914, 933, 938, 940, 946–947, 953, 956, 959 and Tang 1993)

The impact of iron grew as its production gradually became less restricted, but the full military effect of the Iron Revolution was not felt in East Asia until the fourth and third centuries BC. By that time, it was possible to produce sharp, hard weapons in quantity for distribution to large bodies of infantry. The mass production of quality iron weapons, which was not possible with bronze because the copper and tin ores needed to make it are rarer, changed the nature of war. It is precisely at this moment that the feudal institutions that had been in place since the second millennium yielded to bureaucratic institutions. (Mair 1990a: 160–161) Axiomatically, we may state that bronze is to feudalism as iron is to the bureaucratic state.

Bronze weapons had been brought to East Asia from Central Asia and West Asia a thousand years earlier than iron, causing tremendous transformations of society and state.<sup>58</sup> (Loehr 1956; An 1993) The bronze weapons were probably introduced by the same Iranian-speaking peoples who brought the chariot (Shaughnessy 1988, 1989; Anthony 2007; Kuzmina 2007) and the horse (Mair 2003; Mallory and Mair 2000), curiously paralleling the role of the Scythians and other Iranian-speaking peoples in the transmission of iron technology (see also the discussion of *jian* [“arrow”] in Appendix II). The Iron Revolution in East Asia, however, resulted in even more profoundly convulsive changes than had the Bronze Revolution, because it reached further down into and more broadly across society. Whereas the limited supply of bronze weapons meant

that they were perforce restricted to elite warriors, iron could be put into the hands of the plebs.

Another major technological advance in warfare during the Warring States period was the invention of the crossbow in Southeast Asia and its infiltration northward. The crossbow is employed for metaphorical purposes both in *Sun Zi* and in *Sun Bin*, rather than having its military usage explained. In *Sun Zi* 5, there is a discussion of *shi* ("configuration") which draws an analogy with a bird of prey ready to spring or the trigger of a crossbow ready to fire. *Sun Bin* 9, also in a discussion of *shi*, begins with similar animal imagery, but much more elaborate, and also touches on swords, boats, chariots, and a long-handled weapon — each employed as a metaphor for some aspect of military sagesse, not with regard to their actual use in combat. *Sun Bin* 10 presents an even more elaborate metaphor involving the crossbow, again, though, without regard for how to use it in battle.<sup>59</sup>

After iron, the most important Warring States innovation in military affairs was the ridden horse. Cavalry was introduced to the EAH around the mid-fourth century BC in emulation of north(west)ern peoples. (Mair 200b, 2005a, 2003; Dubs 1947) Cavalry figures prominently in *Sun Bin*, e.g., ch. 7, ch. 18, and especially in a passage recovered from Du You's encyclopedia that discusses ten advantages of using cavalry and is explicitly assigned to Sun Bin (Lau and Ames 2003: 179, 235 n. 383), all of which demonstrate that Sun Bin was quite familiar with cavalry, but such is not at all the case in *Sun Zi*.<sup>60</sup> Therefore *Sun Zi* must have been put together largely before the introduction of cavalry, and *Sun Bin* shortly thereafter. In other words, cavalry constitutes the *terminus ad quem* for the *Sun Zi* and the *terminus a quo* of the *Sun Bin*.

It is conceivable that one might argue for an early date of the *Sun Zi* solely on the basis of its lack of any mention of cavalry. After all, it is true that the states of the EAH certainly were unfamiliar with mounted warfare during the Spring and Autumn period. But that would be to ignore all of the other internal and external evidence for the *Sun Zi* as a product of the Warring States period. The northern states of the EAH did not adopt cavalry from the north(west)ern nomads till the latter part of the fourth century (see the second paragraph below). By that time all but the conspicuously late chapter of the *Sun Zi* on espionage had been brought together. Furthermore, it was not until still later that this

new technique of warfare passed to the south, where the *Sun Zi* was ostensibly written (the southeastern state of Wu).<sup>61</sup>

Cavalry in East Asia always played only a supporting role, and never became a major force within the army. It was used for skirmishing, reconnaissance, ambushes, and raids (*qi* applications) — not in main battle (*zheng* operations). Because of the terrain and the environment, the mounted horse was never a key feature of warfare in East Asia. Furthermore, East Asians always had a strained relationship with the horse, which was not in its natural element (the steppes, above all). Nevertheless, it was a prestige item, like the chariot (Mair 2007b)

There is not a single reference to cavalry in the whole of the thirteen chapters of the received text of the *Sun Zi*. Horses are mentioned three times in the *Sun Zi* (chs. 2, 9, and 11), but only for purposes of chariot traction. Some passages from later encyclopedias that have been attributed to the *Sun Zi* do mention cavalry, but it would be better to assign them to the *Sun Bin*, since the authors of the latter text were clearly aware of mounted warfare, whereas there is no evidence that the compilers of the *Sun Zi* knew much, if anything, about it. Cavalry was first introduced to a state of the EAH near the end of the fourth century BC. To be more precise, this happened in the year 307, when King Wuling of Zhao commanded a portion of his men to wear trousers and learn to ride horses so that they could resist the mobile nomad warriors of the steppe. (Mair 2003: 174ab) Zhao, however, was a northern state, so an experiment with cavalry there would have necessitated a lag time before this new skill was passed to states further south. Thus we may posit the end of the fourth century as a rough *terminus ad quem* for the compilation of the *Sun Zi* (excepting the anomalous ch. 13 on spies, which must have been added on after a considerably long interval — perhaps as much as a quarter of a century — had expired from the time when the last previous chapter was appended).

As for a *terminus a quo* for the compilation of the *Sun Zi*, we have adduced numerous specific features that certify it as post-Spring and Autumn. This means that its compilation must have begun sometime after the first quarter of the fifth century BC, which is when the Warring States commenced. Various specific criteria (the crossbow, mass infantry forces, etc.) mark the text as belonging to the fourth century or later.

Defensive walls, both external and internal, were also a significant factor during the Warring States period. Qin linked up the earlier walls of Zhao, Yan, and the ones they had constructed themselves to form the forerunner of what is now known as the Great Wall. (Waldron 1990)

#### TAOISTIC ASPECTS

It may seem odd that the *Sun Zi* is included in the Taoist canon, not once, but twice! These are the *Sun Zi zhujie* (Commentaries to the Sun Zi), which is essentially the same edition as the *Shiyi jia zhu Sun Zi* described above, and the *Sun Zi yishuo* (Gleanings of the Sun Zi), whose late eleventh or early twelfth century editor, Zheng Youxian, employs fictitious dialog to underscore what he sees as the philosophical depth of the text.<sup>62</sup> What is a treatise on war doing in a collection of supposedly religious texts? Aside from the fact that there are lots of other works in the Taoist canon that can hardly be described as religious in nature, let us proceed on the assumption that whoever was responsible for welcoming the *Sun Zi* into the Taoist canon had a reason for doing so, and see whether there is indeed an affinity between the *Sun Zi* and Taoism.

The *Sun Zi* constitutes what may be thought of as a Taoistic approach to war. (Rand 1979–1980) Its authors obviously recognized that a country sometimes must go to war to protect its own interests, perhaps even to ensure its very survival. In their eyes, war is a matter of last resort, and it should be undertaken with the least effort, least expenditure, least risk, and least loss of life. In short, the *Sun Zi*’s approach to war is minimalist.

The *Sun Zi* advocates adherence to the Way (Tao/Dao) as the chief criterion for victory in battle. But what exactly is the Way as applied to warfare? In the very first chapter, Master Sun tells us that the Way (of warfare) is to cause the people to share the same sentiments (be of one mind) with their superiors. It is striking that a work of military theory would begin with such a blatantly political statement, but this is very much in the manner of Lao Zi: rely on the Way to rule the world.

The other key term of the title of the *Tao Te ching* / *Dao de jing*, namely *te* or *de* (*virtus*) is completely missing from the *Sun Zi*. As a matter of fact, *de* is important both for Taoists and for Confucians, though with different emphases. For the Taoists, *de* was the immanence of the Tao in the individual, a kind of charismatic power. For the Confucians, *de* was an ethical concept akin to goodness. For the *Sun Zi*, *de* drew a blank.

Master Sun's attitudes toward the prosecution of war were very different from those of contemporary Confucians. In the chapter of the *Li ji* (Records of Ritual) entitled "Zhong Ni yan ju" (When Confucius Was Dwelling in Retirement), it is stated that "The army has *li* ('civility, etiquette, ritual, propriety'), therefore it accomplishes military merit." Under the fourteenth year of Duke Ai (481 BC) of the *Zuo zhuan* (Chronicle of Zuo; completed ca. 312), it is claimed that "Having *li*, there will be no defeat." The *Sun Zi* does not mention *li* even once. In thus ignoring the prime Confucian virtue of *li*, Master Sun is very much in agreement with the early Taoist thinkers who considered it hypocritical and a cause of dishonesty in human interactions.

Though the *Sun Zi* may have been estranged from Confucianism, it gives every appearance of having arisen in concert with the *Dao De Jing* during the mid- to late fourth century BC. Both texts were projected back in time to ahistorical authors who were imagined to have lived approximately two centuries earlier during the late Spring and Autumn period. The *Sun Zi* consists of military aphorisms attributed to a hazy, legendary figure, just as the *Dao De Jing* is a collection of mystical maxims grouped around a vague, semi-divine founder. (Mair 1990a: 119–130)

That the second half of the fourth century BC was indeed the time during which the *Dao De Jing* was transformed from a body of orally circulating maxims into a written text found "startling" confirmation in 1993 with the archeological recovery of bamboo strip manuscripts at Guodian (Hubei Province, east central China). Dating to around 300 BC and published in 1998, these astonishing manuscripts reveal a *Dao De Jing* in process of formation. As had long been suspected by rigorously critical scholars on diverse grounds, the Guodian manuscripts provide convincing evidence that the *Dao De Jing* was the product of multiple authors and editors over a considerable period of time instead of the work of a single individual writing during the latter part of the Spring and Autumn period (the traditional view).<sup>63</sup> (Henricks 2000)

Precisely the same conditions obtain for the *Sun Zi*. Traditionally held to be the work of a man called Sun Wu who was supposedly a late Spring and Autumn period contemporary of Confucius, modern critical scholarship (confirmed by seemingly miraculous but wonderfully palpable manuscript finds) has demonstrated conclusively that the *Sun Zi* emerged during the second half of the fourth century and that it incorporates the collective, aphoristic wisdom of the age. The chief difference between the *Dao De Jing* and the *Sun Zi* is that the former focuses on how to use a *wuwei* ("nonaction") approach to rule a state, whereas the latter concentrates on applying a similar attitude toward the prosecution of war. (Mair 1990: 138) The supremely adept general is the one who could subdue the enemy without fighting. Thus the *Dao De Jing* is a manual for the *wuwei*-minded ruler, and the *Sun Zi* is a handbook for the *wuwei*-minded general.<sup>64</sup>

#### EURASIAN PARALLELS

Among the works collected by the followers of the great altruistic philosopher, Master Mo (ca. 468–376 BC),<sup>65</sup> under the title *Mo Zi*, there are twenty chapters (52–71 [only eleven of which survive]) dealing with defensive warfare. Together they form Section 5, the last portion of the work,<sup>66</sup> and they are all concerned with how to defend a city. Some of these chapters respond directly to types of attacks mentioned in the *Sun Zi*. For example, ch. 63 of the *Mo Zi* is entitled "Bei 'yi fu'" (Preparing against the "Ant Approach," i.e., swarming up walls), which is specifically referred to in *Sun Zi* ch. 3. *Mo Zi*, ch. 58, "Bei shui" [Preparing against Water] is directed against the sort of hydraulic attacks that are briefly mentioned in *Sun Zi*, ch. 12. Among the missing chapters of the last section of the *Mo Zi*, there certainly would have been one entitled "Bei huo" (Preparing against Fire), the type of attack vigorously promoted in *Sun Zi*, ch. 12. Another late chapter of the *Mo Zi*, ch. 62, "Bei xue" [Preparing against Tunneling], probably dated to around 300 BC, is not specifically mentioned in the late chapters of the *Sun Zi*, such as ch. 3 and ch. 12, but it is also directly related to the type of siegecraft with which they are concerned. (Yates 1982, 1988, 1980)

It would appear that the authors of these late chapters of the *Mo Zi* and the authors of the corresponding chapters of the *Sun Zi* (also late) must have been in some sort of dialogic relationship with each other. Judging from specific textual evidence, furthermore, it would appear that the *Mo Zi-Sun Zi* tradition of siegecraft and defense against it developed in tandem with Graeco-Roman tactics and military science.

There is a perfect Greek word for all of these devices employed in the siege of cities, namely, *poliorcetics*, so one would expect that such techniques and technologies would have been well developed by the ancient Greeks. Such, indeed, is the case, starting with the celebrated attack on Troy that “stands at the beginning of Greek history and literature and has captured the imagination of poets and antiquarians, the mighty and the common people, from its conclusion towards the end of the second millennium BC down to modern times.” (Needham and Yates 1994: 241)

Although much has been lost from the canon of Graeco-Roman military writing,<sup>67</sup> we are extremely fortunate to have portions of the military writings of Aineias<sup>68</sup> the Tactician. By a sheer good luck, the largest segment of the work of Aineias to survive are his chapters on how to survive under siege, which precisely mirror the military chapters of the *Mo Zi*. Internal evidence dates the anti-poliorcetic chapters of Aineias to ca. 355–350 BC. This puts them before (but still in the same timeframe as) the late chapters of the *Mo Zi* and the *Sun Zi* that are concerned with siegecraft and defense against it.

The parallels between the chapters of Aineias on how a city should defend itself against sieges and the chapters of the *Mo Zi* on exactly the same subject are so numerous, so detailed, and so close — even in the most extraordinary, uncanny details — that it would seem virtually impossible that they could have arisen entirely independently. For instance, both describe the construction of similar mechanical devices to raise, transport, and release projectiles and weapons against the enemy, both advocate the digging of counter-tunnels against the tunneling of attackers, both specify the use of geophones to detect tunneling by the enemy,<sup>69</sup> both discuss the employment of asphyxiating materials and devote attention to means for channeling smoke toward the enemy, both emphasize the importance of vinegar for protective purposes,<sup>70</sup> both stress the need to plate the bolt (cross-bar) of the gate with iron, both explain the use of the portcullis, both enjoin the secure tethering of dogs, both emphasize measures for dealing with ladders placed



against the wall, and so forth. There are countless points of comparison between Aineias and the *Mo Zi*, such that it would be futile to catalog all of them. Yet, when we consider that nearly half of the military chapters of the *Mo Zi* are lost and that several of those that do survive are fragmentary, plus the fact that we have only a very small proportion of Aineias' oeuvre,<sup>71</sup> the resonances between the two complete texts would surely have been far greater than what they are under present conditions.

By no means am I suggesting that there necessarily was a direct connection between the *Mo Zi* or the *Sun Zi* and Aineias' work. Indeed, there were other early Greek tacticians whose writings have disappeared, and there may well have been intermediaries involved. What I do believe is that, during this Axial Age, military wisdom, as with so many other aspects of culture, was a product of the human ecumene. This is not to assert that there was only a single Eurasian military culture, for it is obvious that local traditions were strong and distinctive. On the other hand, the common aspects should not be ignored when they do occur.

A few of the features shared between the Greco-Roman tradition of military tactics and Warring States military practices have been highlighted above. Obviously there were significant differences as well. For example, although both emphasize the importance of signals and messages, Aineias goes into great detail about alphabetic writing, including ways to encode it, whereas the *Mo Zi* scarcely mentions writing at all, except for names. Another salient distinction between the two traditions is the plethora of illustrative examples drawn from earlier battles in history and copious extracts from previous writers, a standard feature of European works such as Aineias' *Tactics* (ca. 350 BC), Frontinus' *Strategemata* (first century AD), Polyaeus' *Strategemata* (first century AD), and Flavius Vegetius Renatus' *Epitome Rei Militaris* (384–395 AD), versus their virtually complete absence in Warring States works such as the *Mo Zi* and the *Sun Zi*, making the latter seem as though they were operating in a historical vacuum. Conversely, the *Mo Zi* goes into greater technical detail concerning the size, dimensions, construction, and quantity of the devices and structures it describes, whereas Aineias is generally content to provide brief, schematic descriptions.<sup>72</sup> Finally, the *Mo Zi* makes reference to certain technical innovations that are absent in Aineias' chapters, namely crossbows,

bellows, and well-sweeps (though the "swing-beams" mentioned by Aineias would have fulfilled a similar function).<sup>73</sup>

The continuities in Eurasian military tactics and techniques during the fourth century BC were by no means limited to East Asia and Europe.<sup>74</sup> A celebrated Sanskrit work entitled the *Arthaśāstra* (Treatise on Material Well-Being),<sup>75</sup> being essentially a manual of the science of politics and administration, has numerous chapters on warfare. The authorship of the *Arthaśāstra* is traditionally ascribed to Kauṭilya, who placed Candragupta Maurya on the throne of Magadha in 321 BC. Since the *Arthaśāstra* was meant to be a handbook of government for the new ruler, it follows that it would have been written in the latter part of the fourth century, placing it about half a century after the Tactics of Aineias and roughly the same amount of time before the *Sun Zi* and the military chapters of the *Mo Zi*.<sup>76</sup>

All together there are 15 books in the *Arthaśāstra*, which are divided into 180 sections. One third of the books and more than two fifths of all the sections have to do with various aspects of war. What is more, many of the subjects discussed in the sections of the *Arthaśāstra* devoted to war are held in common with Aineias, the *Sun Zi*, and the military chapters of the *Mo Zi*: incendiary attacks, siegecraft, deception,<sup>77</sup> terrain, arrangement of troops, espionage, and so on. In particular, the use of various types of secret agents and secret practices is advocated in numerous places throughout the *Arthaśāstra*, which resonates perfectly with *Sun Zi* 13.

According to Buddhist sources, Kauṭilya is said to have been from Taxila,<sup>78</sup> whose ruins lie about 22 miles to the northwest of Rawalpindi, Pakistan, and was most likely educated there as well. (Kangle 1972: 3.115) This great ancient city was situated at the junction of three important trade routes: one from India to the east, the second from western Asia (and beyond that Europe), and the third from Kashmir and Central Asia (and beyond that East Asia). Due to its unique location and the fact that it was governed at different times by, among others, Achaemenians (Persians, i.e., Iranians), Greeks (installed by Alexander beginning in 326 BC, an absolutely key moment in Eurasian history), Mauryans (Indians), Bactrians (Irano-Greeks), Sakas (Scythians, i.e., Iranians), Parthians (Iranians), Kushans (Indo-Scythians), and Sasanians (Iranians), before it was sacked by the Huns in the fifth century AD, bringing an end to its glorious history, Taxila

was truly a great center of international learning and exchange. Its importance for the transmission of intellectual and material culture is huge, with Iranian peoples playing a *particularly* key role, as they did elsewhere in Asia from antiquity through the middle ages. It is no wonder that the Iranians are often referred to as *Kulturvermittlers* (“culture brokers”) par excellence.

Whether or not he was born in Taxila, Kauṭilya evidently began his career there, perhaps as a practitioner of medicine. Consequently, he was familiar with knowledge emanating from Greece and Persia. Above all, he seems to have been closely associated with the Magians, significant in light of the fact that the Magians were Iranians. (Walker 1968: vol. 1, p. 541) Regardless of Kauṭilya’s relationship to the city, the contributions of scholars linked with the Taxila region to the foundations and elaboration of Indian grammar alone are of exceptional importance, and the same may be said of many other fields, including medicine, astronomy, and mathematics. (Mair 1990b; 2004; 1993: 9–10, 27–29 nn. 60–63)

So much for the *Arthaśāstra*, its parallels to the *Sun Zi*, and its middle position (in time and space) between Aineias and the *Sun Zi*. In discussing the environment in which Aineias wrote his *Tactics*, David Whitehead (1990: 34) offers a clue toward understanding the circumstances under which the *Sun Zi* may have evolved from a body of orally circulating lore into a written text:

It seems to have been in the last third of the fifth century — in other words, during the Peloponnesian War [431–404 BC] — that military expertise began to evolve from its origins as a loose-knit body of traditional wisdom and experience, passed on from father to son where it could not be absorbed from reading or listening to Homer, into a technical subject, a branch of formal education taught by sophists and other self-styled experts.

The motivation for writing down the collected maxims of the *Sun Zi* during the pervasive militarism of the Warring States period would have been similar.

## ON THE WORLD STAGE

Abroad, the *Sun Zi* has received widespread recognition, with translations into Japanese, French, Russian, German, English, and many other languages. The first known translation of the *Sun Zi*, however, was into Tangut, an extinct Tibeto-Burman (more precisely Qiangic-Tibetan) language. The Tanguts ruled over a large, powerful state extending from Mongolia to Eastern Central Asia. This state was referred to in Chinese as Xi Xia ("Western Xia") (1038–1227 [destroyed by Genghis Khan]).<sup>79</sup>

The Tangut translation of the *Sun Zi* is preserved in a unique blockprint of the twelfth century.<sup>80</sup> The Tangut text includes commentaries by Cao Cao, Li Quan, and Du Mu. The parts that remain are chapters 7–11, 13, and the biography of Sun Zi. There are not many discrepancies between extant Chinese texts of the *Sun Zi* and the Tangut translation, which means that the *Sun Zi* must have become fairly stable by the Song period. The main differences are in the wording of the commentaries. The exact Chinese text of the *Sun Zi* that served as the original for the Tangut translation no longer exists. Nonetheless, it is still possible to correlate portions of the Tangut translation with corresponding passages of the received Chinese text. For instance, where the Chinese text reads "If the enemy is profligate in handing out rewards, it means that he is in extremity," the Tangut version has "[If the general] often gives rewards, [that is be]cause [his] troops find themselves in a position from which they cannot escape." (26b, l. 1) (Keping 1979; Huang 1992)

The Tangut version includes a total of approximately 1,200 different characters, nearly twice as many as in the equivalent portion of the Chinese version (around 700 different characters), a reflection of the monumentally complicated script in which it was written.

The next translation of the *Sun Zi* done into an Asian language was that into Japanese, entitled *Sonshi kokujikai*, which was completed around 1750 by Butsu Mokei (Ogyū Sorai, 1666–1728) and published in Kyoto by the monastery called Izumoji. After that, there were numerous other editions and translations of the *Sun Zi* in Japan, the earliest consisting basically of the Chinese text with marks directing the reader how to rearrange and pronounce the characters. It was only in the twentieth century that

translations of the *Sun Zi* into modern Japanese began to appear. Of the many that are available, some with copious annotations, I have consulted those by Amano Shizuo (1972), Asano Yuichi (1986), Murayama Yoshihiro (in Kanaya Osamu, et al. [1973]), and Yamai Yū (1975).

It is not surprising that the rulers of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) would have ensured that there be a translation into their native tongue, Manchu. The Manchu themselves were superb military rulers, and they studied the *Sun Zi* very carefully to understand the military thinking of their Sinitic subjects. This is perhaps most the most authoritative of translations, because it was done by persons who were perfectly bilingual and who were thoroughly familiar with Chinese practices.<sup>81</sup>

The first translation of the *Sun Zi* into a European language was that into French produced by the Jesuit missionary Jean Joseph Marie Amiot (February 8, 1718 [Toulon]-October 8/9, 1793 [Peking]). Amiot had gone to China in 1750 and became the confidant of the emperor Qianlong. He stayed in China for 43 years, until his death in 1793. Amiot’s translation of the *Sun Zi* appeared in 1772 and was republished 1782. It was a start, but left much to be desired in that it mixed commentary and the translator’s own ideas in with the text.

The next translation into a European language after Amiot’s French version was that into English by Everard Ferguson Calthrop (1876–1915), a British army language student, which appeared in 1905. First issued in Japan, it refers to Sun Zi by the Japanese pronunciation, Sonshi. Although the translation of Calthrop left much to be desired in terms of fidelity to the original (which is, after all, fraught with difficult philological problems), it joined Amiot’s French version in marking the beginning of European exposure to East Asian military thinking. During the last century, scores of translations of the *Sun Zi* have been published in European and other languages, making it next to the *Dao De Jing* in popularity among Chinese texts circulating outside of China.

At some point in the 20th century, the rumor was floated that Napoleon had read Amiot’s translation of the *Sun Zi*. As time passed, the rumor grew into a legend that had Napoleon carefully studying the *Sun Zi*, carrying it on his campaigns, and being heavily influenced by it. It is a romantic story, one designed to capture the imagination, but the entire legend is sheer fabrication and easily debunked. In the first place, no one has ever

pointed to a single Napoleonic battle that evinces Master Sun's influence. Still more damning is the fact that Napoleon (1769–1821) would only have been three years old when Amiot's French translation of the *Sun Zi* was published. Although there was some notice of Amiot's translation in French literary journals when it was first published in 1772, the book soon dropped out of sight so far as the general public was concerned, becoming a matter of interest chiefly to a handful of Sinologists.<sup>82</sup> What is more, Napoleon made it unmistakably clear who his military mentors were:

Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Model yourself upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be enlightened and improved by this study, and you will learn to reject all maxims foreign to the principles of these great commanders.

(Napoleon 2004: 80, Maxim LXXVIII)

It is unlikely that Napoleon, who strongly adhered to this principle of learning from the concrete battlefield experiences of the great generals of the past, would have put much stock in the abstract, theoretical recommendations of the *Sun Zi*.

More recently, *Sun Zi* partisans have surmised that the Nazi High Command may have consulted the ancient oriental oracle, but the evidence in favor of this supposition is even flimsier than that for Napoleon's alleged attraction to the *Sun Zi*. By deflating these unsubstantiated claims, I do not mean to diminish the *Sun Zi*'s place in history, only to delineate it as accurately as possible. Both the Napoleonic French and the Nazi Germans were far more Clausewitzian than to be influenced by an impressionistic, aphoristic text like the *Sun Zi*. Indeed, in terms of the principles adduced in it, the *Sun Zi* more nearly resembles Machiavelli's *Art of War* than the highly systematic *On War* of Clausewitz.

What, then, were the chief contributions of the *Sun Zi*? First of all, Master Sun pointed out the universal rule of military engagement that, if one knows oneself and one's opponent, one will not be vanquished even in a hundred battles (ch. 9 n. 9; ch. Ch. 10 n. 4). Mao Zedong (1893–1976), Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and of the

People's Republic of China, placed great value upon this famous dictum from the *Sun Zi*, according it the status of a "scientific truth" (*kexue de zhenli*).<sup>83</sup>

Another major feature of Master Sun's strategy is his stress on flexibility. One should be ready to change plans in accordance with actual circumstances. If, for example, the enemy shows himself to be vulnerable in a certain place, attack him there instead of according to some blueprint drawn up ahead of time. At the same time, one should avoid revealing any particular weak spots for one's foe to attack.

A key concept of the *Sun Zi* is that success in war is very much a matter of deception. Deceiving one's enemy is like making a feint in basketball or football. One leads his opponent to think that he is going to make a certain move, go in a certain direction, then immediately shifts and does something else entirely different.

In general, the *Sun Zi*'s approach to warfare is motivated by the desire to achieve practical results (in simplest terms, victory over one's opponent), not on abstract principles, historical considerations, or spiritual qualms. As such, the *Sun Zi* has valuable advice to offer anyone who is engaged in conflict with an intransigent foe. On the other hand, there are many limitations to the approach advocated in the *Sun Zi*. For example, it is not always possible to achieve a swift victory, thus Master Sun's distaste for prolonged war may lead an impatient general into difficulties that might be avoided by a more deliberate approach. Master Sun's overwhelming desire to subdue his opponents without actually fighting may also sometimes be self-defeating, especially when faced with a highly aggressive, powerful, and competent opponent. Finally, Master Sun overemphasized the uniquely decisive role of the commander. One gains very little sense of the development of a corps of capable officers or the elaboration of a reliable chain of command — both of which are essential when dealing with large armies.

At the heart of the *Sun Zi* is a "gradualist military strategy" (Keegan 1993: 202). The authors of the *Sun Zi* claim that they are against prolonged war, but what they are really opposed to is a war of attrition. They do not mind a long, drawn-out war, so long as it is not costly. This is very different from the contemporary doctrine of Rapid Dominance with its principles of "overwhelming decisive force" and "spectacular displays of power" (also called "Shock and Awe"), which tend to be stupendously expensive. In war, sometimes it is necessary to be content with patient, incremental gains.

Maybe there is something to be said for a strategy that ingeniously combines both approaches (first Clausewitz, then Sun Zi), and perhaps that is what has evolved under the Rumsfeldian doctrine today.

In sum, the fundamental lesson that the *Sun Zi* teaches us is to go to war only as a last resort. Furthermore, if you must fight, get it over with as quickly as possible and with the least possible loss of life and waste of resources. As recommended in ch. 3, one should avoid combat whenever possible by resorting to political and diplomatic means. Hence, the brave warrior and celebrated hero of Greek and Roman civilization were not exalted in Chinese culture, where warfare was looked upon as a matter of “no alternative,” not an opportunity for glory. (Loewe 1999: 1120) Neither is honor a part of the picture for Master Sun and his epigones, only winning — and not at all possible costs — but with the least possible expense.

The *Sun Zi* represents the distillation of the military wisdom of a war-plagued, war-weary era. Even though we do not know who its authors were, this little volume still merits the most careful consideration, not just in war, but in daily life. There are many reasons for the recent surge in popularity of the *Sun Zi*, including China’s overall rise to prominence in the global economy and world affairs. More intrinsically, however, it offers valuable lessons for businesspersons and for individuals interested in personal development. Everyone has his or her foes, and the *Sun Zi* teaches effective means for dealing with them.



### Notes

1. There are other titles by which the *Sun Zi* sometimes goes, but it would be tedious to list them all.
2. Other renderings of *bingfa* that have been suggested are "methods of war," "war methods," or "military methods." However, it is worth noting that the word *bing* means primarily "weapons" and the men who wield weapons, i.e., "soldiers." Furthermore, "soldier" has a range of meanings, all of which I wish to encompass:
  1. a person who serves in an army; a person engaged in military service.
  2. an enlisted man or woman, as distinguished from a commissioned officer: *the soldiers' mess and the officers' mess*.
  3. a person of military skill or experience: *George Washington was a great soldier*.
  4. a person who contends or serves in any cause; *a soldier of the Lord*

As for "soldierly," it is simply the adjectival form of "soldier," and it has been in our language since the 1570s. (*RH*, s.v.)

3. For a valuable introduction to the history of warfare in China, see Kierman and Fairbank 1974. Although the book oddly skips over the Warring States period, it affords a good macro and micro exposure to Chinese ways in war. The first chapter by Fairbank is particularly insightful in assessing the distinction and interplay between *wen* ("civil") and *wu* ("martial"), the bureaucratic containment of militarism, and the importance of Central and Inner Asia for China's military history. For the intellectual history of early Chinese military theorists, see Rand (1977). For a bibliographically rich research guide to the history of war in China, see Wilkinson (2000), section 28, pp. 554–564.
4. See Appendix I, n. 5

5. The "Yiwen zhi" (Treatise on Literature), a cumulative bibliography that forms part of the *Han shu* (History of the Western Han Dynasty), lists 53 manuals of warfare that were known to exist in the first century BC. Among them is a *Wu Sun Zi bingfa* (Soldierly Methods of Master Sun of the State of Wu) in 82 chapters (*pian*) with nine scrolls of illustrations (*tu jiu juan*). The "Yiwen zhi" also lists, among the works of the Taoist School (*dao jia*) a *Sun Zi* in 16 chapters. In addition, it is noteworthy that the "Yiwen zhi" lists a *Qi Sun Zi* (*Sun Zi* of the State of Qi) in 89 scrolls plus four scrolls of illustrations. This is probably a recension of the same work that is known as the *Sun Bin bingfa*. It is evident that, during the first century BC, not only was there a plentiful supply of military treatises for readers to choose from, the number that were called *Sun Zi* of one sort or another reveals a corpus that was still fluid and expanding.
6. The *Shiyi jia zhu Sun Zi* has been reissued in a handy new format under the title *Shiyi jia zhu Sun Zi jiaoli*, for which see the Bibliography under Yang Bing'an (1999).
7. Du You was not originally included in the list of the ten main commentators on the *Sun Zi* because he had not written a separate commentary on the text. Rather, in compiling the *Tongdian*, he commented extensively on the *Sun Zi*, and his remarks were extracted to form the eleventh member of the expanded *Shiyi jia zhu Sun Zi*.
8. In the notes to the translation published by Columbia University Press, examples of annotations by all of the eleven main commentators on the *Sun Zi* are given. Such annotations are almost never useful, much less definitive, for solving difficult philological problems in the text, but they do give insight into how military specialists from later centuries interpreted the *Sun Zi*, and sometimes they are downright charming.

9. A succinct textual and commentarial history of the *Sun Zi* is available in Gawlikowski and Loewe (1993).
10. These seven military classics were assembled at the request of the Song emperor Shenzong (r. 1068–1085) and presented to him by the compilers in 1080. A complete, annotated translation of all seven works is available in Sawyer (1993).
11. There are slight discrepancies between the received text as preserved in the *Shiyi jia zhu Sun Zi* and in the *Wu jing qi shu*, particularly in ch. 9.
12. The Chinese texts are transcribed in Yinque Shan Hanmu zhujian zhengli xiaozu (1976: 94–111) and their English translations are available in Ames (1993: 173–196). The significance of these tomb texts in the history of writings on military matters is discussed in Lewis (2005). It is essential to note, however, that none of these five Yinque Shan texts that have been assigned by modern editors to the *Sun Zi* corpus mentions Sun Wu by name, only Sun Zi (“Master Sun”), although the first and the fifth adopt the simulacrum of interviews with the king of Wu (with the fifth specifically mentioning Helu), hence they can be ascribed to the emerging (but not yet fully formed) legend of Sun Wu as military adviser to the king of Wu. The second, third, and fourth texts might just as well have been assigned to the Sun Bin corpus, or simply left to an indeterminate “Master Sun” body of military lore.

In contrast, while the Yinque Shan texts that have been assigned by modern editors to the Sun Bin corpus do not mention Sun Bin by name either (he is always called just Sun Zi [“Master Sun”]), they possess a higher degree of historical specificity. The *Sun Bin* fragments refer to particular battles and the individuals who participated in them, together with the number of troops involved and the movements made. In this regard, they are more like Western (Greco-Roman) military treatises than is the *Sun Zi* and its associated fragments.

The notion of a fixed formation is more prominent in the *Sun Bin* than in the *Sun Zi*, which is another difference between the two, just as is the greater

emphasis in the *Sun Zi* on assessment and planning than in the *Sun Bin*. On the other hand, both the *Sun Zi* and the *Sun Bin* have dialogic (especially question [from a ruler] and answer [from the military specialist]) chapters

The Yinque Shan manuscripts have made it crystal clear that, by the second half of the second century BC, there were two separate Sun Zi traditions, one focused on Sun Wu as a military adviser in the southern state of Wu and the other focused on Sun Bin as a military adviser in the northern state of Qi. What is not so clear is how to classify the indeterminate Sun Zi materials from manuscript finds and recovered from later encyclopedias that do not fall unmistakably into either the Sun Wu tradition or the Sun Bin tradition.

13. Located about 30 miles southeast of modern Daming in Hebei Province.
14. It is interesting to observe that Confucius himself had a military background, The legends concerning his father, Shuliang He, in the *Zuo zhuan* (Chronicle of Zuo) place him in a decidedly military context, and the feudal class to which Confucius belonged was that of elite warriors (though they had fallen on hard times in Confucius’ own day).
15. A series of reports on the finding and preliminary study of the Datong Han wooden strip manuscripts was published in *Wenwu* (Cultural Relics), 2 (1981). Transcriptions of the relevant strips for the study of the *Sun Zi* have been republished in Xie and Liu (1993: vol. 1, pp. 139–142) and in Huang (1996: 257–263). Incidentally, it is purely coincidental that this group of Han manuscripts, a few of which are indirectly related to the *Sun Zi*, was unearthed at a site that goes by the modern name of Upper Sun Family Fortress. Shang Sunjia Zhai is located in the southeasternmost part of Datong County on the northern outskirts of Xining City. All together there are over 300 wooden strips from Shang Sunjia Zhai that are documents pertaining to military administration.

16. It is misleading (and regrettable) when modern translators render "Sun Zi" as "Sun Wu" or "Sun Bin," as is frequently the case in various languages. The ambiguity of the original should be preserved, either simply as "Sun Zi" or as "Master Sun."
17. The character used to write *xun* ("flee") has as its phonophore (sound-bearing element) the character for the surname Sun ("grandson").
18. Despite the fact that, already by the third century BC, the canonical *Sun Zi* had precipitated into the thirteen chapter received text known to us today, scholars as late as the Tang period continued to be confused by the ill-defined superabundance of Sun Zi writings that they believed (on the basis of various textual and bibliographical references) once existed. Thus Du Mu, in the preface to his commentary on the *Sun Zi* remarks, "The writings of Sun Wu amount to several hundred thousand words. Wei Wu (i.e., Cao Cao) pared their prolixity and penned their essence, completing this book." Du Mu is mistaken that it was Cao Cao who had reduced the *Sun Zi* to its canonical size, since archeological evidence from the second century BC and textual evidence from the third century BC alluded to above shows that the work had already stabilized at 13 chapters by that time. Furthermore, judging from an average chapter length of about 467 characters in the received text, if there really were a total of "several hundred thousand words" in the Sun Zi corpus writ large, that would mean there would once have been at least six or seven hundred chapters at one time, which is surely excessive. However, if we take all of the military treatises that were written during Han and earlier times, plus all of the recent manuscript finds of texts concerning military strategy and tactics, and look upon them as evolving from a prototypical Master Sun as the fountain of all wisdom about warfare, then Du Mu's overly generous estimate of the size of the Sun Zi corpus would begin to make some sense.

19. Since Wú is known to have conquered the capital of Chu, Ying, in the year 506 BC, this date is seized upon by those who believe in Sun Wu as a real person as a solid datum upon which to hang the elaborate legend they have constructed for him. The problem with this is that there is no solid pre-Han evidence for the existence of Sun Wu, much less for his participation in events that took place along the valley of the Yangtze River in the sixth century BC.
20. Sun Wu is also associated with Le'an in the *Yuanhe xingzuan* (Compilation of Surnames from the Primal Accord Reign Period), compiled by Lin Bao in 812 AD. (Lin 1994: vol. 1, s. 4, p. 461, entry 105) The entry simply declares (without proof) that some of Sun Wu's descendants lived at Le'an during the Han and later times. Unfortunately, both for the entry in the genealogical charts of the grand councilors in the *Xin Tang shu* and the entry in the *Yuanhe xingzuan* that mention Sun Wu, it is impossible to bridge the gap of well over a thousand years from his alleged Spring and Autumn date. Furthermore, since there was no pre-Han place or governmental unit called Le'an, there is no way to connect the Le'an of these two Tang sources with a location of the Warring States or Spring and Autumn period. Finally, the Tang Le'an genealogy is itself contested by the fact that it can be identified either with either modern Boxing County or modern Huimin County in Shandong Province. Indeed, there are partisans for both of these counties as the birthplace of Sun Wu. Neither of them have sufficient evidence to prove their case.
21. See Ye's *Xixue ji yan* (Recorded Remarks on Practice in Learning), s. 46. The chief reason for Ye's suspicion of Sun Wu's historicity is that he was not mentioned in the *Zuo zhuan* (Chronicle of Zuo), the primary narrative (and I stress that word) for studying the history of the Spring and Autumn period. The final composition date of the *Zuo zhuan* is ca. 305 BC. (Brooks 1994: 49) Ye also correctly believed that the type of warfare described in the *Sun Zi* was more characteristic of the Warring States period than of the Spring and Autumn period to which legend ascribes it.

Ye Shi was not alone in his skepticism about the *Sun Zi* as a product of the Spring and Autumn period. Chen Zhensun (fl. 1244, d. ca. 1262), in his *Zhi zhai shulu jieti* (Explanation of Titles in the Studio of Straightness), commented: "Sun Wu [is said to have] served [King] Helu of Wu, but it is not mentioned in the *Zuo zhuan*. We really do not know what period he was from." During the Qing period (1616–1911), doubts concerning the historicity of Sun Wu and the *Sun Zi* intensified, but they have always been restricted to a small circle of critical scholars. For the general public (and even for uncritical scholars), Sun Wu was a real person who lived in the late sixth century BC and who was the undisputed author of the *Sun Zi*.

Other skeptics have pointed out that the honorific, third person "Master Sun said" formula at the beginning of each chapter clearly could not have been written by Sun Wu himself, but that it must have been written by others about him. By themselves, the absence of Sun Wu (nor the *Sun Zi*, for that matter) from the *Zuo zhuan* and the "Master Sun said" formula are not conclusive evidence against Sun Wu's existence during the Spring and Autumn period and his authorship of the *Sun Zi*. In the first place, the *Zuo zhuan* by no means mentions all the noteworthy figures of the Spring and Autumn period (e.g., various individuals in the *Analects*). In the second place, some books that are generally held to be composed of the words of the putative author (e.g., the *Wu Zi* [Sawyer 1993: 187–224, esp. 192]) do preface his quotations with such a formula.

In the final analysis, it is the incompatibility of the military methods and technologies described in the *Sun Zi* that disqualify it as a work of the Spring and Autumn period, and it is the internal stylistics plus the external lack of historical grounding that rule it out as the product of an individual named Sun Wu.

22. Whereas it is virtually certain that an individual named Sun Wu never lived, it is likely (indeed, virtually certain) that an actual person called Sun Bin (though that was not his real name) did exist. These probabilities concerning the historical veracity (or lack thereof) of Sun Wu and Sun Bin are mirrored in the nature of the texts attributed to them. Whereas the *Sun Zi* is a pastiche of apothegms loosely

strung together, the *Sun Bin* consists of dialogs with historical personages, often embedded in a believable narrative context. The same is true of the *Wu Zi* and most other later military treatises.

23. In the narrowest, most specific sense, the word *bin* refers to removal of the kneecaps. More loosely, it could also signify various other degrees of mutilation or amputation of the toes, feet, or the whole of the lower leg.
24. E was located approximately 15 miles northwest of modern Yanggu County in Shandong Province. Juan was about 10 miles north of modern Juancheng, also in Shandong.
25. Tattoo is here referred to as a type of punishment, but less than a thousand years earlier, during the Shang Dynasty, it was a mark of esteem, as it was among the Thracians, the Scythians, and others in a wide belt across the Eurasian steppe, and still is among the Maori and other peoples who retain this old tradition.
26. Wei was often referred to as Liang after King Hui moved his capital from Anyi (about five miles northwest of modern Xiaoxian, Shansi Province) to Da Liang (about five miles northwest of modern Kaifeng, Henan Province).
27. These are the operative terms of the first and third chapters of the *Sun Zi*.
28. The words translated here as “defenseless,” “formations,” and “power” are among the major concepts of the *Sun Zi*: *xu* (“empty, void”), *xing* (“form”), *shi* (“configuration”).
29. There is still a city by this name in Hebei Province. It was the capital of the state of Zhao.



30. The location of this place is uncertain, but was probably in the province of Hebei or Shandong.
31. Sun Bin’s old nemesis.
32. The Three Jin usually refers to the three states of Han, Zhao, and Wei that were created from the breakup of the Spring and Autumn state of Jin during the early years of the Warring States period. Here, however, Three Jin is a metonymy for the state of Wei.
33. Place of a celebrated battle that irrevocably altered the course of Warring States politics. It occurred in 341 BC and took place about 30 miles southwest of modern Daming, in Hebei Province.
34. Although this is one of the first recorded instances of the use of crossbows in battle, the fact that such a large number is mentioned indicates that it must not have been an entirely new weapon at this time.
35. By “the present generation” is meant the time of the writing of the *Shi ji*, i.e., the early first century BC. The translation follows that given in Nienhauser (1994: 29–41) with minor modifications, including changing the Romanization from Wade-Giles to Hanyu Pinyin and the simplification or omission of most notes, which are many and detailed.
36. Aside from foregrounding Sun Wu with his own (albeit flimsy) biography in *Shi ji* s. 65 (translated in Appendix I), Sima Qian also mentions Sun Wu as an outstanding military strategist who served Wu elsewhere in *Shi ji* (s. 25: 1241; s. 31: 1466 [ninth year of Helu]).
37. Technical terms in Chinese tactics, both receiving extensive discussion in the *Sun Zi*. See *xing* and *shi* in the section on “Key Terms” at the beginning of this study.

38. The usual translation of *de* (Old Sinitic pronunciation \*tək, which sounded roughly like “duck”) is “virtue,” which in Modern English means primarily “moral excellence, goodness,” then “chastity, especially of women,” “efficacious or good quality,” and finally “effective force or power.” (*AH*, s.v.) The old, original meaning of “manly courage, valor” is now completely obsolete. Unfortunately, it is precisely the latter sense that is called for when interpreting most early occurrences of *de* that are not specifically concerned with Confucian ethics. Consequently, to bring out the sense required by the context here, I have used the Latin word *virtūs*, which conveys the correct connotation. Curiously, the order of the different senses of Latin *virtūs* is almost exactly the opposite of its English derivate, virtue: 1. the qualities typical of a true man, manly spirit, resolution, valor, steadfastness; 2. excellence of character or mind, worth, merit, ability; 3. moral excellence, virtue, goodness; 4. any attractive or valuable quality, potency, efficacy; 5. that in which something excels, special property. (*Oxford Latin Dictionary*, 2073c–2074a) The main sense of the old Latin word still survives in the related English term “virile” (possessing or relating to the characteristics of an adult male; having or displaying masculine spirit, strength, vigor, power) and, oddly enough, in “virago” (essentially a “manly woman,” with both negative and positive connotations): 1. noisy, scolding, domineering woman; 2. large, strong, courageous woman. The etyma of these words are *wer* in Old English and *vir* in Latin, both of which mean “man,” and both of which go back to the Indo-European root \*wi-ro (“man”).

There still exists in Modern English the adjective “doughty,” which comes close to the range of meanings of Old Sinitic \*tək: “able, capable, worthy, virtuous, valiant, brave, stout, formidable,” but this word is now archaic and considered humorous, whereas the noun form which is called for, “doughtiness” (“valiantness, valor, stoutness”), has long been obsolete. If “doughty” and “doughtiness” were still current in Modern English, they would make a good match for Old Sinitic *de*. For further discussion, see Mair (1990a: 133–135).

39. In contrast to the three biographies of Sun Wu, Sun Bin, and Wu Qi that are squeezed into a single scroll (no. 65), and the first of which (Sun Wu’s) gives every indication of having been completely concocted, Sima Qian affords an entire scroll to Wu Zixu’s biography. It is interesting to note that Sima Qian even writes Sun Wu into Wu Zixu’s biography by giving him a supporting role in determining when to attack Ying, the capital of Chu. (Nienhauser 1994: 53)
40. Just as Sun Bin is far more of a credible historical personage than Sun Wu, so does Wu Qi come across as a largely believable individual who served as a general during the latter part of the rule of Marquis Wen (r. 445–396 BC) of Wei and, more importantly, for his son, Marquis Wu (r. 395–370 BC).
41. Presumably the *Sun Zi* and the *Wu Zi*, but we cannot say with absolute assurance that these abbreviated titles signify the *Sun Zi bingfa* attributed to Sun Wǔ and the *Wu Zi bingfa* attributed to Wú Qi (b. ca. 440–d. ca. 361 BC), since the *Sun Bin bingfa* could also have been called *Sun (Zi)*, while the *Sun Zi bingfa* itself was sometimes called the *Wu Sun Zi bingfa*.
42. In this chapter, Master Xun is referred to not by his real given name, Kuang, but as Qingzi (“Minister”), in reference to his official positions as Libationer and then Magistrate. Neither is he allowed to keep his own surname, but curiously is given the partially homophonous Sun, which is none other than that of the famous military strategists, Sun Bin and his imaginary ancestor, Sun Wu.
43. The surname of Master Xun (Xun Qing) is written with a totally different graph from that used to write the Xun meaning “flee” discussed in n. 17.
44. The word for “match,” i.e., *di*, is the same word that also means “enemy.” Hence, “nobody in the empire was a match / enemy for them.”

45. The significance of the Iron Revolution for the military history of East Asia will be discussed in detail below under the rubric of "Techniques and Technology."
46. This would account for the more basic, elemental quality of the *Sun Zi* in comparison with the *Sun Bin*, which is more elaborate, more centered on the commanding general, and more attentive to actual formations.
47. Griffith (1963: 6–11) offers numerous additional reasons why the *Sun Zi* could not have been written during the Spring and Autumn period, but must have been composed during Warring States times: the general term for metallic money, *jin*, is a Warring States phenomenon, yet it occurs five times in the *Sun Zi*; the word *zhu* with the meaning "sovereign, ruler" occurs eleven times in the *Sun Zi*, but during the Spring and Autumn period it meant "lord, master" (for addressing a minister); *shangjiang* ("commander of the upper / van army"), *zhongjiang* ("commander of the middle army"), and *xiajiang* ("commander of the lower / rear army") are Warring States terms, hence their occurrence in the *Sun Zi* disqualify it as a Spring and Autumn work; specific terms for chamberlain or receptionist (*yezhe*), retainers or bodyguards (*sheren*) that occur in the *Sun Zi* were not in circulation during the Spring and Autumn period, but were common during the Warring States; the cosmological notion of "five phases" or "five elements" (*wuxing*) that are in constant mutation did not develop until the Warring States, yet they occur in *Sun Zi* 6. All of these anachronisms provide internal evidence from the *Sun Zi* itself that the text was written during the fourth century, not at the end of the sixth century as traditionally believed.
48. These dates have been extracted from the review article of E. Bruce Brooks (1994), pages 59–62 of which are a densely argued brief for the *Sun Zi* as an accretional text, describing its growth — in an interstate context — during the period from ca. 345 BC to ca. 272 BC. Brooks (1994) is essential reading for anyone who wishes to understand the intellectual and historical setting in which the *Sun Zi* developed. Working together with A. Taeko Brooks, he employs

accretional theory to show that nearly all pre-Han Sinitic texts were built up over a period of time and reveal traces of the intellectual and political debates that stimulated their composition. The Brookses have applied this analytical technique in its fullest form and to greatest effect in a revolutionary work entitled *The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His Successors* (1998). The Brookses employ a large battery of tools in their investigations of texts such as the *Sun Zi*, including linguistics, stylistics, and text criticism. While critics of the Brookses' studies complain that their findings are overly precise, few would now doubt that their basic methodology has tremendous heuristic value and that it has transformed historical research on early Sinitic texts. As for the specific dates proposed for the individual chapters of the *Sun Zi*, we do not need to accept them as utterly exact and engraved in stone. Indeed, the Brookses themselves have continued diligently to refine their analyses of the entire corpus of Han and earlier texts, so they would undoubtedly now make some small adjustments in the dates given here for the chapters of the *Sun Zi*. None of this, however, should negate the fundamental discovery that the *Sun Zi* developed over a period of time lasting from around the middle of the fourth century BC to the beginning of the second quarter of the third century BC.

49. The social, institutional, and historical background of the rise of mass infantry armies during the fourth and third centuries is studied in Mark Edward Lewis' *Sanctioned Violence in Early China* (1990).
50. Economic matters per se are dealt with more overtly in ch. 2, which was probably written a couple of years before ch. 1, the penultimate chapter.
51. It is reassuring that Lewis (2005: 5) independently arrived at the conclusion that the last chapter of the *Sun Zi* must have been written after 284 BC, and he did so by completely different means than Brooks. Lewis also agrees with Brooks that the earlier chapters of the book were begun around the middle of the fourth century.

52. The total number of characters in the *Sun Zi* and the proportion of *gu* among them will vary slightly from edition to edition. For my computations, I have relied on the variorum edition in Lau (1992), since it is based on careful collation of the best available texts and provides valuable frequency charts in an appendix (the source of all the figures for the four military texts analyzed in this section).
53. Not all of the instances of *gu* in the texts analyzed here are illative conjunctions, but the total occurrences of this character are meaningful for our analysis, inasmuch as illatives constitute over 90% (95 occurrences) of all instances of *gu* in the *Sun Zi*.
54. The high frequency of *gu* in the *Sun Zi* and in the *Dao De Jing* contrasts not only with the lower frequency for *gu* in the three other military texts analyzed above, but also with the frequency of *gu* in a wide range of classical and medieval texts written in Literary Sinitic. Out of a total of 2,555 different characters in nineteen concordances, *gu* is placed in a group of five characters that ranked twenty-sixth in terms of frequency of occurrence. (Brooks and Brooks 1976: esp. p. 8)
55. By "illatives," I mean illative coordinating conjunctions such as "for, hence, so, thus, therefore, as a consequence, as a result, for this reason, so that, so then."
56. Similar analyses could be performed for the prominence of sentence final *ye* serving as a definitional particle as well as for other rhetorical features of the text, but that will have to wait for more specialized linguistic studies.
57. The general west → east cultural gradient shifted in the opposite direction during the Middle Ages, with the Huns, Avars, Mongols, and other fighting hordes from the eastern half of Asia scourging western Eurasia for centuries.

58. Still the most profound book-length study of early bronze weapons in the EAH is Max Loehr's *Chinese Bronze Age Weapons*. In it, while sensitive to distinctive differences, the author points out numerous parallels and analogies between the shapes and ornamentation of ancient Chinese weapons and those of Central Siberia, Iran (Persia, Luristan), the Caucasus, and Mesopotamia (Sumeria), as well as Hallstatt (in what is now Austria). His detailed comparisons between Shang and Zhou weapons, on the one hand, and Siberian artifacts (from Minusinsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Karasuk) belonging to the Afanasievo and Andronovo cultures are particularly revealing. Loehr stresses, in particular, Iranian influence which passed through Western Central Asia and South Siberia, then farther east between the Altai and Tängri Tagh (Tian Shan; Heavenly Mountains) to the Gansu Corridor and the Ordos (Mair 2005a).
59. See note 73 for the date and origin of the crossbow.
60. There is not a single reference to cavalry in the whole of the thirteen chapters of the received text of the *Sun Zi*. Horses are mentioned three times in the *Sun Zi* (chs. 2, 9, and 11), but only for purposes of chariot traction. Some passages from later encyclopedias that have been attributed to the *Sun Zi* do mention cavalry, but it would be better to assign them to the *Sun Bin*, since the authors of the latter text were clearly aware of mounted warfare, whereas there is no evidence that the compilers of the *Sun Zi* knew much, if anything, about it. Cavalry was first introduced to a state of the EAH near the end of the fourth century BC. To be more precise, this happened in the year 307, when King Wuling of Zhao commanded a portion of his men to wear trousers and learn to ride horses so that they could resist the mobile nomad warriors of the steppe. (Mair 2003: 174ab) Zhao, however, was a northern state, so an experiment with cavalry there would have necessitated a lag time before this new skill was passed to states further south. Thus we may posit the end of the fourth century as a rough *terminus ad quem* for the compilation of the *Sun Zi* (excepting the anomalous ch. 13 on spies, which must have been added on after a considerably long interval — perhaps as

much as a quarter of a century — had expired from the time when the last previous chapter was appended).

As for a *terminus a quo* for the compilation of the *Sun Zi*, we have adduced numerous specific features that certify it as post- Spring and Autumn. This means that its compilation must have begun sometime after the first quarter of the fifth century BC, which is when the Warring States commenced. Various specific criteria (the crossbow, mass infantry forces, etc.) mark the text as belonging to the fourth century or later.

Incidentally, in attempting to establish a relative chronology for the early military treatises, it should be noted that cavalry forces are mentioned twelve times in the *Wu Zi*, but not once in the *Sun Zi*, the *Wei Liao Zi*, and the *Sima fa*. This would seem to indicate fairly clearly that the *Wu Zi* was compiled in the third century or later, while the other three texts were probably put together mainly before the end of the fourth century. For an English translation of the passage from Du You's *Tong dian* that discusses the ten advantages of using cavalry, see Lau and Ames (2003: 179).

61. One wonders whether the *Sun Zi* really is a southern work. Perhaps the alleged association of the putative author with the southern figures King Helü and Wu Zixu is yet another component of the overall simulacrum that envelops the *Sun Zi*. According to the Brookses, the *Sun Zi* is a work of the state of Lu, or perhaps the state of Qi, both of which were in the north (the modern province of Shandong). (1998: 7)
62. For annotated bibliographical descriptions of these two works, see the articles by Hans-Hermann Schmidt in Schipper and Verellen (2004: vol. 1, pp. 69–70 and vol. 2, p. 690).
63. The unstable nature of the Guodian bamboo strip *Dao De Jing* qua written text can be seen, among other things, by the fact that the most important concept in it, namely Tao (the Way), is written with two totally different graphs in the same



bundle (A) of strips. These are: 1. the usual character written with a “head” (*shou*) to the right and above radical no. 162 (*chuo* [“go step by step”]), and 2. a rare, archaic variant (now usually read *hang* that consists of “man” (*ren* [radical no. 9]) sandwiched between the two components of radical no. 144 (*xing* [“walk”])).

64. In pointing out the Taoistic affinities and associations of the *Sun Zi*, I by no means wish to identify it as belonging to the Taoist school of thought per se. It is “clearly the work of practical military men concerned primarily with matters of tactics and strategy, and it is difficult to associate [it] with any particular philosophical school.” (Rickett 1985: 267)
65. More than half-a-dozen different sets of dates have been proposed by various scholars for the lifespan of Mo Zi. Despite the disparity, there is a general consensus that he was born around the time of the death of Confucius (550–479 BC) and that he died around the time Mencius (382–279 BC) was born.
66. Specialists on the *Mo Zi* maintain that none of its chapters date from the time of the master himself, but that the entire work was put together by several generations of his followers during a period stretching from around the beginning of the fourth century to the latter half of the second century BC. The military chapters are generally considered to be the latest of the entire Mician corpus, extending from approximately 375 to 225 BC, with the technical chapters on tunneling (62), swarming (63), and walls and gates (52) being the latest among the military chapters, ranging from roughly the beginning of the third century to the last quarter of the same century. (Graham 1993; Brooks and Brooks 1998: 5, 258–262, *passim*; Yates 1980; Needham and Yates 1994; Johnston forthcoming) Of the twenty military chapters that were originally part of the *Mo Zi*, only eleven are now extant.

67. This is not to imply that the Greco-Roman corpus of military treatises is impoverished. The bibliography of Mayor (2003) lists 51 Greek and Latin authors who discuss military matters.
68. I shall refer to him by the Greek form of his name, instead of the Latinate form Aeneas which is often used by modern writers.
69. Aineias attributes the invention of this clever technique to "the distant past <...> when Amasis attempted tunnelling during his siege of Barka." Whereas the Barkaians and later Greeks employed a bronze shield-plate to detect and amplify the sounds of digging beneath the surface of the ground, the *Mo Zi* (ch. 62) specifies the use of large earthen pots called *ying* as geophones.
70. In the surviving portions of Aineias' text, he only mentions the use of vinegar as a flame retardant (p. 92), but other Greek and Roman authors were quite familiar with its efficacy as an antidote for irritating substances released by the enemy, which is exactly the reason the *Mo Zi* (end of ch. 62) enjoins the storing up of large quantities of vinegar in basins that were to be distributed in the defenders' tunnels. This practical lesson of the ancients has not been lost on modern demonstrators who face tear gas wearing handkerchiefs that have been moistened with vinegar. (Mayor 2003: 221–222)
71. Aineias 8.1 mentions another book of his called *Preparations*, which amounts to an exact equivalent of the *bei* chapters in the *Mo Zi*. In 14.2 he further notes yet another of his works entitled *Procurement*, which mirrors concerns expressed in some of the first few chapters of the *Sun Zi*, and in 21.2 he refers to still another work that is now lost, *Encampment*, which would have engaged in topics taken up in the middle chapters of the *Sun Zi*.
72. The *Mo Zi* as a whole is so much concerned with science (e.g., optics) and engineering (e.g., defensive machinery) that one suspects Mo Zi and his school to

have been technocrats. Indeed, his surname Mo ("[black] ink") has been speculatively explained as deriving from the use of this dark substance with a carpenter's string to mark a straight line.

73. The earliest known crossbows in the world appear to have been created about 2,400 years ago by Austroasiatic peoples in Southeast Asia, and perhaps ultimately by the Mon branch of Austroasiatics in South Asia. (Norman and Mei 1976: 293–295). The bellows were most likely developed in association with iron-working, perhaps in the Black Sea area where ferrous metallurgy first developed about 3,300 years ago, although the first-known textual reference to bellows in the world may be that in the *Mo Zi*. In *Zhuang Zi*, chapters 12 (*gao*) and 14 (*jiegao*), especially the former, the well-sweep is derided as being an overly clever contraption. Reading these passages, which were probably written between about 300 and 250 BC, almost makes one feel that the well-sweep is looked upon as an alien importation. Indeed, it is probably nothing more than a shadoof (or shaduf), which has a long history in Egypt and India. One of the uses of the well-sweep in the *Mo Zi* was to work large bellows at the base of the city wall that were intended to pump smoke into the tunnels dug by the enemy.
74. Innovations even in the more esoteric aspects of warfare (e.g., similar incendiary and poisonous weapons, animals as delivery vehicles, comparable or identical combustible mixtures and projectile systems) were developing at roughly the same period across Eurasia, with South Asia and East Asia in general lagging a century or more behind the West in these developments, and Central Asia falling roughly in the middle time-wise, just as it is geographically situated in the center. Although the terrifying Greek Fire is usually associated with the Byzantine Greeks of medieval times, it was already in use by around 434–430 BC. (Mayor: 2003: time line [pp. 11ff], see also pp. 202ff and passim; Partington 1960: 28, and esp. ch. VI [pp. 237–297, "Pyrotechnics and Firearms in China"]; Sawyer 2004: 115ff) Carman (1955: 1) recounts a memorable, early instance of fire being conveyed by animals, when Samson tied firebrands to the tails of foxes and sent

them against the Philistines. Tian Dan of the state of Qi did the same thing with cattle about a thousand years later toward the end of the Warring States period. And Kauṭilya — probably around a century before Tian Dan’s time — advocated attaching incendiary powders to birds, cats, mongooses, and monkeys. (Sawyer 2004: 117; Mayor 2003: 203)

75. The name is also interpreted as referring to economics or statecraft.
76. Modern, critical scholarship dates various parts of the *Arthaśāstra* to the period from ca. 290 BC to 300 AD, and consequently asserts that Kauṭilya could not have written the entire book. Nonetheless, Kangle (1965: 59–115) gives abundant evidence supporting the view that Kauṭilya initiated the writing of the book and that he was responsible for the bulk of it. A large part of the doubt over the early dating of the *Arthaśāstra* is due to statistical analysis of its vocabulary as displaying elements that could not have been present at the time of Kauṭilya, but this could be the result of editorial tampering during the preparation of later recensions.
77. The famous dictum of *Sun Zi* 1 that “Warfare is a way of deception” is echoed by the very name of Kauṭilya, which is said to be derived from *kuṭīla* (“crooked, dishonest, deceitful”). Thus Kauṭilya was simply “Mr. Devious,” which Master Sun would have applauded. In actuality, such an explanation of the name can only be arrived at punningly, since most authorities view it as the author’s Brahmanical *gotra* (“cowshed,” i.e., exogamous patrilineal sibship) name. Another cognomen for Kauṭilya was Cāṇakya (“made of chick-peas”), which makes him sound rather innocuous and a disappointment to all good Machiavellians. However, he was also called Viṣṇugupta (“hidden by Visnu”), which restores some of the mystery to the man (although some scholars think that the latter name may refer to a different person who they believe had a hand in writing the *Arthaśāstra*).

78. Even if Kautilya himself turns out not to have been from Taxila, all that is said here about the importance of this ancient city as a cultural conduit still obtains.
79. There are many conflicting opinions about when the Tangut state was founded, with some holding that it began in 1032 or even as early as ca. 982. The Tanguts created a complicated Sinoform script based upon, but totally different from, Chinese characters, and still largely undeciphered. (Sofronov 1991; Zhou 1991)
80. A facsimile of the Tangut translation may be found in Keping (1979, pp. 477–578), also in Hao and Liu (1993, vol. 1, pp. 691–792).
81. See Appendix III for a complete transcription of the Manchu text, together with word-for-word English glosses.
82. In an effort to determine whether there is any scrap of evidence in support of the contention that Napoleon was familiar with the *Sun Zi*, I read through 65 biographies and studies of Napoleonic history, but could not find a single reference to the *Sun Zi*. Unless someone can produce solid evidence that Napoleon was aware of the *Sun Zi*, I believe that we should declare the rumor to be false and dead.
83. See ch. 3 n. 9.

## Appendix I

### THE PSEUDO-BIOGRAPHY OF SUN WU

Below is a complete translation of the “biography” of Sun Zi from the *Shi ji* (The Grand Scribe’s Records), s. 65. Written by Sima Qian (145–ca. 86 BC) around the year 97 BC, it is an essentially fictional account of a figure for whom there is no other more secure information.

Master Sun, whose courtesy name was Wu (“Martial”), was a man of Qi.<sup>1</sup> Because of his *bingfa*,<sup>2</sup> he gained audience with Helu,<sup>3</sup> the king of Wu.<sup>4</sup> Helu said to him, “I have read the whole of your thirteen chapters.<sup>5</sup> Can you give me a small demonstration of how you train soldiers?” Master Sun replied, “Yes, I can.” Helu asked, “Can you do the demonstration with women?” Master Sun replied, “Yes, I can.”

Thereupon it was permitted for one hundred and eighty beauties to be brought out of the palace. Master Sun divided the women into two companies, with two of the king’s favored concubines as company commanders, and he ordered all of them to carry halberds.

Master Sun gave them orders, “Do you know where your heart and back, your left hand and right hand are?” The women replied, “We know.” Master Sun said, “If I want you to go forward, face in the direction of your heart. If I want you to go to the left, face in the direction of your left hand. If I want you to go to the right, face in the direction of your right hand. If I want you to go to the rear, face in the direction of your back.” “Yes, sir!” replied the women.

The marching commands having been proclaimed, Master Sun had a large battle-ax brought out, then he repeated the orders over and over.<sup>6</sup>

Thereupon, Master Sun drummed<sup>7</sup> them to the right, and the women broke out in laughter. Master Sun said, “If the marching

commands are not clear, and if the orders have not been repeated enough to make them familiar, that is the fault of the general."

Again, Master Sun repeated the orders over and over, then he drummed them to the left, and again the women broke out in laughter. Master Sun said, "If the marching commands are not clear, and if the orders have not been repeated enough to make them familiar, that is the fault of the general. Since the commands have already been made clear, yet you do not execute them according to the regulations, that is the fault of your officers."

Whereupon, he wished to execute the left and right company commanders. When the king of Wu, who was observing the proceedings from a terrace, saw that his concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly terrified. Hastily, he sent a messenger to deliver the following order: "We already realize that you know how to conduct military operations, general. If we, however, are bereft of these two concubines, our food will be tasteless. We hope that you will not execute them."

Master Sun said, "Since your servant has already received your command to be the general of your army, and I am now with the army, 'there are ruler's orders that he does not accept'"<sup>8</sup> Whereupon, he had the two company commanders executed<sup>9</sup> as a warning to the others.

After he appointed the next two in line to be the company commanders, he again drummed the soldiers. The women turned to the left and right, went forward and backward, knelt and rose as precisely as if their movements had been measured with a compass and L-square. None of them dared make a sound.

Thereupon, Master Sun sent a messenger to report to the king: "The soldiers are now in perfect order. Your Honor may come down and observe them. They will do whatever Your Honor wishes, even if you want them to go through fire and water." The king of Wu said, "Enough, general! You may return to your quarters. I do not wish to come down and observe."

Master Sun said, “Your Honor only cherishes the words of the *bingfa*, but cannot apply their reality.”

Thereupon, Helu came to realize that Master Sun was capable of conducting military operations, and eventually made him a general.<sup>10</sup> Subsequently, the kingdom of Wu destroyed the powerful state of Chu<sup>11</sup> to the west, entering its capital at Ying,<sup>12</sup> awed the states of Qi and Jin<sup>13</sup> to the north, and achieved illustrious fame among the feudal lords. Master Sun played an important role in all of these developments.<sup>14</sup>

On the whole, this is not a very helpful introduction to the putative author of the *SZ* and his career. Indeed, the only useful information in it appears in the first and last paragraphs, both of which are short. From these two paragraphs, we learn that Master Sun was supposedly a native of Qi, which was in the northeast of what is now China (the province of modern Shandong), that he was granted an audience with the king of Wu (a coastal state that lay to the south of the Yangtze), and that he later served as a commander in the Wu Army. The rest of the quasi-biography, more than four-fifths of the whole, is taken up with a highly improbable, blood-curdling account of Master Sun drilling 180 palace beauties and ruthlessly beheading the king’s two most favored ladies. Sima Qian, though, certainly did not fabricate this story, since it is told at still greater length in one of the YS bamboo strip manuscripts that was found with the *SZ*, namely, the fragmentary text that has been given the provisional title of “Jian Wu wang” (An Audience with the King of Wu). (Yinque Shan 1976: 106–108) In this earlier rendition of the tale, it is Master Sun who offers to use “noble persons..., ignoble persons..., [or] women” to demonstrate his rigorous military discipline.

From the more expansive, but less polished, manner of the story as it is related in the archeologically recovered manuscript version, it would appear that Sima Qian, author of the *Shi ji*, has abbreviated a preexisting legend. Inasmuch as the YS manuscripts date to between 134 and 118 BC, this means that the story of Master Sun’s interview with King Helu was probably already in circulation by at least the first half of the second century BC. It also pushes back the antecedents of the thirteen chapter edition of the *SZ*



to a similar time, since the extended version of the story in the bamboo strip manuscripts twice mentions that number of chapters.

For an English translation of the YS manuscript version of this fanciful tale, see Ames (1993: 191–196). The Chinese text is available in YSH (1976: 106–108; notes 109–111).

Although Sun Wu’s “biography” in *SJ* 65 is sorely disappointing, there is more that can be said about the scroll as a whole, for he shares it with Sun Bin, and thereby hangs a tale, not to mention Wu Qi, and thereby hangs another tale (see the section on “Authorship” above for a complete translation of the biography of Sun Bin and for additional information concerning Wu Qi, with whom Sun Zi is often paired).

#### Notes to Appendix I

1. A northeastern state located in what is now the province of Shandong.
2. Soldierly methods; Methods of War; Art of War; Strategy.
3. Variant Helü, r. 514–496 BC. Judging from the graphic variants of the Wu king’s name and the lack of a Sinitic surname, it would appear that he was of non-Sinitic descent.
4. A southeastern state located in what is now modern Jiangsu Province.
5. This refers to the *Sun Zi bingfa*, thirteen being the number of chapters in the extant version of the text. In the bibliographical “Yiwen zhi” (Treatise on Literary Arts) of the *Han shu* (History of the [Western] Han Dynasty), s. 30, *Sun Zi bingfa* is listed as having 82 chapters and 9 scrolls of illustrations. This is somewhat puzzling, because we here have the historian, Sima Qian, indicating in the early first century BC that the *SZ* had 13 chapters, and this exactly matches both the number of chapters of the received text and of the recently discovered bamboo manuscripts of the *SZ*. The fact that the *Han shu* is a work of the first century AD,

albeit incorporating materials from the first century BC (including major components of its bibliographical treatise devised by Liu Xiang [ca. 77–8 BC] and his son Liu Xin [d. 23 AD]), means that there must have been a quite different recension of the *SZ* in circulation at that time, after the stabilization of the received text by the early second century BC, two centuries earlier.

It is quite possible, however, that the *Sun Zi bingfa* listed in the bibliographical treatise of the *Han shu* does not refer to the work attributed to Sun Wu, but to another work altogether. As a matter of fact, the entry in the bibliographical entry in the *Han shu* designates the work in question as *Wu Sun Zi bingfa* (Soldierly Methods of Master Sun of the State of Wu). This might conceivably refer to the legendary Sun Wu (Sun the Martial) who allegedly composed the 13 chapter *Sun Zi bingfa*, because he was alleged to have a connection with the state of Wu, but then why would he be credited with an 82 chapter work in the *Han shu*? Furthermore, it was not until the early Tang period that the commentator Yan Shigu (579–645) added a note to the entry in the *Han Shu* identifying this Sun Zi as Sun Wu (Sun the Martial).

It is conceivable that the 82 chapter text mentioned in the *Han shu* is actually a reference to the *Sun Bin bingfa*. In his *Shi ji* biography, which is actually much more detailed, substantial, and historically plausible than that of the legendary Sun Wu that precedes it, Sun Bin is also referred to as Sun Zi (Master Sun). What is more, with the chapters of the *Sun Bin bingfa* recovered from YS, including both the 16 main chapters plus the 15 supplemental chapters, together with 3 other chapters recovered from later commentarial, historical, and encyclopedic sources (Lau and Ames 2003), we know of a total of 34 chapters associated with Sun Bin. This large number of Sun Bin chapters suggests the possibility that there may well have been others that still existed at the end of the Han Dynasty. On the contrary, it is clear that the number of chapters associated with the legendary Sun Wu was already stabilized at 13 at least a century before the time when the YS manuscripts were entombed.

6. The text literally says that “the three orders were stated five times.” This was customary in old military drills to ensure that there would be absolutely no misunderstanding or mistake on the part of the recruits.
7. Master Sun had obviously also instructed his charges on the drum signals that were used to indicate different directions, but this is not mentioned in the text.
8. A direct quotation from the eighth chapter of the received text of the *Sun Zi*.
9. Most likely decapitated with the battle-ax, though the verb used in the text (*zhan*) literally means “cut in two at the waist”.
10. This directly contradicts Master Sun’s assertion above that he had already been commanded by the king to be a general in the king’s army. Apparently, however, that was only a temporary appointment for conducting the trial drills with the two companies of palace women.
11. A large southern state that covered modern Hubei and Hunan Provinces.
12. This occurred in 506 BC. The complex circumstances surrounding Wu’s capture of Ying have been thoroughly studied by modern scholars writing in English. See Rudolph (1962; 1942) and Johnson (1980; 1981). Mair (1983: 123–165, 262–305) presents a popular medieval account of the conflict between Wu and Chu.
13. An important northern state that stretched across much of the Central Plains in what is now modern Shanxi Province.
14. The last paragraph of this “biography” of Sun Wu is like a capsule summary of events recounted in *Shi ji*, scroll 66, “The Biography of Wu Zixu.” (Nienhauser 1994: 49–62)

## Appendix II

### FURTHER NOTES ON SELECTED KEY TERMS

A few particularly difficult-to-understand or complex concepts in the *SZ* (marked with an asterisk [\*] in the section on “Key Terms” at the front of the book) are here explained in greater depth and detail.

*BING*. In private communications (June 16, 2005; June 17, 2005; September 22, 2005; August 10, 2006), Julie Lee Wei has pointed out some remarkable correspondences between the Old Sinitic form of *bing* and certain Indo-European words, especially among the Slavic and Celtic groups. According to the most recent and increasingly widely accepted phonological reconstruction of *bing* as it would have sounded around the time of composition of the *SZ*, its pronunciation would have been \**prang* (i.e., sounding like “brahng”). (Zhengzhang Shangfang 2003: 276a) With these may be compared Old Church Slavic *borjo*, *brati* (“fight”), *bran* (“dispute, battle”), *brani* (“fight”); Old Russian *boron*’ (“battle”); Czech *bran* (“weapon, armament”); Polish *bron*’ (“weapon”); Bohemian *zbran*’ (“weapon”); Russian *borju*, *borot*’ (“fight”) and Welsh *brwydr* (“pitched battle, conflict, attack, campaign, struggle, dispute, bother, controversy, host, army”), *brwydraf* (“battle, fight, struggle, attack”), *brwydrin* (“battle, conflict”), *brwydrwr* (“fighter, warrior, combatant”), *bragad* (“army, battle”); Old Irish *brat* (“pillage, plunder”); Irish *bruion* (“fight, scrap, quarrel”). Wei notes that “d” and “n” have the same point of articulation. The data for Indo-European languages cited in this paragraph have been drawn from Pokorny (1994: 135), Buck (1949: 20.13, 21, 23), Vendryes (1981: B–79), *Geiriadur Prifysgol Cymru* (1950–2002: esp. vol. B, pp. 335c–336ab), and Wei’s notes. For an overview of Indo-European terminology for weapons and warfare, see Mallory (2006: esp. p. 87 [words for “strike”]).

*FA*. This is the last term in the title of the *Sun Zi bingfa* (Soldierly Methods of Master Sun). The character that has been used to write this important word is actually an old

simplified form that came into use with “seal style” writing, which was popular about 2,300 years ago. Before then, another very complicated, but also highly revealing, character was used to write *fa*, which at that time would have sounded something like \**pjwap*. In the process of simplification, several important elements were omitted, leaving behind an eight stroke character (the original form had twenty-one strokes) consisting of two elements, a water radical on the left and a phonophore (“sound carrier”) pronounced *qu* (meaning “go”) on the right, which — by itself — is totally mystifying and makes sense neither semantically nor phonologically. When we carefully analyze the full, complicated form of the original graph, however, even the simplified form can be explained satisfactorily.

The original form of the graph for *fa* consisted of three components, one of which can be further broken down into two components. At different times and different places, the positions of the three main components could be shifted around virtually at random, although they eventually stabilized as follows: on the left was a schematized stream signifying water. To the right, at the top, was a pictograph of a one-horned goat-like creature, and beneath that on the right was a man coming out from the opening of a cave.

How in the world could such a strange configuration possibly signify a notion as exalted as “law”? Let us first dispose of the two-part component at the bottom. A man coming out of a cave is “going” somewhere, so that part of the graph implies “go.” The water on the left signifies “level,” hence “equitable.” The most perplexing part, of course, is the one-horned caprine creature on the top right. We actually know the name of this supernatural animal; it is the *xiezhi*. This is *not* the fabled *qilin*, which is often (erroneously) referred to as a unicorn, but that is a entirely different story that needs to be taken up separately. The function of the *xiezhi* was to butt the guilty party in a lawsuit. Pictures or statues of the *xiezhi* were actually posted in ancient Chinese courtrooms, and several powerful wooden and bronze representations of the *xiezhi* have recently been archeologically recovered from the far northwest (N.B.) of China. (Watt 2004: 177–178 nos. 81 and 82, where they are misidentified as *qilin*) A large, correctly labeled, bronze statue of the *xiezhi* may be

seen in the center of the lobby of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, should anyone be interested in seeing one for him/herself.

It may sound far-fetched for a one-horned goat to be looked upon as the dispenser of justice, but there is actually a long, well-documented Eurasian tradition behind this seemingly bizarre belief. (Meserve 2001; 2003) There can be little doubt that these old ideas were brought to East Asia along with the importation of domesticated ovicaprids (sheep and goats) during the third and second millennia BC. Indeed, there is impeccable evidence that the people who established the earliest form of writing in East Asia during the latter part of the second millennium BC held ovicaprids in high esteem, since they used the symbol for goat as the signifier for the characters conveying such lofty ideas as “beauty,” “good(ness),” and “justice.” (Mair 2003: 177) Thus, in the earliest form of the graph for writing the word *fa*, we have a one-horned caprine (the *xiezhi*) equitably (like level water) butting the guilty party away (from the notion of “go”). After simplification more than two thousand years ago, only the “water” and the “go” were left, the one-horned caprine having been lost in the shuffle.

When Buddhism came to China during the Eastern Han period (25–220), *fa* was used to translate the word *dharma*, whereupon it took on all of the dozens of meanings of the Sanskrit word. Long before that, however, already by the time of the WS, *fa* had evolved from its primitive meaning of meting out justice through increasing stages of abstraction and generalization to mean “law,” “method,” and “model” (both noun and verb).

ㄚ. (tone mark omitted in the remainder of this note) spring, mechanism; pivotal moment  
An early form of the graph (seal script) was composed of *you* (two skeins of silk, signifying “meager, small, slight” and *shu* (“to guard”), the implication being that a weak defense is dangerous. A still earlier form of the graph (bronze inscriptions) is explained as showing a man beneath a large, sharp-bladed weapon suspended by two skeins of silk — a dangerous predicament. Thus *ji* by itself already conveys a sense of vulnerability and possible peril. When joined with *wei* (“danger”) in *weiji*, the resultant binom doubly emphasizes the dangerous instability of an impending crisis.

The best dictionaries for the study of the early meanings of Old Sinitic words are in fundamental agreement about the basic meaning of *ji*:

“small, minutiae, first signs [of something]; near, imminent, almost” (Karlgren 1972: 146 no. 547a)

“minute, almost, dangerous” (Wang 2000: 272a)

“be imminent; close to; near; be at imminent risk” (Schuessler 1987: 264a)

Originally, the graph for writing this morpheme did not have a wood radical. Later, however, as mechanical devices became more complicated and more common, a wood radical was added, because the earliest such devices were mostly made of wood. With the addition of the wood radical, *ji* came more clearly to signify “mechanism” or “clever device” (of the sort decried by the Taoist thinker Zhuang Zi), as well as “spring, moving force.” (Karlgren 1972: 146 no. 547c) Some simple mechanical devices must have been made of stones of various sorts, since the “jade” (i.e., precious stone) radical was also occasionally added to *ji* (instead of the wood radical) to convey the meaning of “apparatus.” Even when more durable and precise mechanisms came to be made of metal, the wood radical was retained. One of the metaphorically most productive *ji* was the firing mechanism of a crossbow.

In the *Yi jing* (*I ching*; Book of Changes), “Xici da zhuan” (The Great Appendix), B, section 4: *zi yue: zhi ji qi shen hu?* (“[Does not he who] knows the turning points [possess] divine [wisdom]?” or, more directly and simply, “[Is not he who] knows the turning points divine?”). Some would translate *ji* in this rhetorical question from the *Book of Changes* as “omen, portent, springs (of action).”

See <http://www.pinyin.info/chinese/crisis.html> for a lengthy discussion of *ji* (“incipient moment; crucial moment when something begins or changes”).

*Ji*. The title of the first chapter, and occurring ten other times in the *Sun Zi* (hereafter *SZ*).

This is a disproportionately large number for such a relatively short text, considering

that this term occurs very infrequently (or not at all) in other early Chinese military texts. For example, in the *Wei Liao Zi*, a text that is more than twice as long as the *SZ*, *ji* occurs only five times, while in the *Wu Zi* and in the *Sima Fa*, two other important military treatises that date to shortly after the *SZ*, it does not appear even once. The challenge of interpreting the significance of *ji* in the *SZ* is that it may mean both “calculation” and “plan.” See also ch. 1 n. 1 of the translation.

*JIAN*. (“arrow”) The word for arrow in the *SZ* is *shǐ*, and it occurs but once. The reason why Sinitic possesses more than one word for arrow is probably that they derive from different language sources. The interesting thing about *jian* is that it may well have been borrowed from Tocharian B *tsain*, which itself derives from Iranian \**dzainu-* (“weapon”), cf. Avestan *zaēna-*, Armenian *zēn*. Tocharian, incidentally, is the source of the Sinitic words for “honey” (MSM *mi* < OS \**mit* < Tocharian *mit*) and “lion” (MSM *shizi* < Late Han Sinitic *ṣi-tsiəʔ* < Tocharian *śiśäk*, *ṣecake*).

*Qí*. See *zheng*.

*SHI*. The title of chapter 5, this is a highly elusive term, with dozens of translations having been proposed for it, from “influence” to “momentum” and “inertia,” from “power / force (of circumstances)” to “authority” and “(strategic/positional) advantage.” Other implications of *shi* are “lay of the land,” “spirit of one’s troops,” “arrangement of an army,” and so forth. In the translation published by Columbia University Press, *shi* is consistently rendered as “configuration” for all of its occurrences. This is in keeping with the structure of the character used to write it, which has an interesting history. At the time the *SZ* was written, the graphic form currently used to write this word did not exist. If we trace the character used to write *shi* back to its earliest form on the oracle bones ca. 1200 BC, we can see that it depicted a man kneeling on the ground and carefully planting a small tree. In the bronze inscriptions, half a millennium or so later, an element signifying “earth, soil” was added beneath the tree to emphasize the notion of planting. It was only later that yet another component, that for “strength,” was added at the very bottom of the graph to give it



its present form. It is clear from the earliest forms of the graph that it had to do with to do with horticultural arts, and that one path of development for the graph ended up with the addition of a radical for vegetation at the top, and this eventually came to mean “art” in general (*yi*). Thus the root idea represented by the earliest form of the graph must have been something like “skill, handicraft, art” (particularly in dealing with plants). The reconstruction of the ancient sound of *shi* is \**sjäi* and that for *yi* is \**njiäi*. The Sino-Tibetan root proposed by Axel Schuessler for its etymology originally meant “certain; firm, make firm; establish.”

The concept of *shi* was taken over from, or at least shared with, the Legalists, for whom it signified the authority of an acknowledged position. For a book-long philosophical study of *shi*, see Jullien 2004 [1992]). Since *shi* is such a subtle and multivalent concept, it has been necessary to discuss it at some length. To conclude, however, it will suffice to emphasize that *shi* implies an inherent fluidity and inertial latency.

*ZHENG* and *qí*. (tone mark omitted in the remainder of this note) These two terms together are universally read as *qizheng* in MSM, but a case might be made that they should be read as *jīzheng*. The underlying etymology of *qi* (“odd, strange”) is indicated by the fact that it is cognate with *jī* (this is a different *jī* from that meaning “spring, mechanism” discussed above) which is written with the same character as that for *qi* and literally means “an odd number.” In traditional Chinese medicine, *qi* (more accurately pronounced *jī*) refers to special diagnostic means and extraordinary treatment brought to bear against a particularly recalcitrant disease. Furthermore, all of the following binoms that are written with the *qi/ji* character for the first syllable are accepted as properly being read *ji*:- *jixie* (“deceit, chicanery”), *jigai* (a) (“an unusual type of military strategy”), *jigai* (b) (“secretive, extraordinary [military maneuvers]”), *jigai* (c) (“an ancient, unorthodox medical technique”), *jiju* (“an irregular chariot”). (*HDC* 2.1520a–1521b, 1525a, 1527a, 1524a, and 1522b) (N.B.: the *-gai* syllable of the three *jigai* is written with a different character in each case)

Granted that *zheng* and *qi* are a challenging pair of terms for the non-specialist, Wallacker’s (1966) interpretation of *zheng* and *qi* as “spike” and “tilt” is clever, but

overly contrived and based on a faulty analysis of the derivation of the first graph and a misleading interpretation of the second graph. *Zheng* is not derived from a combination of *zhi* (“foot” > “stop”) with the phonophore *ding* (“nail”), but rather is itself a basic phonetic component whose earliest graphic rendition showed a “square-shaped” town at the top and a foot walking “straight” toward it at the bottom. Hence it is ludicrous for Wallacker to assert that the character implies, as he says (p. 298), “a sense of fixing a man firmly in place by nailing his feet to the ground” [!]. Likewise, the earliest forms of *qi* depicted a man riding a horse, which was — to the agrarian inhabitants of the EAH — “strange, extraordinary” and “off balance,” all of which are extended meanings of the basic etymon. (Mair 2003) It may be useful to note, moreover, that *zheng* (“straight, correct, direct”) has a perfect homophone that means “govern(ment)” and is written with the identical character to which has been added a simple radical that, in this case and in many other cases, signifies causation, hence, “cause to be straight/correct,” i.e., “govern.”

The *SZ* was not alone in emphasizing the effectiveness of a judicious mixture of *zheng* and *qi* (i.e., *ji*, but commonly read *qi* nowadays) approaches in battle. *Huainan Zi* (Master Huainan, completed in 139 BC), s. 15 is a long treatment of military affairs (longer by a third than the whole of the *SZ*) entitled “Bing lue xun” (Instructions on Military Strategy). The complementary and contrastive application of *qi* and *zheng* is repeatedly advocated in this important work that is heavily tinged with philosophical Taoism.

Finally, the counterposing of *qi* and *zheng* was not restricted merely to military operations, but was applied to politics and morality as well:

Rule the state with uprightness,  
Deploy your troops with craft  
Gain all under heaven with noninterference.  
— *Tao Te Ching / Dao de jing*, 57

When there is no uprightness,  
correct reverts to crafty,

Victor H. Mair, “*Soldierly Methods*: Vade Mecum for an Iconoclastic Translation of *Sun Zi bingfa*”  
*Sino-Platonic Papers*, 178 (February, 2008)

good reverts to gruesome.

— *Tao Te Ching* / *Dao de jing*, 58

### Appendix III

#### TRANSCRIPTION OF THE MANCHU TRANSLATION OF THE *SUN ZI* WITH WORD-FOR-WORD ENGLISH GLOSSES BY H. T. TOH

The Manchus were a nation of great warriors who ably ruled the East Asian Heartland for nearly three centuries and extended its borders to hitherto unimagined regions, many of which are still attached to the People’s Republic of China. They were the founders of the Qing (“Pure”) Dynasty (1644–1911), one of the longest and most glorious dynasties in Chinese history, albeit the last.

The Manchu translation of the *SZ* was done by Qiying (Kiyong; 1790–1858), a high-ranking imperial clansman. For a fascinating account of Qiying’s eventful life, particularly in dealing with foreign powers during the period of the Opium War (mid-nineteenth century), see Fang Chao-ying’s detailed article in Hummel (1943, vol. 1, pp. 130b–134b).

The following transcription was prepared by Hoong Teik Toh of the Institute of History and Philology at Academia Sinica in Taiwan. It is based upon the Manchu text in Vol. 16 of Xie and Liu (1993).

—VHM

The Romanized Manchu text below is based on the *Man-Han hebi Sunzi bingfa* 滿漢合璧孫子兵法, a bilingual blockprint reproduced on pp. 263–429 in *Sunzi jicheng* 孫子集成, Vol. 16, Jinan: Qilu Sushe 齊魯書社, 1993. The numerical sequence in the Romanized text represents the pagination (excluding empty pages) of the facsimile text contained in that volume. The glosses provided are not intended for offering a smooth English translation of the Manchu text but rather for serving those illiterate in Classical Manchu who wish to compare the Classical Chinese text with its Manchu rendition. Before a readable English translation of the Manchu text can be made available, all the extant versions of the *Sun dz i coohai doro bithe* kept in different libraries worldwide have to be carefully collated and edited by a qualified *Mandjurist* (Manchu philologist).

—HTT

(263) sun dz i Sunzi’s coohai military doro Tao bithe book.

sucungga initial bodoro reckoning (imperfect verbal noun) ujui fiyelen first chapter.

sun dz hendume Sunzi says. cooha army; military serengge the so-called (topical marker). gurun country i genitive amba big baita matter . bucere die (imperfect verbal noun) banjire live (imperfect verbal noun) ba place; situation.<sup>1</sup> taksire survive (imperfect verbal noun) gukure perish (imperfect verbal noun) doro Tao.<sup>2</sup> kimcirakûci if not examining ojarahû cannot.<sup>3</sup> tuttu ofi therefore sunja baita five matters be accusative wekjime weaving crosswise gamambime managing.<sup>4</sup> teisulebume (264) bodofi having calculated accordingly.<sup>5</sup> terei its gûnin intent be accusative sibkimbi investigate.<sup>6</sup> uju

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<sup>1</sup> Both *bucere* and *banjire* modify *ba*.

<sup>2</sup> Both *taksire* and *gukure* modify *doro*.

<sup>3</sup> ...*ci...ojarahû* means “one must” (Ch. *buke bu* 不可不).

<sup>4</sup> ...*wekjime gamambime* “regulating...and”. Ma. *wekjime* (adverbially) *gamambi* “handle sth as if weaving crosswise” is an expression patterned after Ch. *jingying* 經營.

<sup>5</sup> The *-bime* ending of *gamambime* can be rendered by “...and”. Thus, *sunja baita be wekjime gamambime teisulebume bodofi* may be rendered by “having regulated the five matters and calculated accordingly”.

de firstly doro Tao sembi to call. jai de secondly abka heaven sembi to call. ilaci de thirdly na earth sembi to call. duici de fourthly jiyanggiyûn general (將軍) sembi to call. sunjaci de fifthly kooli law sembi to call. doro serengge. the so-called Tao irgen common people be accusative dergi above, upper i emgi together with emu one gûnin intention obufi having caused...to become.<sup>7</sup> tuttu so sasa buceci if dying together ojoro can. sasa banjici if living together (265) ojoro can be dahame as a result of, since.<sup>8</sup> irgen people tuksicuke the dangerous de gelerakû will not fear, will not be afraid of be sentence particle kai sentence particle, emphatic. abka serengge. the so-called heaven a the yang e the yin šahûrun cold halhûn hot de acabume gamara managing in accordance with be sentence particle kai sentence particle, emphatic. na serengge. the so-called earth goro far hanci near haksan steep necin level onco broad hafirahûn narrow bucere die banjire live be sentence particle kai sentence particle, emphatic. jiyanggiyûn serengge. the so-called general mergen wise akdun firm, reliable,

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<sup>6</sup> One is to investigate its intent.

<sup>7</sup> Having made the people [share] one [and the same] intention with the superior.

<sup>8</sup> Since [they] can die together and live together ...

trustworthy **gosin** merciful **baturu** brave **cira** strict, stern **be** sentence particle  
**kai** sentence particle, emphatic. **kooli** (266) **serengge**. the so-called law  
**meyen**. divisions (of army) **durun**. rule **hafan**. officer **jugûn**. road **da**.  
leader, chief **baitalan** use, utilization **be** sentence particle **kai** sentence particle,  
emphatic. **uheri** altogether **ere** this **sunja** five **be** about. **jiyanggiyûn** of  
having become a general **donjihakûngge** **akû** [there is] no [such thing as] not  
having heard of [them]. **sahangge** one who knows **etembi** win. **sarkûngge**  
one who does not know **eterakû** will not win **tuttu** so **teisulebume** **bodofi**.  
**terei gûnin** **be** **sibkire** **de** when calculating accordingly and investigating its  
intent **ya** which **ergi** side **ejen** lord **de** locative, dative **doro** Tao **bi** to be.<sup>9</sup> **ya**  
**ergi** which side **jiyanggiyûn** **de** (267) **muten** capability **bi**.<sup>10</sup> **ya** **ergi**  
which side **abka** heaven **na** earth **de** with **acanambi** meet, fit.<sup>11</sup> **ya** **ergi**  
which side **fafun šajin** regulations and prohibitions **be** accusative **yabubumbi**  
carry out. **ya** **ergi** which side **agûra cooha** armed soldiers **etuhun ohobi**  
became strong. **ya** **ergi** which side **uksin cooha** armored soldiers **urehebi**

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<sup>9</sup> The Tao is with the lord of which side? / The lord of which side has the Tao?

<sup>10</sup> The general of which side has capability?

<sup>11</sup> Which side meets (i.e. acts in tune with) Heaven and Earth?

have ripened, have become familiar (i.e. well-trained) [.] **ya ergi** which side  
**šangnahan** reward **erun** punishment **getuken ohobi** became clear, distinct  
**seme**<sup>12</sup> **bi I ede** in this, hereby **etere anabure** winning and losing, victory  
and defeat **be** accusative **sambi** know. **coohai data** military leaders **mini** my  
**arga** plan **be** accusative (268) **gaici** if [they] take/adopt. **baitalafi** having  
employed [them] **urunakû** surely **etere** will win **be dahame**. **bibumbi**  
because of [that], keep [them]. **coohai data** military leaders **mini arga** my plan  
**be** accusative **gaijarakû oci** if [they] do not accept/if [they] reject. **baitalafi**  
having employed [them] **urunakû** surely **gaibure** will be defeated **be dahame**  
[.] **unggimbi** because of [that], send [them] away [.] **arga** plan **sain** good  
**dade** in addition to **gaiha** took **de** when.<sup>13</sup> **tereci** then **horon** [dominant]  
power, airs of majesty **aramé** making pretenses **tulergi de** on/from the outside  
**aisilambi** to aid.<sup>14</sup> **horon** power **serengge** so-called. **aisi be dahame**  
following profits. **tooselame gamarangge** that which exercises authority.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> *seme* functions like quotation marks ( “*ya ergi*..., *ya ergi*...” ).

<sup>13</sup> When [one has] adopted [the plan] in addition to [the fact that] the plan is good.

<sup>14</sup> Then, making pretenses of overwhelming power, one assists from outside.

<sup>15</sup> The so-called *horon* is that which exercises authority [by] pursuing profits.



cooha military serengge so-called. koimali tricky (269) doro Tao. tuttu  
therefore mutembime [while/though] being capable muterakû be  
tuwabumbi display [one’s] being incapable. baitalambime [while/though]  
employing baitalarakû be tuwabumbi display [one’s] not employing.  
hanci bime [while/though] being near goro be tuwabumbi display [its]  
being far. goro bime [while/though] being far hanci be tuwabumbi display  
[its] being near. aisi i by means of profit yarkiyambi to entice. facuhûrabufi  
having caused disorder gaimbi to take. akdun oci if/when [they are] firm  
belhembi [we] prepare. etuhun oci if/when [they are] strong jailambi [we]  
avoid. nukibume irritating (converb) kûthûmbi to confuse. fusihûn arame  
pretending to be humble (converb) coktlobumbi to cause [them] to be arrogant.  
(270) teyehun oci if/when [they are] at ease suilabumbi to cause [them] to  
suffer/to be exhausted. haji oci if/when being dear jakanabumbi to cause to  
divide/break up, cause ruptures. terei its, his belhehekû unprepared be  
accusative afambi attack. terei its, his gûnihakû unexpected ci from, out of  
tucimbi go out, go beyond. ere this coohalame eterengge military  
victory (lit. as for this going to war and winning). doigonde firgembuci if let  
out/divulged/revealed beforehand ojurakû cannot. afara ongolo before

fighting **juktehen de bodofi eterengge** as for having reckoned at the temple  
[that one] will win (i.e. forecasted victory) **(271) bodome bahanahangge**  
reckoning and being able to obtain (i.e. chances to win) **ambula** very much **ofi kai**  
precisely because of. **afara onggolo** before fighting **juktehen de bodofi**  
**eterakûngge** as for having reckoned at the temple [that one] will not win.  
**bodome bahanahangge** reckoning and being able to obtain (i.e. chances to  
win) **arsari** mediocre, fair **ofi kai** precisely because. **bodorongge** reckoning  
**ambula oci** if very much **etere** will win. **bodorongge** reckoning **arsari**  
**oci** if mediocre **eterakû** will not win **bade** in the case that. **bodoro ba akû**  
without reckoning **be** accusative **ai hendure** not to mention. **bi** I erebe  
**tuwaha de** in seeing this **etere anaburengge** victory and defeat **iletu**  
**ombikai** become obvious:

**(273) afara be deribure** undertaking a fight, doing battle **jai fiyelen** second  
chapter.

**sun dz hendume.** Sunzi says **yaya** every, any **cooha baitalara kooli**  
method of using troops (用兵). **feksire sejen** running vehicles **emu minggan**  
one thousand. **sukûngge sejen** leather vehicle **emu minggan.** **uksin i**

cooha armored soldiers juwan tumen ten myriads. minggu baci from  
1000 leagues away jeku juweme ofi because of transporting provisions. dorgi  
tulergi i fayabun internal and external expenses. antaha sa i baitalan  
usage (i.e. necessities) of guests. amdun šugin i (274) jaka materials of (i.e.  
materials such as) glue and lacquer/paint sejen uksin i belhen de in the  
preparation of vehicles and armory. inenggidari daily minggata yan be  
fayabuha manggi after spending 1000 taels each. teni then [and only then]  
juwan tumen cooha 10 myriad soldiers ilimbi stand up<sup>16</sup>. ede then, in this  
uthai afaci if immediately fighting etembi will win. goidabuci if being  
protracted agûra weapons moyombi become dull/blunt. dacun sharp; zeal  
bukdabumbi cause to bend, become crumpled, damped. hecen city be  
accusative afaci if/when attacking. hûsun power, might mohombi become  
exhausted. cooha be tule goidabuci if having the troops stay outside for a long  
time. gurun i baitalan national expenses tesurakû ombi become  
insufficient. (275) yala indeed agûra weapon moyoro become blunt dacun  
sharp bukdbure cause to bend. hûsun strength mohoro become exhausted

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<sup>16</sup> That is, set out, set in motion.

ulin wealth wajire finishing ohode if. goloi beise feudal princes terei that,  
his cukure weary be tuwame in accordance with (i.e. taking advantage of)  
necinjimbi come to encroach. udu mergen urse bihe seme though  
there were wise men. amala hocikon obume muterakû unable to turn the  
consequences good. tuttu therefore cooha army moco incompetent, blunt  
hûdun fast be donjiha [it was] heard. faksidame shrewd goidabure  
persist, last long be sabuhakû [it was] not seen. cooha goidaha bime.

(276) gurun de aisi ojongge akû kai there is indeed no such thing that a  
military [action] lasts long and can benefit the country. tuttu ofi therefore cooha  
baitalara jobolon be akûmbume sarkûngge he who does not know  
exhaustively the harms of using troops. uthai then cooha baitalara aisi be  
akûmbume same muterakû unable to know exhaustively the benefits of  
using troops. cooha baitalara mangga urse people who are capable of  
using troops. cooha be dasame tuciburakû will not re-send troops. jeku  
be ilanggeri juweburakû will not have provisions transported thrice. gurun  
de from the country/state baitalan gaime taking expenses. (277) bata de  
from the enemy jeku tabcilame raiding provisions ofi because. tuttu thus  
coohai jeku military provisions be tesubuci ombi can be made sufficient.

cooha de gurun yadarangge that the country suffers want [as a result of  
being worn down] by [high] military [expenditures]. goro juwere haran [is]  
because of transporting far. goro juweci if transporting far. tanggû halai  
irgen people of a hundred clans (*baixing*, commonfolk) yadambi become poor.  
cooha de hanci ningge those close to the army.<sup>17</sup> mangga hûda de at  
an expensive price uncambi sell. mangga hûda de at an expensive price  
uncaci if/when selling. tanggû halai irgen i (278) ulin wealth of the  
commonfolk wajimbi finish. ulin wealth wajici if finishing. ekşeme  
hurriedly junihin land tax usin de to the field tomilambi will assign. hûsun  
strength mohoro become exhausted ulin wealth wajire finish oci if. bigan i  
the wild field’s niyalmai people’s boode in the house untuhun empty of  
because. tanggû halai irgen i the common people’s fayabun expense.  
juwan ubu ten portions de in/among/within nadan ubu seven portions  
ekiyembi diminish. siden booi official/public fayabun expense. sejen  
vehicle garjara break. morin horse macure become skinny. uksin armor.  
saca helmet. beri bow (279) sirdan arrow. gijun long three-pointed spear.

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<sup>17</sup> *ningge* functions as nominalizer.

kalka shield. dalikû screen. amba big kalka shield. junihin land tax usin  
field ihan ox, bull amba big seien vehicle. juwan ubu ten portions de in  
ninggun ubu six portions ekiyembi diminish. tuttu ofi therefore mergen  
jiyanggiyûn wise general bata ningge what belong to the enemy be jetere  
eat be kicembi strive to. bata i enemy’s emu one jungkengge a measure  
of volume (Ch. *zhong*) be accusative jeci if eating. musei our orin  
jungkengge twenty *zhong* de teherembi equal to. muya straw orho  
grass be emu gingnehen one picul (280) oci if, as for. musei our orin  
gingnehen twenty piculs de teherembi equal to. tuttu ofi therefore bata  
be warangge what kills the enemy. jili banjibure enraging de [lies] in kai  
emphatic. bata i aisi enemy’s benefit be accusative gaijarangge receiving.  
ulin wealth bahabure cause to obtain de [lies] in kai emphatic. tuttu ofi  
therefore seien i by means of vehicles afara de when fighting. seien be  
juwan sejengge ci wesihun above ten *sheng* (unit of vehicles) of vehicles  
bahaci if obtaining. neneme baha urse de to people who obtained first  
šangnambi reward. terei temgetun pennon kiru banner be accusative  
(281) halambi change. seien vehicle be accusative suwaliyaganjame  
mixing together (converb) baitalambi use. cooha soldiers be accusative sain

i well (adverbial) **ujimbi** sustaining. **erebe** of/about this **bata be etembime**  
win over the enemy and **ele** more **etuhun** strong **ombi** become. **sembi** to call.  
**tuttu ofi** therefore **cooha** military [action] **etere be wesihun obumbi**  
gives priority to victory. **goidabure be wesihun oburakû** does not give  
priority to protraction. **tuttu** thus **cooha be sara jiyanggiyûn** general who  
knows about military [matters]. **irgen i ergen** people’s lives **be** accusative  
**jafahabi** holds. **gurun booi elhe (282) tuksicuke de** for the state’s  
being in peace [or in] danger **dalahabi** to be the leader:

**afara be bodoro** planning to attack **ilaci fiyelen** third chapter.  
**sun dz hendume. yaya** any **cooha baitalara doro** Tao of using  
troops. **gurun** the country **be** accusative **yooni oburengge** keeping complete  
**wesihun** primary, top, best. **gurun be efulerengge** ruining the country **ilhi**  
secondary. **giyûn** Ch. *jun* **cooha be yooni oburengge wesihun.**  
**giyûn cooha be efulerengge** destroying, ruining **ilhi** secondary. **lioi** Ch. *lûi*  
**cooha be yooni oburengge wesihun. (284) loii cooha be**  
**efulerengge ilhi. dzu** Ch. *zu* **cooha be yooni oburengge**  
**wesihun. dzu cooha be efulerengge ilhi u** Ch. *wu* **cooha be**

yooni oburengge wesihun. u cooha be efulerengge ilhi. tuttu  
ofi therefore tanggûnggeri afafi tanggûnggeri etecibe though winning  
100 times after fighting 100 times. sain dade sain ningge what is good in  
addition to being good (i.e. the best) waka not. afarakû bime (285)  
niyalmai cooha be bukdaburengge not fighting and [yet] subduing the  
troops of others. sain dade sain ningge what is good in addition to being good  
(i.e. the best) kai emphatic. tuttu ofi therefore wesihun cooha top army  
hebe plot be accusative efulembi destroy, break. terei ilhingge the next to  
that haji being attached (i.e. becoming allies) be accusative efulembi destroy,  
break. terei ilhingge what is next to that cooha army be accusative  
efulembi destroy, break. tereci from that fusihûngge downward hecen  
be afambi to attack a city. hecen be afara arga the strategy of attacking a  
city. umainaci ojurakû ofi because there is no other choice. amba kalka  
big shield duin muheren (286) seye <sejen> four-wheeled vehicle be  
dasatara put in order, fix. agûra hajun be weilere de in making  
weapons. ilan biya ofi after three months teni only then šanggara  
accomplish. boihon i keremu ramparts [made] of ground be cirgere de in  
ramming. geli also, again ilan biya ofi teni wajire be dahame because



of finishing only after three months. **jiyanggiyûn** general **alimbaharakû jili banjifi** having become exceedingly enraged. **yerhuwe gese necinefi** having gone to encroach like [swarming] ants. **cooha urse be ilan ubu de emu ubu wabumbime** having one-third of the soldiers killed and [yet]. **hecen be baharakûngge** not getting (capturing) the city. (287) **ere** this **afara sui** crime of attacking/fighting **kai** emphatic. **tuttu ofi** therefore **cooha baitalara mangga urse** people capable of using troops. **niyalmai cooha be buk daburengge** subduing the army of others. **afara de akû** without fighting. **niyalmai hecen be gairengge** taking/seizing the city of others. **dailara de akû** without [resorting] to making war. **niyalmai gurun be efulerengge** destroying the country of others. **goidabure de akû** without [resorting] to protracted [battles]. **urunakû yooni obume** [by] making complete **abkai fejergi de temšeme ofi** because one must compete beneath heaven.<sup>18</sup> **tuttu** thus **cooha troops (288) cukurakû bime** not becoming tired. **aisi be yooni obuci ombi** the benefit can be kept perfect. **ere** this **afara be bodoro arga** strategy of planning to attack **kai** emphatic. **tuttu ofi** therefore

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<sup>18</sup> That is: because one must compete in this world by taking the surest means for triumph.

cooha baitalara doro method of using troops. juwan ubu ten times fulu  
in excess oci if kambi besiege. sunja ubu five times fulu in excess oci if  
dailambi make war. ubui [one] time fulu in excess oci faksalambi divide.  
tehereci if equal afame mutembi able to fight. komso few oci if  
tuwakiyame meotembi <mutembi> able to guard. (289) isirakû not  
reach oci if jailame avoid mutembi able to. tuttu thus ajige small bata  
enemy nukcike de in advancing valiantly. amba big bata enemy de  
jafabumbi to be captured kai. jiyanggiyûn general serengge so-called  
(topical marker). gurun i aisilarangge one who assists the country.  
aisilarangge mergen oci if the assistance is outstanding gurun urunakû  
etuhun ombi the country will surely become powerful. aisilarangge eberi  
oci if the assistance is weak gurun urunakû yadalinggû ombi the country  
will surely become weak. tuttu thus cooha i ejen de joborongge what  
worry a military leader ilan three. cooha dosici (290) ojarahû be sarkû  
without knowing that the troops cannot advance bime dosi sere and say  
“Advance!”. cooha bedereci ojarahû be sarkû without knowing that the  
troops cannot withdraw bime bedere serengge and say “Withdraw!”.  
erebe of this cooha troops be siderembi to hobble, to encumber sembi to

call. ilan giyûn coohai baita be sarkû bime ilan giyûn coohai  
dasan de danaci if not knowing the matter of the troops of the three *jun* and [yet]  
going to take care of the control of the troops of the three *jun*. coohai urse military  
men hûlimbumbi will be led astray. ilan giyûn coohai toose be sarkû  
bime. (291) ilan giyûn coohai tušan de danaci if not knowing the  
power of the troops of the three *jun* and [yet] going to take care of the duties of the troops  
of the three *jun*. coohai urse military men kenehunjembi will doubt/suspect.  
ilan giyûn cooha the troops of the three *jun* hûlimbure dade  
kenehunjeci if confused and distrustful. goloi beisei jobolon the disaster  
of the feudal princes (i.e. disaster coming from other feudal princes) isinjimbi arrive  
kai emphatic. erebe cooha be facuhûrabufi. etere be yarumbi  
sembi this is called “causing [one’s] army in disarray and leading [the enemy] to  
victory”. tuttu ofi therefore etere be sarangge knowing [how to] win  
sunja five. afaci ojoro afaci ojurakû be sarangge [he] who knows  
[when he] can fight [and when he] cannot fight etembi will win. (292) labdu  
komso be baitalara be ulhirengge [he] who understands [how] to use the  
many [as well as] the few etembi will win. dergi fejergi buyen  
adalingge [in the case] that the desires of the one on the top and the ones below are

similar **etembî** will win. **belhefi belhehekû be alime gairengge** [he]  
who has prepared and [wait] to seize the unprepared **etembî** will win.  
**jiyanggiyûn mutembime ejen ergelerakûngge** [in the case] that the  
general is capable and the emperor does not force **etembî** will win. **ere sunja**  
**serengge** these five. **etere be sara doro** the Tao of knowing [how to] win  
**kai** emphatic. **tuttu ofi** therefore **cembe sara beyebe sara oci** if  
knowing them and knowing oneself. **tanggûnggeri. afaha (293)** seme  
though fighting 100 times **tuksicuke akû** without being in danger. **cembe**  
**sarkû bime beyebe saci** if not knowing them and knowing oneself. **emgeri**  
once **etembî** win **emgeri** once **anabumbi** defeated **cembe sarkû**  
**beyebe sarkû oci** if not knowing them and not knowing oneself. **afahadari**  
everytime one fights **urunakû tuksicuke ombi** must be dangerous **sehebi**  
[thus] said:

**(295) coohai arbun i** of military circumstances **duici fiyelen** fourth chapter  
**sun dz hendume. seibeni** formerly, once **afara mangga urse** men  
capable of fighting. **eteci ojorakû** can win **be** accusative **neneme** beforehand  
**toktobufi** having made sure. **bata i** enemy's **eteci ojoro** can win **be**

accusative **aliyambi** wait. **eteci ojarahûngge** that [one] cannot win **beye**  
**de bi** lies in oneself. **eteci ojarahge** that [one] can win **bata de bi** lie in  
the matter. **tuttu** thus **afara mangga urse** men capable of fighting. **eteci**  
**(296) ojarahû** cannot win **be** accusative **toktobume mutembi** able to make  
sure. **bata** enemy **be** accusative **urunakû** must **eteci ojoro** can win **de**  
**isibume** cause to reach **muterakû** unable to. **tuttu ofi** therefore **etere** win  
**be saci ombime** can know and **toktobuci ojarahû** cannot make sure  
**sehebi** it was said. **eteci ojarahûngge** [that one] cannot win **tuwakiyara**  
guard **de** [lies] in, [subject] to **kai** emphatic. **eteci ojarahge** [that one] can win  
**afara** attack **de** [lies] in, [subject] to **kai** emphatic. **hamirakû oci** if  
unattainable **tuwakiyambi** [one should] guard. **etuhun oci** if strong **afambi**  
[one should] attack. **tuwakiyara (297) mangga urse** men capable of  
guarding. **uyun** nine **na** earth, land **i** enitive **fejile** underneath **somime** hide.  
**afara mangga urse**. **uyun** nine **abkai** heaven + genitive **dele** on top  
**aššame** move, act **ofi** because. **tuttu** thus **beyebe karmambime** protect  
oneself and **yooni eteme mutembi** able to win entirely. **etere** win **be**  
accusative **sarangge** what one sees. **geren niyalmai sarangge ci**  
**dulenderakû oci** if not surpassing what many people see. **sain dade sain**

ningge what is good in addition to being good (i.e. the best thing) waka is not kai  
emphatic. afame etefi having become victorious [by] fighting. abkai fejergi  
sain (298) sehengge that [the people] beneath heaven (i.e. the whole country)  
say, “Well [done]!”. sain dade sain ningge waka is not the best thing kai  
emphatic. tuttu ofi therefore beileci i solmin be tukiyerengge be with  
respect to he who lifts a tiny hair of the autumn pelt. hûsun mangga seci  
ojorakû cannot say [he is] strong. šun biya be saburengge be with  
respect to he who sees the sun and the moon. yasa genggiyen seci ojorakû  
cannot say [his] eye[sight] is clear . kiyatar sere akjan be donjirengge  
be with respect to he who hears the rumbling thunder. šan galbi seci ojorakû  
cannot say [his] ears have keen hearing. julgei of the past, ancient afara (299)  
mangga urse men who were capable of fighting. sehengge topical marker.  
ja i etere be eterengge kai were indeed those who win what was to be won  
easily. tuttu ofi therefore afara mangga. ursei eterengge the victory of  
the men capable of fighting. mergen gebu akû without the fame of being wise.  
baturu gungge akû without the merit of being courageous ofi because. tuttu  
so terei afame etefi his fighting and winning endeburakû ombi do not  
err. endeburakûngge that [he] does not err etere be tokto bufi. emgeri

gidabuhangge be eteme ofi kai is precisely because [he] has made sure [that he is] to win and [that he is] to win over those already defeated. **tuttu** so **afara mangga (300)** urse men capable of fighting. **gaiburakû bade** in an undefeatable place **ilifi** having stood. **bata be gidara** defeat the enemy **be ufaraburakû** without missing/failing. **tuttu ofi** therefore **etere cooha** troops that are to win **oci** as for. **neneme etehe manggi** after becoming victorious in advance **teni** only then **afara be baimbi** seek to fight. **gaibure cooha** troops that are to be defeated **oci** as for. **neneme afaha manggi** after fighting **teni** only then **etere be baimbi** seek to win . **cooha baitalara mangga urse** men capable of using troops. **doro be tuwancihiyambime** rectify the method and **fafun be karmame** protect the law **(301) ofi** because. **tuttu** thus **etere gaibure dasan** governance of victory [as well as] defeat **be tokkobume mutembi** able to fix/decide. **coohai doro** military Tao **uju de** firstly **kemun** regulation **sembi** call. **jai de** secondly **miyalin** a measure **sembi**. **ilaci de** thirdly **ton** number **sembi**. **duici de** fourthly **toose** weight for a balance **sembi**. **sunjaci de** fifthly **eterengge** being victorious **sembi**. **na ci** from earth **kemun banjinambi** come about. **kemun ci miyalin banjinambi**. **miyalin ci ton**

banjinambi (302) ton ci toose banjinambi. toose ci eterengge  
banjinambi. tuttu so etere cooha troops who are to win oci as for .  
gintoho i heni be gingnere adali like weighing a pinch [of sth] by the unit  
of yi. gaibure cooha troops who are to be defeated oci as for. heni i  
gintoho be gingnere adali like weighing by a pinch [what is to be measured  
by] the unit of yi. etere ursei victorious people’s afara fighting de in.  
minggan jerun i holo de in a valley of a thousand ren tehe muke stagnant  
water be accusative sendelehe breaching adalingge like. arbun de [lie]  
in, [subject] to kai emphatic:

(303) coohai horon military power i genitive sunjaci fiyelen fifth chapter.  
sun dz hendume. yaya any geren be kadalara ruling the many de  
in/when. komso be kadalara adali ojongge like ruling the few. ubu  
portion ton number de in kai emphatic. geren be afara fighting the many de  
when. komso be afara adali ojongge like fighting the few. arbun  
shape; situation, circumstances jilgan sound de [due] to kai emphatic. ilan  
giyûn three jun cooha i troop’s geren many, crowd be accusative. (304)  
bata i baru sujame resisting the enemy. urunakû surely



gidaburakûngge can be undefeatable. iletu clear, open somishûn hidden, secret de [due] to kai emphatic. cooha army, troops sucunaha went to storm de when. wehe gaifi umhan be gidara adali ojongge like, having taken a stone, crushing an egg (i.e. taking a stone to crush an egg). kumdu empty yargiyan real de kai. yaya any afarangge fight. iletu clear i by means of bakcilabumbi to make oppose. somishûn hidden i by means of etembi to win. tuttu thus somishûn hidden be accusative baitalara mangga urse people capable of using. abka na i adali like heaven and earth mohon akû inexhaustible. ula mederi i adali like river and sea (305) farakû not dry up. dubefi dahûme deriburengge having ended and started again. šun biyai adali like the sun and the moon. bucefi dahûme banjirengge having died and reborn. duin erin i adali like the four seasons. jilgan sound sunja be dulenderakû not going beyond five. sunja five jilgan sound i genitive kûbulirengge change be about. donjiha seme though heard wajirakû without end. boco color sunja be dulenderakû not going beyond five. sunja five boco color i genitive kûbulirengge change be accusative. tuwaha seme though seen wajirakû without end. amtan taste sunja be (306) dulenderakû not going beyond five. sunja five amtan taste i genitive

kûbulirengge change be accusative. amtalaha seme though tasted  
wajirakû without end. afara fighting horon power, awe. somishûn hidden  
iletu open, clear be dulenderakû not going beyond. somishûn hidden  
iletu open i kûbulirengge the change of be. sibkiha seme though  
investigated wajirakû without end. somishûn hidden iletu open i genitive  
ishunde banjinarangge giving rise to each other. muheren wheel  
forgošoro turning gese like da dube akû be dahame because [it is]  
without beginning and end. we sibkime (307) mutembini who is able to  
investigate? . cingabuha mukei blocked water’s hûsun power de in. wehe  
stone dekdere floating de isinarangge reaching [the extent]. horon power  
de kai emphatic. dasihire gasha i hûsun power of a bird who swoops down  
and seize de in. meirere <meijere> shatter, break bijara break, snap de  
isinarangge reaching to. kemun limit de kai. tuttu so afara mangga  
urse people capable of fighting. terei horon power of that, its power  
gelecuke frightful. terei its kemun limit hakcin brusque. horon uthai  
dabuha fitheku beri i adali like a operating crossbow. kemun limit (308)  
uthai gabtaha selmin i adali just like a shooting mechanism. burgin  
bargin i in sudden bursts šašabume cause to be in a mess. afara de when

fighting **facuhûn** in disarray, disorder. **gojime** only **facuhûraci** **ojorakû** cannot be confused **bur bar seme** in profusion. **arbun** shape **muheliyen** round **gojime** only **gidaci** **ojorakû** cannot be defeated. **facuhûn** confusion, disorder. **teksin** even, in order **ci** from/out of **banjinambi** come about. **oliha** cowardly (cowardice) **baturu** brave (bravery) **ci** from **banjinambi** come about. **yadalinggû** weak **etuhun** strong **ci** **banjinambi** come about from. **teksin** **facuhûn** **ojorongge** being in order [or] in disorder. (309) **ton** number **de** [due] to, [lie] in **kai** emphatic. **baturu** **oliha** **ojorongge** being brave [or] cowardly **horon** power, awe **de** [due] to, [lie] in **kai** emphatic. **etuhun** **yadalinggû** **ojorongge** being strong [or] weak **arbun** shape, situation, circumstances **de** [due] to, [lie] in **kai** emphatic. **tuttu** **ofi** therefore **bata** be **aššabure** **mangga** **urse** people capable of causing the enemy to move. **arbun** **tuwabure** showing the situation **de** [lie] in. **bata** enemy **urunakû** must **necinjimbi** come to encroach. **bure** **de** when giving **bata** enemy **urunakû** must **gaimbi** take. **aisi** **i** by means of benefits **aššabumbi** cause to move. **bekilefi** having made fast/firm **alime** **gaimbi** to receive. **tuttu** so **afara** (310) **mangga** **urse** people capable of fighting. **horon** **de** **baimbi** to seek power. **niyalma** **de** **nikeburakû** not entrusting to others **ofi** because.

tuttu so [n]iyalma be sonjome selecting people horon de akdame  
mutembi can depend on power. horon de akdaha urse people depending  
on power. niyalmai baru afara de when fighting against others. moo wood  
wehe stone be accusative fuhešebure causing to roll over adali is like.  
moo wood wehe stone i genitive banin nature. elhe oci if peaceful cibsen  
ombi will be still. tuksicuke oci if dangerous aššambi will move. (311)  
hošonggo square oci as for/if ilimbi stop, rest. muheliyen round oci as for  
fuhešembi to roll. tuttu ofi therefore afara mangga niyalmai horon.  
minggan jerun alin ci muheliyen wehe be fuhešebure adali  
ojorongge that the power of the man capable of fighting is like causing a round stone  
to roll [down] from a mountain of a thousand ren . horon power de [lie] in, [due] to  
kai emphatic :

(313) kumdu empty yargiyan real i genitive ningguci fiyelen sixth  
chapter.

sun dz hendume. yaya any afara bade neneme bifi. bata be  
alime gairengge one who, having stayed in the place of fighting, [waits to] receive  
the enemy ergembi will rest (will be at ease). afara bade amala sitafi.

**afame dosirengge** one who, lagged behind [in coming] to the place of fighting, advances to fight **suilambi** will suffer hardship. **tuttu** so **afara mangga urse** people capable of fighting. **niyalma be jibumbime** cause others to come and **niyalma de yarkiyaburakû** without being enticed by others. **batai (314) niyalma be ini cisui jibume muterengge** that one can make the enemy come on his (i.e. the enemy’s) own initiative. **aisi be tuwabume** showing benefits **ofi** because of **kai** emphatic. **batai niyalma be bahafi jiderakû obume muterengge** that one can make the enemy not able to come. **jobolon be tuwabume** showing the harms **ofi** because of **kai** emphatic. **tuttu ofi** therefore **bata** enemy **ergeci** if resting **suilabume mutembi** able to cause [the enemy] to suffer. **ebici** if being full/sated **omiholobume mutembi** able to cause [the enemy] to starve. **elhe oci** if being in peace **aššabume mutembi** able to cause [the enemy] to move. **ceni (315) dosinjirakûci** if they do not come to advance (lit., their without coming to enter) **tucimbi** [one should] come out. **ceni gûnihakûci** if they have not expected **dosimbi** [one should] advance. **minggan ba be yabumbime suilarakûngge** going over a thousand leagues without suffering hardship. **niyalma akû babe yabume ofi** because of going in places where there are no other people **kai** emphatic. **afara de** when

attacking **urunakû gaijarangge** must capture. **ceni tuwakiyahakû**  
**babe afame ofi** because of attacking where they have not guarded **kai** emphatic.  
**tuwakiyara de** when guarding **urunakû akdun ojongge** must be firm.  
**ceni afarakû babe tuwakiyame ofi** because of guarding where they do not  
attack **kai** emphatic. **tuttu ofi** therefore (316) **afara mangga urse** people  
capable of attacking. **bata ceni tuwakiyara babe sarkû** the enemy being  
ignorant of what/where to guard. **tuwakiyara mangga urse** people capable of  
guarding. **bata ceni afara babe sarkû** the enemy being ignorant of  
what/where to attack. **somishûn** secret **kai** emphatic. **somishûn** secret **kai**  
emphatic. **arbun akû** shapeless **de isinambi** to the extent of.  
**ferguwecuke** wonderful **kai** emphatic. **ferguwecuke** wonderful **kai**  
emphatic. **jilgan akû** soundless **de isinambi** to the extent of. **tuttu** thus, so  
**bata i ergen be jafame mutembi** able to seize the enemy’s life. **dosire**  
**de** when advancing (317) **dalici ojarahungge** cannot block/thwart. **ceni** their  
**kumdu** empty **be** accusative **fondoloro** penetrating **de** [due] to **kai** emphatic.  
**bederere de** when withdrawing **fargaci ojarahungge** cannot pursue.  
**hûdun ofi** because of being quick **amcaci ojarahû** cannot catch up to **de** [lie]  
in, [due] to **kai** emphatic. **tuttu** so **muse afaki seci** when/if we want to fight .

bata enemy udu ten keremu šumin yohoron seme despite high  
citadels and deep canals. umainaci ojurakû having no choice musei baru  
afarangge fight against us. ceni urunakû aitubure babe afara  
attacking where they have to rescue de [due] to kai emphatic. (318) muse  
afarakû oki seci when/if we do not want to fight. udu na be jijufi  
tuwakiyaha seme though having drawn [a borderline on] the ground and  
guarded. bata enemy musei baru bahafi afarakûngge cannot fight  
against us. ceni jidere ici be farfabuha being confused in the direction of  
their coming de [due] to kai emphatic tuttu ofi therefore niyalma de arbun  
be tuwabumbime showing the shape/situation of others and . muse de  
arbun akû we being shapeless oci as for. muse uhei bime we being united  
bata enemy faksalambi separate. muse (319) uhei ofi because we become  
united emu ombi become one. bata enemy faksalafi divided juwan ombi  
become ten. ere this juwan be gaifi. emke be afaci if having taken ten  
and attacking one. muse we geren ombi become many. bata enemy  
komso ombi become few. geren i by the many komso be gidame  
muteci if/as for being able to raid the few. musei afanarangge our going to  
fight boljonggo agreeing on, fixing a date kai emphatic. musei afanara

babe the place where we go to fight ulhici ojarahû [we] cannot understand.  
ulhici ojarahû cannot understand oci as for. bata i enemy's belherengge  
being prepared (320) labdu ombi become many. bata i enemy's  
belherengge being prepared labdu many oci as for. musei our  
afanarangge going to fight komso ombi become few. tuttu ofi therefore  
julergi front, fore be accusative belheci if preparing amargingge what is  
behind/comes later komso few ombi become. amargi back be accusative  
belheci if preparing. julergingge what is before komso few ombi become.  
hashû ergi left side be accusative belheci if preparing ici ergingge what is  
on the right side komso few ombi become. ici ergi right side be accusative  
belheci if preparing hashû ergingge what is on the left side komso few  
(321) ombi become. belherakûngge akû nothing unprepared oci as for.  
komso akûngge akû nothing is not few ombi become. komso  
ojorongge that being few. niyalma be belherengge preparing [to deal  
with] others kai emphatic. geren ojongge that being many niyalma de  
belheburengge causing others to prepare kai. tuttu ofi therefore afara ba  
be same knowing the place to fight. afara inenggi be same knowing the  
day to fight ohode if. minggan baci if 1000 leagues acanjifi afaci ombi



can come to meet and fight. **afara ba be sarkû** not knowing the place to fight.  
**afara inenggi be (322) sarkû** not knowing the day to fight **ohode** if.  
**hashû ergingge** what is on the left side. **ici ergi be aitubume**  
**muterakû** unable to assist the right side. **ici ergingge** what is on the right side.  
**hashû ergi be aitubume muterakû** unable to assist the left side.  
**julergingge** what is in front **amargi be aitubume muterakû** unable to  
assist the back. **amargingge** what is behind **julergi be aitubume**  
**muterakû** unable to assist the front **bade** in cases<sup>19</sup>. **gorokingge ududu**  
**juwan be. hacikingge ududu babe ai hendure** not to mention the  
cases of [as] far [as] several tens of leagues [and as] near [as] several leagues. **u**  
**gurun be jafafi bodoki** intend to capture the Wu state and calculate. **yuwei**  
**gurun i niyalmai (323) cooha udu labdu seme** though the soldiers of  
the Yue people were many. **inu** also **etere de ai tusa ni** what is the benefit for  
victory. **tuttu ofi** therefore **etere** victory **be** accusative **toktobuci ombi** can  
be made sure. **bata** enemy **udu geren seme** though many **eljeburakû oci**  
**ombi** can be made not to oppose **sehebi** [thus] it was said. **tuttu ofi** therefore

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<sup>19</sup> In cases such as what is on the left side is unable to assist the right side...

bodoho de when calculating jabšara ufarara arga plots for gains and losses be accusative sambi to know. nukibuhe de when causing to stir up. aššara cibsera giyan principles of moving and being quiet be accusative sambi to know. (324) arbun be tuwabuha de when showing the shape bucere perishing banjire surviving ba place be accusative sambi to know. meljebuhe de when causing to compete. fulu eberi babe what/where there is excess [or] inadequacy sambi to know of. tuttu ofi therefore coohai army’s arbun shape be accusative tuwabure ten the extreme of showing. arbun akû shapeless de isinambi reach the extent of, go so far as to. arbun akû shapeless oci as for. jakanabure manggangge a well-crafted *jian*<sup>20</sup> hiracame muterakû unable to spy intently on. mergen urse wise men bodome muterakû unable to plot/plan. arbun be dahame because of/after the shape (325) geren de to/among the many etere be tuwabucibe though showing victory. geren the many same muterakû unable to know. niyalma people gemu all musei etere arbun the “shape” of our victory be sara gojime only know of. musei etere be toktobure arbun be

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<sup>20</sup> jakanabure (Ch. *jian*) “cause to split”.

sarkû without knowing the “shape” of our ensuring victory. tuttu so terei its  
afame etere fight and win be accusative dahiburakû not repeated bime  
and. arbun shape de acabure adjusting to, attuning with de mohon akû  
without exhaustion. coohai arbun serengge the so-called “shape of troops”  
mukei (326) adali like water. mukei arbun shape of water. nuhu ci  
biyalume slipping away from high places wasihûn ici eyembi to flow  
downwards. coohai army’s, troops’ arbun shape. yargiyan ci jailame  
avoid the real kumdu be gidambi raid the empty. muke water na be  
dahame following [the shape of] earth eyen banjinambi the flow comes forth.  
cooha troops bata be dahame following the enemy etere be  
toktobumbi to ensure victory. tuttu thus cooha de enteheme horon  
akû the troops have no constant power. muke de enteheme arbun akû  
the water has no constant shape. (327) bata be dahame kûbulifi ubaliyafi  
eteme muterengge being able to change and transform in accordance with [the  
situations of] the enemy and become victorious be. ferguwecuke “wonderful”  
sembi call. tuttu ofi therefore sunja feten the five elements de  
enteheme eterengge akû have no constant victory. duin erin the four  
seasons de enteheme teisu akû have no constant assigned places. šun the

sun/day **de golmin foholon bi** has [occasions of being] long [and] short. **biya**  
the moon **burubumbi die banjimbi** live:

(329) **giyûn jun coohai** army’s **temšen** contention/strife **i** genitive **nadaci**  
**fiyelen** seventh chapter

**sun dz hendume. yaya** any **cooha baitalara doro** Tao of using  
troops. **jiyanggiyûn** general **ejen i hese be alime gaifi** having received  
the emperor’s decree. **geren cooha** multitude and soldiers **be** accusative  
**bargiyame isabufi** having gathered. **kûwaran i camp’s duka** gate  
**bakcilame** opposite **tatara** camping, stationing **be dahame** after. **giyûn**  
**jun coohai** army’s, military **temšen** strife **ci manggangge akû** nothing  
more difficult than. **giyûn (330) coohai temšen i** military strife’s  
**manggangge** what is difficult, difficulties. **goro** far, distant **be** accusative  
**hanci** near **obumbi** to cause to become, to make. **jobolon** harm **be** accusative  
**aisi** benefit **obumbi** to cause to become, to make. **tuttu** so **jugûn be goro**  
**obufi** having caused the route to become distant. **aisi i** by means of benefit  
**yarkiyambi** to allure. **niyalmai amala juracibe** though setting out  
behind/after than other people. **niyalmai onggoro isinambi** arrive before other

people. ere this goro hanci ojoro arga be sarangge knowing the strategy of being far and near kai emphatic. tuttu ofi therefore giyûn jun cooha troops gaifi having taken temšeneci if/when contending aisi ombi can be advantageous. (331) geren many, multitude gaifi having taken temšeneci if/when contending tuksicuke ombi can be dangerous. giyûn jun cooha troops be accusative yooni all together gaifi having taken temšeneci if/when contending. amcarakû ombi cannot make it on time. giyûn jun cooha troops be accusative werifi having left behind aisi benefit be accusative temšeneci if/when contending. ujen heavy, valuable aciha load, burden waliyabumbi to be abandoned. uttu thus be dahame because of. uksin armor be accusative uhufi having wrapped dosime advance. inenggi day dobori night teyerakû not at ease/relax. on gaime taking route hachiyame hurriedly yabume go. tanggû ba 100 leagues (332) surteme racing aisi benefit be accusative temšeneci if/when contending. ilan three coohai data military leaders jafabumbi capture. silin cooha crack troops juleri in front. eberhun cooha weak troops amala be dahame following behind. toktofi certainly juwan ubu de emu ubu one tenth isinambi arrive. susai ba 50 leagues surteme racing aisi benefit be

accusative **temšeneci** if/when contending. **dergi coohai data** top military  
leaders **kokirambi** injure. **toktofi** certainly **dulin** half **isinambi** arrive.  
**gûsin ba** 30 leagues **surteme** racing **aisi** benefit **be (333)** **temšeneci**  
if/when contending. **ilan ubu de juwe ubu** two third **isinambi** arrive. **uttu**  
thus **be dahame** because of. **giyûn cooha de ujen aciha akû oci** if  
the *jun* troops have no heavy loads **gukumbi** to be annihilated. **jeku jufeliyen**  
**akû oci** if without provisions **gukumbi** to be annihilated. **iktambuha**  
**isabuhangge akû oci** if without what have been collected **gukumbi** to be  
annihilated. **tuttu ofi** therefore **goloi beisei hebe be sarkûngge** not  
knowing the plots of the feudal princes. **doigonde** beforehand **hajilame**  
**muterakû** unable to ally. **(334)** **alin** mountain **weji** forest **haksan** steep,  
precipice **hafirhûn** narrow **hali** swamp **omo** lake **i** genitive **arbun** shape **be**  
accusative **sarkûngge** not knowing. **cooha** troops **gaifi** having taken  
**yabume muterakû** unable to go. **jugûn jorire gajaraci** a guide who  
points the way **be** accusative **baitalarakûngge** no using/employing. **na i**  
earth’s **aisi** benefit **be** accusative **bahame muterakû** unable to obtain. **tuttu**  
thus **cooha** troops **be** accusative **koimalidame** [by] acting cunningly  
**mutebumbi** achieve. **aisi i** by means of benefits **aššabumbi** cause to move.

faksalame acabume [by] separating [and] joining kûbulibumbi cause to change. tuttu so terei its (335) hahilarangge acting urgently edun i adali like the wind. terei its elhešerengge acting leisurely bujan i adali like a forest sucunara going to storm tabcilarangge marauding tuwa i adali like fire. aššarakûngge being motionless alin i adali like a mountain. ulhire de manggangge being difficult to understand butu i adali like [what is] hidden/dim. aššarangge being in motion kiyatar sere akjan i adali like rumbling thunder. gašan village, country be accusative tabcilafi having marauding geren multitude be accusative faksalambi divide. ba na territory be accusative fesheleci if/when opening up arbungga having good shape be accusative (336) tuwakiyambi watch over. tooselame exercising power aššame moving. goro hanci i arga be doigonde sarangge knowing beforehand the strategy of being distant and near etembi to win. ere this giyûn *jun* coohai temšen i military strife’s doro Tao, method kai emphatic. coohai dasan de in military rule/governance henduhengge [there is a] saying gisun words be accusative ishunde donjirakû ojoro jakade because of not mutually listening. tuttu thus tungken drum can cymbal be accusative ilibuhabi set up. yasa eye ishunde saburakû ojoro jakade

because of not mutually see **tuttu** thus (337) **temgetun** pennant **kiru** banner be  
accusative **ilibuhabi** set up **sehebi** it was said. **tungken** can **temgetun**  
**kiru** **serengge** so-called. **cohome** **niyalmai šan yasa** be **emu**  
**oburengge** what especially makes people’s ears and eyes into one **kai** emphatic.  
**niyalma** people **emgeri** once **cohotoi** especially **emu oho** became one  
**manggi** after. **baturu urse** brave people **emhun dosime muterakû**  
unable to advance alone. **oliha urse** cowardly people **emhun bedereme**  
**muterakû** unable to withdraw alone. **ere** this **geren** be **baitalara doro**  
the Tao of using the multitude **kai** emphatic. (338) **tuttu ofi** therefore **dobori** [at]  
night **afara de** when fighting. **tuwa tungken** be **labdu obure** having  
many fire and drums. **inenggi** [during] daytime **afara de** when fighting.  
**temgetun kiru** be **labdu oburengge** having many pennants and banners.  
**cohome niyalmai šan yasa** be **farfaburengge** what especially  
confuse people’s ears and eyes **kai** emphatic. **ilan giyûn coohai sukdon**  
spirit/morale of the three **jun** be **durici ombi** [one] can rob/seize. **jijanggiyûn**  
**i mujilen** the general’s heart/intention be **durici ombi** [one] can rob/seize. **uttu**  
**ofi** so **erde i sukdon** air of early [morning] (339) **etuhun** vigorous.  
**inenggi dulin i sukdon** air of the midday **šadashûn** rather tired. **yamji i**



sukdun air of the evening šoyoshûn rather shrunken. cooha baitalara  
mangga urse people capable of using troops. tesei etuhun sukdu their  
vigorous air ci jailara avoid. tesei their šadashûn rather tired šoyoshûn  
rather shrunken be accusative gidarangge raiding. ere this sukdu air be  
accusative dasarangge ruling/controlling kai emphatic. teksin i by orderliness  
facuhûn disorder be accusative alime gaire receive. ekisaka i by quietness  
curgindure commotion be alime (340) gairengge receive. ere this  
mujilen mind be dasarangge ruling/controlling kai. hanciki i by means of  
being near goroki far be alime gaire receive. teyehun i by means of  
relaxation suilara being exhausted, suffering be alime gaire receive. Ebifi  
having become full/sated omiholoro starving be alime gairengge receive.  
ere this hûsun be dasarangge ruling/controlling might kai. cak seme  
neatly teksilehe set out evenly/orderly kiru banner be ume okdoro do not go  
to meet. sehehuri towering faidaha orderly arranged faidan rows be  
accusative ume birere do not attack. (341) ere this kûbulin change be  
dasarangge ruling/controlling kai. tuttu ofi therefore cooha baitalara  
doro the Tao of using troops. den high munggan mound i baru toward  
ume tafara do not ascend. fisa the back waliyaha abandoned muhu mound

i baru toward ume okdoro do not go to meet holtome deceitfully burulara  
fleeing be accusative ume sudalara do not pursue. dacun coohai baru  
against shrewd soldiers ume afara do not attack welmiyere fishing cooha  
troops be accusative ume sekere do not take the bait. bederere withdrawing  
cooha troops be accusative ume (342) heturere do not intercept and rob.  
horibuha cooha de to enclosed/besieged troops jaka bure give an interval.  
mohoho cooha be accusative ume fargara do not pursue. ere this  
cooha baitalara doro the Tao of using troops kai emphatic:

(343) uyun nine kûbulin change, variation i genitive jakûci fiyelen eighth  
chapter.

sun dz hendume. yaya cooha baitalara doro any Tao of using  
troops. jiyanggiyûn general ejen i hese be alime gaifi having received  
the emperor’s decree. geren multitude cooha soldiers, troops be accusative  
isabume bargiyaha gathered manggi after. nuhaliyan swamp,  
depression in the land ba place oci as for. ume tatara do not halt. salja forking  
ba place oci as for hûwaliyame harmoniously acambi join, meet. lakcaha  
remote ba place oci as for (344) ume indere do not halt/spend the night.

horire enclosed **ba** place **oci** as for **bodombi** plot. **bucere** perishing **ba** place **oci** as for **afambi** fight. **jugûn be yaburakûngge bi** there are [cases where people do] not go along the road. **cooha be gidarakûngge bi** there are [cases where people do] not raid troops. **hoton be afarakûngge bi** there are [cases where people do] not attack a city. **ba be temşerakûngge bi** there are [cases where people do] not contend [to occupy] lands. **ejen i hese be alime gaijarakûngge bi** there are [cases where people do] not accept (do not follow) the emperor’s decree. **tuttu ofi** therefore **jiyanggiyûn** general **uyun kûbulin i aisi be hafuci** if penetrating (i.e. thoroughly well-versed in) the benefits of 9 changes. (345) **cooha baitalara be sambi** will know [how to] use troops. **jiyanggiyûn** general **uyun kûbulin i aisi be hafurakû oci** if not penetrating the benefits of 9 changes. **udu na i arbun be sacibe** though knowing the shape of earth (i.e. geographical conditions). **na i aisi be bahame muterakû ombi** will be unable to gain benefits of earth (i.e. take geographical advantage). **coohalara de** when sending troops **uyun kûbulin i arga be hafurakû oci** if not penetrating the strategy of 9 changes. **udu sunja aisi be sacibe** though knowing the five benefits. **niyalma be** (346) **bahafi baitalame muterakû ombi** will be unable to use people (i.e. personnel). **uttu**

ofi therefore mergen ursei seolerengge what wise men consider.  
urunakû must aisi benefit jobolon harm be accusative barabumbi to be  
mixed/blended. aisi de barabuci if being mixed with benefits. faššan efforts  
be accusative sidarambuci ombi can be unfolded/spread out. jobolon de  
barabuci if being mixed with harms. kokiran damage, harm be subuci  
ombi can be removed. uttu ofi so goloi beise be bukdarangge he who  
subdues the feudal princes. jobolon harms be accusative (347) isibumbi cause  
to arrive. goloi beise be takûrarangge he who employs the feudal princes.  
jabšaki be bolibumbi to lure with advantages goloi beise be  
surteburengge he who makes the feudal princes to race. aisi benefits be  
accusative isibumbi cause to arrive. tuttu ofi therefore cooha baitalara  
doro method of using troops. tesei jiderakû seme ume erture do not  
count on their not coming. muse cembe alime gaire babi. seme  
ertumbi count on [the fact that] there are circumstances [under which] we receive  
(wait to confront) them. ce afanjirakû seme ume erture do not count on  
[the fact that] they will not come to attack. (348) muse de afaci ojarahû  
babi seme ertumbi count on [the fact that] there are circumstances [under which]  
we cannot attack. tuttu ofi therefore jiyanggiyûn de sunja tuksicuke bi

a general has five dangerous [situations]. **urunakû faršarangge** must risk one’s life **be** accusative **waci ombi** can kill. **urunakû ergen guwerengge** must escape [for] life **be jafaci ombi** can seize. **hatan fiery hahingge** hurried **be gidašaci ombi** can oppress. **hanja** incorrupt, honest **bolgongge** clean **be** accusative **girubuci ombi** can be disgraced. **irgen be gosirengge** loving the people **be** accusative (349) **kûthûci ombi** can stir up/confuse. **ere** this **sunja** five **serengge** so-called. **jiyanggiyûn** i general’s **endebuku** mistakes. **cooha baitalara sui** the crime of using troops **kai** emphatic. **cooha kokirara jiyanggiyûn waburengge** harming the troops and having the general killed. **urunakû** must **sunja tuksicuke haran** five dangerous causes. **kimcirakûci ojarahû** must examine carefully.

(351) **cooha** troops **yabure** going **uyuci fiyelen** ninth chapter.

**sun dz hendume. cooha tatara** to settle/station troops **bata be cincilara** examine the enemy **de** when. **alin be dabafi** having crossed mountains **holo de nikembi** lean on valleys. **banjire** survive **de forofi** having faced/turned toward **deken bade tatambi** halt in a high place. **afanara ba** place for going to attack **den oci** if being high **ume tafara** do

not station. ere this alin de cooha (352) tatarangge kai is stationing troops on a mountain. muke be dooci if crossing the river urunakû must muke ci aldangga obumbi cause to stay far from the river. aikabade bata muke be doome jici should the enemy cross the river and come. ume do not mukei dulimba de in the middle of the river okdoro go to meet/engage. imbe dulin doobufi gidaci if [you] let [the enemy] half cross and [then you] plunder aisi ombi can be advantageous. afaki seci if intending to attack. ume do not muke de on the river latunafi go to encroach and bata be okdoro receive/go to meet the enemy. (353) antu de forofi having turned toward/faced the sunny (southern) side of a mountain deken bade in a high place ilimbi stop. ume do not mukei eyen waterflow be accusative toso block. ere this mukei bade cooha tatarangge kai is stationing troops in the place/area (the vicinity) of a river. hûjuri <= hûjiri> niyo alkaline swamp be accusative dulere de when passing. hûdun gene quick[ly] go! (imperative). ume jibgešere do not tarry. aikabade hûjuri niyo bade cooha acaci if troops meet in the place/area of alkaline swamp. urunakû must muke water orho grass de nikeme lean/depend on. (354) moo bujan woods be accusative cashûlambi to turn the back on. ere this hûjuri niyo alkaline swamp de

cooha tatarangge stationing troops at kai is indeed. šehun barren olhon  
dry land de on, in oci if/as for necin bade in the level place tatambime  
camping/halting and. ici ergi the right side fisa ergi back side deken high .  
juleri front, fore bucere perishing amala back banjire surviving bade  
tatambi camp/halt in the place of. ere this šehun barren, desolate olhon dry  
land de cooha tatarangge stationing troops in/at kai is indeed uheri  
altogether, jointly ere this (355) duin four coohai aisi military  
advantages/benefits. hûwang di han duin ergi di be etehengge how  
Emperor Huangdi won over the di of the four directions kai is/are indeed. yaya any  
cooha troop. nuhu a place higher than a surrounding depression de cihangga  
is willing nuhaliyan depression in the land de cihakû unwilling. antu be  
weshun boso be fusihûn obuhabi making the south side of a mountain as  
superior and the north side of a mountain as inferior. luku thick, dense de ujime  
nourish muhu mound de tatame stationing ohode if. cooha de eiten  
nimeku (356) akû ombi troops become without all [kinds] of illness. erebe  
about this urunakû eterengge must win sembi call. muhu mound  
mungga low hill dalan dam ekcin bank oci as for. urunakû must antu  
ergide on the south side of a mountain tatafi station/camp and. ici ergi right side

be cashûlambi turn the back on. ere this cooha i troops’s aisi benefits.  
na i earth’s arbun i situation’s aisilan aid, help kai is indeed. dergi ci from  
above aga rain muke obonggi water bubbles/foams eyeme flowing jidere  
come de when. dooki seci if/when intending to cross. (357) tohororo calming  
down be aliyambi to wait for. yaya ba de kes sere yohoron. abkai  
hûcin. abkai gindana. abkai hûrhan. abkai eye. abkai yeru  
bihede in any [case that] the place has precipitous waterway, heavenly well, heavenly  
prison, heavenly net, heavenly pitfall, heavenly hole. urunakû must ekšeme  
hurriedly gene go! (imperative) . ume do not latunara go to encroach. muse  
we aldangga oci if being far. bata enemy hanci ombi if being near.  
muse we ishun oci if facing towards. bata enemy cashûn ombi  
backwards. coohai dalbade beside the troops (358) haksan steep  
hafirhûn narrow omo lake pond hûcin well. bujan weji woods šuwe  
<šuwa> dense forest on the north side of a mountain jajuri thicket bihede when  
there are. urunakû must dahûn dahûn i repeatedly kiceme suwelembi  
diligently/carefully search for. ere this buksire ambush geodelere lure, lead  
astray ba place of kai is indeed. hanci near bime and cibserengge quiet.  
ceni their haksan precipitous de ertuhengge depending on kai emphatic.



goro far bime and yarkiyame entice, decoy afanjirengge come to attack.  
niyalma be ibekini want others to advance serengge kai emphatic. ce  
they sulfa bade at ease (359) tatahangge stationing. aisi  
tuwaburengge showing benefits kai emphatic. geren many moo i trees’  
aššahangge moving. jiderengge coming kai emphatic. orho grass fik  
seme thickly dalihangge screening off. kenehunjeburengge causing to  
suspect kai emphatic. gasha bird dekdehengge rising. buksirengge  
ambushing kai emphatic. gurgu beast aksakangge hiding because of fear.  
necinjirengge coming to encroach kai emphatic. buraki dust den bime  
being high and sucunarangge flying up. sejen i vehicles’ jiderengge  
coming kai emphatic. fangkala bime being low and toron duststorm amba  
big (360) ningge nominalizer yafahan i afoot jiderengge coming kai  
emphatic. son son i scattered fakcahangge split. moo sacirengge  
chopping wood kai emphatic. seri sparse bime and amasi Julesi  
yabuhangge going back and forth. kûwaran camps ilirengge setting up  
kai emphatic. gisun words gocishûn modest bime nememe and yet  
belhehengge being prepared. dosiki serengge want to advance kai  
emphatic. gisun words etenggi powerful bime and surteme running, racing

dosinjirengge coming in. bedereki serengge want to retreat kai  
emphatic. weihuken light (361) sejen vehicle neneme tucifi having come  
out. dalbade bisirengge staying beside. faidan rows faidarangge lining  
up kai emphatic. boljohakû without agreeing on bime and hûwaliyame  
acaki serengge want to come harmoniously in agreement. argadarangge  
using artifice kai emphatic. surtenume running in all directions, racing together  
yabume going cooha faidarangge lining up troops. bolgoki  
serengge want to agree on/fix [a date] kai emphatic. dulin dosire dulin  
bedererengge half-advancing and half-withdrawing. yarkiyarangge  
enticing kai emphatic. teifun staff teifulefi having leaned on as a staff  
ilirengge standing. omiholohongge starving kai emphatic. muke water  
tatafi having drawn/pulled (362) neneme omirengge drinking beforehand.  
kangkahangge being thirsty kai emphatic. aisi be sabufi ibeme  
sarkûngge he who has seen benefits and [yet] does not know to advance.  
suilahangge kai is indeed the one who has suffered. gasha bird isarangge  
gathering . untuhun empty ohongge becoming kai emphatic. dobori night  
hûlarangge shouting. golohongge frightened kai emphatic. cooha troops  
kûthûrengge being confused. jiyanggiyûn general ujen akûngge

without seriousness **kai** emphatic. **temgetun** pennant **kiru** banner  
**aššarangge** moving. **facuhûn ohongge** being in disarray **kai** emphatic.  
**hafasa** officers **jilidarangge** enraged. (363) **bandahangge** fatigued **kai**  
emphatic. **morin wafi** haing killed horses **yali jeterengge** eating flesh.  
**cooha de jeku akû ohongge** troops having no provisions **kai** emphatic.  
**mucen be lakiyafi** having hung cooking pots **amasi tatan de**  
**jiderakûngge** without returning to where they stopped. **hûlha** bandits  
**mohohongge** being exhausted **kai** emphatic. **cu cu ca ca seme** sound of  
whispering/murmuring **niyalmai baru** to people/others **elhehen i** rather gentle  
**gisurerengge** talking. **geren i gûnin** feeling of the many  
**šahûrakangge** becoming cold **kai** emphatic. **emdubei šangnarangge**  
rewarding frequently. (364) **gacilabuhangge** depriving **kai** emphatic.  
**emdubei weile ararangge** punishing frequently. **mohohongge** being  
exhausted **kai** emphatic. **neneme doksirafi** acted cruelly first **amala** later  
**geren many de** dative **olhorongge** fearing . **narhûn akû** not fine **i** genitive  
**ten** extreme **kai** emphatic. **jifi** having come **waka be** about the mistakes  
**alirengge** apologizing. **cooha nakaki serengge** intending to stop **kai**  
emphatic. **cooha** troops **nukcifi** having acted in a rage **okdonjire** come to

meet/engage **de** when. **kejine** a long time **goidafi** having lasted long **acarakû**  
not in agreement. **geli** also, again **waliyafi generakûngge** not abandoning and  
going away **be**. (365) **urunakû** must **olhošome** cautiously **kimci** examine!  
(imperative). **cooha** troops, soldiers **be fulu nonggire** increase **de akû** there  
is not. **damu** but **baturulame dosirakû** not acting bravely and acting cruelly  
**bime** and. **cihai** as one wishes **hûsun be kamcire** consolidating power.  
**bata** enemy **be** accusative **tolbire** surmising. **niyalma be etere de**  
**wajihabi** ended with winning over others. **terei** its, his **bodohon akû** without  
plan **bime** and **bata be oihorilarangge** slighting the enemy. **urunakû**  
must **niyalma de jafabumbi** be seized by others. **cooha** soldiers **hajilame**  
(366) **dayanjihakû** without, [by] being attached, coming to rely on [him] **bime**  
and [yet] **weile araci** if punishing. **daharakû ombi** will not obey.  
**daharakû** not obey **oci** if, as for. **baitalara de mangga ombi** will be  
difficult to use [them]. **cooha** soldiers **hajilame dayanjiha** have, [by] being  
attached, come to rely on [him] **bime** and **weile arame banjinarakû** there is  
no giving rise to [the carrying out of] punishment **oci** if, as for. **baitalaci**  
**ojorakû** cannot use **kai** emphatic. **tuttu ofi** therefore **šu i** by means of *wen*  
**fafulambi** to decree. **horon i** by means of *wu* **teksilembi** to set out evenly.

erebe of/about this urunakû etembi must win sembi call. selgiyen be aifini yabubufi (367) irgen be tacihiyaci if/when the order has already carried out and the people are trained irgen dahambi people will obey. selgiyen be aifini yabubuhakû bime. irgen be tacihiyaci if/when the order has not already carried out and the people are trained. irgen daharakû people will not obey. selgiyen be aifini yabubumbi serengge that the order has already carried out. geren i emgi together with the many gûnin acarangge [sharing] similar thoughts kai is indeed :

(369) na i earth's arbun shapep i genitive juwanci fiyelen tenth chapter. sun dz hendume. na i earth's arbun shape (physical circumstances) de dative-locative. hafunurengge one which interconnects bi there is. tarangge one which gets entangled bi there is. sujanurengge one which supports bi there is. hafirahûn ningge one which is narrow bi there is. haksan ningge one which is precipitous bi there is. gorokingge one which is distant bi there is. muse geneci ogoro. tese jici ojongge where we can go, they can come be about, with respect to . hafunumbi interconnect sembi call. hafunure (370) arbun serengge situation of interconnection. neneme šun goire

**deken ba be ejelefi** having occupied beforehand a high place hit by the sun (i.e. exposed to sunshine). **jeku i jugûn** the road for [transporting] provisions **be** accusative **hafumbuha manggi** after causing to penetrate (i.e. making the transportation smooth). **afaci aisi ombi** fighting can be advantageous. **geneci ombi. bedereci mangga ningge** that to go is permissible [but] to withdraw is difficult **be** accusative **tambi** get entangled **sembi** call. **tara arbun serengge** situation of getting entangled. **bata belhehekû de** when the enemy is unprepared. **tucici etembi** will win if coming out. **bata aikabade belhehe de** if the enemy is ready. **tucici (371) eterakû bime. bederere de mangga be dahame** because, if coming out, [one] will not win and it is difficult to withdraw. **aisi akû ombi** can be of no advantage. **muse tucike de** when we come out **aisi akû** without benefit. **tese tucike de** when they come out **aisi akû** without benefit **be. sujanumbi** support **sembi** call. **sujanure arbun serengge. bata udu muse be bolicibe** although the enemy entices us. **muse ume tucire** we do not come out. **gaifi** having led [away] **gene** go! (imperative). **bata dulin tucike manggi** after the enemy has half come out. **(372) gidaci** if raiding. **aisi ombi** can be advantageous. **hafirahûn** narrow **arbun** situation **serengge. muse neneme ejelefi**

we have occupied beforehand. **urunakû funcetele obufi bata be alime gaimbi** must, having made it [full] up until in excess (fully occupy the space), [wait to] confront and capture the enemy. **aikabade bata neneme ejelefi** if the enemy occupy it first. **beki firm oci if ume latunara** do not go to encroach. **beki akû** firmless **oci if latunambi** [should] go to encroach. **haksan** precipitous **arbun serengge**. **muse neneme ejelembihede** when we have occupied it first. **urunakû šun goire (373) deken babe ejelefi**. **bata be alime gaimbi** [we] must occupy a high place exposed to the sunshine and [wait to] confront and seize the enemy. **aikabade bata neneme ejeleci** if the enemy occupy it first. **gaifi** having led [away] **gene** go! (imperative). **ume latunara** do not go to encroach. **goroki** distant **arbun serengge**. **hûsun** strength **tehereci** if equal . **yarkiyame** [by alluring] **afara de mangga** difficult to attack. **afaha de** when having fought **aisi akû ombi** can be of no benefit. **ere ninggun serengge** this six. **na i** land’s/earth’s **doro** Tao. **jiyanggiyûn i** general’s **oyonggo tušan** essential duties. (374) **kimcirakûci ojarahû** must investigate thoroughly. **tuttu ofi** therefore **cooha de** in military [matters] **ukarangge bi** there is the case where the soldiers flee. **sartaburengge** delaying, lingering **bi** there is. **lifanarangge** going to be

engulfed **bi** there is. **ulejerengge** collapse **bi** there is. **facuhûrangge**  
being in disarray **bi** there is. **burularangge** fleeing **bi** there is. **ere ninggun**  
**serengge** this six. **abka na i** heaven’s and earth’s **gashan** disaster **waka** is  
not. **jiyanggiyûn i** general’s **endebuku** error **kai** is indeed. **hûsun** strength  
**teherefi** being equal. **emken i juwan be gidarangge** that one has to fight  
10 [persons] singly **be** with respect to. (375) **ukambi** flee **sembi** call. **cooha**  
troops, soldiers **etenggi** strong **hafan** officer **eberhun** weak **be** about, with  
respect to. **sartabumbi** put at ease, cause to idle **sembi**. **hafan** officer  
**etenggi** strong **cooha** soldiers **eberhun** weak **be** about, with respect to.  
**lifambi** to engulf **sembi** call. **ambakan** rather big **hafan** officer **jilideme**  
enraged **daharakû** not obey. **bata de** to/against the enemy **nukcifi** acted in a  
rage **cisui** privately, on one’s own **afanafi** gone to attack. **jiyanggiyûn terei**  
**muten be sarkûngge** general being ignorant of his (i.e. the soldier’s) ability **be**  
about, with respect to. **ulejembi** collapse **sembi** call. **jiyanggiyûn** general  
**yadalinggû** being weak/feeble **ofi cira akû** not strict. **tacibure** (376) **doro**  
method of instructing **getuken akû** unclear. **hafan cooha de toktohon**  
**akû** officers and soldiers have no fixedness (i.e. fixed duties)/are uncertain [about their  
duties]. **cooha be balai ici faidarangge** lining up soldiers blindly/carelessly



be about/of, with respect to . **facuhûrambi** to be in disorder **sembi** call.  
**jiyanggiyûn** general. **bata** enemy **be** accusative **tulbime** **muterakû**  
unable to surmise. **komso i** by/with a few **geren de bakcilara** oppose many.  
**yadalinggû i** with the weak **etuhun be gidanara** go to raid the strong.  
**cooha** soldier **dacun silin akûngge** without shrewd and crack [regiment]  
be. **burulambi** to flee **sembi**. **ere ninggun serengge** this six. (377)  
**gaibure doro** the way of being defeated. **jiyanggiyûn i** general’s **oyonggo**  
**tušan** essential duties. **kimcirakûci ojarahû** must investigate carefully **kai**  
emphatic. **na i** earth’s **arbutun** circumstances **serengge**. **cooha de**  
**aisilarangge** what assists the army. **bata be tulbime** surmise [the situation  
of] the enemy **etere be toktobure** ensure victory. **haksan** precipices **kamni**  
narrow passes **hanciki** near **goroki** far **be bodorongge** planning. **dergi**  
**jiyanggiyûn i** top general’s **doro** Tao. **erebe safi afarangge** he who  
knows this and fights. **urunakû** (378) **etembime** will surely win. **erebe**  
**sarakû bime afarangge** he who does not know this and fights. **urunakû**  
**gaibumbi** must be defeated. **tuttu ofi** therefore **afara** fighting **murû** form  
**urunakû etembime** will surely win and. **ejen ume afara secibe** even  
though the emperor says: “Don’t fight!” . **urunakû afaci acambi** it is fitting that

one must fight. **afara muru eterakû bime** will not win and. **ejen urunakû afa secibe** though the emperor says: “[You] must fight!”. **afarakû oci acambi** it is fitting that one must not fight. **tuttu** so **dosicibe** though one advances **gebu gairakû** seeks no fame. (379) **bederecibe** though one withdraws **weile ci jailarakû** shuns no punishment. **damu** only **irgen be karmame** take care of the people. **ejen de tusa ojongge** do benefit to the emperor. **gurun i boobai** national treasure **kai** is indeed. **cooha be ajige jusei adali tuwame ohode** if guarding the troops like [guarding] little sons. **tuttu** so **terei emgi** together with them **šumin holo de** to a deep valley **funtuci ombi** can brave. **cooha be gosire jusei adali tuwame ohode** if guarding the troops like [guarding] beloved sons. **tuttu** (380) so **terei emgi sasa buceci ombi** can die together. **gosimbime** to love and **fafulame muterakû** unable to order/prohibit. **jiramilambime** to be thick (to treat generously) **takûrame muterakû** unable to delegate/employ . **facuhûn bime** being in disorder and **dasame muterakû** unable to rectify **ohode** if. **duibuleci** for instance, to take a simile **halašara jusei adali** like spoiled children. **baitalaci ojarahû** cannot use **kai** emphatic. **musei cooha gidanaci ojoro be sara gojime. bata be gidaci ojarahû be**

sarkû oci if knowing only that our army can go to raid [but] not knowing that the enemy cannot be raided. dulin half etembi win. (381) bata be gidaci ojoro be sara gojime. musei cooha gidanaci ojarahû be sarkû oci if knowing only that the enemy can be raided [but] not knowing that our army cannot go to raid. dulin half etembi win. bata be gidaci ojoro be sara. musei cooha gidanaci ojoro be sara gojime. na i arbun de afaci ojarahû be sarkû oci if knowing only that our army can go to raid [but] not knowing that [we] cannot fight under the physical circumstances of the land. dulin half etembi win. (382) tuttu so cooha be sara urse people who know military [matters]. aššara de when moving farfaburakû not confused. yabure de when going oitoburakû not in dire straits. tuttu ofi therefore cembe sara beye be sara ohode if knowing them and knowing yourself. eterengge victory tuksicuke akû without being in danger. abka be sara na be sara ohode if knowing heaven and knowing earth. eterengge victory yooni ombi can be complete/perfect sehebi [thus] said:

uyun nine na earth, ground i genitive juwan emuci fiyelen eleventh chapter. sun dz hendume. cooha baitalara doro the way of using troops.

samsire disperse ba place bi there is. weihuken light ba place bi there is.  
temšere vie ba place bi. acara ba meeting place (intersection) bi. salja  
forking ba bi. ujen heavy ba bi. efujere ruined ba bi. horire enclosed ba  
bi. bucere perishing ba bi. goloi beise feudal princes meimeni bade  
each in [their] place afarangge attacking. (384) samsire ba inu is the place  
(state) of dispersedness. niyalmai bade dosinafi šumin akûngge going  
to the place of others and without [going far] deep [into that place]. weihuken light  
ba place inu is muse bahaci inu aisi ogoro if we obtain [it,] it can benefit  
[us]. tese bahaci inu aisi ojongge if they obtain [it,] it can also benefit  
[them]. temšere vie ba place inu is. muse geneci ogoro tese jici  
ojorongge [in the case that] we can go [and] they can come. acara ba inu is.  
goloi beise i ba the place of feudal princes ilan ergi de (385) hafunafi  
having connected with 3 sides. neneme isinjifi abkai fejergi i geren be  
baharangge [in the case that one], having reached [there] first, is to obtain the  
multitude beneath heaven. salja ba inu. niyalmai bade šumin dosinafi  
having entered [far] deep into the place of others. hecen hoton city walls be  
labdu much dulerengge passing. ujen ba inu. alin mountain weji forest  
haksan precipice mudangga curved hali untilled land, swamp niyo marsh.

yaya yabure de in any going mangga difficult jugûn road serengge  
so-called efujere ba inu. (386) dosinarangge entering hafirahûn  
narrow. bedererengge withdrawing gorokon rather far. tesei komso i  
by their few musei geren our many be accusative gidaci ojongge can be  
defeated. horire ba inu. ekšeme afaci taksire. ekšeme afarakû  
oci gukurengge [in the case that one] will survive if fighting speedily [and one]  
will be wiped out if not fighting speedily. bucere ba inu. uttu be dahame  
because of this samsire ba oci as for ume afara do not attack. weihuken  
ba oci as for ume ilinjara do not tarry. (387) temšere ba oci as for  
ume dosire do not advance. acara ba oci ume lakcara do not break off.  
salja ba oci hûwaliyame acambi harmoniously meet. ujen ba oci as  
for tabcilambi [should] maraud. efujere ba oci as for genembi [should]  
go. horire ba oci as for argadambi to use strategem. bucere ba oci as  
for faršambi to risk one’s life. julgei of the past cooha baitalara  
mangga sehe urse men who were said to be capable of using army. bata i  
enemy’s (388) cooha army be julergi front amargi back ishunde daci  
ojorakû cannot help mutually. komso few geren many ishunde ertuci  
ojorakû cannot depend on each other. wesihun noble fusihûn humble

ishunde aitubuci ojarahû cannot save one another. dergi up fejergi down  
ishunde bargiyataci ojarahû cannot protect one another. cooha  
samsifi having dispersed isabuci ojarahû cannot be assembled. cooha  
acacibe though agreeing teksin akû obume mutembi cannot be orderly  
arranged. aisi de (389) acanaci if agreeing with benefit aššambi should act.  
aisi de acanarakû oci if not agreeing with benefit. nakambi should stop.  
gelhun akû dare to fonjiki want to ask. bata enemy geren crowd teksin  
orderly arranged bime and jiderengge come be about/of. adarame how to  
alime receive gaimbi take. hendume say (answer). ceni their buyehe  
babe of what [they] desire neneme durime gaici if seizing and taking  
beforehand. dahambi kai surely will obey coohai military muru shape, style,  
manner hahilarangge acting urgently wesihun [is] topmost. niyalmai  
others’ jabdurakû not having time to be tuwame in accordance with.  
gûnihakû (390) jugûn ci via the route of unexpectedness. belhehekû  
babe unpreparedness + accusative particle afambi should attack. yaya any  
antaha ojoro doro Tao of becoming guest (Ch. *ke*). šumin dosici if  
entering [far] deep cohotoi exclusive ofi because. boigoji host (Ch. *zhu*) cooha  
eterakû ombi cannot overcome. elgiyen bade in the place abundant [in food]

supply] **tabcilaci** if plundering. **ilan giyûn** three *jun* **cooha coohai jeku**  
military provisions **tesumbi** will suffice. **saikan ujimbime** sustaining pretty  
well and **ume suilabure** do not exhaust. **horon be isabume** gathering  
power and **hûsun be bargiyame** preserving strength. (391) **cooha**  
**baitalara arga bodogon** strategy of using troops **be** about. **tulbici**  
**ojorakû obume** cannot be surmised. **geneci ojurakû bade isibume**  
sending to the place [where one] can go nowhere **ohode** if. **buceci** were one to die  
**bucekini burularakû ombi** [one] is willing to die and will not flee. **buceci**  
were one to die **adarama baharakû ni** how can [one] not. **cooha** military  
**niyalma** man **hûsun akûmbumbi** exert strength to the utmost. **cooha**  
military **urse** men **umesi lifanaci** if very much engulfed. **olhorakû ombi**  
become fearless. **genere ba akû oci** if there is nowhere to go. **bekilembi**  
become firm. (392) **šumin dosici** if entering [far] deep. **bargiyambi** protect.  
**umainaci ojurakû oci** if there is no way out **iselambi <iselembi>**  
oppose steadfastly. **uttu ofi** so **cooha** army **be** accusative **teksilerakû** without  
setting out evenly/uniformly **bime** and [yet]. **olhošombi** become cautious.  
**bairakû** not seeking **bime** and [yet] **bahambi** obtain. **bargiyatarakû**  
without bringing together in one place **bime** and [yet] **hajilambi** become attached.

fafularakû without forbidding bime and [yet] akdambi trust. ganiongga  
ominous be šajilame forbid buhiyecun suspicion be nakabuci if putting  
to stop. bucetele until death generakû ombi can go nowhere. musei  
cooha de our soldiers ulin funcerakûngge have no excessive wealth. (393)  
jaka material be accusative hihalarakûngge without appreciating waka not.  
ergen life funcerakûngge without excess. jalgan lifespan be accusative  
hairarakûngge without cherishing waka not. fafun selgiyehe inenggi  
ci since the day the decree was promulgated. tecehe cooha soldiers who sat  
down oci as for. yasai muke tears adasun lapel usihimbi to wet, moisten.  
deducehe urse people who laid down together oci as for . yasai muke  
tears dere face de locative jalumbi fill. genere ba akû bade to the place  
where there is nowhere to go isibuci if sending. juwan ju Zhuan Zhu. tsoo gui  
Cao Gui i genitive (394) baturu ombi brave. tuttu ofi therefore cooha  
baitalara mangga urse men who are capable of using army be accusative.  
duibuleci to take a simile šuwai žan i adali is like Shuairan. šuwai žan  
serengge the so-called “Shuairan”. cang šan alin i meihe the snake of the  
Changshan mountain ini uju its head be accusative forici if striking. uncehen  
tail danjimbi come to aid. ini uncehen its tail be accusative forici if striking.



uju head danjimbi come to aid. ini darama its midsection be accusative  
forici if striking. uju uncehen head and tail yooni altogether (395)  
danjimbi come to aid. gelhun akû dare to fonjiki want to ask. šuwai žan  
i adali obuci ombio can make it like Shuairan or not. hendume say/answer  
ombi it can. u gurun i niyalma people of the Wu state yuwei gurun i  
niyalmai baru against the people of the Yue state kimuntuhebi had had a  
grudge. emu jahûdai de on one boat tefi having sat. muke doore de  
when crossing the water edun wind ucaraci if encountering. tese ishunde  
aituburengge their helping one another. hashû ici ergi gala i adali like  
left and right hands ombi can. (396) uttu ofi so morin horse be accusative  
hûwaitaha tied up muheren wheel be accusative umbuha buried seme  
though. ertuci ojarahû unreliable. teksin even, uniform baturu brave emu  
one oci if. dasan i doro the Tao of governance kai emphatic. ganggan hard  
genggen soft de dative-locative yooni altogether acanaci if fitting. na i  
earth’s giyan principle kai emphatic. tuttu so, thus cooha baitalara  
mangga urse people who are capable of using army. gala hand jafafi having  
held emu niyalma be takûrara (397) adali like employing one person.  
umainaci ojarahû no way out ombi become kai emphatic. jiyanggiyûn i

general's **baita** matter. **cib seme** quietly **somishûn** secret, hidden. **tob**  
**seme** justly **teksin** even. **coohai** military **ursei** men, people **šan** ears **yasa**  
eyes **be farfabufi** confused. **ulhirakû obume** making [them] ignorant.  
**baita** matter **kûbulifi** having changed. **arga** plot **halafi** having changed.  
**niyalma de sereburakû obume** unrevealed to people/others. **tatan** a  
stopping place **gurifi** having shifted/transferred. **on** route, distance covered  
**mudalifi** having made a detour. **niyalma de gûnin bahaburakû**  
**obume** causing people unable to get an idea. (398) **mutembi** able to.  
**yuwanšuwai** Ch. *yuanshuai* i genitive **boljohongge** fixing a date. **den de**  
**tafambufi** having caused to go upward **wan** ladder **be** accusative **ganara**  
taking away **adali** like. **yuwanšuwai yuanshuai** **goloi beise** feudal princes i  
**bade** to the place of **šumin** [far] deep **dosifi** having entered. **songgiha** nose  
hook **be uksalaburengge** loosening. **geren honin** flock of sheep **be**  
accusative **bošoro** expel **adali** like. **bošofi** having expelled **genome** go.  
**bošofi** having expelled **jime** come . **absi ojoro** whither **be sarkû** ignorant  
of. **ilan giyûn** three *jun* **cooha i** soldiers' **geren** multitude, crowd **be** (399)  
**gaifi** having taken. **haksan** precipice **de isibumbi** send to. **ere** this  
**jiyanggiyûn i** general's **baita** matter **kai** emphatic. **uyun** nine **na** earth i

kûbulin change of. ikûre shrinking saniyara stretching aisi benefit [of].  
niyalmai gûnin people’s intention, human mind i giyan principle of be  
accusative kimcirakûci oJORakû must look into carefully. yaya any antaha  
guest coohai doro military Tao. šumin dosici if entering [far] deep [into]  
cohotoi ombi become exclusive. cinggiya near dosici if entering  
samsimbi become dispersed. gurun state ci aljafi having left jecen border  
be dulefi having passed (400) coohalarangge going to war. lakcaha ba  
remote place kai emphatic. duin ergi de hafunarangge connecting with 4  
sides. salja ba kai. šumin deep dosikangge entering. ujen ba kai.  
singgiya dosikangge. weihuken ba kai fisa back ergi side beki  
firm julergi front hafirahûn narrow ningge nominalizer. horire enclosed ba  
kai. genere ba akûngge having no place to go. bucere perishing ba  
kai. uttu ofi samsire ba (401) oci as for/in the case of. bi I tesei gûnin  
their minds be emu obumbi make one, unify. weihuken ba oci. bi I  
tesebe them falibumbi cause to bind. temšere ba oci as for. bi I tesei  
amargi ci dosimbi advance from behind them. acara ba oci as for. bi I  
tuwakiyara guarding be accusative olhošombi to be cautious. salja ba  
oci as for. bi I hajilame attachedly falimbi tie. ujen ba oci as for. bi I

jeku grain, provisions be sirabumbi cause to continue. (402) efujehe ba  
oci as for. bi I on route gaime take dosimbi enter. horire ba oci. bi I  
funtuhulehe making a gap be simbi fill in. bucere ba oci as for. bi I  
banjirakû not to survive be tuwabumbi show. tuttu ofi therefore coohai  
soldiers' gûnin mind. hûrbuci <horibuci> if being besieged fondolombi  
penetrate. oitobuci if being hard pressed iselembi oppose steadfastly.  
hafirabuci if being embarrassed dahambi obey. uttu ofi so goloi beise  
feudal princes i hebe plot of be sarkûngge he who does not know. (403)  
doigonde beforehand hajilame come to be attached muterakû cannot. alin  
weji haksan mudangga hali niyo i genitive arbun circumstances be  
sarkûngge. cooha troops gaifi having taken yabume muterakû cannot  
go. gajarci a guide jugûn route jorirengge one who points be  
baitalarakûngge he who does not use. na i earth's aisi benefit be  
baharakû without using. duin sunja be about four and five emke sarkû  
oci if being ignorant of one. da ojoro han ojoro cooha waka not the army  
of one who is to become the chief and of one who is to become the khan kai. (404) da  
ojoro han ojoro cooha army of one who is to become the chief and of one who  
is to become the khan amba gurun be dailaci if making war against a big state.

tesei their geren multitude bahafi isarakû cannot gather together. bata de  
to the enemy horon awe, power, airs of authority tuwabuci if exhibiting. tesei  
their haji attachedness bahafi acarakû cannot match, cannot become  
harmonious. uttu ofi so abkai fejergi i world’s hajilaha attached[ness] be  
accusative lashalame cutting, severing. abkai fejergi i world’s toose power  
be durime robbing, seizing. beyei gûnin one’s own intent sidarame  
unfolding. bata de to the enemy horon awe, power, airs of authority tuwabure  
exhibiting jakade because of. (405) tuttu so hoton be gaici ohobi could  
seize the city. gurun be efuleci ohobi could destroy the country. kooli ci  
tulgiyen šangnaha reward other than (i.e. not subject to/beyond) the regulations  
be isibumbi bestow. dasan rule, governance ci tulgiyen other than, outside  
of fafun prohibition, decree be ulhibume selgiyembi proclaiming. ilan  
giyûn cooha i geren be baitalarangge using the multitude of soldiers of  
the three jun. emu niyalma be unggire adali as if sending off one person.  
baita i by means of matters afabumbi cause to attack. turgun be alarakû  
not informing of the situation. aisi i by means of benefit (406) dosimbumbi  
cause to enter. jobolon harm, troubles be alarakû not informing of . gukure  
bade in the place (state of) being annihilated šukiha ensnared manggi after.

teni only then taksimbi [one will] persist. bucere bade in the place where one is to perish lifabuha engulfed manggi after. teni banjimbi only then one will survive. geren multitude be jobolon de in troubles lifabuha engulfed manggi after. teni only then etebume gidabume mutembi can be victorious or to be defeated. coohalara baita matter/affair of going to war. bata i gûnin de acabure agreeing with the enemy’s intent be narhûšafi having dealt minutely with. uhei hûsun i with united strength emgeri once ibehe advanced de when. (407) minggan ba i of a thousand leagues jiyanggiyûn general be waci ombi can kill. erebe of this faksikan i shrewdly baita be mutebuhe accomplish matters sembi call. uttu ofi so cooha tucire inenggi ci since the day the army come out. furdan pass, gateway be yaksifi having shut acangga tally temgetu seal, stamp be efulefi having destroyed. mejige news be hafumburakû without informing. mafari juktehen de in the ancestral temple fafulafi having handed down a decree. baita matter be accusative nikebumbi entrust. bata de with the enemy jaka interval, fault šolo opportunity bici if there is (bata de...bici: if the enemies have). uthai immediately hûdun quick (408) dosifi having entered/advanced. tesei buyehe babe of what they desire. inenggi boljorakû without fixing a day

neneme in advance gaimbi will take. kooli be dahame in accordance with regulations bata be tuwame observing the enemy. afara baita matter of fighting be accusative lashalambi decide. uttu ofi so tuktan de at the beginning sargan jusei gese like girls oci as for. bata jaka tucinjimbi. amala later ukcaha golmahûn i gese like a hare who has escaped oci as for. bata sujame jabdurakû ombi have no time to resist the enemy:

(409) tuwa i afara attacking by means of fire juwan juweci fiyelen twelfth chapter.

sun dz hendume. tuwa i afarangge [in the case of] attacking by means of fire uheri sunja hacin bi there are altogether five kinds. uju de firstly niyalma man be accusative deijimbi to burn. jai de secondly isabuhangge what have been gathered be accusative deijimbi burn. ilaci de thirdly aciha load be accusative deijimbi burn. duici de fourthly coohai namun military storehouse be deijimbi. (410) sunjaci de fifthly agûra faidan rows of weapons be deijimbi sembi call. tuwa sindafi deijire setting fire and burning de urunakû ildun bi must have [an] opportunity. tuwa sindara jaka objects for setting fire be of/about urunakû

doigonde must beforehand belhebumbi be ready/prepared. tuwa sindara de setting fire in <erin> bi has [its] season. tuwa dekdere de raising fire inenggi bi has [its] day. erin serengge the so-called "season". abakai <abkai> of the sky olhon ucuri dry time be sentence particle kai emphatic. (411) inenggi serengge the so-called "day". biya girha bikita imhe jeten i oron de bisire the moon is present in the domain of *ji*, *bi*, *yi*, *zhen* be sentence particle kai emphatic. ere duin tokdon these four constellations serengge so-called (topical marker). edun dekdere inenggi the day when the wind rises kai emphatic. yaya any tuwa i afarangge attacking by means of fire. urunakû sunja tuwa i kûbulika be dahame acabumbi must be accorded with the change of 5 fire. dorgi de inside tuwa sindaci if setting. uthai then tulergi ci from outside (412) erdeken i rather early acabumbi should be attended accordingly. tuwa sindaha setting fire bime and tesei cooha their army cibsén [remain in] quietness oci as for. aliyambi wait ume afara do not attack. tuwa i fire's gûrgin flame yendeci if flaring up. dosici oci if to advance is okay dosimbi [one should] advance. dosici oJORakû oci if to advance is not okay nakambi [one should] halt. tulergi de tuwa sindaci ombime. dorgingge be aliyarakû



oci if/when it is okay to set fire outside and not to wait [for the action] inside. ucuri  
be tuwame sindambi [one should] set fire [by] observing the opportunity.  
edun i (413) dergi ci tuwa daci should fire burn above the wind (i.e. burn  
eastward). edun i fejergi be ume afara do not attack the wind’s underneath  
(i.e. do not attack westward). inenggi [during] the day edun kejine daha de  
when the wind blew for a long time. dobori ome at night edun nakambi the  
wind will cease. yaya any cooha army de to urunakû must sunja tuwa i  
kûbulin change of 5 fire be accusative safi having known. ton number be  
accusative tuwame seremšembi watchfully guard. tuttu ofi therefore  
tuwa i afara de aisilarangge he who helps attack by means of fire  
genggiyen [is] bright. muke i (414) afara de aisilarangge [he] who  
helps attack by means of water etuhun [is] powerful. muke water lashalaci  
ombi can cut off/intercept. durici ojarahû cannot seize/rob. afafi etehe  
dosifi gaiha bime. ceni gungge be ilgarakûngge [he] who fights  
and wins, advances and captures, and [yet] does not distinguish (reward discriminately)  
the merits [of his soldiers] ehe inauspicious (i.e. in dangerous situation). fayambi  
spend sirkedembi to last for a long time sembi call. tuttu ofi therefore  
genggiyen ejen seolembi. mergen jiyanggiyûn dasambi

**sehebi** it was said that a bright emperor considers and a wise general corrects. **aisi**  
**waka** without benefit **oci** as for **aššarakû** [there should be] no action. (415)  
**baharangge waka** no gain **oci** as for **baitarakû** [there should be] no using.  
**tuksicukengge waka** not dangerous **oci** as for **afarakû** no attack. **ejen**  
emperor **jili de** with anger, irately **cooha tucici** troops come out **ojorakû**  
cannot. **jiyanggiyûn** general **korsocun de** with regret **afanaci ojurakû**  
cannot go to attack. **aisi de acanaci** if it agrees with the benefit **aššambi** [one  
should] act. **aisi** benefit **de acanarakû** not agree with **oci** if, as for **nakambi**  
stop. **jili** anger **be** about **dahûme urgunjebuci ombi** can be made glad  
again. **korsocun** regret **be** about (416) **dahûme selabuci ombi** can be  
made happy again. **gukuhe gurun** country which has been wiped out **be** about  
**dahûme taksibuci ojurakû** cannot be made exist again. **bucehengge**  
one who has perished **be** about **dahûme weijubuci ojurakû** cannot be  
revived. **tuttu ofi** therefore **genggiyen ejen olhošombi. mergen**  
**jiyanggiyûn targambi. sehebi** it was said that a bright emperor should be  
cautious and a wise general should abstain. **ere gurun be elhe obure cooha**  
**be yooni obure doro kai:** this is precisely the way of making the state peaceful  
and making the army complete (i.e. keeping the army intact)

(417) **jakanaburengge** causing to split/divide, cause ruptures (Ch. *jian*) **be** accusative **baitalara** use, apply **juwan ilaci fiyelen** thirteenth chapter.  
**sun dz hendume. juwan tumen cooha ilifi** having raised 100,000 troops. **minggan bade tuwancihyanaci** when sending out military expedition over [a distance of] 1,000 leagues. **tanggû halai irgen i** commonfolk’s **fayabure** expenditure. **siden booi baitalara** official expenditure **de** in, [with respect] to. **inenggidari** daily **minggan yan** 1,000 taels **baibumbi** it needs. **dorgi tulergingge** interior and exterior **burgišame** being in disarray, being disturbed. **jugûn (418) tala de** on the roads **šadame** getting weary. **usin bahafi weilerakûngge** [the fact] that [one] cannot cultivate the fields. **nadanju tumen boo** 700,000 households. **ududu aniya** [for] several years **tuwakiyandufi** having guarded together. **emu inenggi i** one day’s **etere** winning **be** accusative particle **temšembime** vying for. **tanggû yan menggun i hafan** officials of 100-tael silver **fulun** salary **be** accusative **hairame** loving, cherishing. **bata i** enemy’s **turgun** circumstances **be** accusative **sarkûngge** who are ignorant of. **gosin akû** merciless **i ten** the extreme of. (419) **niyalmai** man’s

jiyanggiyûn general waka not. ejen i emperor’s, lord’s aisilarangge  
assistance waka not. etere da victorious chief waka not kai emphatic. tuttu  
ofi therefore genggiyen ejen mergen jiyanggiyûn i brilliant emperor[’s]  
and wise general’s aššara acting de when niyalma be eteme winning  
[over] men. gungge be mutebume accomplishing merits. geren ci  
colgorokongge surpassing the multitude. doigonde saha de kai [lie]  
indeed in having known in advance [the enemy’s situation]. doigonde sarangge  
What [one] should know in advance. hutu (420) enduri de jalbarime  
bahabuci ojurakû cannot be obtained [by] praying to ghosts and spirits baita  
de murušenci <muřšeci> ojurakû cannot be likened to [what take form  
as] matters, cannot be somewhat grasped in [terms of] matter. ton de yargiyalaci  
ojurakû cannot be verified in [terms of] number. urunakû niyalma de  
akdafi must rely on men and. bata i turgun be sara de kai [lie] indeed in  
knowing the enemy’s situation. tuttu ofi Therefore jakanaburengge be  
baitalara de sunja hacin bi there are five kinds of using [the tactic of] causing  
ruptures [within the enemy]. gašan i of village/country jakanaburengge  
causing to split/divide bi there is. (421) dorgi internal, interior  
jakanaburengge causing to split/divide bi there is. fudarame counter-

jakanaburengge causing to split/divide bi there is. buceme perishing  
jakanaburengge causing to split/divide, jian bi there is. banjime surviving  
jakanaburengge jian bi there is. sunja five [kinds of] jakanaburengge  
jian be accusative yooni deribure de when starting all together. terei doro  
its Tao be accusative ulhirakû not comprehend. erebe of/about this  
ferguwecuke wonderful hergin discipline/order. ejen oho niyalmai  
boobai treasure of the man who has become the emperor sembi to call. gašan i  
of village/country jakanabumbi to cause to divide, cause ruptures serengge the  
so-called tesei gašan i niyalmai ildun de taking advantage of their  
countrymen (422) baitalara use be sentence particle [.] dorgi internal  
jakanabumbi serengge the so-called. tesei hafan i ildun de taking  
advantage of their officer baitalara use be sentence particle. fudarame  
counter- jakanabumbi serengge the so-called. bata i enemy’s  
jakanaburengge be accusative baitalara use be sentence particle.  
buceme jakanabumbi serengge. tulergi outside de in, on holo  
baita deceitful matters yabufi having carried out. musei our  
jakanaburengge jian de [with respect] to ulhibufi having caused to  
understand. bata i enemy’s gurun country/state de to ulame pass on alara

inform **be** sentence particle **kai** emphatic. (423) **banjime jakanabumbi**  
**serengge. amasi** backward **boolanjibure** cause to come to report **be**  
sentence particle **kai** emphatic. **tuttu ofi** Therefore **ilan giyûn i coohai**  
**baita oci** when [dealing with] the military affair of three *jun* **jakanaburengge**  
**ci hajingge akû** there is nothing more intimate than *jian*. **šangnaha oci** As  
for rewarding **jakanaburengge ci jiramin ningge akû** there is nothing  
(i.e. there is no reward that is) thicker (more generous) than *jian*. **baita oci** As for  
matters **jakanaburengge ci somishûn ningge akû** there is nothing (i.e.  
there is no matter that is) more secret than *jian*. **enduringge mergen waka**  
**oci** As for [he who is] not sagacious and wise. **jakanaburengge be** (424)  
**baitalame muterakû** [he is] unable to use *jian*. **gosin** mercy **jurgan** right  
**waka** not **oci** As for. **jakanaburengge be takûrame muterakû**  
unable to employ *jian*. **narhûn** fine **ferguwecuke** wonderful **waka** not **oci**  
As for. **jakanaburengge i yargiyan be bahame muterakû** unable to  
obtain the truth of *jian*. **narhûn kai. narhûn kai.** How fine/subtle it is! How  
fine it is! **jakanaburengge be baitalarakû ba akû** There is no  
circumstance [under which a military expert does] not use *jian*. **jakanabure baita**  
**be deribure unde de** Before starting the matter of *jian* **firgembuci** if being

revealed/leaked out. **donjihangge (425)** **alahangge** **be** **gemu**  
**bucebumbi** he who heard and he who reported are all to be put to death. **yaya**  
**cooha** **be** **gidaki**. **hecen** **be** **gaiki**. **niyalma** **be** **waki** **seci** Anyone  
intending to crush/defeat an army, to take/capture a city, to kill a man. **urunakû**  
**ceni** **tuwakiyara** **coohai** **data**. **hashû** **ici** **ergi** **urse**.  
**boigojilabure** **niyalma**. **dukai** **niyalma** **takûrabure** **niyalma** **i**  
**gebu** **hala** **be** **doigonde** **saci** **acara** **be** **dahame** because it is fitting  
that [he] must know beforehand the names and surnames of their garrison leaders, men  
[on their] left and right side, host, gatekeeper, emissary. **musei (426)**  
**jakanaburengge** **be** **unggifi** having sent off our *jian*. **urunakû**  
**fujurulabume** **sambi** must know [by] probing deeply (through thorough  
research). **bata** **i** **jakanaburengge** **jifi** **muse** **be** **jakanabure** **be**  
**urunakû** **fujurulafi** must inquire the enemy’s *jian* who has come and *jian* us, and  
[having done this]. **ereci** from this, hereafter **aisi** **i** by means of [offering] profits  
**dosimbume** admitting [a guest]. **yarufi** **tebume** **ohode** when [you] have  
led [him] and install [him in your place]. **tuttu** thus **fudarame**  
**jakanaburengge** **be** **bahafi** **takûraci** **ombi** you can employ [the tactic  
of] counter-*jian*. **ede** **akdafi** **saha** **de** when [you] have relied on this and have

known. **tuttu** thus **gašan** i (427) **jakanaburengge** **dorgi**  
**jakanaburengge** **be** **bahafi takûraci ombi** [you] can employ [the tactics  
of] country *jian* and internal *jian*. **ede akdafi saha de.uttu** thus, so  
**buceme** perishing **jakanaburengge** *jian* **holo baita yabufi** having  
carried out deceitful matters. **bata de alanabuci ombi** [you] can have someone  
to go to report [them] to the enemy. **ede akdafi saha de** when [you] have relied  
on this and have known. **tuttu** thus **banjime** surviving **jakanaburengge** *jian*  
**be** accusative. **boljoho songkoi obuci ombi** [you] can have [things turned  
out] in accordance with the date you fixed. **sunja jakanabure baita be.**  
(428) **ejen urunakû saci acambi** It is fitting that the emperor must know  
these matters of five *jian*. **urunakû fudaram** **jakanabure de bisire be**  
**safi** having known that [they all] exist in the counter-*jian*. **tuttu fudaram**  
**jakanaburengge be jiramilarakûci ojarah kai** so, indeed, [he] cannot  
not thicken (i.e. he must invest more in) the counter-*jian*. **seibeni** formerly, in the  
past **yen gurun i mukdekengge** the rise of the Yin state. **i jy hiya gurun**  
**de bihe de kai** [was due] indeed to [the fact that] Yi Zhi was present in the Xia  
state. **jeo gurun i mukdekengge** the rise of the Zhou state. **lioi ya šang**  
**gurun de bihe de kai** [was due] indeed to [the fact that] Lü Ya was present in



the Shang state. (429) **tuttu ofi** Therefore **genggiyen ejen sain**  
**jiyanggiyûn umesi mergen urse be jakanabure de baitalame**  
**bahanarangge** a brilliant emperor and a wise general who can use men of high  
wisdom as *jian*. **urunakû amba gungge be mutebumbi** [he] will surely  
accomplish great merits. **ere coohai oyonggo. ilan giyûn cooha i**  
**akdafi aššarangge kai:** This, being the essence of military [wisdom], is indeed  
what the three *jun* rely on and act (i.e. on which they rely to act).

## Appendix IV

TRANSCRIPTION OF THE MANCHU TRANSLATION OF THE *SUN ZI* BY H. T. TOH

(263) sun dz i coohai doro bithe.

sucungga bodoro ujui fiyelen.

sun dz hendume. cooha serengge. gurun i amba baita. bucere banjire ba. taksire gukure doro. kimcirakûci ojarahû. tuttu ofi sunja baita be wekjime gamambime. teisulebume (264) bodofi. terei gûnin be sibkimbi. uju de doro sembi. jai de abka sembi. ilaci de na sembi. duici de jiyanggiyûn sembi. sunjaci de kooli sembi. doro serengge. irgen be dergi i emgi emu gûnin obufi. tuttu sasa buceci ojoro. sasa banjici (265) ojoro be dahame. irgen tuksicuke de gelerakû be kai. abka serengge. a e šahûrun halhûn de acabume gamara be kai. na serengge. goro hanci haksan necin onco hafirahûn bucere banjire be kai. jiyanggiyûn serengge. mergen akdun gosin baturu cira be kai. kooli (266) serengge. meyen. durun. hafan. jugûn. da. baitalan be kai. uheri ere sunja be. jiyanggiyûn ofi donjihakûnge akû. sahangge etembi. sarkûnge eterakû [...] tuttu teisulebume bodofi. terei gûnin be sibkire de ya ergi ejen de doro bi. ya ergi jiyanggiyûn de (267) muten bi. ya ergi abka na de acanambi. ya ergi fafun šajin be yabubumbi. ya ergi agûra cooha etuhun ohobi. ya ergi uksin cooha urehebi ya ergi šangnahan erun getuken ohobi seme bi ede etere anabure be sambi. coohai data mini arga be (268) gaici. baitalafi urunakû etere be dahame. bibumbi. coohai data mini arga be gaijarahû oci. baitalafi urunakû gaibure be dahame unggimbi arga sain dade gaiha de. tereci horon arame tulergi de aisilambi. horon serengge. aisi be dahame. tooselame gamarangge. cooha serengge. koimali (269) doro. tuttu mutembime muterakû be tuwabumbi. baitalambime baitalarakû be tuwabumbi. hanci bime goro be tuwabumbi. goro bime hanci be tuwabumbi. aisi i yarkiyambi. facuhûrabufi gaimbi. akdun oci belhembi. etuhun oci jailambi. nukibume kûthûmbi. fusihûn arame coktolobumbi. (270) teyehun oci suilabumbi. haji oci jakanabumbi. terei belhehekû be afambi. terei gûnihakû ci tucimbi. ere coohalame eterengge. doigonde firgembuci ojarahû. afara onggolo juktehen de bodofi eterengge bodome bahanahangge

ambula ofi kai. afara onggolo juktehen de bodofi eterakûnge. (271) bodome bahanahangge arsari ofi kai. bodorongge ambula oci etere. bodorongge arsari oci eterakû bade. bodoro ba akû be ai hendure. bi erebe tuwaha de etere anaburengge iletu ombikai:

(273) afara be deribure jai fiyelen.

sun dz hendume. yaya cooha baitalara kooli. feksire sejen emu minggan. sukûnge sejen emu minggan. uksin i cooha juwan tumen. minggan baci jeku juweme ofi. dorgi tulergi i fayabun. antaha sa i baitalan. amdun šugin i (274) jaka sejen uksin i belhen de. inenggidari minggata yan be fayabuha manggi. teni juwan tumen cooha ilimbi. ede uthai afaci etembi. goidabuci agûra moyombi. dacun bukdabumbi. hecen be afaci. hûsun mohombi. cooha be tule goidabuci. gurun i baitalan tesurakû ombi. (275) yala agûra moyoro dacun bukdabure. hûsun mohoro ulin wajire ohode. goloi beise terei cukure be tuwame necinjimbi. udu mergen urse bihe seme. amala hocikon obume muterakû. tuttu cooha moco hûdun be donjiha. faksidame goidabure be sabuhakû. cooha goidaha bime. (276) gurun de aisi ojongge akû kai. tuttu ofi cooha baitalara jobolon be akûmbume sarkûnge. uthai cooha baitalara aisi be akûmbume same muterakû. cooha baitalara mangga urse. cooha be dasame tuciburakû. jeku be ilanggeri juweburakû. gurun de baitalan gaime. (277) bata de jeku tabcilame ofi. tuttu coohai jeku be tesubuci ombi. cooha de gurun yadarangge. goro juwere haran. goro juweci. tanggû halai irgen yadambi. cooha de hanci ningge. mangga hûda de uncambi. mangga hûda de uncaci. tanggû halai irgen i (278) ulin wajimbi. ulin wajici. ekšeme junihin usin de tomilambi. hûsun mohoro ulin wajire oci. bigan i niyalmai boode untuhun ofi. tanggû halai irgen i fayabun. juwan ubu de nadan ubu ekiyembi. siden booi fayabun. sejen garjara. morin macure. uksin. saca. beri (279) sirdan. gijun. kalka. dalikû. amba kalka. junihin usin ihan amba sejen. juwan ubu de ninggun ubu ekiyembi. tuttu ofi mergen jiyanggiyûn bata ningge be jetere be kicembi. bata i emu jungkengge be jeci. musei orin jungkengge de teherembi. muya orho be emu gingnehen (280) oci. musei orin gingnehen de teherembi. tuttu ofi bata be warangge. jili banjibure de kai. bata i aisi be gaijarangge. ulin bahabure de kai. tuttu ofi sejen i afara de. sejen be juwan sejengge ci wesihun bahaci. neneme baha urse de šangnambi. terei temgetun kiru be (281) halambi. sejen be suwaliyaganjame baitalambi.

cooha be sain i ujimbi. erebe bata be etembime ele etuhun ombi. sembi. tuttu ofi cooha etere be wesihun obumbi. goidabure be wesihun oburakû. tuttu cooha be sara jiyanggiyûn. irgen i ergen be jafahabi. gurun booi elhe (282) tuksicuke de dalahabi:

afara be bodoro ilaci fiyelen.

sun dz hendume. yaya cooha baitalara doro. gurun be yooni oburengge wesihun. gurun be efulerengge ilhi. giyûn cooha be yooni oburengge wesihun. giyûn cooha be efulerengge ilhi. lioi cooha be yooni oburengge wesihun. (284) lioi cooha be efulerengge ilhi. dzu cooha be yooni oburengge wesihun. dzu cooha be efulerengge ilhi u cooha be yooni oburengge wesihun. u cooha be efulerengge ilhi. tuttu ofi tanggûnggeri afafi tanggûnggeri etecibe. sain dade sain ningge waka. afarakû bime (285) niyalmai cooha be bukdaburengge. sain dade sain ningge kai. tuttu ofi wesihun cooha hebe be efulembi. terei ilhingge haji be efulembi. terei ilhingge cooha be efulembi. tereci fusihûngge hecen be afambi. hecen be afara arga. umainaci ojarahû ofi. amba kalka duin muheren (286) seye <sejen> be dasatara. agûra hajun be weilere de. ilan biya ofi teni šanggara. boihon i keremu be cirgere de. geli ilan biya ofi teni wajire be dahame. jiyanggiyûn alimbaharakû jili banjifi. yerhuwe gese necinefi. cooha urse be ilan ubu de emu ubu wabumbime. hecen be baharakûngge. (287) ere afara sui kai. tuttu ofi cooha baitalara mangga urse. niyalmai cooha be bukdaburengge. afara de akû. niyalmai hecen be gairengge. dailara de akû. niyalmai gurun be efulerengge. goidabure de akû. urunakû yooni obume abkai fejergi de temšeme ofi. tuttu cooha (288) cukurakû bime. aisi be yooni obuci ombi. ere afara be bodoro arga kai. tuttu ofi cooha baitalara doro. juwan ubu fulu oci kambî. sunja ubu fulu oci dailambi. ubui fulu oci faksalambi. tehereci afame mutembi. komso oci tuwakiyame meotembi <mutembi>. (289) isirakû oci jailame mutembi. tuttu ajige bata nukcike de. amba bata de jafabumbi kai. jiyanggiyûn serengge. gurun i aisilarangge. aisilarangge mergen oci gurun urunakû etuhun ombi. aisilarangge eberi oci gurun urunakû yadalinggû ombi. tuttu cooha i ejen de joborongge ilan. cooha dosici (290) ojarahû be sarkû bime dosi sere. cooha bedereci ojarahû be sarkû bime bedere serengge. erebe cooha be siderembi sembi. ilan giyûn coohai baita be sarkû bime. ilan giyûn coohai dasan de

danaci. coohai urse hûlimbumbi. ilan giyûn coohai toose be sarkû bime. (291) ilan giyûn coohai tušan de danaci. coohai urse kenehunjembi. ilan giyûn cooha hûlimbure dade kenehunjeci. goloi beisei jobolon isinjimbi kai. erebe cooha be facuhûrabufi. etere be yarumbi sembi. tuttu ofi etere be sarangge sunja. afaci ogoro afaci ogorakû be sarangge etembi. (292) labdu komso be baitalara be ulhirengge etembi. dergi fejerni buyen adalingge etembi. belhefi belhehekû be alime gairengge etembi. jiyanggiyûn mutembime ejen ergelerakûngge etembi. ere sunja serengge. etere be sara doro kai. tuttu ofi cembe sara beyebe sara oci. tanggûnggeri. afaha (293) seme tuksicuke akû. cembe sarkû bime beyebe saci. emgeri etembi emgeri anabumbi cembe sarkû beyebe sarkû oci. afahadari urunakû tuksicuke ombi sehebi:

(295) coohai arbun i duici fiyelen

sun dz hendume. seibeni afara mangga urse. eteci ogorakû be neneme toktobufi. bata i eteci ogoro be aliyambi. eteci ogorakûngge beye de bi. eteci ogorongge bata de bi. tuttu afara mangga urse. eteci (296) ogorakû be toktoleme mutembi. bata be urunakû eteci ogoro de isibume muterakû. tuttu ofi etere be saci ombime toktofici ogorakû sehebi. eteci ogorakûngge tuwakiyara de kai. eteci ogorongge afara de kai. hamirakû oci tuwakiyambi. etuhun oci afambi. tuwakiyara (297) mangga urse. uyun na i fejile somime. afara mangga urse. uyun abkai dele aššame ofi. tuttu beyebe karmambime yooni eteme mutembi. etere be sarangge. geren niyalmai sarangge ci dulenderakû oci. sain dade sain ningge waka kai. afame etefi. abkai fejerni sain (298) sehengge. sain dade sain ningge waka kai. tuttu ofi beileci i solmin be tukiyerengge be. hûsun mangga seci ogorakû. šun biya be saburengge be. yasa genggiyen seci ogorakû. kiyatar sere akjan be donjirengge be. šan galbi seci ogorakû. julgei afara (299) mangga urse. sehengge. ja i etere be eterengge kai. tuttu ofi afara mangga. ursei eterengge. mergen gebu akû. baturu gungge akû ofi. tuttu terei afame etefi endeburakû ombi. endeburakûngge etere be toktobufi. emgeri gidabuhangge be eteme ofi kai. tuttu afara mangga (300) urse. gaiburakû bade ilifi. bata be gidara be ufaraburakû. tuttu ofi etere cooha oci. neneme etehe manggi teni afara be baimbi. gaibure cooha oci. neneme afaha manggi teni etere be baimbi. cooha baitalara mangga urse. doro be tuwancihiyambime fafun be karmame (301) ofi. tuttu etere gaibure dasan be toktoleme mutembi. coohai doro uju de kemun sembi. jai de miyalin sembi. ilaci de ton

sembi. duici de toose sembi. sunjaci de eterengge sembi. na ci kemun banjinambi. kemun ci miyalin banjinambi. miyalin ci ton banjinambi (302) ton ci toose banjinambi. toose ci eterengge banjinambi. tuttu etere cooha oci. gintofo i heni be gingnere adali. gaibure cooha oci. heni i gintofo be gingnere adali. etere ursei afara de. minggan jerun i holo de tehe muke be sendelehe adalingge. arbun de kai:

(303) coohai horon i sunjaci fiyelen.

sun dz hendume. yaya geren be kadalara de. komso be kadalara adali ojongge. ubu ton de kai. geren be afara de. komso be afara adali ojongge. arbun jilgan de kai. ilan giyûn cooha i geren be. (304) bata i baru sujame. urunakû gidaburakûngge. iletu somishûn de kai. cooha sucunaha de. wehe gaifi umhan be gidara adali ojongge. kumdu yargiyan de kai. yaya afarangge. iletu i bakcilabumbi. somishûn i etembi. tuttu somishûn be baitalara mangga urse. abka na i adali mohon akû. ula mederi i adali (305) farakû. dubefi dahûme deriburengge. šun biyai adali. bucefi dahûme banjirengge. duin erin i adali. jilgan sunja be dulenderakû. sunja jilgan i kûbulirengge be. donjiha seme wajirakû. boco sunja be dulenderakû. sunja boco i kûbulirengge be. tuwaha seme wajirakû. amtan sunja be (306) dulenderakû. sunja amtan i kûbulirengge be. amtalaha seme wajirakû. afara horon. somishûn iletu be dulenderakû. somishûn iletu i kûbulirengge be. sibkiha seme wajirakû. somishûn iletu i ishunde banjinarangge. muheren forgošoro gese da dube akû be dahame. we sibkime (307) mutembini. cingabuha mukei hûsun de. wehe dekdere de isinarangge. horon de kai. dasihire gasha i hûsun de. meirere <meijere> bijara de isinarangge. kemun de kai. tuttu afara mangga urse. terei horon gelecuke. terei kemun hakcin. horon uthai dabuha fitheku beri i adali. kemun (308) uthai gabtaha selmin i adali. burgin bargn i šašabume. afara de facuhûn. gojime facuhûraci ojarahû bur bar seme. arbun muheliyen gojime gidaci ojarahû. facuhûn. teksin ci banjinambi. oliha baturu ci banjinambi. yadalinggû etuhun ci banjinambi. teksin facuhûn ojongge. (309) ton de kai. baturu oliha ojongge horon de kai. etuhun yadalinggû ojongge arbun de kai. tuttu ofi bata be aššabure mangga urse. arbun tuwabure de. bata urunakû necinjimbi. bure de bata urunakû gaimbi. aisi i aššabumbi. bekilefi alime gaimbi. tuttu afara (310) mangga urse. horon de baimbi. niyalma de nikeburakû ofi. tuttu [n]iyalma be sonjome horon de akdame mutembi. horon de akdaha urse. niyalmai baru afara de. moo wehe be fuhešebure adali.

moo wehe i banin. elhe oci cibsén ombi. tuksicuke oci aššambi. (311) hošonggo oci ilimbi. muheliyen oci fuhešembi. tuttu ofi afara mangga niyalmai horon. minggan jerun alin ci muheliyen wehe be fuhešebure adali ojongge. horon de kai:

(313) kumdu yargiyan i ningguci fiyelen.

sun dz hendume. yaya afara bade neneme bifi. bata be alime gairengge ergembi. afara bade amala sitafi. afame dosirengge suilambi. tuttu afara mangga urse. niyalma be jibumbime niyalma de yarkiyaburakû. batai (314) niyalma be ini cisui jibume muterengge. aisi be tuwabume ofi kai. batai niyalma be bahafi jiderakû obume muterengge. jobolon be tuwabume ofi kai. tuttu ofi bata ergeci suilabume mutembi. ebici omiholobume mutembi. elhe oci aššabume mutembi. ceni (315) dosinjirakûci tucimbi. ceni gûnihakûci dosimbi. minggan ba be yabumbime suilarakûngge. niyalma akû babe yabume ofi kai. afara de urunakû gaijarangge. ceni tuwakiyahakû babe afame ofi kai. tuwakiyara de urunakû akdun ojongge. ceni afarakû babe tuwakiyame ofi kai. tuttu ofi (316) afara mangga urse. bata ceni tuwakiyara babe sarkû. tuwakiyara mangga urse. bata ceni afara babe sarkû. somishûn kai. somishûn kai. arbun akû de isinambi. ferguwecuke kai. ferguwecuke kai. jilgan akû de isinambi. tuttu bata i ergen be jafame mutembi. dosire de (317) dalici ojongge. ceni kumdu be fondoloro de kai. bederere de fargaci ojongge. hûdun ofi amcaci ojongge de kai. tuttu muse afaki seci. bata udu den keremu šumin yohoron seme. umainaci ojongge musei baru afarangge. ceni urunakû aitubure babe afara de kai. (318) muse afarakû oki seci. udu na be jijufi tuwakiyaha seme. bata musei baru bahafi afarakûngge. ceni jidere ici be farfabuha de kai tuttu ofi niyalma de arbun be tuwabumbime. muse de arbun akû oci. muse uhei bime bata faksalambi. muse (319) uhei ofi emu ombi. bata faksalafi juwan ombi. ere juwan be gaifi. emke be afaci. muse geren ombi. bata komso ombi. geren i komso be gidame muteci. musei afanarangge boljonggo kai. musei afanara babe ulhici ojongge. ulhici ojongge oci. bata i belherengge (320) labdu ombi. bata i belherengge labdu oci. musei afanarangge komso ombi. tuttu ofi julergi be belheci amargingge komso ombi. amargi be belheci. julergingge komso ombi. hashû ergi be belheci ici ergingge komso ombi. ici ergi be belheci hashû

ergingge komso (321) ombi. belherakûnge akû oci. komso akûnge akû ombi. komso  
ojorongge. niyalma be belherengge kai. geren ojongge niyalma de belheburengge kai.  
tuttu ofi afara ba be same. afara inenggi be same ohode. minggan baci acanjifi afaci ombi.  
afara ba be sarkû. afara inenggi be (322) sarkû ohode. hashû ergingge. ici ergi be  
aitubume muterakû. ici ergingge. hashû ergi be aitubume muterakû. juleringge amargi  
be aitubume muterakû. amargingge julergi be aitubume muterakû bade. gorokingge  
ududu juwan be. hancikingge ududu babe ai hendure. u gurun be jafafi bodoki. yuwei  
gurun i niyalmai (323) cooha udu labdu seme. inu etere de ai tusa ni. tuttu ofi etere be  
toktobuci ombi. bata udu geren seme eljeburakû oci ombi sehebi. tuttu ofi bodoho de  
jabšara ufarara arga be sambi. nukibuhe de. aššara cibsera giyan be sambi. (324) arbun be  
tuwabuha de bucere banjire ba be sambi. meljebuhe de. fulu eberi babe sambi. tuttu ofi  
coohai arbun be tuwabure ten. arbun akû de isinambi. arbun akû oci. jakanabure  
manggangge hiracame muterakû. mergen urse bodome muterakû. arbun be dahame (325)  
geren de etere be tuwabucibe. geren same muterakû. niyalma gemu musei etere arbun be  
sara gojime. musei etere be tokto bure arbun be sarkû. tuttu terei afame etere be  
dahiburakû bime. arbun de acabure de mohon akû. coohai arbun serengge mukei (326)  
adali. mukei arbun. nuhu ci biyalume wasihûn ici eyembi. coohai arbun. yargiyan ci  
jailame kumdu be gidambi. muke na be dahame eyen banjinambi. cooha bata be dahame  
etere be tokto bumbi. tuttu cooha de enteheme horon akû. muke de enteheme arbun akû.  
(327) bata be dahame kûbulifi ubaliyafi eteme muterengge be. ferguwecuke sembi. tuttu  
ofi sunja feten de enteheme eterengge akû. duin erin de enteheme teisu akû. šun de  
golmin foholon bi. biya burubumbi banjimbi:

(329) giyûn coohai temšen i nadaci fiyelen

sun dz hendume. yaya cooha baitalara doro. jiyanggiyûn ejen i hese be alime gaifi. geren  
cooha be bargiyame isabufi. kûwaran i duka bakcilame tatara be dahame. giyûn coohai  
temšen ci manggangge akû. giyûn (330) coohai temšen i manggangge. goro be hanci  
obumbi. jobolon be aisi obumbi. tuttu jugûn be goro obufi. aisi i yarkiyambi. niyalmai  
amala juracibe. niyalmai onggoro isinambi. ere goro hanci ojoro arga be sarangge kai.  
tuttu ofi giyûn cooha gaifi temšeneci aisi ombi. (331) geren gaifi temšeneci tuksicuke  
ombi. giyûn cooha be yooni gaifi temšeneci. amcarakû ombi. giyûn cooha be werifi aisi



be temšeneci. ujen aciha waliyabumbi. uttu be dahame. uksin be uhufi dosime. inenggi dobori teyerakû. on gaime hacihiyame yabume. tanggû ba (332) surteme aisi be temšeneci. ilan coohai data jafabumbi. silin cooha juleri. eberhun cooha amala be dahame. toktofi juwan ubu de emu ubu isinambi. susai ba surteme aisi be temšeneci. dergi coohai data kokirambi. toktofi dulin isinambi. gûsin ba surteme aisi be (333) temšeneci. ilan ubu de juwe ubu isinambi. uttu be dahame. giyûn cooha de ujen aciha akû oci gukumbi. jeku jufeliyen akû oci gukumbi. iktambuha isabuhangge akû oci gukumbi. tuttu ofi goloî beisei hebe be sarkûngge. doigonde hajilame muterakû. (334) alin weji haksan hafîrhûn hali omo i arbun be sarkûngge. cooha gaifî yabume muterakû. jugûn jorire gajaraci <gajarci> be baitalarakûngge. na i aisi be bahame muterakû. tuttu cooha be koimalidame mutebumbi. aisi i aššabumbi. faksalame acabume kûbulibumbi. tuttu terei (335) hahilarangge edun i adali. terei elhešerengge bujan i adali sucunara tabcilarangge tuwa i adali. aššarakûngge alin i adali. ulhire de manggangge butu i adali. aššarangge kiyatar sere akjan i adali. gašan be tabcilafi geren be faksalambi. ba na be fesheleci arbungga be (336) tuwakiyambi. tooselame aššame. goro hanci i arga be doigonde sarangge etembi. ere giyûn coohai temšen i dorokai. coohai dasan de henduhengge gisun be ishunde donjirakû ojoro jakade. tuttu tungken can be ilibuhabi. yasa ishunde saburakû ojoro jakade tuttu (337) temgetun kiru be ilibuhabi sehebi. tungken can temgetun kiru serengge. cohome niyalmai šan yasa be emu oburengge kai. niyalma emgeri cohotoi emu oho manggi. baturu urse emhun dosime muterakû. oliha urse emhun bedereme muterakû. ere geren be baitalara dorokai. (338) tuttu ofi dobori afara de. tuwa tungken be labdu obure. inenggi afara de. temgetun kiru be labdu oburengge. cohome niyalmai šan yasa be farfaburengge kai. ilan giyûn coohai sukdun be durici ombi. jiyanggiyûn i mujilen be durici ombi. uttu ofi erde i sukdun (339) etuhun. inenggi dulin i sukdun šadashûn. yamji i sukdun šoyoshûn. cooha baitalara mangga urse. tesei etuhun sukdun ci jailara. tesei šadashûn šoyoshûn be gidarangge. ere sukdun be dasarangge kai. teksin i facuhûn be alime gaire. ekisaka i curgindure be alime (340) gairengge. ere mujilen be dasarangge kai. hanciki i goroki be alime gaire. teyehun i suilara be alime gaire. ebifî omiholoro be alime gairengge. ere hûsun be dasarangge kai. cak seme teksilehe kiru be ume okdoro. sehehuri faidaha faidan be ume birere. (341) ere kûbulin be dasarangge kai. tuttu ofi cooha baitalara dorokai. den munggan i baru ume tafara. fisa waliyaha muhu i baru ume

okdoro holtome burulara be ume sudalara. dacun coohai baru ume afara welmiyere cooha be ume sekere. bederere cooha be ume (342) heturere. horibuha cooha de jaka bure. mohoho cooha be ume fargara. ere cooha baitalara doro kai:

(343) uyun kûbulin i jakûci fiyelen.

sun dz hendume. yaya cooha baitalara doro. jiyanggiyûn ejen i hese be alime gaifi. geren cooha be isabume bargiyaha manggi. nuhaliyan ba oci. ume tatara. salja ba oci hûwaliyame acambi. lakcaha ba oci (344) ume indere. horire ba oci bodombi. bucere ba oci afambi. jugûn be yaburakûngge bi. cooha be gidarakûngge bi. hoton be afarakûngge bi. ba be temşerakngge bi. ejen i hese be alime gaijarakûngge bi. tuttu ofi jiyanggiyûn uyun kûbulin i aisi be hafuci. (345) cooha baitalara be sambi. jiyanggiyûn uyun kûbulin i aisi be hafurakû oci. udu na i arbun be sacibe. na i aisi be bahame muterakû ombi. coohalara de uyun kûbulin i arga be hafurakû oci. udu sunja aisi be sacibe. niyalma be (346) bahafi baitalame muterakû ombi. uttu ofi mergen ursei seolerengge. urunakû aisi jobolon be barabumbi. aisi de barabuci. faşşan be sidarambuci ombi. jobolon de barabuci. kokiran be subuci ombi. uttu ofi goloi beise be bukdarangge. jobolon be (347) isibumbi. goloi beise be takûrarangge. jabşaki be bolibumbi goloi beise be surteburengge. aisi be isibumbi. tuttu ofi cooha baitalara doro. tesei jiderakû seme ume erture. muse cembe alime gaire babi. seme ertumbi. ce afanjirakû seme ume erture. (348) muse de afaci ojarahû babi seme ertumbi. tuttu ofi jiyanggiyûn de sunja tuksicuke bi. urunakû farşarangge be waci ombi. urunakû ergen guwerengge be jafaci ombi. hatan hahingge be gidaşaci ombi. hanja bolgongge be girubuci ombi. irgen be gosirengge be (349) kûthûci ombi. ere sunja serengge. jiyanggiyûn i endebuku. cooha baitalara sui kai. cooha kokirara jiyanggiyûn waburengge. urunakû sunja tuksicuke haran. kimcirakûci ojarahû.

(351) cooha yabure uyuci fiyelen.

sun dz hendume. cooha tatara bata be cincilara de. alin be dabafi holo de nikembi. banjire de forofi deken bade tatambi. afanara ba den oci ume tafara. ere alin de cooha (352) tatarangge kai. muke be dooci urunakû muke ci aldangga obumbi. aikabade bata muke be

doome jici. ume mukei dulimba de okdoro. imbe dulin doobufi gidaci aisi ombi. afaki  
seci. ume muke de latunafi bata be okdoro. (353) antu de forofi deken bade ilimbi. ume  
mukei eyen be tosono. ere mukei bade cooha tatarangge kai. hûjuri <=hûjiri> niyo be  
dulere de. hûdun gene. ume jibgešere. aikabade hûjuri niyo bade cooha acaci. urunakû  
muke orho de nikeme. (354) moo bujan be cashûlambi. ere hûjuri niyo de cooha  
tatarangge kai. šehun olhon de oci necin bade tatambime. ici ergi fisa ergi deken. juleri  
bucere amala banjire bade tatambi. ere šehun olhon de cooha tatarangge kai uheri ere  
(355) duin coohai aisi. hûwang di han duin ergi di be etehengge kai. yaya cooha. nuhu de  
cihangga nuhalian de cihakû. antu be wesihun boso be fusihûn obuhabi. luku de ujime  
muhi de tatame ohode. cooha de eiten nimeku (356) akû ombi. erebe urunakû eterengge  
sembi. muhi mungga dalan ekcin oci. urunakû antu ergide tatafi. ici ergi be cashûlambi.  
ere cooha i aisi. na i arbun i aisilan kai. dergi ci aga muke obonggi eyeme jidere de. dooki  
seci. (357) tohororo be aliyambi. yaya ba de kes sere yohoron. abkai hûcin. abkai  
gindana. abkai hûrhan. abkai eye. abkai yeru bihede. urunakû ekšeme gene. ume latunara.  
muse aldangga oci. bata hanci ombi. muse ishun oci. bata cashûn ombi. coohai dalbade  
(358) haksan hafirhûn omo hûcin. bujan weji šuwe <šuwe> jajuri bihede. urunakû dahûn  
dahûn i kiceme suwelembi. ere buksire geodelere ba kai. hanci bime cibserengge. ceni  
haksan de ertuhengge kai. goro bime yarkiyame afanjirengge. niyalma be ibekini  
serengge kai. ce sulfa bade (359) tatahangge. aisi tuwaburengge kai. geren moo i  
aššahangge. jiderengge kai. orho fik seme dalihangge. kenehunjeburengge kai. gasha  
dekdehengge. buksirengge kai. gurgu aksakangge. necinjirengge kai. buraki den bime  
sucunarangge. sejen i jiderengge kai. fangkala bime toron amba (360) ningge yafahan i  
jiderengge kai. son son i fakcahangge. moo sacirengge kai. seri bime amasi julesi  
yabuhangge. kûwaran ilirengge kai. gisun gocishûn bime nememe belhehengge. dosiki  
serengge kai. gisun etenggi bime surteme dosinjirengge. bedereki serengge kai. weihuken  
(361) sejen neneme tucifi. dalbade bisirengge. faidan faidarangge kai. boljohakû bime  
hûwaliyame acaki serengge. argandarangge kai. surtenume yabume cooha faidarangge.  
bolgoki serengge kai. dulin dosire dulin bedererengge. yarkiyarangge kai. teifun teifulefi  
ilirengge. omiholohongge kai. muke tatafi (362) neneme omirengge. kangkahangge kai.  
aisi be sabufi ibeme sarkûngge. suilahangge kai. gasha isarangge. untuhun ohongge kai.  
dabori hûlarangge. golohongge kai. cooha kûthûrengge. jiyanggiyûn ujen akûngge kai.

temgetun kiru aššarangge. facuhûn ohongge kai. hafasa jilidarangge. (363) bandahangge kai. morin wafî yali jeterengge. cooha de jeku akû ohongge kai. mucen be lakiyafî amasi tatan de jiderakûngge. hûlha mohohongge kai. cu cu ca ca seme niyalmai baru elhehen i gisurerengge. geren i gûnin šahûrakangge kai. emdubei šangnarangge. (364) gacilabuhangge kai. emdubei weile ararangge. mohohongge kai. neneme doksirafî amala geren de olhorongge. narhûn akû i ten kai. jifî waka be alirengge. cooha nakaki serengge kai. cooha nukcifi okdonjire de. kejine goidafî acarakû. geli waliyafî generakûngge be. (365) urunakû olhošome kimci. cooha be fulu nonggire de akû. damu baturulame dosirakû bime. cihai hûsun be kamcire. bata be tol bire. niyalma be etere de wajihabi. terei bodohon akû bime bata be oihorilarangge. urunakû niyalma de jafabumbi. cooha hajilame (366) dayanjihakû bime weile araci. daharakû ombi. daharakû oci. baitalara de mangga ombi. cooha hajilame dayanjiha bime weile arame banjinarakû oci. baitalaci ojarahakû kai. tuttu ofî šu i fafulambi. horon i teksilembi. erebe urunakû etembi sembi. selgiyen be aifini yabubufî (367) irgen be tacihiyaci irgen dahambi. selgiyen be aifini yabubuhakû bime. irgen be tacihiyaci. irgen daharakû. selgiyen be aifini yabubumbi serengge. geren i emgi gûnin acarangge kai:

(369) na i arbun i juwanci fiyelen.

sun dz hendume. na i arbun de. hafunurengge bi. tarangge bi. sujanurengge bi. hafirahûn ningge bi. haksan ningge bi. gorokingge bi. muse geneci ojoro. tese jici ojarahangge be. hafunumbi sembi. hafunure (370) arbun serengge. neneme šun goire deken ba be ejelefî. jeku i jugûn be hafumbuha manggi. afaci aisi ombi. geneci ombi. bedereci mangga ningge be tambi sembi. tara arbun serengge. bata belhehekû de. tucici etembi. bata aikabade belhehe de. tucici (371) eterakû bime. bederere de mangga be dahame. aisi akû ombi. muse tucike de aisi akû. tese tucike de aisi akû be. sujanumbi sembi. sujanure arbun serengge. bata udu muse be bolicibe. muse ume tucire. gaifî gene. bata dulin tucike manggi. (372) gidaci. aisi ombi. hafirahûn arbun serengge. muse neneme ejelefî. urunakû funcetele obufî bata be alime gaimbi. aikabade bata neneme ejelefî. beki oci ume latunara. beki akû oci latunambi. haksan arbun serengge. muse neneme ejelembihede. urunakû šun goire (373) deken babe ejelefî. bata be alime gaimbi. aikabade bata neneme ejeleci. gaifî gene. ume latunara. goroki arbun serengge. hûsun tehereci. yarkiyame afara

de mangga. afaha de aisi akû ombi. ere ninggun serengge. na i doro. jiyanggiyûn i oyonggo tušan. (374) kimcirakûci ojarahû. tuttu ofi cooha de ukarangge bi. sartaburengge bi. lifanarangge bi. ulejerengge bi. facuhûrangge bi. burularangge bi. ere ninggun serengge. abka na i gashan waka. jiyanggiyûn i endebuku kai. hûsun teherefi. emken i juwan be gidarangge be. (375) ukambi sembi. cooha etenggi hafan eberhun be. sartabumbi sembi. hafan etenggi cooha eberhun be. lifambi sembi. ambakan hafan jilideme daharakû. bata de nukcifi cisui afanafi. jiyanggiyûn terei muten be sarkûngge be. ulejembu sembi. jiyanggiyûn yadalinggû ofi cira akû. tacibure (376) doro getuken akû. hafan cooha de toktohon akû. cooha be balai ici faidarangge be. facuhûrambi sembi. jiyanggiyûn. bata be tulbime muterakû. komso i geren de bakcilara. yadalinggû i etuhun be gidanara. cooha dacun silin akûngge be. burulambi sembi. ere ninggun serengge. (377) gaibure doro. jiyanggiyûn i oyonggo tušan. kimcirakûci ojarahû kai. na i arbun serengge. cooha de aisilarangge. bata be tulbime etere be toktohare. haksan kamni hanciki goroki be bodorongge. dergi jiyanggiyûn i doro. erebe safi afarangge. urunakû (378) etembu. erebe sarakû bime afarangge. urunakû gaibumbi. tuttu ofi afara muru urunakû etembime. ejen ume afara secibe. urunakû afaci acambi. afara muru eterakû bime. ejen urunakû afa secibe. afarakû oci acambi. tuttu dosicibe gebu gairakû. (379) bederecibe weile ci jailarakû. damu irgen be karmame. ejen de tusa ojarahge. gurun i boobai kai. cooha be ajige jusei adali tuwame ohode. tuttu terei emgi šumin holo de funtuci ombi. cooha be gosire jusei adali tuwame ohode. tuttu (380) terei emgi sasa buceci ombi. gosimbime fafulame muterakû. jiramilambime takûrame muterakû. facuhûn bime dasame muterakû ohode. duibuleci halašara jusei adali. baitalaci ojarahû kai. musei cooha gidanaci ojoro be sara gojime. bata be gidaci ojarahû be sarkû oci. dulin etembu. (381) bata be gidaci ojoro be sara gojime. musei cooha gidanaci ojarahû be sarkû oci. dulin etembu. bata be gidaci ojoro be sara. musei cooha gidanaci ojoro be sara gojime. na i arbun de afaci ojarahû be sarkû oci. dulin etembu. (382) tuttu cooha be sara urse. aššara de farfaburakû. yabure de oitoburakû. tuttu ofi cembe sara beye be sara ohode. eterengge tuksicuke akû. abka be sara na be sara ohode. eterengge yooni ombi sehebi:

uyun na i juwan emuci fiyelen.

sun dz hendume. cooha baitalara doro. samsire ba bi. weihuken ba bi. temšere ba bi. acara ba bi. salja ba bi. ujen ba bi. efujere ba bi. horire ba bi. bucere ba bi. goloi beise meimeni bade afarangge. (384) samsire ba inu. niyalmai bade dosinafi šumin akûngge. weihuken ba inu muse bahaci inu aisi ogoro. tese bahaci inu aisi ojongge. temšere ba inu. muse geneci ogoro tese jici ojongge. acara ba inu. goloi beise i ba ilan ergi de (385) hafunafi. neneme isinjifi abkai fejergi i geren be baharangge. salja ba inu. niyalmai bade šumin dosinafi. hecen hoton be labdu dulerengge. ujen ba inu. alin weji haksan mudangga hali niyo. yaya yabure de mangga jugûn serengge efujere ba inu. (386) dosinarangge hafirahûn. bedererengge gorokon. tesei komso i musei geren be gidaci ojongge. horire ba inu. ekšeme afaci taksire. ekšeme afarakû oci gukurengge. bucere ba inu. uttu be dahame samsire ba oci ume afara. weihuken ba oci ume ilinjara. (387) temšere ba oci ume dosire. acara ba oci ume lakcara. salja ba oci hûwaliyame acambi. ujen ba oci tabcilambi. efujere ba oci genembi. horire ba oci argadambi. bucere ba oci faršambi. julgei cooha baitalara mangga sehe urse. bata i (388) cooha be julergi amargi ishunde daci ojarahû. komso geren ishunde ertuci ojarahû. wesihun fusihûn ishunde aitubuci ojarahû. dergi fejergi ishunde bargiyataci ojarahû. cooha samsifi isabuci ojarahû. cooha acacibe teksin akû obume mutembi. aisi de (389) acanaci aššambi. aisi de acanarakû oci. nakambi. gelhun akû fonjiki. bata geren teksin bime jiderengge be. adarame alime gaimbi. hendume. ceni buyehe babe neneme durime gaici. dahambi kai coohai muru hahilarangge wesihun. niyalmai jabdurakû be tuwame. gûnihakû (390) jugûn ci. belhehekû babe afambi. yaya antaha ogoro doro. šumin dosici cohotoi ofi. boigoji cooha eterakû ombi. elgiyen bade tabcilaci. ilan giyûn cooha coohai jeku tesumbi. saikan ujimbime ume suilabure. horon be isabume hûsun be bargiyame. (391) cooha baitalara arga bodogon be. tulbici ojarahû obume. geneci ojarahû bade isibume ohode. buceci bucekini burularakû ombi. buceci adarame baharakû ni. cooha niyalma hûsun akûmbumbi. cooha urse umesi lifanaci. olhorakû ombi. genere ba akû oci. bekilembi. (392) šumin dosici. bargiyambi. umainaci ojarahû oci iselambi <iselembi>. uttu ofi cooha be teksilerakû bime. olhošombi. bairakû bime bahambi. bargiyatarakû bime hajilambi. fafularakû bime akdambi. ganionnga be šajilame buhiyecun be nakabuci. bucecele generakû ombi. musei cooha de ulin funcerakûngge. (393) jaka be hihalarakûngge waka.

ergen funcerakûngge. jalgan be hairarakûngge waka. fafun selgiyehe inenggi ci. tecehe cooha oci. yasai muke adasun usihimbi. deducehe urse oci. yasai muke dere de jalumbi. genere ba akû bade isibuci. juwan ju. tsoo gui i (394) baturu ombi. tuttu ofi cooha baitalara mangga urse be. duibuleci šuwai žan i adali. šuwai žan serengge. cang šan alin i meihe ini uju be forici. uncehen danjimbi. ini uncehen be forici. uju danjimbi. ini darama be forici. uju uncehen yooni (395) danjimbi. gelhun akû fonjiki. šuwai žan i adali obuci ombio. hendume ombi. u gurun i niyalma yuwei gurun i niyalmai baru kimuntuhebi. emu jahûdai de tefi. muke doore de edun ucaraci. tese ishunde aituburengge. hashû ici ergi gala i adali ombi. (396) uttu ofi morin be hûwaitaha muheren be umbuha seme. ertuci ojarahû. teksin baturu emu oci. dasan i doro kai. ganggan genggen de yooni acanaci. na i giyan kai. tuttu cooha baitalara mangga urse. gala jafafi emu niyalma be takûrara (397) adali. umainaci ojarahû ombi kai. jiyanggiyûn i baita. cib seme somishûn. tob seme teksin. coohai ursei šan yasa be farfabufi. ulhirakû obume. baita kûbulifi. arga halafi. niyalma de sereburakû obume. tatan gurifi. on mudalifi. niyalma de gûnin bahaburakû obume. (398) mutembi. yuwanšuwai i boljohongge. den de tafambufi wan be ganara adali. yuwanšuwai goloi beise i bade šumin dosifi. songgiha be uksalaburengge. geren honin be bošoro adali. bošofi geneme. bošofi jime. absi ojoro be sarkû. ilan giyûn cooha i geren be (399) gaifi. haksan de isibumbi. ere jiyanggiyûn i baita kai. uyun na i kûbulin. ikûre saniyara aisi. niyalmai gûnin i giyan be kimcirakûci ojarahû. yaya antaha coohai doro. šumin dosici cohotoi ombi. cinggiya dosici samsimbi. gurun ci aljafi jecen be dulefi (400) coohalarangge. lakcaha ba kai. duin ergi de hafunarangge. salja ba kai. šumin dosikangge. ujen ba kai. cinggiya dosikangge. weihuken ba kai fisa ergi beki julergi hafirahûn ningge. horire ba kai. genere ba akûngge. bucere ba kai. uttu ofi samsire ba (401) oci. bi tesei gûnin be emu obumbi. weihuken ba oci. bi tesebe falibumbi. temšere ba oci. bi tesei amargi ci dosimbi. acara ba oci. bi tuwakiyara be olhošombi. salja ba oci. bi hajilame falimbi. ujen ba oci. bi jeku be sirabumbi. (402) efujehe ba oci. bi on gaime dosimbi. horire ba oci. bi funtuhulehe be simbi. bucere ba oci. bi banjirakû be tuwabumbi. tuttu ofi coohai gûnin. hûrbuci <horibuci> fondolombi. oitobuci iselembi. hafirabuci dahambi. uttu ofi goloi beise i hebe be sarkûngge. (403) doigonde hajilame muterakû. alin weji haksan mudangga hali niyo i arbun be sarkûngge. cooha gaifi yabume muterakû. gajarci jugûn jorirengge be baitalarakûngge. na i aisi be baharakû. duin sunja

be emke sarkû oci. da ogoro han ogoro cooha waka kai. (404) da ogoro han ogoro cooha  
amba gurun be dailaci. tesei geren bahafi isarakû. bata de horon tuwabuci. tesei haji  
bahafi acarakû. uttu ofi abkai fejergi i hajilaha be lashalame. abkai fejergi i toose be  
durime. beyei gûnin sidarame. bata de horon tuwabure jakade. (405) tuttu hoton be gaici  
ohobi. gurun be efuleci ohobi. kooli ci tulgiyen şangnahan be isibumbi. dasan ci tulgiyen  
fafun be ulhibume selgiyembi. ilan giyûn cooha i geren be baitalarangge. emu niyalma be  
unggire adali. baita i afabumbi. turgun be alarakû. aisi i (406) dosimbumbi. jobolon be  
alarakû. gukure bade şukiha manggi. teni taksimbi. bucere bade lifabuha manggi. teni  
banjimbi. geren be jobolon de lifabuha manggi. teni etebume gidabume mutembi.  
coohalara baita. bata i gûnin de acabure be narhûşafi. uhei hûsun i emgeri ibebe de. (407)  
minggan ba i jiyanggiyûn be waci ombi. erebe faksikan i baita be mutebuhe sembi. uttu  
ofi cooha tucire inenggi ci. furdan be yaksifi acangga temgetu be efulefi. mejige be  
hafumburakû. mafari juktehen de fafulafi. baita be nikebumbi. bata de jaka şolo bici.  
uthai hûdun (408) dosifi. tesei buyehe babe. inenggi boljorakû neneme gaimbi. kooli be  
dahame bata be tuwame. afara baita be lashalambi. uttu ofi tuktan de sargan jusei gese  
oci. bata jaka tucinjimbi. amala ukcaha golmahûn i gese oci. bata sujame jabdurakû ombi:

(409) tuwa i afara juwan juweci fiyelen.

sun dz hendume. tuwa i afarangge uheri sunja hacin bi. uju de niyalma be deijimbi. jai de  
isabuhangge be deijimbi. ilaci de aciha be deijimbi. duici de coohai namun be deijimbi.  
(410) sunjaci de agûra faidan be deijimbi sembi. tuwa sindafi deijire de urunakû ildun bi.  
tuwa sindara jaka be urunakû doigonde belhebumbi. tuwa sindara de iin <erin> bi. tuwa  
dekdere de inenggi bi. erin serengge. abkai olhon ucuri be kai. (411) inenggi serengge.  
biya girha bikita imhe jeten i oron de bisire be kai. ere duin tokdon serengge. edun  
dekdere inenggi kai. yaya tuwa i afarangge. urunakû sunja tuwa i kûbulika be dahame  
acabumbi. dorgi de tuwa sindaci. uthai tulergi ci (412) erdeken i acabumbi. tuwa sindaha  
bime tesei cooha cibsens oci. aliyambi ume afara. tuwa i gûrgin yendeci. dosici oci  
dosimbi. dosici ogorakû oci nakambi. tulergi de tuwa sindaci ombime. dorgingge be  
aliyarakû oci. ucuri be tuwame sindambi. edun i (413) dergi ci tuwa daci. edun i fejergi  
be ume afara. inenggi edun kejine daha de. dobori ome edun nakambi. yaya cooha de  
urunakû sunja tuwa i kûbulin be safi. ton be tuwame seremşembi. tuttu ofi tuwa i afara de



aisilarangge genggiyen. muke i (414) afara de aisilarangge etuhun. muke lashalaci ombi. durici ojarahû. afafi etehe dosifi gaiha bime. ceni gungge be ilgarakûngge ehe. fayambi sirkedembi sembi. tuttu ofi genggiyen ejen seolembi. mergen jiyanggiyûn dasambi sehebi. aisi waka oci aššarakû. (415) baharangge waka oci baitarakû. tuksicukengge waka oci afarakû. ejen jili de cooha tucici ojarahû. jiyanggiyûn korsocun de afanaci ojarahû. aisi de acanaci aššambi. aisi de acanarakû oci nakambi. jili be dahûme urgunjebuci ombi. korsocun be (416) dahûme selabuci ombi. gukuhe gurun be dahûme taksibuci ojarahû. bucehengge be dahûme weijubuci ojarahû. tuttu ofi genggiyen ejen olhošombi. mergen jiyanggiyûn targambi. sehebi. ere gurun be elhe obure cooha be yooni obure doro kai:

(417) jakanaburengge be baitalara juwan ilaci fiyelen.

sun dz hendume. juwan tumen cooha ilifi. minggan bade tuwancihyanaci. tanggû halai irgen i fayabure. siden booi baitalara de. inenggidari minggan yan baibumbi. dorgi tulergingge burgišame. jugûn (418) tala de šadame. usin bahafi weilerakûngge. nadanju tumen boo. ududu aniya tuwakiyandufi. emu inenggi i etere be temšembime. tanggû yan menggun i hafan fulun be hairame. bata i turgun be sarkûngge. gosin akû i ten. (419) niyalmai jiyanggiyûn waka. ejen i aisilarangge waka. etere da waka kai. tuttu ofi genggiyen ejen mergen jiyanggiyûn i aššara de niyalma be eteme. gungge be mutebume. geren ci colgorokongge. doigonde saha de kai. doigonde sarangge. hutu (420) enduri de jalbarime bahabuci ojarahû baita de murušenci ojarahû. ton de jargiyalaci ojarahû. urunakû niyalma de akdafi. bata i turgun be sara de kai. tuttu ofi jakanaburengge be baitalara de sunja hacin bi. gašan i jakanaburengge bi. (421) dorgi jakanaburengge bi. fudarame jakanaburengge bi. buceme jakanaburengge bi. banjime jakanaburengge bi. sunja jakanaburengge be yooni deribure de. terei doro be ulhirakû. erebe ferguwecuke hergin. ejen oho niyalmai boobai sembi. gašan i jakanabumbi serengge tesei gašan i niyalmai ildun de (422) baitalara be dorgi jakanabumbi serengge. tesei hafan i ildun de baitalara be. fudarame jakanabumbi serengge. bata i jakanaburengge be baitalara be. buceme jakanabumbi serengge. tulergi de holo baita yabufi. musei jakanaburengge de ulhibufi. bata i gurun de ulame alara be kai. (423) banjime jakanabumbi serengge. amasi boolanjibure be kai. tuttu ofi ilan giyûn i coohai baita oci jakanaburengge ci hajingge akû.

šangnaha oci jakanaburengge ci jiramin ningge akû. baita oci jakanaburengge ci somishûn ningge akû. enduringge mergen waka oci. jakanaburengge be (424) baitalame muterakû. gosin jurgan waka oci. jakanaburengge be takûrame muterakû. narhûn ferguwecuke waka oci. jakanaburengge i yargiyan be bahame muterakû. narhûn kai. narhûn kai. jakanaburengge be baitalarakû ba akû. jakanabure baita be deribure unde de firgembuci. donjihangge (425) alahangge be gemu bucebumbi. yaya cooha be gidaki. hecen be gaiki. niyalma be waki seci. urunakû ceni tuwakiyara coohai data. hashû ici ergi urse. boigojilabure niyalma. dukai niyalma takûrabure niyalma i gebu hala be doigonde saci acara be dahame. musei (426) jakanaburengge be unggifi. urunakû fujurulabume sambu. bata i jakanaburengge jifi muse be jakanabure be urunakû fujurulafi. ereci aisi i dosimbume. yarufi tebume ohode. tuttu fudarame jakanaburengge be bahafi takûraci ombi. ede akdafi saha de. tuttu gašan i (427) jakanaburengge dorgi jakanaburengge be bahafi takûraci ombi. ede akdafi saha de. tuttu buceme jakanaburengge holo baita yabufi. bata de alanabuci ombi. ede akdafi saha de. tuttu banjime jakanaburengge be. boljoho songkoi obuci ombi. sunja jakanabure baita be. (428) ejen urunakû saci acambi. urunakû fudarame jakanabure de bisire be safi. tuttu fudarame jakanaburengge be jiramilarakûci ojarahai kai. seibeni yen gurun i mukdekengge. i jy hiya gurun de bihe de kai. jeo gurun i mukdekengge. lioi ya šang gurun de bihe de kai. (429) tuttu ofi genggiyen ejen sain jiyanggiyûn umesi mergen urse be jakanabure de baitalame bahanarangge. urunakû amba gungge be mutebumbi. ere coohai oyonggo. ilan giyûn cooha i akdafi aššarangge kai:

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